SAN FRANCISCO PUBLIC LIBRARY
3 1223 04688 2909

13
908 Y12m

Newhall

The English conquest of Normandy 218123

Jan27'43 55455

BOOK NO. 908 Y12m 13 | ACCESSION 218123

SAN FRANCISCO PUBLIC LIBRARY

VITA SINE LITERIS MORS EST

Form 16 20M-2-14-25

SAN FRANCISCO PUBLIC LIBRARY
3 1223 04688 2909

Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2025

https://archive.org/details/englishconquesto0013unse

YALE
HISTORICAL PUBLICATIONS

MISCELLANY

XIII

THE EIGHTH VOLUME
PUBLISHED UNDER THE DIRECTION OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY ON THE
KINGSLEY TRUST ASSOCIATION PUBLICATION FUND
ESTABLISHED BY
THE SCROLL AND KEY SOCIETY
OF YALE COLLEGE

THE ENGLISH CONQUEST OF NORMANDY 1416-1424

A STUDY IN FIFTEENTH CENTURY WARFARE

By

RICHARD AGER NEWHALL

Assistant Professor of History
in Yale University

NEW HAVEN: YALE UNIVERSITY PRESS
LONDON: HUMPHREY MILFORD
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
MDCCCCXXIV

COPYRIGHT, 1924, BY
YALE UNIVERSITY PRESS

PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

908 Y12m v.13

Newhall, Richard Ager.

The English conquest of Normandy, 1416-1424, a 1924.

3 1223 04688 2909

TO THE MEMORY OF

GEORGE GUEST HAYDOCK

FIRST LIEUTENANT, TWENTY-EIGHTH INFANTRY, A. E. F.

WITH WHOM THE AUTHOR CAMPAIGNED

ON THE FRONTIERS OF NORMANDY AND IN PICARDY

DURING THE SPRING OF 1918.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER		PAGE
Preface.		xi
Introduction.		xiii
I.	The Attempted French *Revanche* of 1416.	1
II.	The Conquest Launched—to the capture of Falaise, 1416-1418.	37
III.	The Conquest Completed—Cherbourg, Domfront, Rouen, Upper Normandy, 1418-1419.	92
IV.	Military Finance.	143
V.	Military Organization.	190
VI.	Provisions and Matériel.	247
VII.	The Conquest Defended—from the murder of Montereau to the battle of Verneuil, 1419-1424.	269
Bibliographical Note.		323
Index.		345

MAPS

Normandy and the neighboring regions, 1416-1424. 308

Map to illustrate the conquest of Upper Normandy and the English occupation in 1421. . . 322

Abbreviated Titles used in the foot-notes.

Cal. Fr. Rolls 44.545=Calendar of the French Rolls, Henry V; *Report of the Deputy Keeper of the Public Records,* vol. 44, page 545.

Cal. Fr. Rolls 48.215=*ut supra,* Henry VI; *ibid.,* vol. 48, page 215.

Cal. Norm. Rolls 41.671; 42.313=Calendar of the Norman Rolls, Henry V; *ibid.,* vol. 41, page 671; vol. 42, page 313.

Chaplain=*Henrici Quinti, Angliae Regis, Gesta,* Benjamin Williams ed., London, 1850.

Cordeliers="Extrait d'une Chronique Anonyme pour la régne de Charle VI, 1400-1422" in *Chronique de Monstrelet,* Douët d'Arcq ed., vol. VI.

Devon Issues=*Issues of the exchequer,* Frederick Devon ed., London, 1837.

R. C. F.=*Recueil des Chroniques de Flandres,* J. J. de Smet, ed. also known as *Corpus Cronicum Flandriae.*

Rôles de Bréquigny="Rôles Normands et Français et autres pièces tirées des archives de Londres par Bréquigny en 1764, 1765, et 1766" in *Mémoires de la Société des Antiquaires de Normandie,* XXIII. Paris, 1858.

PREFACE

This study was made originally as a doctoral dissertation at Harvard University where it was awarded a Toppan prize in 1918. The research in French and English archives upon which it is chiefly based was carried on during 1914-1915 and the work completed by the spring of 1917. Following that date the author was too much distracted with other matters to give much attention to fifteenth century warfare, consequently some years elapsed before any attempt was made to prepare the manuscript for publication. Some revision of detail has been made in an effort to utilize documents which have been published since 1917, but no one is better aware than the present writer how difficult it is at an American university to keep in touch with the publications of French provincial societies where much of the material for this book has been found. The sources for the details of this subject are very widely scattered, and the task of searching and assembling is so slow and laborious that the hope cannot be entertained that all the documents, even the published ones, have been utilized, but a large number have been found, sufficient, it is hoped, to give a vivid and reasonably correct impression of the military problems which confronted the French and English leaders and the means which they employed to solve them. It is the military point of view which has been kept constantly in mind, consequently no attempt has been made to recount the general political history of the period except in so far as it bore upon questions of warfare. This has

often necessitated the assumption that the reader will be familiar with the persons and events of these years, and as such a book as this is likely to appeal only to the specialist this assumption seems reasonable.

It is pleasant to have this opportunity to express my gratitude to Professor Howard L. Gray, now of Bryn Mawr College, whose friendly interest and encouragement determined me to enter upon this field; my great indebtedness to Professor Charles H. Haskins of Harvard under whose supervision this work was originally written, and to whose criticism, example, and friendship I owe much more than this book can show; and my appreciation of the kindness and great care of Professor Charles M. Andrews of Yale in helping me to prepare the manuscript for publication. To the authorities of the British Museum, the Public Record Office, the Bibliothèque Nationale, the Archives Nationales, the Bibliothèque de Rouen, the Archives de la Seine Inférieure, the Archives du Calvados, and the Archives Municipales de Lisieux, I wish to express my appreciation for the unfailing courtesy which they showed to a foreigner even in time of war. Thanks also are due to the Harvard University Press for permission to utilize an article of mine on "Discipline in an English Army of the Fifteenth Century" which appeared in the *Military Historian and Economist,* and to the *English Historical Review* for similar permission to use an article on "The War Finances of Henry V and the Duke of Bedford" which appeared in that publication.

Richard A. Newhall.

New Haven, Conn.
April 1923.

INTRODUCTION

The Hundred Years' War has long been considered as falling into two main periods roughly divided from each other by the termination of the fourteenth century. That these periods differ from each other, however, from the point of view of military history is a fact which has not always been sufficiently emphasized. Generally speaking, the age of Edward III and the Black Prince was one of tactics, while that of Henry V and Bedford was one of strategy. That the latter marks a much higher development of the art of war is obvious. Crecy and Poitiers were the decisive events of the fourteenth century period of the war, but the results which they achieved had little or no military permanence. Agincourt is customarily classed with the two preceding victories, as the basis for the success of Henry V. This is an exaggeration, and from the military point of view has very little foundation. Normandy could have been conquered in 1417 and the succeeding years by the same strategy as was employed, had Agincourt never been fought. That there were political results of that battle which were far-reaching has not been overlooked, and they have been indicated in the discussion of military events, but it is the English conquest and occupation of Normandy which is the basis for any understanding of the latter half of the great war, and which marks a step forward in the military art. Henry's whole military policy during 1417-1422, a policy which he bequeathed to his successor, was a change from that of his first campaign and from the campaigns of his

predecessor. It is that policy and its actual workings which this study undertakes to sketch.

Edward III had been baffled in such attempts as he made to gain possession of any considerable portion of France by the fact that the country was so dotted with castles, strongholds, and fortified cities that the process of conquest must needs be slow, and the effort to hold conquered provinces costly in men. His campaigns, in consequence, owing either to his failure to grasp the true nature of the military problem, or to his unwillingness to attempt its solution, degenerated into devastating raids. His great-grandson, on the other hand, deliberately set himself to meet the situation. He seems to have had an appreciation of the military value of time, unusual in the annals of medieval warfare. To this he added a comprehension of the exigencies of the military and political situation which indicates generalship and statesmanship of a high order. His strategy consisted in quickly establishing a line of strongholds in the direction of the enemy army, and then, behind this line of defense, deliberately undertaking the reduction of a given area by capturing and garrisoning the castles and cities. In this latter process time was not so much the important factor as men. The frontier line of strongholds first established, supported in case of need by the English field army, cut off hope of relief for the enemy garrisons in the region to be reduced. Consequently, the English king could afford to win by blockade rather than by assault, saving his men for garrison duty in captured places. The application of this strategy is illustrated by the campaign of 1417 when Henry, by rapid movements and vigorous attacks, established himself on a line from Caen to Alençon, threw out a strong frontier towards Paris, and then proceeded to subdue the Cotentin at his leisure. On a larger scale the same policy applied to his subjugation of northern

France. A line of garrisons extended from Avranches to Paris; English power was pushed up the Seine and eastward through Champagne cutting off the north of France from the south; Burgundy was an ally. The Armagnacs were then cleared from the valleys of the Somme, Oise, Aisne, and Marne. Henry himself died before the task was completed, but Bedford continued it. Its successful completion marks the end of the war's first phase and the limit of the present discussion. The test of the English ability to hold their frontier came at the battle of Verneuil, which was thus of much more strategic significance than Agincourt, and has therefore been taken as the climax of the period under consideration. That victory assured the success of the strategy of Henry V, and made possible further advance in the process of conquest.

In addition to studying the English strategy it is necessary to investigate the financial and administrative policies that accompanied it and provided the basis for English success. For the years under consideration the English rulers apparently undertook to make the war pay for itself as far as possible. Henry V's attempt to shift gradually the financial burden of the war from England to the conquered provinces seems to have been astonishingly successful during his lifetime. The Norman and French administrative machinery and methods of taxation were taken over and operated. One gets the impression that the operation was more efficient in English hands than it had been in French, but this may be due to the fact that the documents are more plentiful for studying the English administration. There are not lacking indications, however, that, by the end of this period, the available resources in money were becoming insufficient for the military demands of the ambitious English leaders.

In the matter of men and their organization into armies

there are no innovations during this period, but the multiplicity of documents has made possible a somewhat detailed study of the raising and maintaining of armies. The question of numbers is always present and has been attacked, an attempt being made to utilize a large amount of scattered material, the collection and analysis of which is a slow and tedious piece of work, and the result, a greater degree of probability as to numbers, so meagre, that heretofore the task has been avoided. It would seem that under Henry V England utilized her maximum military strength, and that that strength did not exceed 15,000 men. In this connection it has also been possible to show forth the manner of a successful military occupation in the fifteenth century. Under this head comes the consideration of discipline and its enforcement, pay, and provisioning. As an adjunct to the successful military occupation could well be considered the king's policy of conciliation towards the Normans and its results, but that has been reserved for the future.

Over against the English strategy and organization it has been necessary to consider that of the French, both Armagnacs and Burgundians. Unfortunately the available material is much more fragmentary than for English affairs. It has therefore seemed best to present such picture of the French government's financial and administrative activities as can be drawn in narrative form in connection with the development of the military situation. The result is an impression of haphazard financial and military preparedness, usually of a defensive sort. Probably the contrast between French and English "efficiency" in these respects is more or less true, but one cannot help feeling that a more complete set of French records would show a more effective administration than is sometimes supposed. Always the French had greater obstacles to overcome arising from the civil wars and the

fact that the monarchy was not yet the effective organ of national power that its English counterpart had become. Furthermore, with the exception of Armagnac, the French lacked leaders capable of coping with Henry and Bedford, and even he could not control an army and government without money. What does become clearer from the history of the French efforts against the English is the power of tenacious resistance which the nation could show even through an antiquated governmental organization incompetently directed. That administrative system was in process of re-organizing itself with a view to expelling the invader. In the years here covered it could merely give way before a more efficient system directed by skillful administrators. When the latter were gone and their ambitious plans had stretched the English efforts beyond their resources, a revivified French monarchy could come again into its own. But that belongs to a subsequent epoch.

CHAPTER I

THE ATTEMPTED FRENCH REVANCHE OF 1416

When Edward III closed his campaigns with the peace of Brétigny it seemed as if the greatness of Henry II's times might again be realized. But before his death the sagacity of Charles V and the generalship of Du Guesclin had robbed the English king of his fruits of victory. His successor, too weak and too completely engrossed in English and Irish affairs to revive his grandfather's ambitious pretensions, preferred an unpopular peace with France. His preference cost him his throne and his life in 1399. The fifteenth century, therefore, opened with Anglo-French relations assuming a threatening aspect. The dynastic revolution in England which had resulted from Richard's weak foreign policy preluded a more aggressive attitude towards the ancient enemy across the Channel, restrained only by the necessity for making the new royalty secure. French internal conditions, the feudal semi-independence of Burgundy, Brittany, and the Angevin states, the contention of rival factions to control a demented king, incited the English kings to ambitious intervention as soon as they could turn the national energies towards a reconquest of their Continental empire. The fact that one of the French rivals, Burgundy, was developing independent political ambitions and interests outside of the French kingdom, interests, in many respects, in common with the English, still further complicated the already intricate situation.

Henry IV, towards the end of his reign, began to turn his attention towards France, but division in the English council prevented more than a meddling policy. His son, succeeding to the throne in 1413, inaugurated a change. He openly favored the duke of Burgundy. But the accession of a pro-Burgundian in England was shortly followed by a serious Burgundian defeat in France which left the Orleanists secure in their possession of the government, and free for the moment to turn their strength against England and to enhance their prestige by reviving the war for expelling the foreigners from France.

A renewal of the war was inevitable. There could be no lasting peace with the English established on the continent. Such a situation was a constant menace to France. Says a French popular ballad:—

"La paix suis desirans;
Car je n'ose descouchier le matin,
Pour les Anglois qui nous sont destruisans;
Mais dire oy, il a passé dix ans,
Qu'à leur dessoulz quierent toudis aloingne
Pour mettre sus leur fait et leur besoigne,
Et puis courent le regne à grans eslays;
Maint l'ont veu, et pour ce je tesmoigne,
Paix n'arez jà s'ilz ne rendent Calays."[1]

What was true of Calais was also true of Guienne, where, in addition, the French had the memory of Charles V's successes to encourage their belief that, with internal discord healed, they could expel the English.

Such irredentist hopes clashed with popular opinion in England, where it was held that the overseas possessions were bulwarks of national defense, a belief which French naval activity, coupled with occasional schemes for the invasion of England, stimulated.

[1] Thomas Wright (ed.), *Political Poems and Songs relating to English History* (Rolls Series, 2 vols., London, 1859-1861), I, 301.

"Oure townes and castels, the reme with-oute,
They are oure stones of gret pouste,
In pes they kepe all this contre,
Holynes, contemplacioun,
God, let them never skatered be,
And save the kyng, and kepe the crowne!"

. . . . . .

"By-yonde the see, and we had nought,
But all oure enemys so neyge us were,
Thoug all here gold were hider brougt,
I wolde set hit at lytel store.
Oure enemys wolde coke therfore
With ordynaunce and habergeoun,
Wynne that, and wel more:
Oure landes, aoure lyves, the reme, the crowne."[2]

In addition to these sentiments were proud reminiscences of former exploits in France and elsewhere, memories of successes proving the divine approval of the English cause. Negotiations merely afforded the enemy time to prepare, or provided him means for cheating the English of their rights. Hard blows were the popular means for dealing with enemies.[3] Diplomacy was scorned as the weaker party's weapon.

"Praevalet in lingua qui non est fortior armis,
Nullus in hac pugna plus meretrice valet."[4]

The proposal to surrender a conquest in France, even temporarily and to a neutral mediator, made the people "fful sory and dreddyn of strong treson that might fall the reme."[5] Furthermore "the Frensche Kyng and his

[2] J. Kail (ed.), *Twenty-six Political and Other Poems* (Early English Text Society, original series 124, London, 1904), p. 51.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 58-60.

[4] Wright, II, 128.

[5] Charles L. Kingsford (ed.), *Chronicles of London* (Oxford, 1905), p. 125.

Councelle was evyr founde dobil,"[6] and "the proferes on the French side were but fraude and sotilte."[7] "Certes alle the ambassadors, that we dele wyth," writes a British soldier in France, "ben yncongrue, that is to say, yn olde maner of speche in Englond, 'they ben double and fals:' whyth whiche maner of men I pray God lete never no trewe mon be coupled with."[8] Political conditions in France were despised and special contempt appears to have been felt for the schemes of John the Fearless[9] who was described as "vagus et inconstans animo fluctuanti jam quasi paratis recusabat favere foederibus, et alternans amores regales amicicias exuit."[10]

Supported by a proud, vigorous national spirit, and with the resources of a prosperous kingdom at his command, Henry V need not wait upon events for renewing his great-grandfather's ambitious enterprises. Indeed the time chosen for his first descent upon Normandy was one when the Orleanist party had just secured itself in possession of the French government, a security which stimulated the over-confidence that led to the disaster at Agincourt.

The strategy developed by Charles V's great constable had been based upon the disastrous experience of Crecy and Poitiers. "Better a country ravaged than a country lost." Let the English armies pursue their raiding campaigns, but refuse to give battle. Hang on their flanks, restrict their pillaging and foraging as much as possible, but never come to a decisive clash. The enemy's strength exhausted, he will recross the Channel, leaving garrisons

[6] John Capgrave, *The Chronicle of England* (Rolls Series, London, 1858), p. 314.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 315.

[8] Henry Ellis (ed.), *Original Letters Illustrative of English History* (Second series, 4 vols., London, 1846), I, 77.

[9] Kail, pp. 53, 69, 71.

[10] Thomas de Elmham, *Vita et Gesta Henrici Quinti Anglorum Regis* (Thomas Hearne editor, London, 1727), p. 235.

in conquered places. Against these the French can direct their energies, recapturing them one by one, thus robbing the English of the fruits of their victories before they return with strength renewed to continue their conquests. Such strategy had been forced on the French because of their tactical inferiority which could not be overcome by hiring Italian or Spanish cross-bowmen. Under this policy the country suffered, but it achieved its military ends, regaining for France all that had been lost in the reign of John the Good.

This established policy the Orleanist princes abandoned in 1415. Their army was assembled to oppose the English king, who, landing in Normandy, had laid siege to Harfleur. That, at the start, they intended to follow Du Guesclin's strategy seems certain from their failure to attack the besiegers even when the city was on the point of capitulation. When, however, the English king, fearful of being cooped up in the conquered city, attempted to make a dash for Calais, the opportunity to crush him in the field was too good to be neglected. Constable d'Albret, true to the tradition, counseled that the French army be used to strike immediately at Harfleur and regain the place. Events proved that this would have been the wiser course, but the princes rejected the plan. Nor was their action headstrong. They had completely outgeneraled Henry, forcing him from his chosen line of march, preventing him from living on the country so that his army was badly in need of provisions, and obliging him to give battle in the face of superior numbers without any choice of ground. Strategy could do no more. Nevertheless the result was a crushing defeat, which not only assured the English a safe march to Calais, but also precluded an immediate attack on Harfleur. It enhanced the prestige of the English troops enormously and, by its effect on the French political situation, greatly increased

the chances for further successful attacks in the near future.

The disaster of St. Crispin's Day confronted the Orleanist government with a more serious situation than any which the French monarchy had faced since Poitiers. National integrity was threatened by a victorious foreign enemy. Party power, and with it the personal safety of the partisans, was jeopardized by the duke of Burgundy, to whom this English victory offered an opportunity for accomplishing a revolution in the state. With Orleans himself a prisoner and many of his lieutenants dead or sharing his captivity,[11] with the administrative and military organization shaken by loss of personnel,[12] with military prestige shattered and the nation in mourning,[13] prompt organization for defense against English and Burgundians was imperative.

For immediate operations resources were not lacking. The duke of Brittany was marching north with re-enforcements[14] for d'Albret and had reached Amiens when

[11] For the most complete list see René de Belleval, *Azincourt* (Paris, 1865), pp. 125 ff.

[12] *La Chronique du religieux de Saint Denys contenant le règne de Charles VI de 1380 à 1422* (L. Bellaquet editor, 6 vols., Paris, 1844), V, 748, mentions those "qui sibi [i.e. rex] aula regia obsequabantur familiarius, et quorum consilio regni negocia ardua disponebat." [This work will hereafter be referred to as St. Denis.]

[13] "cunctis oris et provinciis Francie inconsolabiliter;" *ibid.* "Cum in proelio apud Azincourt contra Anglos, tot principes, nobiles, milites ac barones de sanguine regio et de natione Gallicana mortui essent, et pauci vel nulli essent in dicta natione quin habuissent parentes, fratres, cognatos aut veros amicos, qui ceciderant in proelio," the University of Paris held special service for the dead; H. Denifle and E. Chatelain, *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis* (4 vols., Paris, 1889-1897), IV, 308, no. 2051.

[14] 5,000 lances according to *La Chronique de Bretagne de Jean de Saint Paul* (Arthur de La Borderie editor. Nantes, 1881), p. 52. Described as "grant puissance de gens d'armes et de trait pour resister à l'encontre de nosdiz annemis" in the pardon to Pierre le Gros; Archives du Calvados, F Fonds Danquin, Série Falaise. "Six mille combatans" says *La chronique*

he learned of the defeat.[15] There were yet at Rouen, with Charles VI and the duke of Guienne, the ships and sailors assembled to raise the siege of Harfleur.[16] Men-at-arms were still gathering in response to the summons for relieving that city. News of the battle stimulated others to take the field in the king's defense,[17] while fugitives from the defeated army, making their way southward, might reasonably be expected to augment materially the forces at the royal disposal.

Without attempting to harass the English march northward, Brittany fell back to Rouen[18] where he arrived by November 3, at the latest.[19] Danger lest the English, operating from Calais or Harfleur, attempt to follow up their victory forced the French to hold their forces at Rouen

de Enguerran de Monstrelet, 1400-1444 (L. Douët d'Arcq editor, 6 vols., Société de l'Histoire de France. Paris, 1859), III, 102.

15 Alain Bouchart, *Les Grandes Croniques de Bretaigne* (Société des Bibliophiles Bretons, Rennes, 1886), f. 174 v°.

16 There are muster rolls for September 1415 of sailors serving under the admiral of France "en certaine armee de vesseaulx de guerre qui de present c'est mise sus audit lieu de Rouen pour aler faire guerre aux ennemis angloiz tenans siege par mer et par terre devant la ville de harefleu;" Bib. Nat., fr. 25766, no. 715; Brit. Mus., Add. Ch. 68. Jean Piquet had been commissioned to levy forces by land and sea to oppose the English and men had been sent to Sluys for shipping, carricks, galleys, calkers, and rowers, all to be sent to Rouen; Brit. Mus., Add. Ch. 259; Bib. Nat., Portefeuilles de Fontanieu 109-110, f. 335.

17 "Et quant le dit messire Guillaume ouyt nouvelles de la dicte bataille, luy et aucunes autres gentilhommes du Daulphiné voulans servir le Roy de tout leur pouvoir en sa nécessité firent tant devers monseigneur de Guienne;" E. Maignien (ed.), *Faits et Gestes de Guillaume de Meuillon* (Grenoble, 1897), p. 19. J. Roman *Montres et Revues des Capitaines Dauphinois* (*Documents Dauphinois* t. VII, Grenoble, 1888), p. 22, shows another Dauphinois company at Paris, Jan. 24, 1416.

18 Censure of this failure appears in the tone of a brief set of annals (1405-1429) which relates how the duke of Brittany withdrew without striking a blow "avec sa belle compaignie;" Bib. Nat., fr. nouv. acq. 4518, f. 25.

19 On this date he issued letters from Rouen. "Lettres et Mandements de Jean V, Duc de Bretagne" (R. Blanchard editor, *Archives de Bretagne*, t. V., Nantes, 1890), p. 194, no. 1201.

until events showed what policy the enemy intended to pursue. Late in November Dorset, commanding at Harfleur, did make a demonstration to within two leagues of Rouen, but it was only a raid which was driven off.[20] It was reasonably certain that Burgundy would make some move on Paris, but this danger, less immediate than the English menace, need not yet be met with strong military force. On November 7, in order to forestall the duke, was issued a general amnesty (with forty-five exceptions) for all who had supported the Burgundian cause against the king.[21] At the same time John the Fearless had set out for the capital and had reached Châtillon-sur-Seine.[22] This was not very far on the road to Paris but precautions were not to be neglected on that account, consequently orders were dispatched to the prévôt of Paris not to admit any royal princes to the capital, to break the bridges and to seize the boats on the river as a measure of defense.[23] On November 16, the English king crossed the Channel.[24] This left the Orleanist leaders free to turn their whole attention to the Burgundian question and the safety of the capital. The council and king hastened to return thither, arriving November 21,[25] and leaving Guienne to follow nine days later with the army.[26] With the arrival by river of Louis of Anjou, who reached Paris from Rouen on November 30,[27] the Orleanist government was ready to face the situation.

[20] Jean Jouvenel des Ursins, *Histoire de Charles VI* (Michaud et Poujoulat, *Mémoires*, Sèries I, t. II, 338-569. Paris, 1836), p. 522. The exploit was repeated in December, Kingsford, *Chronicles of London*, p. 123.

[21] Published in Paris, Nov. 13, 1416; Jouvenel des Ursins, p. 522.

[22] Ernest Petit, *Itinéraires de Philippe le Hardi et de Jean sans Peur, ducs de Bourgogne, 1363-1419* (Documents inédits sur l'histoire de France, Paris, 1888), p. 422.

[23] Jouvenel des Ursins, p. 523.

[24] Monstrelet, III, 125.

[25] Jouvenel des Ursins, p. 524; Monstrelet (III, 127) says Nov. 22.

[26] St. Denis, V, 582; Jouvenel des Ursins, p. 524.

[27] *Ibid.*, p. 524.

Early in December,[28] the great council met. By unanimous consent it was voted to offer the vacant constableship together with the chief command in the field to the count of Armagnac, urging him to march north at once with all his men to safeguard Paris.[29] Clugny de Brabant, admiral of France, and the sire de Barbasan with the remnant of the defeated army were also ordered to the capital.[30] Rouen was being put into a state of defense by both the local[31] and national authorities,[32] and similar activity was being shown elsewhere.[33] Already new captains and baillis had been appointed to govern the fortresses and bailliages towards Burgundian territory and in Normandy.[34] The necessity of protecting Paris, coupled

[28] Dec. 4-5. Anjou left Paris Dec. 10 (*ibid.*, p. 525), and Monstrelet (III, 126) specifies that Anjou, Berry, and Brittany were present at the council meeting.

[29] St. Denis, V, 584; *Chronique de Jean Le Fèvre, seigneur de Saint-Remy* (F. Morand editor, 2 vols., Société de l'Histoire de France. Paris, 1876-1881), I, 270; Monstrelet, III, 128.

[30] *Ibid.*, p. 127.

[31] The city was borrowing to repair the fortifications and provide munitions against attack by the English occupying Harfleur and threatening Rouen. Repayment was promised as soon as possible. Record of a loan of 5 l. t. made Nov. 8, 1415; Brit. Mus., Add. Ch. 250.

[32] Bib. Nat., fr. 26041, nos. 5017, 5089.

[33] Honfleur, Oct. 27, 1415; V. Hunger, *Quelques actes normands du 14e, 15e, et 16e siècles* (3 vols., Paris, 1910-1911), II, 107:

Bayeux, Michaelmas, 1415; Brit. Mus., Add. Ch., 10933: Arques, Dec. 22, 1415; Bib. Nat., fr. 26041, no. 5018: Regneville, —, 1415; *ibid.*, no. 5021: Gisors, Oct. 18 and Nov. 18, 1415; Bib. de Rouen, Y 29, tome II. nos. 5, 7. In January 1416 William Bloundell, counsellor and chamberlain, was sent into the Boulnois and the frontiers towards the English and other enemies to inspect "habillements, vivres, garnisons, gens d'armes et de trait," etc.; Bib. Nat., fr. 26041, no. 5039. On May 22, 1416 payment was made for 122 days of carpentry in repairing the donjon and castle of Falaise; Archives du Calvados, F Fonds Danquin, Série Falaise. For Senlis see A. Bernier, *Monuments inédits de l'histoire de France, 1400-1600* (Paris-Senlis, 1853), p. 10.

[34] Bib. Nat., fr. 20684; Captains:—Oct. 27, 1415 at Crevecouer-en-Brie (f. 56) and Ribemont (f. 57); (Oct. 28 at Conches; Portefeuilles de Fontainieu 109-110, f. 356); Oct. 30 at "Byere" (Biars?), Nov. 3 at Meaux

with well merited fear of Dorset's powerful garrison, precluded any attempt to retake Harfleur at present.[35] The best that could be done when Guienne withdrew Parisward was to leave a restraining force scattered in garrisons throughout the Pays de Caux and about Rouen[36] with a view to confining the English raiding to as small an area as possible. The royal lieutenants in Picardy and West Flanders[37] could exercise similar restraint on the English at Calais. Brittany having obtained from the king the surrender of St. Malo[38] as a price, doubtless, for his continued political support, withdrew into his duchy and dispersed his men.[39] The remaining royal forces returned with Guienne to Paris to go into winter quarters there or in the strongholds along the Seine, Marne, and Oise.[40]

(f. 57), (also Maignien, p. 19); Nov. 4 at Touques (f. 58) and Falaise (f. 59); Nov. 7 at Château Gaillard (f. 61); Nov. 9 at Peronne (f. 62) and St. Germain-en-Laye (f. 58); Nov. 13 at Choisy (f. 59); (Nov. 15 at Mortemer, Bib. Nat., fr. 25709, no. 730); Nov. 29 at Gisors (f. 59); Dec. 3 at Le Crotoy (f. 59); Dec. 10 at Montargis (f. 63); Dec. 19 at Pont St. Maxence (f. 60). Baillis:—Dec. 14 at Rouen, Caen, and Amiens (f. 59); Dec. 27 at Senlis and Evreux (ff. 60-1), (*cf. Journal de Nicolas de Baye, greffier du Parlement de Paris (1400-1417)* (A. Tuetey editor. 2 vols. Société de l'Histoire de France, Paris, 1885-1888), II, 230, 234.

[35] St. Denis, V, 582.

[36] Pierre Cochon, *Chronique Normande* (Charles de Robillard de Beaurepaire editor, Société de l'Histoire de Normandie, Rouen, 1870), p. 376.

[37] These were the sire de Moreul and the sire de Vielzville. They are mentioned in a muster of the Boulogne garrison for Dec. 25, 1415 (Victor de Beauville, *Recueil des documents inédits concernant la Picardie* [4 vols., Paris, 1860-1882], II, 124, no. 120) and another for Oct. 21, 1416. (Bib. Nat., fr. 26041, no. 5127.) Other musters for this garrison are *ibid.*, fr. 25766, nos. 727-8, 732-3, 736.

[38] *Archives de Bretagne,* V, 194, nos. 1201-2.

[39] Mention of the return of the Bretons through Lower Normandy appears in the pardon of Pierre le Gros, Archives du Calvados, F Fonds Danquin, Série Falaise; Bouchart, f. 174 v°. By Dec. 19 the duke was at his castle of Hermine, *Archives de Bretagne,* V, 197, no. 1204.

[40] St. Denis, V, 582. For musters and reviews of French companies stationed at Paris and St. Cloud during this winter see Arch. Nat., K 59, no.

Meanwhile the duke of Burgundy was marching down the Seine "avec plusieurs chevaliers et escuiers, en armes,"[41] a fact which filled Paris with fears and rumors.[42] By December 10, 1415 he had taken up a position at Lagny-sur-Marne where he could menace the capital and take advantage of the political unrest for a coup de main. Momentarily, for the Armagnac government, the Burgundian crisis overshadowed everything. In consequence it became expedient to forestall possible Anglo-Burgundian co-operation by diplomacy. An appeal was made to Sigismund, king of the Romans, to mediate between France and England,[43] while negotiations were opened with John the Fearless and carried on boldly and even threateningly.[44]

At the same time the financial situation demanded attention. Men-at-arms were being assembled to defend the government. Larger forces required increased revenue. But it was so much easier to collect men than money that the treasury could not meet the demands of the growing army. Money was still coming in from the Agincourt levy

10 bis; Bib. Nat., fr. 25766, nos. 718-21, 723, 725-6, 722, 724; fr. 26041, nos. 5042, 5058, 5085, 5124; fr. nouv. acq. 5847, no. 243; Roman, *Montres et Revues*, pp. 21-2. These show eleven companies totalling 122 knights and squires. The dates range from Nov. 21, 1415 to Feb. 24, 1416.

41 Petit, pp. 422-3: Nov. 5, Dijon; Nov. 7-16, Châtillon-sur-Seine; Nov. 18, Bar-sur-Seine; Nov. 21-27, Troyes; Nov. 29-Dec. 1, Nogent; Dec. 1-6, Provins; Dec. 10, Lagny.

42 Jouvenel des Ursins, pp. 524-5.

43 Letter of Peter von Ortenberg to the Frankfurt council, Jan. 17, 1416. "Darnach synt mere kommen, daz unser vorgennant [i.e., Sigismund] von des konniges son von Frankreich, czu der czyt eldests son, gebeden were czu Parisz czu kommen." The succeeding lines show this to have occurred before Guienne's death (Dec. 18). Johannes Janssen (ed.), *Frankfurts Reichscorrespondenz nebst andern verwandten aktenstücken, 1376-1519* (2 vols., Freiberg, 1863-1872), I, 296. Doubtless this appeal was suggested by Sigismund's proffer of mediation during the siege of Harfleur; Eberhard Windecke, *Das Leben König Sigmunds (Die Geschichtsschreiber der deutschen Vorzeit. Fünfzehntes Jahrhundert.* Band I. Leipsic, 1886), p. 65.

44 St. Denis, V, 584; Jouvenel des Ursins, pp. 524-6.

but it was needed for the expenses of that campaign.[45] Tax farmers in Normandy pleaded that they could not pay their debts to the crown because the men-at-arms, both English and French, had so ravaged the country.[46] Feudal dues were similarly affected[47] and the council still further confused conditions by voting that no collections, other than feudal "redevances" up to November 1, be made on the estates of Agincourt captives, in order that their ransoms might be more speedily raised.[48] Zealous officials who undertook to exercise the royal rights on these estates were restrained.[49] In mid-November the parlement of Paris deliberated upon the ravages of the men-at-arms and the export of treasure to the papal court "to the destruction of the realm," and drew up a list of reforms for presentation to the king, then at Rouen.[50] To meet expenses an aide was levied sometime in November or December, 1415.[51] In addition, orders

[45] By Oct. 31, 1415, 17,800 l. t. collected in Normandy had been transported from St. Lô and Caen to Falaise to pay the duke of Brittany's men. It had to be convoyed "pour le doupte des gens d'armes qui sont sur le pays." Archives du Calvados, F Fonds Danquin, Série Caen.

[46] Pardon to Pierre le Gros, *ibid.*, Série Falaise; Bib. Nat., fr. 25709, no. 737; Brit. Mus., Add. Ch. 6800, 10937.

[47] Arch. Nat., K 59, no. 18.

[48] St. Denis, V, 748. Orleans wrote from London giving orders "pour user d'economie dans ses domaines et suspendre les gages de ses officiers pour payer sa rançon;" *Report on the Foedera* (London, 1869), "Archives de France," p. 148.

[49] *Histoire généalogique de la maison de Harcourt* (Gilles André de la Roque editor. 4 vols., *Preuves,* tomes III, IV, Paris, 1662), IV, 1715-16.

[50] Nicolas de Baye, II, 222-3.

[51] Paul Dognon, "Les Armagnacs et les Bourguignons, le Comte de Foix et le Dauphin en Languedoc (1416-1420)" (*Annales du Midi,* I, 433-509. Toulouse, 1889), p. 437, cites the Toulouse archives for a levy on Languedoc of 100,000 fr. R. Maugis, "Essai sur le régime financier de la ville d'Amiens du 14e à la fin du 16e siècles" (*Mémoires de la Société des Antiquaires de Picardie,* 4e série, t. III, 133-656, Amiens, 1899), p. 304, note 1, mentions a taille at Amiens in 1415 after Agincourt. Under date of Nov. 12, 1415 we find mention of commissioners of the aide for the defense of the realm

were issued on December 10 to increase the gabelle to thirty livres the measure.[52]

Throughout the last months of 1415 and the opening ones of 1416, disquieting rumors were about, brought home by returning prisoners, that the English king, enriched by his captives' ransoms, was preparing to renew the attack in the spring.[53] At the same time the tenseness of the Burgundian crisis had been slackened by the count of Armagnac's arrival at Paris on December 29,[54] and his investiture as constable the following day.[55] He promptly inaugurated vigorous measures. An embassy was dispatched to Genoa to negotiate a truce for ten years, and to hire ships and soldiers.[56] The emperor, whom the death of Guienne and the presence about Paris of large Burgundian forces might have halted, was again invited to the French capital to assume the rôle of mediator, his expenses to the extent of three hundred crowns a day being guaranteed.[57] Negotiations with Duke John were continued, and it was even hoped by some that, through Breton good offices, a domestic peace could be patched up

against the English, Brit. Mus., Add. Ch., 6799. This may refer to an earlier levy.

[52] Bib. Nat., fr. 25709, no. 732; Porte. de Font. 109-10, f. 362.

[53] Agincourt prisoners began leaving England late in November and continued returning to France during the following months; Calendar of the French Rolls, Henry V (*Deputy Keeper's Report*, vol. 42, pp. 545 ff.), pp. 572, 575-8 [hereafter referred to as Cal. Fr. Rolls, 42.572]; St. Denis, V, 580, 750.

[54] Jouvenel des Ursins, p. 526; Monstrelet, III, 131.

[55] Jouvenel des Ursins, p. 527; *Journal d'un Bourgeois de Paris* (*1405-1449*) (A. Tuetey editor. Société de l'Histoire de Paris. Paris, 1881), p. 68.

[56] St. Denis, V, 750; VI, 12; Agostino Giustiniani, *Annali della Repubblica di Genova* (3d ed., 2 vols., Genova, 1854), II, 277.

[57] Janssen, I, 296; Friedrick Fornhaber, *Petrus de Pulka-Abgesandter der Wiener Universität am Concilium zu Constanz* (*Archiv für Kunde österreichischer Geschichts-Quellen*, XV, 1-70, Vienna, 1856), p. 43; Windecke, p. 44.

which would enable the country's strength to be turned against the English.[58]

Whatever success was to attend these efforts, it is clear that there was an attempt to return to the wise policies of the preceding reign. Taxes were to be levied to pay the men-at-arms, who, being paid, could be restrained from ravaging the country.[59] Brigands and marauding companies were to be suppressed that the country might more readily endure taxation. Military and naval forces were to be concentrated for the recapture of Harfleur, while dilatory negotiations for peace kept Henry from raising the siege. In the accomplishment of this program another general aide was levied in January, to be collected by March 8, 1416. The income from this would provide for siege engines, artillery, naval munitions, and ships, as well as the expenses of garrisoning Paris. Orders for collection were accompanied by directions that pillaging was to be stopped and robbers expelled so that people could contribute to the royal expenses.[60] Of this tax 150,000 livres tournois was assigned to Languedoc to be paid by the end of March.[61] Immediate finances were obtained by pledging the royal jewels for 40,000 francs.[62] Even before this, however, it had been decided to raise a large fleet for the

[58] Brittany arrived in Paris, Jan. 14, 1416 to act as peacemaker; Jouvenel des Ursins, p. 527. The university appears to have specially concerned itself with the recovery of Harfleur; Denifle et Chatelain, IV, 309, no. 2055.

[59] This reasoning is reflected in St. Denis, V, 750.

[60] *Vidimus* of a letter of Jan. 23, 1416 from Charles VI to the collectors at Mantes; 8000 l. t. was apportioned to the vicomté of Mantes. Orders to the collectors were issued Feb. 15; Bib. Nat., fr. 25709, no. 736. 4000 l. t. was levied on Caen for which quittance was given April 14, 1416; Archives du Calvados, F Fonds Danquin, Série Caen; Bib. Nat., fr. nouv. acq. 9255, no. 43.

[61] Dom J. Vaissette et Dom C. Devic, *Histoire Générale de Languedoc* (15 vols. Toulouse, 1872-1893), IX, 1036. Dognon in *Annales du Midi* (I, 437) mentions 130,000 francs levied on Languedoc in March-April, 1416, citing the archives of Narbonne.

[62] Bib. Nat., fr. 25709, no. 735.

recovery of Harfleur, and orders had been given to build and equip galleys at Rouen, while two commissioners were sent out to buy provisions and munitions for the same.[63]

Meanwhile the English government had also been active. While the victorious army was still at Calais, parliament met, November 4, 1415. The bishop of Winchester opened the session with a speech reminding the houses that not yet had the king been able "duly to reconquer the lands pertaining to the heirship and crown of our realm, which have been for long,—by enormous wrong, withheld."[64] True, striking successes have been achieved, but the project can not be carried to a triumphant issue without further parliamentary grant.[65] To this appeal the commons promptly and generously responded. The levy of taxes voted at the previous session to be collected in February[66] was ordered in December, within a month of the present sitting.[67] To meet the war expenses the wool subsidy was granted the king for life. Similarly an export and import duty (i.e. tonnage and poundage) was laid on wines and merchandise to provide for a fleet to patrol the seas. And finally they imposed another tenth and fifteenth upon the kingdom to be collected in November 1416.[68] The day following this last vote (November 18, 1415) the convocation of Canterbury assembled at St. Paul's, where, in the course of a fortnight's sitting it voted two entire tenths on each benefice to be collected in

[63] Charles VI to the Norman baillis, Jan. 4, 1416; Bib. Nat., fr. 25709, no. 733.

[64] From a speech of the king to the mayor and aldermen of London outlining the purpose of the Agincourt campaign, Mar. 10, 1415, H. T. Riley, *Memorials of London and London life* (London, 1868), p. 604.

[65] *Rotuli Parliamentorum* (6 vols., London, 1767-1777), IV, 62.

[66] At Candlemas, Feb. 2.

[67] On St. Lucy's Day, Dec. 13. These were the second tenth and fifteenth voted in the previous November. *Rot. Parl.*, IV, 63.

[68] *Ibid.*, pp. 63-4; *Deputy Keeper's Report*, 2, appendix II, 186.

November of 1416 and 1417.[69] The convocation of York passed a similar vote of one tenth during the latter part of December.[70] Obviously the nation favored the prosecution of a war policy.

With the king's arrival in London, November 23, 1415, measures were taken to provide for the Harfleur garrison. Meeting November 25, the privy council decided to send two commissioners to inspect conditions, especially the artillery, of which the king thought there was need, and to pay the garrison. The expedited tenth and fifteenth would provide funds by mid-December from which could be drawn £3640, wages of 300 men-at-arms and 900 archers for three months, part of which was to be used to buy 1000 quarters of oats for the horses. At the same time instructions for the town's governance in the absence of Dorset, the captain, could be sent.[71] Inasmuch as the town had suffered from the English bombardment the defenses needed restoration. Orders were issued, consequently, to impress workmen in England for the repair of Harfleur.[72] Late in January 1416 the town administration was increased by the appointment of a treasurer and a receiver of provisions.[73] At the same time the captain's authority was extended by letters patent empowering him to confirm the rights and privileges of persons and

[69] *Ibid.*

[70] D. Wilkins, *Concilia Magnae Britanniae et Hiberniae* (4 vols., London, 1737), III, 377.

[71] *Proceedings and Ordinances of the Privy Council* (Sir Harris Nicolas editor, 6 vols., London, 1834), II, 184-5. Dorset was still at Harfleur, Dec. 18, 1415 when he led a raid into Caux, Kingsford, *Chronicles of London,* p. 123. Probably he returned to England late in the month.

[72] Dec. 16, 1415; Thomas Rymer, *Foedera* (20 vols., London, 1729), IX, 326. Simon Fleet's account book has a series of entries for carpentry, masonry, and the payment of laborers; P. R. O., Ex. Accts. 48/7, ff. 18-25. That the city was considerably battered appears from the numerous grants of houses in ruins which are contained in the Rôles de Bréquigny.

[73] Jan. 22 and 24, 1416, Cal. French Rolls, 44.576.

towns in Normandy, and to receive the homage of the king's subjects there.[74] Probably this marks the time when the earl returned to his post.[75] It certainly indicates that the English government was preparing for an offensive by the Harfleur garrison, to secure the submission of other Norman towns. Dorset had already shown that a force as strong as his could ride unopposed to Rouen.[76] Could the surrounding country be secured, Harfleur would be protected from blockade by land, while the use of the city as a landing place for a large expedition and the base for an invasion would be greatly facilitated.

For the French, in the meantime, the military situation had become much more favorable. Burgundy dared not attempt an assault on Paris. Brittany's mediation, though futile, had provided a delay advantageous to the government. The Armagnacs, recovered somewhat from the shock of Agincourt, enjoyed more capable leadership than before their defeat. On January 28, 1416 John the Fearless acknowledged his repulse by breaking camp at Lagny-sur-Marne, and departing for his own domains in the north.[77] Threat of renewed attack subsided in March

[74] Jan. 27, 1416. *Rôles Normands et Français et autres pièces tirées des archives de Londres par Bréquigny en 1764, 1765, et 1766* (*Mémoires de la Société des Antiquaires de Normandie,* t. XXIII, Paris, 1858), 69. [Hereafter referred to as Rôles de Bréquigny.]

[75] It is evident that masons impressed in England crossed the Channel late in January, for Simon Fleet records one master and fifty-seven masons collected in different parts of England serving from Jan. 31, 1416 to May 2; P. R. O., Ex. Accts., 48/7, f. 18. The new commission to Dorset coincides so readily with this date that it seems probable that they crossed together.

[76] *Vide supra,* p. 8. For the size of the garrison see the order to pay wages of Jan. 11, 1416; Rôles de Bréquigny 67. On Feb. 29, £4892 2s was issued from the exchequer to the treasurer of Harfleur for wages. This is £1221 more than would have been needed for the wages and rewards of 1200 men for one quarter. *Issues of the exchequer* (Frederick Devon editor, London, 1837), p. 345. [Hereafter referred to as Devon Issues.] Acknowledgment of this sum is in P. R. O., Ex. Accts., 48/18, f. 1.

[77] Petit, p. 423.

when the Burgundian army dispersed.[78] For the moment the military problem before the government, as far as Burgundians were concerned, was merely to suppress the wandering bands which infested Santerre.[79]

Free to turn most of his strength against the English, Armagnac acted at once. Garrisons which had been protecting Paris from the Burgundians were summoned to the constable's banner for service in Normandy.[80] Thither Armagnac himself set out during the first days in March, despite the arrival of Sigismund to discuss peace negotiations.[81] Meanwhile Dorset, returned to Harfleur, was preparing an expedition into Caux, pursuant to the plans for an offensive made in England, and for the purpose of foraging. Setting out March 9, 1416 with a thousand mounted men, and riding towards Rouen, the English captain made the circuit of the Pays de Caux in three days.[82] By that time Armagnac, informed of the English incursion, was ready to meet the enemy.

[78] "Chronique des Pays-Bas, de France, d'Angleterre, et de Tournai" (J. J. de Smet, *Recueil des Chroniques de Flandres,* Commission Royale d'Histoire, III, 111-570), 359, records this dispersal as following the duke's conference with the Flemings at Ghent. The duke was at Ghent March 1-6, Petit, p. 424.

[79] Monstrelet, III, 133-4; Beauville, *Doc. inédits,* IV, 108, 112-3. Charles VI in a letter to Tours vividly describes the atrocities committed by these bands. Victor Luzarche, *Lettres Historiques des Archives Communales de la ville de Tours depuis Charles VI jusqu'à la fin du règne de Henri IV, 1416-1594* (Tours, 1861), pp. 10-12.

[80] Maignien, p. 20.

[81] Sigismund reached Paris March 1. "Alsbald ritten aber der Graf von Armagnac und einige Franzosen aus der Stadt und wollten den Konig nicht empfangen," Windecke, p. 69.

[82] *Henrici Quinti, Angliae Regis, Gesta* (Benjamin Williams editor, English Historical Society, London, 1850) [Hereafter referred to as Chaplain.], p. 69, gives the number 1000. If correct this use of so large a force, nearly the whole garrison, would confirm the theory that an offensive on a small scale, something more than a mere foraging expedition, was intended. Kingsford, *Chron. of London,* p. 123. "in initio Quadragesimae" says Thomas Walsingham, *Ypodigma Neustria* (H. T. Riley editor, Rolls Series, London, 1876), p. 468. In 1416 Quadragesima began March 8.

By forced marches northward from Rouen, he placed himself in front of the English. At the same time he ordered marshal de Longny to assemble the neighboring garrisons and threaten the English retreat. How great were the forces available we can only surmise. A chronicler says 1800 men.[83] Official documents show that in January 1416, Armagnac had 2000 men-at-arms and 1000 archers.[84] Rouen alone is said to have sent 600 men-at-arms equipped by the town, together with the local company of 50 arbalesters and eight wagons of provisions.[85] Whatever the exact figure, it seems probable that the French were the stronger both in numbers and in strategic position. The constable's aim, however, was not to destroy or capture the opposing force, doubtless he could not hope for such success, but to drive the enemy back to Harfleur stripped of booty. His strategy was directed towards the re-capture of Harfleur itself. Too weak, or unwilling, to risk an assault, his alternative was a blockade. For such a plan it was not to his advantage to cut off half the garrison. Such action would merely hasten relief from England before the investment could be completed, and would double the period during which the city's supplies would last. He sought only to prevent foraging in the surrounding country, and the consequent replenishing of those supplies. With this end in view the French commander joined battle near Valmont on March 11, 1416.[86] The results were much to the French advan-

[83] St. Denis (V, 752) says "per Picardiam" which seems roundabout, if, as Cochon (p. 376) relates, he passed through Rouen.

[84] Etienne Baluze, *Histoire Généalogique de la maison d'Auvergne* (2 vols., Paris, 1708), II, 359.

[85] Cochon, p. 377.

[86] This date fits in with that of March 9 plus the three days' raid described by Monstrelet (III, 171), and gives time for the news to reach Mantes where orders were given to perform mass "le XIII[e] jour de ce present moyx—pour les bonnes nouvelles qui vindrent de ce que les Anglois avoient este desconfis par Monseigneur le Connestable devant Granville en Caux." E. Grave, "Archives municipales de Mantes. Analyses des registres

tage. They pushed the enemy hard and captured his horses and baggage.[87] On the next day orders went to the marshal to keep in touch with the English retreating towards Harfleur, but not to attack unless they assumed the offensive. This latter injunction was disobeyed and the French suffered a repulse at the hands of Dorset, but this reverse did not impair the success of Armagnac's strategy. The constable's wise restraint, however, was unappreciated by his countrymen, ill content to be prevented from avenging Agincourt and capturing ransomable prisoners.[88] Nevertheless the results were satisfying. With French forces at Montivilliers[89] and Caudebec,[90] the English were now held within their walls while the constable's policy of blockade by land and sea was effectively developing.

The maintenance of such a blockade, however, required money and still more money. Preparations for a great effort to retake Harfleur had been under way even before the battle of Valmont. On February 12, 1416 Armagnac

de comptes de 1381 à 1450.'' (*Bulletin historique et philologique* for 1898, pp. 306-331), p. 317. Guillaume Cousinot, *La Geste des nobles francoys descendus du roi Priam* (Vallet de Viriville editor. Paris, 1859), p. 135, wrongly puts this event in January.

[87] Kingsford, *Chronicles of London,* p. 123; A. Hellot (ed.), *Cronicques de Normendie* (*1223-1453*) (Rouen, 1881), p. 23; Georges Chastellain, *Chronique de Normandie* (published as an appendix to *Henrici Quinti, Angliae Regis Gesta, vide supra,* note 82.), p. 223. The latter gives March 14 as the date of the battle but this must be rejected in the face of the strictly contemporary evidence from the municipal records at Mantes (see note 86).

[88] St. Denis, V, 752 ff.; Chaplain, p. 69; Chastellain, *Chron. de Norm.,* pp. 222-3; Hellot, *Cron. de Norm.,* p. 24. Rumor of this discontent even reached Flanders; ''Chron. de Pays Bas, etc.'' de Smet, *R. C. F.,* III, 361. Monstrelet (III, 171) and Chastellain make the seigneur de Villequer the chief figure in the second battle. St. Denis calls him captain of Montivilliers and reports him killed at Valmont.

[89] Hellot, *Cron. de Norm.,* p. 24.

[90] Jean Raoulet, *Chronique anonyme du roi Charles VII* (*1403-1429*) (Fragment A, vol. III, pp. 142-199, of Vallet de Viriville's edition of Jean Chartier, *vide infra,* p. 285), p. 157.

was named governor of all finances and captain-general of all forces.[91] Before March ended a special commission, acting under orders from the constable, had been formed to mobilize the Norman revenues for the conduct of the war.[92] Those revenues, however, had to be used for ordinary expenses also, as appears from a receipt of April 14, 1416 for 4000 livres collected by the "receuveur des aides ordonnez pour la guerre" at Caen, to be used for the ordinary expenses of the royal household.[93] To meet the war expenses there was the general aide ordered in January which in April[94] was levied upon the kingdom for the recovery of Harfleur and the defense of the realm against the English.[95] On May 29 an assembly of prelates, sitting at the Palais Royal, voted a dîme to support the war.[96] In Languedoc, however, the cities, encouraged by

91 Vaissette, IX, 1032.

92 A document of March 30, 1416 mentions "Jehan Piquet, escuier, Michiel de Lalier, et Regnier de Boulegny, conseillers du Roy messire, commissaires ordonne par lesdit seigneur soubz mons. le conn^{ble} de france, et en son absence, a faire venir ens et assembler tous les deniers des pays et duchie de Normandie, tant de demain dudit seigneur, comme des aides et gabelle pour iceulx convertir et emploier par l'ordonnance de mondit sr. le connetable en fait de la guerre;" Bib. Nat., fr. 26041, no. 5050. There is a letter of April 22, 1416 from the above officials ordering the grenetier of Rouen to deliver a measure of salt "non gabelle" to Boulegny and to Mace Heron, treasurer of war, "pour leur despense et usaige, eulx estans audit lieu de Rouen;" Bib. de Rouen, Y 29, tome II, no. 47.

93 Bib., Nat., fr. nouv. acq. 9255, no. 43.

94 After Sigismund's departure from Paris (Monstrelet, III, 139) which occurred April 8, 1416 (Max Lenz, *König Sigismund und Heinrich der Fünfte von England* (Berlin, 1874), p. 83, note 1).

95 Vaissette, IX, 1035. Apparently the collection ordered for March was not begun until a month later. This seems more probable than to suppose that a second aide, for which we have no evidence, was ordered. Dognon in *Annales du Midi*, I, 437. At Amiens 3400 l. t. was levied; Maugis, p. 304, note 1; see also Grave, p. 317. There is a receipt of May 3, 1416 for 240 l. t. from the collector at Evreux of the aide to suppress "plusieurs pillars et gens de compaignie"; Bib. Nat., fr. 26041, no. 5060.

96 Decrusy et Jourdan Isambert, *Recueil Générale des Anciennes Lois Françaises depuis l'an 420 jusqu'à la Revolution de 1789* (28 vols. Paris,

Burgundian emissaries, rebelled against these taxes, and forcibly resisted the royal collectors.[97] Consequently, in July, further measures were found necessary. It was pointed out that Harfleur was about to be regained and that to bring the enterprise to a successful conclusion a tax of 600,000 livres would be laid on the whole kingdom.[98] For those regions which had resisted payment earlier in the year, this was probably equivalent merely to a new order to pay,[99] but for Normandy, where returns from the former aide had been coming in,[100] this meant a double burden of taxation, still further increased by the necessity of reducing the quota demanded from the rebellious provinces.[101]

With these resources in hand or in prospect Armagnac pushed the blockade of Harfleur with vigor. Men had been assembled from as far south as Beaucaire for service in Normandy.[102] After Easter (April 19, 1416) word came from Genoa that as soon as money was received, the ships and soldiers asked for would be sent.[103] These, when they came, consisted of 600 Genoese cross-bowmen, eight carricks, and as many galleys.[104] Unfortunately

n. d.), VIII, 574, no. 631. In connection with the collection of this there is a letter of July 16 to the collector at Sens to the effect that the abbot of St. Germain de Prés had paid a lump sum of 200 livres parisis for which the abbey property is to be considered quit of the tax; Arch. Nat., K 59, no. 13.

[97] Dognon, pp. 437-8; Vaissette, IX, 1036.

[98] July 26, 1416, Charles VI to the collectors at Rouen: 30,000 livres was apportioned to Rouen, Bib. Nat., fr. 25709, no. 743.

[99] So represented by Vaissette.

[100] Bib. Nat., fr. 26041, nos. 5060, 5079, 5094.

[101] The spring levy in Languedoc had been 130,000 livres (Vaissette says 150,000), but in July only 100,000 livres was demanded, Dognon, p. 440.

[102] Vaissette, IX, 1032. This was in April.

[103] St. Denis, VI, 12.

[104] The French ambassadors "soldarono seicento balestrieri Genovesi, e otto navi grosse, e altrettante galere, tutte armate di Genovesi, e delle galere fu capitano Gionni di Grimaldi," Giustiniani, II, 277. French popular confidence is reflected in St. Denis' description of this force as numbering

Burgundian activity prevented the constable's operations from being continued with the same energy with which they had been begun. For some time in April the blockading force had to be weakened to guard against a Burgundian rising in Paris. Indeed, so threatening was the situation that a truce for four weeks (May 5-June 2) was concluded with Dorset which left Armagnac free to concentrate troops at Paris to overawe the malcontents,[105] and gave the English opportunity to obtain some relief from home.[106] Only prompt action by the prévôt of Paris had suppressed the conspiracy.[107] A month later the king declared Burgundy to be a rebel.[108]

In looking back over the activity of the English government during this spring, it may well be believed that the previous campaign, spectacular as had been its success, had caused Henry V to pause before considering the immediate renewal of his invasion. A single town had held him in check for seven weeks while the French assembled a superior force. He had been completely outgeneraled in the field, and owed his victorious escape to the enemy's egregious tactical blunders, and to the fighting qualities of his men. Further successes of the same sort might bring about a revival of the treaty of Brétigny, but that result might also be gained by diplomacy, and even if gained gave promise of no greater success in fulfillment than had been achieved after 1360. To produce results renewed military operations must be undertaken with the intent to maintain a sustained effort enabling the invaders to overrun and hold some considerable part of France such as Normandy. Such an attempt Henry does

5000 arbalesters (according to common report), nine carricks, 300 smaller vessels, transports, and galleys, not to mention barques, brigantines, corsairs, etc.

[105] Monstrelet, III, 139-42.

[106] *Vide infra*, p. 27.

[107] St. Denis, VI, 4.

[108] Bib. Nat., Porte. de Font. 109-10, f. 378.

not appear to have contemplated at the end of 1415.[109] The war might serve as a means for obtaining grants from a willing parliament, but, for the moment, the king intended to try diplomacy, either to gain his ends without fighting or to prepare the way for another attack. Since July 1415 he had been contemplating an alliance, even a marriage alliance, with Aragon, and from September 1415 to June 1416 kept envoys at the Aragonese court.[110] During the latter half of 1415 secret negotiations for an alliance with Brittany were in progress.[111] Steps were taken to prorogue the truce with Castile, the traditional ally of France.[112] Efforts were made to reach an understanding with those perennial trouble-makers at home, the Scots and the Welsh;[113] while with Burgundy and the Flemings lively negotiations had been going on throughout 1415, in regard to the preservation and continuation of the truce with Flanders, which Henry would willingly have converted into an alliance,[114] about commercial affairs, and later about the Council of Constance.[115] The

[109] There are no evidences of extensive military preparations until it became necessary to send relief to Harfleur in May. Ordinarily when the king was planning a campaign the first indentures would be made in February.

[110] July 25, 1415 commission to Waterton and Kemp, envoys to Aragon; Rymer, IX, 293-5. Sept. 8, 1415-June 13, 1416 the above "fecerunt [quoddam viagium] eundo de mandato regis apud regem de Arragonia deffunctum"; E. Deprez and L. Mirot, "Les Ambassades Anglaises pendant la guerre de cent ans: catalogue chronologique (1327-1450)" (*Bib. de l'École des Chartes,* LIX, 550 ff., LX, 177 ff., LXI, 20 ff., 1898-1900), LXI, 29, no. 595.

[111] July 28, 1415 commission to Honyngham and Flete, Cal. Fr. Rolls, 44.572. These men were gone from Aug. 23-Dec. 7, 1415, carrying on "certis secretis negociis," Deprez, p. 29, no. 594. Licenses to trade with Brittany appear in April and May, 1416, Cal. Fr. Rolls, 44.579.

[112] Jan. 13, 1416 commission to the seneschal of Aquitaine and others; Rymer, IX, 328.

[113] *Ibid.,* 329, 338, 341.

[114] Instructions to ambassadors at Calais, Mar. 21, 1416, L. Gilliodts-Van Severin, *Le Cotton. MS. Galba BI* (Brussels, 1896), p. 364.

[115] Complaints of English piracies on Flemings appear as early as May 9, 1415; *ibid.,* p. 335. For documents à propos of these negotiations see

result was an Anglo-Burgundian truce from June 24, 1416 to September 29, 1417, but confined to Flanders and Artois, "dont moult de gens furent moult esmerveillez pour icelles treves faictes ainsi particulieres."[116] Meanwhile the king of the Romans was trying to mediate between the warring countries, an attempt doomed to failure, but which secured for Henry prestige, the imperial alliance,[117] and, in England, the reputation for peaceful intentions.[118] Parliament, assembling in March 1416, was again reminded that war was to be continued without intermission, that "well begun was half done" ("dimidium facti qui bene cepit habet"), and that Agincourt was God's verdict on the justice of England's claims; but no new demands were made, and no new grants voted other than a vote expediting the levy set for November 1416 by ordering collection at Pentecost (June 7, 1416).[119]

Not until April did the necessity for military and naval action force itself upon the English government. By that time the Armagnac offensive against Harfleur had developed dangerous strength. Dorset repeatedly wrote to England for provisions and artillery, sent messengers with lists of his necessities, and finally declared that want of meat and grain, loss of horses, and sickness among his men would force him to evacuate the town within two months.[120] On April 12 the privy council ordered a com-

Rymer, IX, 328, 331-2, 352, 354, 357, 364; Cal. Fr. Rolls, 44.572-3, 576-7. *Proceedings* II, 186-7, 191-2; L. P. Gachard, *Rapport sur différentes séries de documents concernant l'histoire de la Belgique qui sont conservées dans les Archives de l'ancienne Chambre des Comptes de Flandre à Lille* (Brussels, 1841), pp. 137-140.

116 Monstrelet, III, 147.

117 Aug. 15, 1416, treaty of Canterbury; see Lenz *op. cit.* and Jacob Caro, *Das Bündniss von Canterbury* (Gotha, 1880).

118 Capgrave, *Chronicle,* pp. 312, 315.

119 *Rot. Parl.,* IV, 70-2; *Deputy Keeper's Report,* 2, appendix II, p. 186; Chaplain, p. 74.

120 "au nouvel Quaresme." Inasmuch as this appears in a letter of April

missioner to Southampton to seize all vessels of 20 tons, and to hold them for further orders.[121] Two days later the controller and deputy-victualler of Harfleur were authorized to take ships for the transport of provisions bought in England for the garrison.[122] Directions were also given to make extensive purchases for victualling the town.[123] A month later £2000 was paid from the exchequer for victuals, artillery and matériel.[124] Preparations were also made to send 200 men-at-arms and 600 archers as re-enforcement[125] or relief.

By the end of April three companies under Huntingdon, Courtenay, and Clifford were assembling to man the ships convoying the supplies sent the besieged city.[126] Their total force numbered 900 men-at-arms and 1800

14, 1416 in which year Easter came on April 19 and the tone of the letter is too urgent for the reference to be to the "Careme" of the next year, this must mean the "Careme" of Pentecost (June 4, 1416) or of St. John (June 24). This letter mentions earlier letters which had already stirred the government to take some measures for relief, *Proceedings*, II, 196.

[121] *Ibid.*, p. 70.

[122] *Ibid.*, p. 71.

[123] April 14, orders to buy 1000 quarters of wheat, 1000 quarters of oats, 2000 quarters of malt, 500 quarters of peas, 500 quarters of beans, 2000 bacons, and 200 oxen to be taken to Sandwich, London, and Winchelsea for provisioning Harfleur: April 20, same for 1000 bacons and 500 quarters of oats: May 1, same for 500 bacons and 850 quarters of wheat: May 10, same for 200 bacons and 100 quarters of oats; *Calendar of the Patent Rolls, Henry V* (2 vols. London, 1910-1911), II, 7-8, 11.

[124] P. R. O., Issue Roll 624, m. 1.

[125] May 11, 1416, issue of £300 on the wages of 200 men-at-arms and 600 archers, charged to the treasurer of Harfleur, *ibid.*, m. 2; Ex. Accts. 48/8, f. 1 says £400. Items like this on the Issue Rolls usually mean that the troops paid are in England about to go on active service. Since Fleet's account shows no such increase it seems probable that these men relieved part of the garrison.

[126] Huntingdon had 3 bannerets, 9 knights, 337 men-at-arms, and 700 archers. Courtenay had 5 knights, 343 men-at-arms, and 700 archers. (Probably this was the number he indented for, but on May 5 (?) he had to be authorized to impress 40 men-at-arms and 100 archers for this voyage, Rymer, IX, 344.) Clifford had 5 knights, 194 men-at-arms, and 400 archers, P. R. O., Issue Roll 624 m. 1.; Devon Issues, p. 346.

archers, retained for forty days' service[127] for which payment was made in advance.[128] By May 12 preparations were sufficiently complete for the issuance of instructions to Huntingdon, the commander, to convoy the provision ships to Harfleur and then to keep the sea to the west against an expected French attack.[129] Even then, however, the fleet was not entirely ready, for on the same day two ships lying in Lynn were arrested by royal order, loaded with provisions for Dorset, and added to the expedition.[130] Final proclamation for setting sail was not made until May 27 when soldiers and sailors in London were ordered to embark the following day at 11 A.M.[131] The only information about the success of this expedition is the statement of a French chronicler that one provision fleet eluded the blockading fleet by flying false colors.[132] Such relief as it could bring could not be decisive and indeed was only intended to strengthen the garrison until a stronger force could be raised. Meanwhile the French investment continued.

In handling the blockading army Armagnac returned to the policy inaugurated and pursued by Charles V, of saving the country from its defenders by providing adequate provisions for the troops and maintaining strict discipline. From October 1, 1415 to September 31, 1416 Caudebec was the chief depot for provisions, and the tax ordinarily levied there on the sale of victuals was suspended, "affin que plus grant habundance de vivres feust

127 Commission for mustering was issued May 11, 1416, P. R. O., Issue Roll 624 m. 2. Indenture, therefore, is for service until June 20, 1416.

128 Huntingdon received £1447 6s 8d, Courtenay, £1416, Clifford, £816, the money coming from the second tenth and fifteenth ordered to be collected by Pentecost. In addition, £2643 9s 5d was paid in wages to sailors. This would indicate a force of some 2500. P. R. O., Issue Roll 624 m. 1-2; Devon Issues, p. 346.

129 Rymer, IX, 345.

130 P. R. O., Chanc. Enroll. 266 (Close Roll 4 Henry V), m. 24.

131 *Calendar of Letter Books of the City of London* (London, 1909), I, 151.

132 St. Denis, VI, 12.

et fortist en notre dicte ville de Caudebec, par quoy les dictes gens d'armes, de trait, mariners, et aultres gens de guerre, n'eussent occasion de prendre, soubz couleur de deffault de vivres, aucune chose sur notre peuple.''[133] Safe-conducts were issued to merchants bringing provisions ''nécessaires à l'approvisionnement de l'armée rassemblée en Normandie contre les Anglais,''[134] and it was publicly proclaimed that all who brought wares to the army ''seront exempts de tous droits pour la vente desdites marchandises ou vivres.''[135] Royal commissioners were appointed ''pour le vitaillement et garnison du navire ordonne et mis sus pour le recouvrement de la ville de Harfleur,'' and the vicomtes were subject to their orders.[136] Upon these latter and upon the baillis was thrown the duty of seeing to it that merchants brought food regularly and in large quantities to the army.[137] At the same time local officials sent out agents who seized ''all grain found in barns, granaries, and hostelries, as well that of churchmen and nobles, as of other folk, to send it to Honfleur for victualling of the royal army and navy.''[138] Furthermore in order that the soldiers be able to buy provisions thus provided, the taxes collected in Normandy were transported direct to headquarters for the wages of the troops.[139]

[133] Bib. Nat., fr. 25709, no. 749.

[134] *Catalogue Analytique des Archives de M. le Baron Joursanvault* (2 vols. Paris, 1838), p. 17, no. 120.

[135] *Ibid.*, p. 328, no. 1829.

[136] Bib. Nat., fr. 26041, no. 5082.

[137] *Ibid.*, fr. 25709, no. 744. The merchants at Mantes were ordered to go to the army, Grave, p. 317.

[138] Léopold Delisle, *Les Collections de Bastard d'Estang a la Bibliothèque Nationale. Catalogue analytique* (Nogent-le-Rotrou, 1885), p. 160, no. 241.

[139] Aug. 1-3, 1416, transport of 830 livres from Caen to Honfleur, part of 4000 livres levied on Caen, for which discharge was given April 14, 1416, Archives du Calvados, F Fonds Danquin, Série Caen.

This system enabled the constable to enforce discipline rigorously, beheading, hanging, or drowning such as disobeyed his orders against committing violence.[140] There seems reason to believe that, in addition, efforts were made to suppress brigandage so that, by preserving order, the country might flourish sufficiently to support the burden of war taxes.[141] In consequence, for four months, agriculture is said to have flourished up to the very walls of Harfleur.[142]

At Honfleur naval headquarters were established, from which base the Franco-Genoese fleet blockaded the English on the opposite bank of the Seine, scoured the Channel, harried the coasts of England, plundered the Isle of Wight, blockaded Portsmouth, made hostile demonstrations off Calais,[143] and even raided Southampton, though not without loss.[144] England began to fear an invasion. On April 5, in view of the extensive French naval preparations, orders went to the sheriffs of the coast counties from Newcastle to Cornwall, to proclaim that ships and

140 St. Denis, V, 760.

141 Taxes were collected in Normandy for the suppression of "plusieurs pillars et gens de compaignie;" receipt of 240 livres from the collector at Evreux, May 3, 1416, Bib. Nat., fr. 26041, no. 5060. April 27, 1416, a gift of five horses was made the bailli of Rouen for having pursued and captured Jean Riviere "et autres, ses conplices, pillars, et robeurs lors vivans sur notre peupple, lesquelz ont este executez audit lieu de Rouen," Bib. de Rouen, Y 29, tome 2, no. 48. February 1416, execution at Honfleur of Pierre d'Ancre, who had joined the English at Harfleur, pillaged the French, and acted as a spy in Lower Normandy, Bib. Nat., fr. 26041, no. 5130.

142 St. Denis, V, 760.

143 This was on April 12, 1416, Kingsford, *op. cit.*, p. 124.

144 Chaplain, pp. 80, 83; St. Remy, I, 281; St. Denis, VI, 14; Hellot, *op. cit.*, p. 26. "le connestable voulut que icelluy messire Guillaume [de Meuillon] y allast et s'en tirerent devant Antonne [Southampton] en Angleterre, et là ne demourerent guyères pour la fortune du temps qui fut si contraire qu'ilz ne peurent venir à leur entreprise et s'en retournerent à Onnefleur," Maignien, p. 20. This may be the same bad weather that delayed Bedford, *vide infra*, pp. 33-4. Other French vessels withdrew into Dieppe, Jouvenel des Ursins, p. 532.

sailors assemble at "Orwell" to resist the enemy.[145] Commissioners of array were appointed in the southern counties,[146] and Huntingdon's squadron formed to attack the enemy and patrol the seas as well as to convoy ships to Harfleur. Even then English vessels going from London to Southampton required guarding "for fear of the enemy who had assembled in numbers at sea."[147] Foreign merchant-men, on the other hand, stood in great fear of the English fleet.[148]

Such success in dominating the sea, following the constable's victorious occupation of the Pays de Caux, filled the French government with elation at the prospect of Harfleur's fall. It was even hoped that Burgundy, impressed by these events, would join the winning side in the war against the English.[149] Such confidence of victory was the more satisfying from the fact that it was popularly believed that if Harfleur remained in hostile hands the English would eventually reconquer all of Normandy.[150] Armagnac was violently opposed to any agreement with the enemy that included raising the siege, inasmuch as he believed the city to be already reduced to the last extremity. No good, he declared, had ever come from the repeated English promises. They wanted a truce merely in order to make Harfleur impregnable.[151] Henry's demand, therefore, that the siege be raised as a preliminary to negotiating peace[152] was rejected. France clung to the policy which she had been pursuing, namely of de-

[145] P. R. O., Chanc. Enroll. 266 (Close Roll 4 Henry V), m. 24 v°. *Cal. Letter Books of London*, I, 151.

[146] May 14, 1416, Rymer, IX, 350.

[147] June 30, 1416, Devon Issues, p. 357.

[148] *Chronique d'Antonio Morosini* (Germain Lefèvre-Pontalis and Léon Dorez, editors, 4 vols., Société de l'Histoire de France. Paris, 1898-1902), II, 103.

[149] Jouvenel des Ursins, p. 532.

[150] St. Denis, VI, 10.

[151] *Ibid.*, p. 24.

[152] *Ibid.*, p. 20.

laying the enemy by negotiation,[153] as far as possible, while pushing siege operations with energy.

But England refused to be delayed once the plight of Harfleur was realized. Even while Huntingdon's squadron was being fitted out, preparations were also being made for a larger expedition to bring permanent relief to the besieged city. From April to August royal agents were impressing ships in English ports, paying earnest-money to owners and masters to secure their appearance at the mustering point.[154] On May 28 the sheriffs were ordered to proclaim that all who held fiefs or annuities from the king, on pain of forfeiture, assemble at Southampton on June 22, arrayed and provisioned for three months, there to receive wages and embark for France.[155] Two days later indentures had been made with more than a hundred captains, record of the same sent to the treasurer of war,[156] and by June 6 wages for three months

[153] *Ibid.*, p. 26. From April to June the archbishop of Reims was in England negotiating. Safe-conduct to come was issued him April 26; another to depart, June 20, Rymer, IX, 342, 364. March 23-May 11, Henry Ware and retinue was at Calais "ad tractandum et communicandum ibidem cum ambassiatoribus et procuratoribus regis Francie," Deprez, p. 29, no. 596. June 28, appointment of English commissioners to treat for a truce and for an interview between Henry V and Charles VI, Rymer, IX, 365-6. July 3-Oct. 21, Sir Ralph Rochefort was on mission to Paris "ad tractandum cum avo dicti regis nunc de Francia et aliis de consilio suo super certis materiis unionem et pacem finalem amborum regnorum," Deprez, no. 597. Throughout March Sigismund was at Paris in the rôle of mediator. During the summer he was playing the same rôle in England. It was common belief that France would fight as long as the English held Harfleur, Morosini, II, 101-3, 119.

[154] In parliament of 1415 the king had been petitioned to restore the customary rate of 3s 4d the ton per quarter for impressed vessels, *Rot. Parl.*, IV, 79. For the expedition of 1416 there is record of thirty-five vessels impressed, varying from 20 tons to 300 tons, and totalling 3700 tons. For these immediate payment was made of £125 19s 4d., P. R. O., Ex. Accts. 48/10, nos. 1-35. The total payment for one quarter would have been £621 16s 8d.

[155] Rymer, IX, 355.

[156] Specimen in Rymer, IX, 356; the whole series is in P. R. O., Ex. Accts. 48/10.

paid out of the exchequer.[157] The expedition numbered over seven thousand fighting men,[158] of whom two-thirds were archers. This proportion shows that only naval operations were planned, for had a campaign been in prospect three-fourths of the army would have been bowmen.[159] In addition to this force, Clifford was kept at sea with 200 men-at-arms and 400 archers in thirteen ships.[160]

On June 8, 1416 proclamation was made. "Alle maner of lordes, knyghtys, and squyers, that ben y pointed to goo with oure liege Lord the Kyng in this present viage, drawe hem home in to here contrees, and make hem redy to be with oure liege Lord the Kyng atte Hamptone, the Munday afor Myssomers-day next come." (i.e. June 22).[161] This was shortly followed by another proclamation throughout England, that negotiations with France had proved futile, and that captains and vassals were to appear at Southampton by July 1 at latest, to go to the defence of Harfleur.[162] On June 20 orders went to Court-

[157] P. R. O., Issue Roll 624, mm. 3, 6, 9. The total outlay for troops was £21,294 13s 8d of which £800 was paid out May 27, and £1251 8s 6d in July. In addition to this £6410 14s 2½d was paid out as wages to sailors from May 27 to July 24. *Ibid.*, mm. 3, 4, 6, 9, 11. Aug. 1, receipt by Hungerford of 1000 marcs to pay the wages of the sailors going to sea with Bedford, Brit. Mus., Sloane 4601, f. 45.

[158] P. R. O., Issue Roll 624, mm. 3, 4, 5, 9; Receipt Roll 672 (June 6); Ex. Accts. 48/10; Brit. Mus., Stowe 440, f. 39.

[159] This conclusion is reached by comparing the indentures of captains hired "to keep the sea" in which the ratio of men-at-arms to archers is always 1 to 2, with those of captains in expeditions formed to invade Normandy in which the ratio is always 1 to 3.

[160] July 4, Clifford was paid £814 (m. 6) and the mariners with him in two ships, £21 16s 4d (m. 6). July 24, Clifford was again paid £814 (m. 11) and the mariners with him in thirteen ships, £599 19s (m. 10), P. R. O., Issue Roll 624.

[161] Riley, *Memorials of London*, p. 628.

[162] Orders given June 13 name June 30 as the muster day (Rymer, IX, 362) but as proclaimed the date was evidently made July 1, *Cal. Letter Books of London*, I, 152; Kingsford, *op. cit.*, p. 125.

enay[163] to send all vessels and soldiers in western waters to the same port there to await the king.[164] The ineffectiveness of these orders is shown by the necessity for renewing them in July. Proclamation of July 18 sets the following day "ad ultimum," for assembling the captains at Southampton;[165] again the men-at-arms were ordered thither for July 20,[166] but on that day new orders had to be issued advancing the date to July 24.[167] In the meantime, throughout the month, artillery, munitions, and provisions were being collected,[168] and miners and surgeons provided.[169] Not till the end of July, then, was this expedition ready to start.[170] Further delay, due to the weather, prevented the armada from reaching Harfleur until mid-August, but on August 15, 1416 battle was joined at Seine-mouth, and the blockade broken.[171]

In France the organization of a grand fleet by the English had excited fears that a new invasion of Normandy was contemplated.[172] Defensive measures were taken accordingly. Coast towns north of Harfleur were garrisoned, and a reserve of arbalesters assembled by the royal lieutenants in Picardy.[173] Robert de Braquemont

163 Probably still keeping the sea according to instructions of May 12, *vide supra*, p. 27.

164 P. R. O., Chanc. Enroll. 266 (Close Roll 4 Henry V), m. 19.

165 *Ibid.*, m. 15 v°. 166 *Ibid.*, m. 16 v°.

167 Rymer, IX, 370.

168 July 6, 1416, issuance of £86 16s 4d for provisions from London (m. 7); July 8, £140 19s and £62 16s 5d for gunpowder and gun-stones (*ibid.*); July 13, £151 2s for iron cannon, iron for machines, and ordnance (m. 8); (July 15, £76 14s for making cannon, carriages for the same, and other matériel, Devon Issues, p. 351): July 24, £32 13s 4d for provisions and £10 for "pavys pro navibus" (m. 10), P. R. O., Issue Roll 624.

169 June 14, warrant to arrest surgeons, Rymer, IX, 363. July 15, payment of £113 15s wages to miners from Liege, Devon Issues, pp. 351-2.

170 July 25, Bedford was authorized to muster his army, Rymer, IX, 372.

171 For an account of the battle see de la Roncière, "L'Invasion Anglàise sous Charles VI—Dernières batailles navales," *Rev. des Quest. Hist.*, LXVII (1900), 56 ff.

172 St. Denis, VI, 36.

173 These towns were Boulogne, Arde, Dieppe, Le Crotoy, and St. Valéry,

commanded the French, Genoese, and Spanish ships collected at Honfleur,[174] while William de Montenay was captain-general of the forces collected to retake Harfleur. They were preparing to resist any attempt to make a landing in Lower Normandy.[175] At the end of July orders were sent to the Norman baillis to proclaim that all accustomed to bear arms, all archers and seamen, prepare at once to take the field to resist the English,[176] because Montenay had learned from prisoners captured July 29 that the English fleet had put to sea.[177] Contrary winds delayed the attack a fortnight,[178] but even with this respite the Norman levies failed to respond.[179] Military summons were served even upon Burgundy,[180] but his only action was to forbid his subjects fighting the English with whom he had truce. To this the royal government could reply only by re-issuing its orders to baillis and prévôts to proclaim the ordinance, "and command all vassals and subjects to take up arms."[181]

"Le Livre des Trahisons de France envers la maison de Bourgogne" (Kervyn de Lettenhove editor, in *Chroniques relatives à l'Histoire de la Belgique sous la domination des Ducs de Bourgogne,* II, 1-258, Brussels, 1873), p. 130. At Le Crotoy Jacques de Harcourt had 30 men-at-arms and 25 arbalesters for whose wages for one month he received 440 livres on Sept. 13, 1416, Charles Breard, *Le Crotoy et les armements maritimes des XIV^e^ et XV^e^ siècles* (Amiens, 1902), p. 163, no. 116.

[174] Charles de Robillard de Beaurepaire, "Accord conclu par Robert de Braquemont, amiral de France, entre les capitaines du parti de Bourgogne, et les capitaines du parti d'Orleans en garnison dans la haute Normandie" (*Bib. de l'École des Chartes,* XXXVI, 307 ff. Paris, 1875), p. 307. "E fo anchora a questa bataia nave XXX de Bischaia—et de Spagna;" Morosini, II, 110.

[175] Chastellain, *Chron. de Norm.,* p. 176, makes this the purpose of the Honfleur mobilization.

[176] July 31, 1416, order to pay the messenger who carried the bailli's orders from Rouen to Pont de l'Arche, Bib. Nat., fr. 26041, no. 5099.

[177] Montenay to the vicomte of Auge, Bib. Nat., fr. 26040, no. 5097.

[178] Chaplain, p. 86. [179] Cousinot, p. 135.

[180] Jouvenel des Ursins, p. 532.

[181] Orders were issued Aug. 12, 1416, Nicolas de Baye, II, 263-4.

This fear of invasion was not dispelled by Bedford's naval victory. That battle itself was not reported as a defeat, and the unconcealable repulse was covered by reports of heavy English losses, including "Prince John," cousin of Henry V, among the killed, and Bedford himself among the wounded.[182] A new summons to the Normans was at once dispatched by Armagnac from Honfleur, ordering them to assemble at that town on pain of confiscation.[183] Bedford's return to England relieved the fear of an offensive from Harfleur, but Henry's journey to Calais in early September[184] excited apprehensions lest that city be made the base for an invasion from the north. Work of repairing Norman fortifications "à propos du recouvrement de la ville de Harfleur" was continued into September,[185] and by the end of that month the government was still further alarmed. The dauphin wrote from Quesnoy in Hainault, September 27, 1416,

182 St. Denis, VI, 42. This account closes:—"Judicet lector igitur quis amborum excercituum meliorem calculem reportavit." In some places the battle was reported a French victory, "Chronique de Pays Bas," de Smet *R. C. F.*, III, 365. Jouvenel des Ursins (p. 532) dwells on the heavy English losses. The Genoese took great pride in the part they played; "e con tutto cio fu laudata e commendata assai la prudenza e virtu dei Genovesi, che sostennero tanto la battaglia," Giustiniani, II, 278. At Bruges, however, it was believed that this victory assured the retention of Harfleur to the English, Morosini, II, 114.

183 Armagnac to the bailli of Rouen, Aug. 17, 1416, Bib. Nat., fr. 26041, no. 5102. The bailli of Rouen to the vicomtes of Pontauton, Pontaudemer, and Pont de l'Arche, Aug. 20, *ibid.*, no. 5105. Apparently the response was unsatisfactory for on Aug. 27 the bailli, acting on new orders from Armagnac, wrote to the vicomtes urging them to hasten the feudal mobilization, *ibid.*, no. 5110.

184 Sigismund crossed the Channel Aug. 24. Henry followed Sept. 4, returning to England Oct. 16.

185 Sept. 21, 1416, Charles VI ordered 600 livres to be expended in repairing Bayeux, *Le Cabinet Historique V*2 (1859), 182, no. 40. Work had been in progress at Neufchâtel and Longueville during June (Bib. Nat., fr. 26041, nos. 5077, 5138, 5083), at Molineaux castle near Rouen in July (*ibid.*, nos. 5089, 5096), at Vernon and Les Goulets during September (*ibid.*, no. 5113).

that the English king had landed at Calais, "avec toute sa puissance de gens, d'armes et de trait, en entencion, comme nous avons oy ey esy à croire, de porter tout le domaige qu'il pourra à mon dit seigneur et à son royaume." Cities were urged to forget civil dissension, to be prepared to support the king, and to respond to his summons against the ancient enemy.[186] At about the same time Charles VI informed a deputation from Amiens that he intended to send the constable into Picardy with a strong force, and ordered the city to receive him.[187]

True, the naval battle had by no means driven the French from the sea. Indeed the English were still in fear of an attack,[188] but hope of reducing Harfleur was gone. Consequently the French army was withdrawn from Normandy nearer to Paris,[189] and a truce concluded with the English from October 3, 1416 to February 2, 1417.[190]

[186] Letter to Tours, Luzarche, *Lettres Hist.*, p. 4; letter to Lyons, Louis Caillet, *Étude sur les Relations de la commune de Lyon avec Charles VII et Louis XI, 1417-1483* (Annales de l'Université de Lyon. Nouvelle série II. Fascicule 21, Lyon-Paris, 1909), p. j. 2, p. 300.

[187] J. N. A. Thierry, *Recueil des monuments inédits de l'Histoire du Tiers État* (4 vols., Paris, 1850-1870), II, 75, note 1.

[188] In August an attempt to block the passage to Calais was expected, Rymer, IX, 384. Sept. 10, 1416, orders were given the sheriffs to warn the men of the southern counties to be ready to assemble for defense of the realm, *ibid.*, p. 388; *Cal. of Letter Books of London*, I, 164. Titus Livius, *Vita Henrici Quinti* (Thomas Hearne, editor, Oxford, 1716), p. 29, tells of an indecisive naval fight off Calais during Henry's negotiations with Burgundy. Late in September a Genoese ship had the temerity to engage the English at Calais single-handed, Charles de la Roncière, *Histoire de la marine français* (t. II, *La Guerre des Cent Ans*, Paris, 1900), p. 225.

[189] For some indications of this withdrawal see Douët d'Arcq, *Choix de Pièces Inédits relatives au règne de Charles VI* (2 vols. Société de l'Histoire de France, Paris, 1863-1864), II, 69.

[190] Rymer, IX, 397: confirmed in England, Oct. 20, *ibid.*, p. 404.

CHAPTER II

THE CONQUEST LAUNCHED—TO THE CAPTURE OF FALAISE, 1416-1418

While Armagnac was occupied, during the summer of 1416, with the siege of Harfleur, John the Fearless played a waiting game. He did not desire to benefit the English by creating a diversion while prospects for Burgundian success were no greater than they had been during the previous year, when his efforts culminated in the Lagny fiasco. His captains, however, acting upon their own initiative, busied themselves with plundering up to the very walls of Paris.[1] There were two main lines of approach from Burgundian territory to the capital, one by the roads running from Picardy down the valley of the Oise, the other by those following the Seine valley northwestward from Dijon. Duke John followed the latter route in 1415 and the former in 1417. In the interim his partisans operated aimlessly along both, collecting plunder, committing atrocities, and hoping to precipitate a Paris revolution or to accomplish a coup de main.

During the summer of 1416 certain of these companies, operating from Artois, appeared south of the Somme.[2] The Armagnacs held the strongholds commanding the

1 Monstrelet (III, 148) tells of an attempt to surprise the chancellor and the prévôt of Paris at St. Denis.

2 Quesnes and Hangest were plundered, Chaulnes castle surprised, Lihons-en-Santerre pillaged, and Oisy castle and Davesnescourt captured; Monstrelet, III, 148-9; *Mémoires de Pierre de Fenin* (*1407-1427*), (Mlle. Dupont, editor, Paris, 1837), p. 73.

river-crossings, but by moving into Vermandois, the Burgundians could avoid the rivers or strike them near their sources where crossing was easy, and pass behind the defended places. Crossing also by Blanche-Taque they carried their activities into Eu, Aumâle, and Beauvoisis, from the sea to the Oise, capturing Aumâle castle, carrying off cattle, and holding the field without opposition.[3] From the southeast came men-at-arms sent to the duke by his sisters in Austria and Savoy. These invaded the region of the upper Seine, where the royal baillis attempted to block their march northward but were defeated at Bar-sur-Seine, which place the Burgundians captured. This resistance, however, prevented an advance Parisward down the river, apparently forcing the enemy to make a circuit east and northward until a juncture with other companies gave encouragement for an advance down the Aisne.[4]

Meanwhile, about the end of May, the constable sent Raymonet de la Guerre to Nesle and Noyon to re-enforce the bailli of Vermandois in defending the Somme frontier against the Picard companies.[5] That a check was put upon their incursions southward is indicated by the fact that the duke of Burgundy shortly consented that the companies maintain themselves in his own territory, confining their operations to the regions north of the Somme.[6] Turning eastward, then, against the companies on the Aisne, the Armagnac leaders, though suffering a repulse while attempting to relieve Neufchâtel-sur-Aisne, again

[3] Monstrelet, III, 148, 182; Fenin, p. 74. See map following p. 308.

[4] A pro-Burgundian chronicler reports the defeat of the baillis of Troyes, Sens, and Chaumont before Bar-sur-Seine, but the next Burgundian success which he records is the capture of Montaigu near Laon, "Le Livre des Trahisons," p. 131.

[5] Monstrelet, III, 160; St. Denis, VI, 82.

[6] Although the chroniclers are pro-Burgundian they record no further Burgundian successes south of that river.

appear to have checked the enemy,[7] and by August they had pacified Vermandois and Santerre hanging as brigands all Burgundians captured so that certain large trees near Montdidier are said to have been "merveilleusement chargés et hordés."[8] The enemy, however, checked in one place, struck in another. Eluding the Armagnac frontier guards, these Burgundian forces of the upper Aisne and Oise united, made a dash down the west bank of the latter stream, crossed at Auvers, and appeared suddenly on August 13, 1416 before Paris, where they attempted to surprise the city, or to raise a civil commotion. Failing, they turned northward at once, surprised and pillaged Beaumont-sur-Oise, then following the road through Clermont back into the Somme valley, they turned eastward into Vermandois, treated Nesle as they had treated Beaumont, and escaped into Burgundian territory.[9]

This all but successful Burgundian exploit, coupled with the failure of the operations against Harfleur, decided Armagnac to adopt a new strategy. No decisive action against the English could now reasonably be expected, nor, on the other hand, need the latter be regarded as a serious menace for the next six months. If, however, the country was to sustain the burdens which must be put upon it in order to resist the hostile attacks sure to come with the following year, it must be protected from Burgundian, English, and brigand raiders. To this end had been directed the activities of the royal baillis on the

[7] Monstrelet, III, 180; Fenin, p. 73. Again it seems justifiable from the failure of the Burgundian chroniclers to mention successes, to assume that, excepting the raid on Paris, the Armagnacs succeeded in holding the frontier. St. Denis (VI, 48) records depredations in Picardy, which is Burgundian territory. Not until December, 1416, do we learn of serious interruption of Paris-Amiens communications, Nicolas de Baye, II, 275.

[8] Victor de Beauville, *Histoire de la ville de Montdidier* (3 vols. Paris, 1857), I, 132.

[9] Nicolas de Baye, II, 265; St. Denis, VI, 44-6; Monstrelet, III, 150-1; "Chronique des Pays-Bas," p. 364.

Seine, Oise, and Aisne, already described. Earlier in the year efforts had been made to protect the Orleanais from companies coming from the east.[10] The year following we get a glimpse of similar activity in Normandy.[11] On August 16, 1416, the parlement at Paris took up considerations of means for suppressing brigandage.[12] Two weeks later (August 30) was issued a proclamation outlawing the Burgundian companies, supplemented by letters from the dauphin to the baillis of Amiens and Vermandois ordering all men-at-arms to cease from rapine on pain of arrest.[13] Additional arrangements were made for defending the capital. During a momentary lull, the Paris government followed these measures with preparations for an offensive movement to restore its prestige and to put a check on enemy activities. No great success had yet been gained to offset the disasters of 1415. There was apprehension of an Anglo-Burgundian alliance.[14] Popular opinion, in the north at least, felt that the English war would continue until Burgundy again controlled the capital.[15] But the Armagnacs, conscious of still unexerted strength, were confident. Consequently, on finding Burgundy prepared to form a Franco-Burgundian alliance against the English, they refused to come to terms.[16]

[10] Delisle, *Les Collections de Bastard d'Estang,* p. 77, Chart. Orig. 703; *Cat. anal. de Joursanvault,* p. 17, no. 121.

[11] The dauphin at Mantes called for volunteers to attack a hostile company near Nonancourt, Grave, p. 317.

[12] Denifle and Chatelain, IV, 320, no. 2071; Nicolas de Baye, II, 266.

[13] Monstrelet, III, 160, 167.

[14] Nicolas de Baye, II, 267; Monstrelet, III, 164.

[15] Morosini, II, 122.

[16] Monstrelet, III, 165-6. Politically, no anti-Burgundian move was made beyond prohibiting, at the instance of the University, the publishing or reading of the pamphlet "le Justification du duc de Bourgoine." Nicolas de Baye (II, 269-270) records the publication of this prohibition on Sept. 16, 1416. The modern copy in Arch. Nat., K 60, no. 7, cited by Jules Tardif, *Monuments Historiques* (Paris, 1866), no. 1926, is dated Dec. 9, 1416.

Preparations for new offensive and defensive operations now occupied the government's attention, and, as always, the chief need was money. New orders for the payment of the subsidy in Languedoc were issued November 26, 1416, with the result that by spring returns began to come in.[17] Royal directions had been given continuing for another year, in the bailliages of Amiens, Vermandois, and Senlis, an imposition of four deniers on the livre laid on the clergy, nobility, and towns, an imposition which, in January 1417, the king attempted to extend to other regions.[18] In expectation of renewed attack from England another aide was levied in February, 1417, to be collected the following month.[19] This was followed by de-

[17] Dognon, *Annales du Midi*, I, 440-1.

[18] This statement is based on an undated letter to the bishop of Lisieux (Arch. Nat., K 60, no. 15[4] original), which Tardif (no. 1922) assigns to 1415. That it was written between Jan. 26, 1417 and Feb. 2, 1417 appears from internal evidence. There is mention of "notre trescher et aisne fil, Jehan, duc de Normandie." He was "aisne fil" from Dec. 18, 1415, until his death, Apr. 5, 1417, consequently the letter must be of that period. It further mentions "le jour de mardi prochain venant en quel dovient faillir les trieves prises entre nous et nos diz anemis." The only Anglo-French truce in the above period was from Oct. 3, 1416, to Feb. 2, 1417 (*vide supra*, p. 36). The latter date came on Tuesday. Therefore the letter must have been written after Tuesday, Jan. 26. It says, however, "nous entendons le Roy d'Engleterre est ja passez la mer et entet de son pooir avec ses aliez, nos anemis, porter dommage à nous et à tout le peuple de notre Royaume" as soon as the truce ends. This was not true. It may be that the French government believed some unfounded rumor, or it may have "created" this crisis to impress on the bishop the necessity of compliance.

[19] Feb. 14, 1417, 5000 livres of this aide was apportioned to Lyons, Caillet, p. j. 3, p. 301. A document of Feb. 3, 1417, mentions "les commissaires—sur le fait del'aide—pour resister aux anglois et extirper du royaume les pilleries et roberies qui a present sont en plusiers parties dudit royaume," Brit. Mus., Add. Ch. 6801. 5000 francs was laid on Mâcon, Caillet, p. 299, p. j. 1. In Provence 100,000 francs was levied by royal orders without consent of the estates, Vaissette, IX, 1037, note 5. Rouen was taxed 20,000 livres, Bib. Nat., fr. 26041, no. 5164. An assessment of 15,000 livres was made upon Reims in a letter from the king dated Feb. 14, *Le Moyen Age*, 2[e] série, t. XX (1918), 314-5. Feb. 23, 28,000 livres was assigned to Amiens for payment, A. de Calonne, *Histoire de la ville d'Amiens*

mands from the dauphin upon the cities for loans,[20] with promises that repayment would be made "pro certo de prima peccuniali collecta super plebem imponenda,"[21] while 60,000 l. t. was forcibly borrowed from sixty-seven leading men of the kingdom then at Paris, adherents of both parties.[22]

Collection, however, either of aide or loan, was not easy. Mâcon complained that it could not endure the burden of both and secured, in March, a letter from the king directing that only so much of the tax as could be paid be demanded.[23] Amiens sent delegations both to the dauphin, then in Holland, and to the king at Paris, pleading poverty and asking to be exempt from the aide. Securing from Charles no more than a 2000 livres reduction of assessment, negotiations with the dauphin were pushed. On April 21, 1417 the envoys reported that they obtained remission of 1000 livres on the clergy and 2000 livres on the bourgeoisie.[24] As for the loan, the city agreed to provide 1500 florins instead of the 3000 écus demanded.[25] Mantes delayed by sending to the king to know "se il vouldroit prest estre fait à monseigneur le Dauphin," and then offered twelve silver plates.[26] At Rouen it was found necessary to remit 3000 livres, to promise that 1000 livres of the remainder be employed on the local

(2 vols. Amiens, 1899), II, 362, note 4. *Journal de Clement de Fauquembergue, greffier du Parlement de Paris, 1417-1435* (A. Tuetey editor. 3 vols. Société de l'Histoire de France. Paris, 1903-1915), I, 25, under June 9, 1417, mentions "l'aide mis sus ou mois de mars derrain passé."

[20] From Mâcon he asked 1200 écus (Caillet, p. 299), from Amiens 3000 écus (Maugis, p. 304, note 1), from Rouen 6000 livres (Bib. Nat., fr. 26041, no. 5164), from Mantes 1000 écus (Grave, p. 310).

[21] St. Denis, VI, 60.

[22] A. de Boislisle (ed.), "1416-1417, Un Episode de la Domination des Armagnacs à Paris" (*Bulletin de la Société de l'Histoire de France*, 1884, p. 219).

[23] Caillet, p. 299, p. j. 1.

[24] A. de Calonne, *La Vie Municipale au XV^e siècle dans le Nord de la France* (Paris, 1880), pp. 310-311.

[25] Maugis, p. 304, note 1.

[26] Grave, pp. 309-10.

defenses, and to offer, as inducement for prompt payment of the aide, the immediate repayment of the loan, and the use of the money for maintaining troops on the Harfleur frontier from which Rouen was most seriously threatened.[27] The municipality then floated a loan among its citizens to pay the aide.[28]

This inability to get money promptly remained the chief difficulty for the royal government. Burgundy was making extensive military preparations.[29] Henry was doing likewise. At Calais they had met in conference, and the French, while ignorant of the subjects discussed, feared from the subsequent publication of a truce, that a secret alliance had been concluded.[30] To meet these threatening attacks money must be had at once. May 15, 1417 the chancellor laid the question before the two chambres.[31] Nine days later the subject was revived in full parlement, before the chancellor and the constable. Here it was demonstrated that for the next four or five months there was need of from 8-900,000 francs, and that the finances on hand would last only until June.[32] In the face of this situation the chambres could only advise that peace be made with Burgundy. This counsel was later repeated, and letters exhorting peace sent to the duke and to the frontier cities, but nothing resulted. To meet the immediate crisis forced loans were suggested.[33] The chambre des requêtes decided to investigate the resources of rich individuals,

[27] Bib. Nat., fr. 26041, no. 5164. The only indication of troops on this frontier is a record of men-at-arms and arbalesters at Quillebeuf, guarding against the English, April 28, 1417, *ibid.*, fr. 26042, no. 5173.

[28] *Ibid.*, fr. 26047, no. 221.

[29] In June he gave orders to mobilize, Fenin, p. 75. For his preparations in April and May see *Le Moyen Age*, 2e série, XX, 322, note 1.

[30] May 13, 1417, Charles VI to Tours, Luzarche, pp. 12-18; May 14, Charles VI to Reims, *Le Moyen Age*, 2e série, XX, 323; William Besse, *Recueil de diverses pièces servant à l'histoire du roy Charles VI* (Paris, 1660), p. 132.

[31] Fauquembergue, I, 14-15.

[32] *Ibid.*, p. 17.

[33] *Ibid.*, I, 19, 21.

exhorting them "bien et aimablement," with promises of prompt repayment and good security, to make loans to the king, and using force against the obstinate.[34] The king's secretary was commissioned "ad recipiendum mutua—pro solutione gentium armorum et defensione Regni," and the chambre itself advanced 2000 francs.[35] Orders went out directing the baillis to take over the administration of temporalities in vacant dioceses,[36] and apparently, in late May or early June, another aide was laid upon the realm.[37]

June 9, 1417 a scheme for raising money quickly was presented. This embraced proposals for increasing the income from the gabelle, for levying a dîme on the clergy (to be paid most promptly under pressure from the prelates), for abolishing exemptions from payment of the aides for that year as well as all other exemptions made since 1407, for curtailing royal expenses, for persuading the seigneurs to bring men-at-arms and accept four months' wages in place of the revenue which they were entitled to take from the aide, for levying octrois at the towns, for debasing the coinage, and for mortgaging the royal jewels and plate. It was hoped that this program would net the government 650,000 francs[38] (running ex-

[34] *Ibid.*, I, 22.

[35] Bib. de Rouen, Collection Leber 5870, t. III, Jornalia thesauri, ff. 221-2. The following January re-payment was made, 800 livres to the chancellor, 400 livres to the bishop of Paris, 400 livres to the treasurer of France, 240 livres to the maîtres de requêtes of the treasurer's household, 40 livres to the clerk of accounts. In December the treasurer, and the bishop, each loaned 400 livres more which was repaid the following February (cf. Fauquembergue I, 24, 41); 1000 livres was obtained from certain merchants. The abbey of St. Denis was called upon to supply 3000 écus d'or, to provide which treasure had to be sold, St. Denis, VI, 68.

[36] May 28, 1417, Isambert, VIII, 580, no. 638.

[37] Fauquembergue (I, 25) on June 9, mentions, after the March aide, "celui [i.e. l'aide] qui derrainment a esté mis sus." Twice in the year, says St. Denis (VI, 66), a heavy tax was levied to support the army.

[38] Fauquembergue, I, 25-6.

penses for about three months, during which time the aide could be collected). Some of these measures were adopted. Six livres the measure added to the gabelle it was hoped would raise enough to repay 50,000 livres borrowed in January, 1415, and 60,000 livres additional.[39] As a result, by October, the price of salt had reached four écus d'or,[40] and every citizen was ordered to buy a certain amount.[41] The coinage was debased,[42] and in mid-July, for need of ready money to keep the army together, orders were issued "que nos joyaulx et vaisselle, quelque part qu'ilz soient baillez en gaige ou en garde à marchans et autres personnes, en quelque main que ce soit, soient prins deceulx qui les ont, et l'or et l'argent d'iceulx vendus." The money so obtained was to be paid to the treasurer of war, and obligations given to the present holders.[43] Later when the constable packed the queen off to Blois, he seized her treasure stored at Melun and used it to pay the soldiers.[44] Whether or not these measures were successful cannot be shown. Whatever the actual returns, the people believed vast sums to have been accumulated and prodigally given to the men-at-arms. To the monk of St. Denis, anxious for the abbey's precious things, the members of the government appeared to be rapacious, insatiable, deadly enemies of the realm,[45] and even a more friendly chronicler admits, without attempting any defense, that the Armagnacs had a bad reputation for making excessive levies "lequel n'estoit point employé au bien de la chose publique."[46]

Meanwhile there was considerable activity for improving the defenses of Normandy. The English attack would

[39] June 14, 1417, Bib. Nat., fr. 25709, no. 751.
[40] *Journal d'un Bourgeois*, p. 81.
[41] St. Denis, VI, 68.
[42] *Ibid.*, p. 66.
[43] Bib. Nat., fr. 25709, no. 752; no. 753 is a duplicate.
[44] St. Denis, VI, 72-4.
[45] *Ibid.*, p. 68.
[46] Jouvenel des Ursins, p. 502.

fall there and the hope of warding it off lay in making the cities and castles capable of stubborn resistance. The enemy would then exhaust his strength without achieving any decisive results. The king appointed special commissioners "à faict reparer, et garnir de vivres et habillements de guerre, les villes de Honnefleu et Monstierviller, et les autres villes, chasteaulx, et forteresses du pais de Normendie, pour resister à l'entreprinses des angles," whose expenses were to be drawn from the receipts of the Norman vicomtes and grenetiers.[47] An ordinance of June 3 empowered them extensively to requisition laborers and wagons throughout the duchy, it being incumbent upon the vicomtes to collect the same at the commissioner's orders.[48] Particular effort was made to strengthen Honfleur, capture of which would close the Seine.[49] At Rouen both royal and local authorities were busy. The city government floated another loan to put the walls into a state of defense.[50] A general contribution was imposed on the citizens.[51] At the same time the municipal procureur-general demanded 200 écus from the cathedral chapter, while the bailli assessed the monks of St. Ouen 400 écus which they refused to pay. The royal commissioners enforced payment.[52] Directions came from the

[47] Bib. Nat., fr. 26042, nos. 5195-6. [48] *Ibid.*, no. 5228.

[49] *Ibid.*, nos. 5167, 5177, 5182, 5183, 5186, 5187, 5192, 5194, 5200, 5203, 5204, 5205, 5214. These are all records of work done at Honfleur. The dates range from Mar. 24 to July 24, 1417, cf. Archives de la Seine Inf., Occupation Anglaise, pièces mêlées, I—letter of the commissioners establishing the salary of Adam of Brageloigne appointed "au paiement des euvres et fortifications de ladicte ville de Honnefleu et autres villes et chasteaulx du pais de Normandie." For receipts from him for work done at Honfleur in April and May see Archives du Calvados, F Fonds Danquin, Série Honfleur.

[50] Bib. Nat., fr. 26047, no. 221.

[51] Léon Puiseux, *Siège et Prise de Rouen par les Anglais, 1418-1419* (Caen, 1867), p. 24.

[52] *Bull. de l'Hist. de Norm.*, III, 328-9; Puiseux, *Siège de Rouen*, pp. 24-6; A. Chéruel, *Histoire de Rouen sous la domination anglaise au quinzième siècle* (Rouen, 1840), p. j., pp. 7-13.

king to his officers to inspect the walls and towers, to put them into a state of defense, to provide guards for them from among the citizens, to assess contributions, to bring into the city provisions and property from near-by towns abandoned as indefensible, to burn these latter if necessary, to expel the seditious and "inutiles," and to garrison and defend Mont St. Catherine.[53] New officials were appointed, the new bailli being charged, in addition, with the defense of Caen and Falaise,[54] and it seems highly probable that the garrison was very considerably strengthened.[55]

Other "bonnes villes" were similarly occupied. June 4, 1417, Charles VI wrote the captain of Vernon that, in view of the English menace, he must fortify the town for resistance, inspect the walls and moats, and impress the necessary labor, throwing the expense on the city and the surrounding places which enjoy his protection, as was customary.[56] Senlis levied a taille and contracted a loan for the repair of the fortifications.[57] At Paris the prévôt was directed to fortify and provision the city, with authority to force everyone to share the expense.[58] Later

[53] Royal commission to this effect was issued June 3, 1417. On June 17, Raoul de Gaucourt, bailli of Rouen, published the royal orders, *Bull. de l'Hist. de Norm.*, III, 328; Léon Fallue, *Histoire politique et religieuse de l'église métropolitane et du diocèse de Rouen* (4 vols. Rouen, 1850-1851), II, 322.

[54] May 28, 1417, the seigneur of Préaux became captain of Rouen in place of the count of Tancarville who was pro-Burgundian (Hellot, *Cron. de Norm.*, p. 25). June 13, 1417, Gilbert de Lafayette replaced Raoul de Gaucourt as bailli; Bib. Nat., fr. 20684, f. 73; cf. Fauquembergue, I, 29.

[55] There is a quittance of Oct. 3, 1416 for 123 livres, a fortnight's wages of the garrison; Brit. Mus., Add. Ch. 11437. On Oct. 12, 1417, the captain drew 3100 livres on the receveur of Rouen to pay his soldiers, *ibid.*, 11443.

[56] This letter is published in E. Meyer, *Histoire de la ville de Vernon et de son ancienne Châtellenie* (2 vols., Andelys, 1874), I, 387.

[57] J. Flammermont, *Histoire de Senlis pendant la seconde partie de la guerre de Cent ans* (*1405-1451*) (Mémoires de la Société de l'Histoire de Paris, t. V. Paris, 1879), p. 200.

[58] April 22, 1417, Isambert, VIII, 580, no. 636.

the king ordered the local authorities to sell "rentes" to the value of 1000 livres, the proceeds to be expended on city defenses.[59] Crossings of the Seine and Oise were guarded. Artillery was placed on the walls. Householders stocked their larders for a year. Grain prices were arbitrarily fixed while tariffs on provisions were abolished as an encouragement to merchants from outside. Suspects were expelled, and men enrolled for city-defense.[60]

Throughout Normandy castles were being taken into royal hands and strengthened at royal expense.[61] Courtonne castle, normally under the jurisdiction of the bishop of Lisieux, was taken in guard by the king because of the English war.[62] Itinerant commissioners went out to inspect strongholds and collect information "touchant les rediffícacions et desemparemens neccessaires."[63] Vicomtes received orders to make all necessary repairs on strongholds of their vicomtés.[64] Sometimes the costs

[59] June 9, 1417, Fauquembergue, I, 24.

[60] St. Denis, VI, 84-6.

[61] The local powers were also busy. "Monseigneur Jehan de Langres, evêque de Bayeux garnit d'artillerie le chastel de Nuilly [l'Evêque], etant en son diocese, afin qu'il ne pust etre pris par les Anglois." Compte de Pierre de Gorremont, Bib. Nat., Coll. Bourgogne, vol. 104, f. 200 v°. The abbot of Mont St. Michel hastened home from Paris to defend his abbey, and the monks undertook to strengthen the fortifications at their own expense, "Thomas le Roy et le MS des Curieuses Recherches du Mont Sainct Michel" (*Mémoires de la Société des Antiquaires de Normandie,* XXIX, 267 ff., Caen, 1877), pp. 465-6.

[62] Mar. 7, 1417, H. de Formeville, *Histoire de l'ancien évêche-comté de Lisieux* (Paris, 1873), p. DLIV.

[63] Feb. 13, 1417, they were at St. Sauveur-le-Vicomte. This was evidently a local inspection by the officials of the Cotentin, but it seems probable that similar measures were being taken in other bailliages, Léopold Delisle, *Histoire du Château et des Sires de Saint-Sauveur-le Vicomte* (Valognes, 1867), p. j. 247, pp. 333-4. Officials "comis à visiter les forteresses de ce royaume" inspected Mantes, Grave, p. 318.

[64] Aug. 8, 1417, letter to the vicomte of Coutances, Bib. Nat., fr. 26042, no. 5212. In May permission had been given to draw on the seigneurial revenues for guard and repairs at Hambye and Briquebec castles "et autres estans en la main du Roy," Fauquembergue, I, 13-4. There remain records

were met from the ordinary vicomtal receipts,[65] at other times special orders went out to the commissioner of aides to draw upon the war revenues.[66] From these latter came the means for buying munitions for such places as were insufficiently supplied, although the duty of actually providing the requisite matériel appears to have fallen on the captains.[67]

The necessity of remaining on the defensive put a great strain on the Armagnacs. Their attempt to strike a blow at the English in 1416 had been costly and futile. With no increase in resources[68] that attempt could not be repeated. At the same time precautions must be taken against surprise from Burgundy,[69] while preparations had to be made against the inevitable renewal of the English war, in which it was expected that the Bur-

of repairs at Gisors (Brit. Mus., Add. Ch. 10941-2), at Conches (Bib. Nat., fr. 26041, no. 5181), at Gournay (*ibid.*, 5198-9), at Regneville (*ibid.*, fr. 26042, no. 5210), and at Pont de l'Arche (Brit. Mus., Add. Ch. 10946).

[65] Bib. Nat., fr. 26041, nos. 5198-9.

[66] June 14, 1417, Charles VI to the commissioners. He has learned that Pont de l'Arche castle needs considerable repair. Pay out 200 livres from the war levy in the bailliage of Rouen and make the same at once, Bib. Nat., fr. nouv. acq. 5821, no. 71.

[67] May 21, 1417, order to the commissioner in Evreux to pay 100 francs to the captain of Conches "pour convertir et emploiez en l'achat d'arbalestes, artillerie, et autres abillements de guerre," *ibid.*, no. 750. We find the captain of Mantes buying feathers for arrows at Paris; Grave, p. 318. Further activity in regard to munitioning appears from a document of June recording the shipment from Cherbourg to Valognes of 9 cannon, 12 arbalests, 10 bows, 22 bundles of arrows, 8 boxes of cross-bow bolts, a box of salt-petre, a sack of gun-powder, and 12 "paniers," Bib. Nat., fr. 26041, no. 5188.

[68] It is possible that a new force of 1500 Genoese arbalesters was coming north to join Armagnac. On July 22-4, 1417, they were at Montferrand, A. Thomas, "Soldats italiens au service de la France en 1417," *Annales du Midi*, IV, 68-70. Sept. 6, 1417, a Genoese captain and four arbalesters were ordered into garrison at Brie-Conte-Robert, *Cat. anal. de Joursanvault*, p. 44, no. 327.

[69] For eleven months (i.e. August, 1416-July, 1417) Paris was apprehensive of immediate attack, St. Denis, VI, 70.

gundians would act with the enemy. Consequently the constable was constrained to keep his forces on a war footing, draining the treasury and alienating the people by heavy taxes to meet military expenses, without gaining anything but momentary security. There were strong garrisons in the Somme fortresses (Peronne, Demuin, Amiens, Corbie), but they could not hope to withstand alone the large army which Duke John was reported to be collecting, inasmuch as the local levies in Vermandois had already been cut to pieces in border warfare, and Raymonet de la Guerre had fallen back to Paris to consult the government.[70]

Since spring John the Fearless had been issuing popular manifestoes designed to appeal to an overtaxed people.[71] He made special efforts to secure the adherence of the Somme towns, the first line of Armagnac defense.[72] Appeals were also addressed to, and agents sent into, Normandy and the northern cities.[73] Dieppe, indeed, eventually opened its gates to a Burgundian captain, who made the town a base for attacks on the Armagnacs at Arques and Pontrancart.[74] As early as February the king had attempted to forestall Burgundy by ordering the baillis to seize all ducal letters addressed to cities in their bailliages and to send the same to Paris without permitting any one to read them, to arrest all persons bringing

[70] St. Denis, VI, 82.

[71] April 25, 1417 is the date of the first one issued from Hesdin, Dom Plancher, *Histoire Générale et Particulière du Bourgogne* (4 vols., Dijon, 1739-1781), III, 303: the original is Arch. Nat., J 963, no. 7.

[72] Monstrelet, III, 184; *Le Moyen Age*, 2e série, XX, 325, note 1.

[73] May 18, 1417, Burgundy to Rouen, Arch. Nat., X1a 8603, f. 17 vo. In June Burgundy sent treasonable letters to the northern cities, Fauquembergue, I, 30-1. Reception of the Burgundian envoys at Mantes, Grave, p. 318. From a letter of the dauphin to Reims, dated Aug. 19, we learn that Reims was Burgundian by that date, G. du Fresne de Beaucourt, *Histoire de Charles VII* (6 vols., Paris, 1881-91), I, 74; also *vide infra* note 148.

[74] Hellot, *Cron. de Norm.*, pp. 29-30.

letters from the duke, if such letters should be posted on church doors or elsewhere to tear them down and to punish those who had put them up, and to order the local authorities to surrender unopened and immediately any communications they might receive from the duke. Against the duke's treasonable propaganda the king issued anti-Burgundian prohibitions, publicly burning Duke John's manifestoes, ordering Amiens not to obey the duke nor give entrance to his officers or soldiers, forbidding Troyes to do the same,[75] warning Mantes to disarm all men-at-arms presenting themselves at the gates and to allow passage to small companies only, blaming Burgundy for the continuance of the war and accusing him of forming an alliance with the English, upbraiding the cities which opened their gates to him and threatening punishment for treason upon them.[76] Such measures could not be expected, however, to have effect when a crisis arose. More strenuous measures against Burgundy, on the other hand, precipitated a revolt at Rouen which required the dauphin's presence and occupied him until the English invasion.[77]

Nor was it only in the north and west that danger threatened. In Languedoc the Armagnacs had spent the spring and early summer attacking Réole castle with small success and considerable loss. Toulouse itself was not free from English sympathizers.[78] While in the opposite direction Dauphiné was threatened by Sigismund now in open alliance with Burgundy and England.[79]

[75] *Le Moyen Age,* 2 série, XX, 316-17; Maugis, p. 263; Arch. Nat., X^{1a} 8603 f. 18 v°; *ibid.,* J 768 no. 44.

[76] *Le Moyen Age,* 2e série, XX, 318-27; Grave, p. 318.

[77] St. Denis, VI, 92-6; Hellot, *Cron. de Norm.,* pp. 28-9; de Beaucourt, "Presidential Address," *Bulletin de l'Histoire de Normandie,* III, 330-5.

[78] Vaissette, IX, 1037, 1038, note 1; X, no. 809.

[79] April 29, 1417, letters of Sigismund to Duke John promising to assist Burgundy avenge his injuries against the Armagnacs, L. P. Gachard,

In the latter country, during this period of preparation, the advantage gained by Bedford was promptly utilized. Steps were taken to secure provisions for Harfleur by indenture with private individuals;[80] the victualler of Harfleur received orders to transport grain from Southampton[81] which he duly executed;[82] and considerable sums for supplies and provisions were expended.[83] Similarly grain was shipped to Calais.[84] The cost of these provisions, charged against the garrison's wages, covered at Harfleur more than half that item of expense.[85] Furthermore a "dyker" was sent over to remove a mound, doubtless thrown up by the besiegers of 1415, and to

Rapport sur les documents concernant l'histoire de la Belgique qui existent dans les dépôts littéraires de Dijon et de Paris, 1e partie, "Archives de Dijon" (Brussels 1843), p. 46, no. 49. Sigismund wrote Charles VI that he was allied with Henry and planned to intervene in the war with all his power; *Report on the Foedera,* "Archives de France," p. 308. June 2, 1417 the estates of Dauphiné were summoned "pour aviser aux moyen de resister aux entreprinses du roi des Romains," Isambert, VIII, 580, no. 640.

80 Sept. 18, 1416, Nicholas Harewode indented to buy beasts in Wales, bringing them to Southampton for "lardar et stuffura ville Regis de Harefleu." On the date of indenture he received £66 13s 4d. He delivered 4 bulls, 746 beeves, and 50 cows to Reginald Curteys, victualler of Harfleur, receiving in payment £100. These were received at Harfleur Oct. 28, 1416. P. R. O., For. Accts. 51 (5 Henry V), m. Avo. Other private enterprises appear from a licence of Dec. 9, 1416 to one of the king's squires to ship 300 tons of grain from Ireland to Harfleur, Bordeaux, and Bayonne, provided the customs and subsidies be paid, *Cal. Pat. Rolls, Henry V,* II, 59.

81 Cal. Fr. Rolls, 44.584.

82 Oct. 20, 1416, order to ship 1100 quarters of wheat from Southampton, *Cal. Pat. Rolls, Henry V,* II, 46.

83 Issued from the exchequer:—Oct. 26, 1416, £333 6s 8d for supplies; Nov. 6, £666 13s 4d for grain, hogs and other victuals; Nov. 23, £386 12s 9d for supplies, P. R. O., Issue Roll 629, mm. 1, 3.

84 In January 1417, 1200 quarters of wheat were shipped, *Cal. Pat. Rolls, Henry V,* II, 60.

85 Nov. 30, 1416, there was issued to Thomas Barnaby, treasurer of Harfleur, £1014 12s 1d in money and £1385 7s 10d in obligations for merchandise (*vide supra,* note 83), on the wages of the garrison, P. R. O. Issue Roll 629, m. 3.

build a fosse about the town.[86] New exports of provisions followed the termination of the truce.[87] Fresh contingents of workmen to strengthen the defenses were dispatched,[88] and re-enforcements of soldiers were in preparation.[89] Altogether the maintenance of the Harfleur garrison proved to be a considerable burden. From December 5, 1415, to March 2, 1417, it had cost England £15,507 10s 1½d, over three-eighths of the deficit for 1416, a year in which the burden of taxation had been unusually heavy.[90] Yet the only success attendant upon this expenditure had been resistance to recapture, and that had necessitated a large and costly naval expedition. If the benefits from the triumphs of 1415 were to be reaped new efforts must be made.

Such efforts had been initiated by the end of 1416. Parliamentary grant assured Henry of finances for two years.[91] An entente if not an alliance had been concluded at Calais in October 1416, with Burgundy.[92] At the same

[86] Dec. 14, 1416, this man was paid in advance £200 of the £800 for which he agreed to do the job, Devon Issues, p. 349.

[87] The truce ended Feb. 2, 1417. Feb. 11 the victualler received orders to provide food, Cal. Fr. Rolls, 44.587. Mar. 2, £800 for supplies was issued from the exchequer; Mar. 18, £26 13s 4d for supplies was issued, P. R. O., Issue Roll 629, mm. 12, 15.

[88] Feb. 8, 1417, payment from the exchequer of £291 4s for one master and 16 carpenters, 1 master and 16 masons, 6 "tegulators," and 2 "lyme-brynners," *ibid.*, m., 9.

[89] Feb. 26, 1417, John Pelham made indenture to serve with 8 men-at-arms and 60 archers for one year, beginning March 19, in defense of Harfleur; Feb. 27, Salisbury did the same with 100 men-at-arms and 300 archers "qui ne seront tenus de rester en cette ville que jusque à la venue du dit Roy en France," Rôles de Bréquigny, 71-2. Sir John Popham indented with 10 men-at-arms and 30 archers, *Cal. Pat. Rolls, Henry V,* II, 75.

[90] The total receipts for 1416 were greater than for any subsequent year of Henry's reign, *vide infra,* p. 144.

[91] Parliament at Westminster, Oct. 19, 1416, voted two tenths and two fifteenths, *Deputy Keeper's Report,* 2, appendix II, p. 187. Jan. 5-12, 1417 the convocation of York voted "unam integram decimam,"; Wilkens, III, 380.

[92] The document in Rymer (IX, 394) in which the duke recognizes

time England made diplomatic advances to the French allies with a view to undermining their friendship, and to France's neighbors for the purpose of securing their alliance.[93] Overtures for the conclusion of a truce were made to Scotland,[94] while proposals to prorogue the truce and to treat with France for peace served their customary purpose of screening aggressive preparations.[95] Meanwhile, in January, the first steps for raising an army had been taken, and extensive activity for assembling transports, munitions, and provisions initiated. Throughout the summer this continued till it culminated on August 1, 1417 in the landing of an expeditionary force at Touques commanded by the king in person.

But the English must first secure the mastery of the

Henry's rights to the French crown, promises homage, and agrees to aid him in war, is obviously an unconcluded agreement. The lack of date and place of signing, and the indefinite allusion to "ses Ennemis du Royaulme de France (c'est assavoir) A, B, C, D, etc.," shows it to be a document drawn up tentatively for use during the negotiations, the English demands perhaps, but not an actual agreement. Negotiations for a truce continued throughout the spring of 1417, Burgundy having been rebuffed by the Armagnacs. The inclusion of Boulogne in the truce (May 8, 1417) helped the English in their efforts to dominate the Channel. Rymer, IX, 449, 451, 425, 454. For negotiations with the Flemings see *Proceedings,* II, 186-7, 191-2, 221. By July 31, 1417 the truce with Flanders had been extended, thus securing English commerce from Flemish attack, while leaving the English free to attack Genoese ships without fear of capturing Flemish goods. Thomas Goodwin, *The History of the Reign of Henry the Fifth, King of England* (London, 1704), pp. 151-2, citing Cottonian MSS. Caligula D 5 (now destroyed). Such attacks on the Genoese were made, Brit. Mus., Sloane 4602, f. 55.

[93] Dec. 2, 1416, commissions issued to treat for alliance with Aragon, and for truce and alliance with Genoa, Rymer, IX, 410, 414. Dec. 15, instructions to ambassadors in Castile to persuade the king to renounce all league with France, *ibid.,* p. 419. Jan. 20, power to revive the former alliance between England and Castile, *ibid.,* p. 431. By Feb. 24, 1417, these negotiations were ended, safe-conduct for return of the envoys being issued, Cal. Fr. Rolls, 44.588.

[94] June 7, 1417, Northumberland empowered to treat, Rymer, IX, 458.

[95] Jan. 18, 1417, commission to prorogue the truce, Rymer, IX, 422: Mar. 11 the same; Mar. 12 power to treat for peace, *ibid.,* p. 438.

Channel. The French still had a Genoese squadron of nine carricks, "the grettest that ever was seyne in thes costes," according to English accounts, stationed at Honfleur. Want of supplies had kept them inactive all summer, although we have evidence that matériel was sent down the Seine in July for the equipment of the fleet.[96] Popular criticism of the government's failure to send military stores and to provide men, and discontent with the failure of the Genoese "to do something," is reflected in the chronicle of St. Denis.[97] Against this force, as a preliminary to his invasion, Henry sent the earl of Huntingdon, who, on June 29, 1417, won a victory off Clef de Caux, capturing four carricks, which Henry added to his own navy,[98] the French admiral, and "alle the tresour that they alle shulde have to wages with, ffore a quarter off a yeer." The other Genoese vessels took refuge in Brittany leaving the Seine open to the invader.[99] "And so we know for certain," wrote a Venetian in Flanders, "that the wrath of God has brought these three defeats upon the French because of their arrogance and pride."[100]

On July 23, 1417 the English expedition embarked. Its

[96] July 8, 1417, quittance to the general master and inspector of artillery for 52 livres paid for transport on the Seine in a boat of 60 tons of "six grans manteaux et engines faiz de boiz pour fait de guerre, avecques grant nombre de trait qui estoit pour la garnison des carraques lors estans prez de chief de Caux," *Bull. de l'Hist. de Norm.*, VI, 494.

[97] St. Denis, VI, 66, 96, 98, 100; Jouvenel des Ursins (p. 534) speaks of the French ships as "mal equippez de gens."

[98] Williams, *Gesta*, p. 87, note 2.

[99] William de Meuillon glosses over the defeat by saying, "Mays la, Dieu mercy, monsieur de Nerbonne et ceulx de sa compaignie, s'en partirent à l'onneur," Maignien, p. 21; St. Denis, VI, 96-8; Kingsford, *Chronicles of London*, I, 71, and *E. H. R.*, XXIX, 512; Morosini, II, 136; Livius, p. 31; royal letters to capital de Buch (Rymer, IX, 376), and the constable of Bordeaux (Brit. Mus., Sloane 4601, f. 48). The date in both cases is wrongly given as 1416.

[100] Morosini, II, 140.

destination was kept secret.[101] Seine-mouth, however, was the natural objective, and the French expected the blow to fall at Honfleur.[102] When Henry landed, Aug. 1, at Touques, it appeared as if this expectation would be realized. Easily driving off the few knights of the locality who opposed the debarkation,[103] the king sent Huntingdon up the river against Touques castle[104] which capitulated without resistance on August 3, agreeing to surrender in six days if not relieved.[105] The dauphin was at Rouen with an army,[106] and to him the castle commander went under safe-conduct.[107] Failing of succor the fortress surrendered, the garrison of about 100 men withdrawing to Argentan.[108] Already Deauville castle at the river mouth had capitulated to Salisbury.[109] These successes, slight in themselves, gave the English a position upon the road from Honfleur to Caen within ten miles of the former place, and with an alternative line of advance up the river Touques to Lisieux.

The problem before Henry was both political and military. He must secure control of a district sufficiently large and prosperous to support his army easily, yet, inasmuch as he aimed at annexation, he must refrain from pillage which would waste the country and alienate the population. It was already his intention to winter in France, consequently his initial successes must be rapid in order to secure his position before bad weather interrupted supplies from England. The strategy of the Harfleur-Agincourt campaign could not, therefore, be repeated.

101 Livius, p. 33.

102 *Vide supra,* note 49.

103 Walsingham, *Ypodigma,* p. 477; Livius, p. 33.

104 Jules Delpit, *Collection Générale des Documents Français qui se trouvent en Angleterre* (Paris, 1847), p. 219.

105 Thomas Duffus Hardy, *Rotuli Normanniae in Turri Londinensi asservati, Johanne et Henrico Quinto Angliae Regibus* (London, 1835), p. 284. For this campaign see the map facing p. 308.

106 *Vide supra,* note 77.

107 Hardy, p. 145.

108 *Ibid.,* p. 147; Delpit, p. 219.

109 Aug. 7, 1417, Hardy, pp. 285, 146.

Livius[110] describes a council of war outlining a plan of campaign so "that they shoulde not have overmuch scarcetie of victuall."[111] For the execution of such a plan Lower Normandy offered a suitable field. The country was rich. Caen, an important port for food,[112] within thirty or forty miles of this disembarkation, would be open to sea communications with England and Harfleur, and would be a good base for advance southward and westward.

A march upon Caen was, therefore, determined upon, and only a reconnaissance made towards Honfleur, which brought back reports of feverish preparations for defense, there and elsewhere.[113] Clarence was sent up the Touques as soon as the landing was accomplished, to reconnoitre at Pont l'Evêque and Lisieux the routes by which troops might come from Rouen or Paris. By August 4 he had occupied Lisieux, pushing eastward on the Paris road as far as Bernay, which was undefended.[114] Then turning back he marched on Caen. The king himself, after waiting at Touques for over a week for reports on

110 Livius, p. 35; Elmham, p. 100.

111 *The first English life of King Henry the Fifth written in 1513 by an anonymous author commonly known as the translator of Livius* (C. L. Kingsford, editor. Oxford, 1911), p. 83.

112 From it were exported grain, beer, herring, cattle, and horses, Abbé G. de la Rue, *Essais Historiques sur la ville de Caen et son arrondissement* (2 vols., Caen, 1820), passim.

113 Livius, p. 34, note 1; Elmham, p. 98. The text of Elmham reads "Hareflew," but a note indicates that Harl. MS., 864, no. 1 gives the divergent reading "Hunfles," which is undoubtedly correct. Jouvenel des Ursins (p. 534) reports a three weeks' siege of Honfleur prior to the attack on Caen, but there is no reason for believing this to be correct; *vide infra*, note 195.

114 Cousinot, *Geste de Nobles*, p. 150 and Thomas Basin, *Histoire des règnes de Charles VII et de Louis XI* (J. Quicherat, editor, 4 vols., Société de l'Histoire de France. Paris, 1855-59), I, 27 recount the surrender of Lisieux contemporaneously with the fall of Touques; A. Goujon, *Histoire de Bernay et de son canton touchant à l'histoire générale de la Normandie* (Evreux, 1875), pp. 158-9.

the military situation, set out August 13, along the coast to the Dives, turned southward along that stream and the Ancre, then westward to the south of Troarn till he reached the Lisieux-Caen road at Argences[115] where, doubtless, he came in touch with Clarence who immediately advanced on Caen to prevent the destruction of the suburbs. This the duke, appearing before the city August 14,[116] successfully accomplished.[117] Within four days Caen was invested.

When the army landed such ships as were not laden with artillery were sent back to England. Before leaving Southampton arrangements had been made for conducting the empty transports back across the Channel and bringing over a second contingent to the king in Normandy, the earl of March being commissioned to direct the operation.[118] Other transport ships to the number of

[115] The king's itinerary is based on Walsingham who records that on Aug. 13, Henry reached "St. Salvator de Tybe," i.e. Dives; Aug. 14, he was at "Grainvyle," i.e. Grentheville, where he celebrated the eve of the Assumption; Aug. 15, headquarters were at "Abbey de Fontenes," Fontenay l'Abbey; Aug. 16 at "Stutevyle" (unidentified); Aug. 18, at St. Etienne de Caen, Thomas Walsingham, *Historia Anglicana* (*1272-1422*) (H. T. Riley, editor, 2 vols., Rolls Series, London, 1863-1864), II, 322; Chaplain, p. 113. C. L. Kingsford, "An Historical Collection of the Fifteenth Century," *E. H. R.*, XXIX, 512 gives a list of places captured in the first weeks of the campaign. This includes Troarn and Argences. R. N. Sauvage, *L'Abbaye de Saint-Martin de Troarn au diocèse de Bayeux des origines au siezième siècle* (Caen, 1911), p. 40, note 1, assumes that Henry did not go to Troarn. He may very possibly, however, have sent forces along the Troarn-Caen road which took possession of the abbey. Livius' (p. 35) statement "sed quia tantum exercitum per intermedios rivos et torrentes recta ducere non poterat, ipse longiore, sed faciliore, via cum exercitu proficiscitur" is in accord with the foregoing. There is still a road running from Dives to Argences avoiding Troarn.

[116] "Gregory's Chronicle," p. 115, in *Three Fifteenth Century Chronicles* (James Gairdner editor, Camden Society, London, 1880).

[117] Chaplain, p. 112; St. Denis, VI, 104, attributes the failure to destroy the monasteries in the suburbs to the piety of the Caennois.

[118] Chaplain, p. 112; Livius, p. 34; Elmham, p. 98. March was appointed July 20, 1417, Rymer, IX, 466.

239 made their way to Caen where, on September 1, they too received their discharge.[119] Balingers of the royal navy maintained communications between Caen and Harfleur, and policed the Channel.[120] Meanwhile March "Skymmed the sea and kept the sea-coast that no manner of enemy durst rowte upon the sea" until August 24 (St. Bartholomew's Day), when a storm drove him for refuge to the Isle of Wight.[121] In English waters he was joined by part of the "home squadron" which served under him in the seas between England and La Hogue until the end of October.[122] Eventually the earl landed his forces at the latter point and marched to join the king at Caen, making an unsuccessful attempt on St. Lô en route.[123]

At Caen the attack was arranged with a view to reducing the city speedily to submission, to producing an impression on other strongholds by a sudden success, to discouraging resistance by striking terror, and to providing the army with booty which would keep up enthusiasm for the invasion.[124] The first move on completing the investment was to send out small contingents to subdue the country to the west from which supplies could be drawn.[125] When Henry was ready to attempt an assault,

[119] Hardy, pp. 320 ff. These were probably the vessels carrying artillery and matériel.

[120] This appears from the accounts of the ship *Thomas of London* and the balinger *John of London*, serving the king and the captain of Harfleur, P. R. O., Ex. Accts. 48/23 and 49/6; also that of the *Nicholas de la Tour* and other balingers, *ibid.*, 49/16, no. 2.

[121] F. W. D. Brie (ed.), *Brut or the chronicles of England* (2 vols., Early English Text Society, London, 1906-1908), II, 383, 385.

[122] Sir Thomas Carrew (*vide infra*, p. 196) served under March on the sea with 40 men-at-arms and 80 archers from Sept. 1 to Oct. 27, 1417, P. R. O., For. Accts. 57 (1 Henry VI), E. On Sept. 20, £276 13s 8d was issued from the exchequer for sailors in March's expedition, Issue Roll 630, m. 13.

[123] Hellot, *Cron. de Norm.*, pp. 33-4.

[124] For detailed account of the siege see Léon Puiseux, *Siège et Prise de Caen par les Anglais en 1417* (Caen, 1858).

[125] Aug. 20, 1417, commissions were issued to Salisbury, Talbot, and

preparations were made to carry it through with a rush. A simultaneous attack from the north and west followed the preliminary bombardment.[126] The assailants, formed in three companies, relieving each other, maintained a continuous assault until the city was stormed September 4, 1417 "with right littel death of oure peple."[127] The French consoled themselves with accounts of heavy loss inflicted on the enemy.[128] Although Caen castle held out, the effect of the city's fall upon the surrounding country was immediate. Already Gloucester had been sent against Bayeux,[129] and on September 8, issued letters of safe-conduct for the garrison to depart.[130] The next day both that city and Caen castle formally capitulated.[131] Smaller places like Neuilly l'Evêque, Lingèvres, Tilly-sur-Seulles, and Thury-Harcourt followed suit in the course of September, during which month the king remained at Caen sending out captains with authority to take over castles and receive allegiances.[132]

Caen town, in the turmoil of victory, had been given up to pillage. An official account of the capture written a

Huntingdon to subdue castles, Hardy, p. 150. Huntingdon was already in the field and to him Villers-Bocage capitulated on Aug. 25, *ibid.*, pp. 286, 152. Three days previous the surrender of Creully with the surrounding places gave the English control of the region between Caen, Bayeux, and the sea, *ibid.*, p. 151.

[126] Brie (ed.) *Brut*, II, 383.

[127] Livius, p. 38; Walsingham, *Ypodigma*, p. 481; Monstrelet, III, 242; Henry to London, Sept. 5, 1417, Delpit, p. 220.

[128] Monstrelet (III, 242) reports 600 English dead, a figure which became 6000 by the time the news reached Flanders, Morosini, II, 146.

[129] Livius, p. 40.

[130] Hardy, p. 153.

[131] Rôles de Bréquigny 231; Hardy, p. 287.

[132] Sept. 15, evacuation of Lingèvres, Hardy, p. 163; Sept. 19, commission to take over Bayeux, *ibid.*, p. 167; Sept. 22, same for Tilly, *ibid.*, p. 154; Sept. 28, safe-conduct for the evacuation of Thury, *ibid.*, p. 158; Oct. 2, commission to occupy the same, *ibid.*, p. 172. Capture of Neuilly l'Evêque Chaplain, p. 115; Livius, p. 42. It is probable that the French captain of Neuilly merely agreed to surrender on demand, for apparently the English did not occupy this place until May 1418, *vide infra*, p. 93, note 4; Delpit, p. 221.

generation later describes the event with many harrowing details, streets running with blood, refugees irrespective of age torn from the sanctuaries, imprisoned, or deported, general destruction, plundering of valuables, and burning of the city records.[133] Even the English report dwells upon the spoliation of the city while averring that churches and women were respected.[134] Clarence was rewarded for his share in the assault with the gift of such riches as remained unplundered when order was restored. These he distributed among his men "whereby he marvelouslie obtayned theire favour and love."[135] In France it became generally believed that Henry had ordered his men to cut in pieces all above the age of twelve without exception.[136] The contrast between Caen forced and Harfleur surrendered was doubtless calculated to be striking. For in 1415 it was reported in France that the English entered Harfleur exhorting the citizens to have no fear, the king would not destroy his own, they would not suffer the fate of Soissons,[137] the English were "good Christians."[138] Coupled with the French failure to send aid, the fate of Caen sufficed to make other Norman strongholds disposed to treat early with the English, as long as the Armagnacs controlled the government. The prestige of English arms, furthermore, was supplemented by rumors about the size of the English army, which was estimated at from thirty to forty thousand men, for the most part archers with whose skill were associated de-

133 Pierre Carel, *Étude sur la Commune de Caen* (Caen, 1888), p. 152 quotes from the "Matrologe de la ville de Caen."

134 Livius, p. 40.

135 Translator, p. 92. This is one of the items which the translator had orally from the earl of Ormond.

136 Morosini, II, 146.

137 May 21, 1414, the Armagnacs captured Soissons and punished its resistance with a ferocious massacre which became a tradition of barbarity.

138 Jouvenel des Ursins, p. 509.

feats of former years,[139] and by tales about the enormous engines of war, which hurled stones of unheard-of size, destroying fortifications deemed impregnable.[140]

Meanwhile a Burgundian campaign had been monopolizing the attention of the Paris government. During the summer military preparations had been in progress both in Burgundy[141] and Flanders. The ducal domains permitting an advance on Paris from two directions, the Seine and Oise valleys, minor operations from one side could supplement major ones from the other. In 1417 the campaign opened late in July on the upper Seine with the capture of Nogent, where artillery was taken and turned against neighboring Armagnac strongholds with intent to advance along the river to Troyes.[142] On July 27, 1417 a force of Burgundians and Savoyards entered Troyes where the citizens "se declarent à l'obeissance du Roy et à l'intention de Monseigneur de Bourgogne tout au bien, honneur du Roy, et de la chose publique de ce Royaume, et pour resister, aux dampnables entreprinses et voulentes—des ennemis et adversaires du Roy."[143] At the same time the duke was preparing the way for an advance from Flanders and Picardy. On July 13, 1417 Amiens town meeting listened to a ducal letter demanding

[139] St. Denis, VI, 100; *Chronique de Perceval de Cagny* (H. Moranville editor, Société de l'Histoire de France, Paris, 1902), p. 110.

[140] St. Denis, VI, 102, 166.

[141] Joseph Garnier, *Correspondance de la Mairie de Dijon extraits des archives de cette ville* (3 vols., Dijon, 1868-1870), I, no. 17. By July, Burgundian partisans were gathering in the vicinity of Tournai, H. Vandenbroeck, *Extraits Analytiques des Anciens Registres des Consaux de la Ville de Tournai, 1385-1430* (2 vols., Tournai, 1861-1863), I, 134.

[142] July 24, 1417, letter to Gens de Comptes at Dijon, Petit, p. 610, Plancher, *Preuves*, III, no. 304.

[143] Compte de Pierre de Gorremont, Bib. Nat., Coll. Bourgogne 104, f. 200. This force remained at Troyes until Dec. 23, 1417, when the duke and queen reached the city. The manner of occupying Troyes, through support of the pro-Burgundian populace in the face of the pro-Armagnac officials, is recounted in a letter of Aug. 1, 1417, Petit, p. 610.

the expulsion of the royal bailli. For a month the citizens vacillated, refusing to comply but sending the bailli to Paris with messages to the king.[144] When he heard of the English landing, however, Duke John took the field.[145] On August 10 he was "in arms." On the 12th he established his headquarters at Corbie where he remained ten days completing his mobilization.[146] By delaying his southward march he might hope that the English attack would draw off defenders from Paris. A visit to Amiens secured that city's adherence, promise of support, provision of supplies, and a loan of 3000 livres.[147] Almost the same day Reims also declared for him.[148]

Against this attack, actual or threatened, from three sides, the Armagnacs could prepare no counter-offensive. When Henry landed the dauphin was at Rouen, newly subdued, with 700 men-at-arms and 1000 arbalesters.[149] Caen was thought to be impregnable, and the garrison, re-enforced by local contingents, sufficient to hold the enemy at bay.[150] A force sent from Rouen to Falaise while Caen was besieged,[151] could do no more than arouse disquieting rumors among the English.[152] In view of the

144 Thierry, *Recueil,* II, 71.

145 This is conjecture but seems highly probable from the date of the Burgundian advance.

146 Petit, p. 434; "Extraits d'une Chronique Anonyme pour la règne de Charles VI, 1400-1422" (appendix to Douët d'Arcq's edition of Monstrelet, vol. VI), pp. 234-235 (hereafter referred to as Cordeliers). This chronicle makes the error of putting the Calais conference at this time.

147 Thierry, II, 71-2.

148 The duke was at Amiens Aug. 15-19. Petit, p. 434. "XVIII Augusti accesserunt ad capitulum remensi cives remense, et exposito quod promiserunt auxilium praebere domino Duci Burgundiae in prosecutione negotii per ipsum inchoati pro bono et conservatione Regis et Delphini" (ex actis capitular, 1417), quoted in *Journal General de l'Instruction publique,* XXIV (1855), 679.

149 Alain Chartier, *L'Histoire Memorable des Grands Troubles de ce Royaume soubs le Roy Charles VII* (Nevers, 1594), p. 32v°.

150 St. Denis, VI, 100.

151 Maignien, p. 21.

152 Livius, pp. 39-40.

danger from Burgundy, however, it was deemed wisest for the dauphin to avoid a clash with Henry and to return to the defense of Paris.[153] To help out the treasury as well as to punish the rebellious city, he levied, before leaving, an aide on Rouen for paying the garrison, to provide which the city had still further to borrow from its citizens.[154] Orders were issued August 4, 1417 for a general renewal of the oath of allegiance.[155] A new levy of 120,000 francs was imposed on Languedoc.[156] New officials were appointed at Rouen and Evreux.[157] Still further attention was paid to fortifications.[158] The communal militia was called out presumably to resist the English invaders.[159] And an envoy was sent to Burgundy at Amiens with remonstrating letters calling upon him

153 Alain Chartier, p. 32r°.

154 Bib. Nat., fr. 26042, nos. 5213, 5214, 5218; fr. 26043, no. 5388.

155 Noted in Tardif, no. 1930 and Henri Stein, *Inventaire Analytique des Ordonnances Enregistrées au Parlement de Paris jusqu'a la mort de Louis XII* (Paris, 1908), p. 22, no. 310. A modern copy is in Arch. Nat., K 60. no. 9. The oath reads as follows:—"Vous jurez par Die, le tout puissant, par la foy et loy que vous tenez de luy, par la part que vous entendez avoir en Paradis, et sur le peril de la damnation de votre ame, et par la loyaute que vous devez au Roy, notre souverain Seigneur, et à Monseigneur le Dauphin, son filz, et que à ce qui de par eux vous sera mandé et commandé vous obeyrez et non à autres, et que vous vous employerez de cuer, de corps, et de tout votre pouvoir, bien et loyaument, sans fraude ou aucun malengin, a la defense, tuition, et conservation du Roy, notredit Seigneur, de son royaume, et de sa seigneurie, à l'encontre du Roy d'Angleterre, dudit de Bourgogne, et de tous leurs allies et complices, et de chacun d'eux, et contre tous autres anemis et malveillans du Roy, notredit Seigneur, et de sa Seigneurie, et que se aucune chose vient à votre cognoissance qui peult porter prejudice ou dommage au Roy notre Sire, à son Royaume et Seigneurie, ou que aucun die ou faie chose contre les mandemens, prohibitions, et deffenses, incontinent que le sç-urez en adviserez ou serez adviser le Roy, son Conseil, ou sa justice."

156 Dognon in *Annales du Midi*, I, 441.

157 Bib. Nat., fr. 20684, ff. 76 and 74; *Travaux de la Société d'Agriculture de l'Eure*, Série 4, VII, 240.

158 Bib. Nat., fr. 26042, nos. 5216-7.

159 Sept. 13, 1417, Charles VI to Tournai, Vandenbroeck, I, 136-7; Sept. 16, dauphin to Tournai, de Beaucourt, I, 437, p. j. III.

to demobilize.[160] To this demand he returned a flat refusal.[161] Whereupon the constable summoned all his forces in Normandy to the defense of Paris.[162] "Adonc demoura Normandie degarnye de gens d'armes, et pour ce que, en pluseurs villes de France, les gens d'armes n'estoient pas si puissans comme les habitans!!"[163] River-crossings were garrisoned, towns ordered not to receive or obey Duke John, and a counter-manifesto issued on "Why We Are at War," reciting the Burgundian crimes and forbidding loyalists to receive his letters, heed his commands, or give him aid.[164]

With the force at his command and the advantage of a simultaneous English invasion, John the Fearless was not to be stopped by letters patent or vituperative proclamations. There is some reason for thinking that his army numbered between seventeen and eighteen thousand men.[165] During the latter part of August he advanced

[160] Thierry, II, 74; Monstrelet, III, 192; these were dated Aug. 2, 1417.

[161] Monstrelet, III, 196.

[162] *Ibid.*, p. 208. The master of the arbalesters was recalled from Falaise, leaving Lafayette to harass the English and do them "grans dommaiges," Maignien, p. 21.

[163] Jean Raoulet, p. 158.

[164] Monstrelet, III, 207; Besse, *Recueil*, p. 119; the manifesto is dated Sept. 5, 1417.

[165] This number can only be roughly estimated, but the figure is obtained as follows. We know from actual musters that the seigneur de Fosseux had at Beauvais on Aug. 30-31, 1417, 3423 men (1361 knights and men-at-arms, 2062 archers), Gachard, "Archives de Dijon," p. 153; Bib. Nat., Coll. Bourgogne 104, f. 213 v. "Le Livre des Trahisons de France" (p. 132) names de Fosseux as commander of the advance guard with 14 "standards." The duke led the main body with 48 "standards," and Luxembourg commanded the rear guard with 11 "standards." By supposing that the proportions of men to standards was the same in the main body and rear guard as in de Fosseux's company we arrive at the total given above. Cordeliers (p. 237) gives 3600 men-at-arms and 2000 archers as the total Burgundian force. It seems so improbable that so large a part of this number would have been put in one contingent under de Fosseux that I cannot think that this is the total. Gachard (p. 154) mentions many other musters of men from Artois and Flanders preserved at Dijon. In J. J. Villevielle, *Tresor Généalogique* (H. and A. Passier, editors, 2 vols., not completed,

southward to Beauvais, where, nearer to Paris, he could be ready to profit by any favorable turn of the English war. Here he remained from August 26 until September 2,[166] while Henry battered the walls of Caen. Gournay in Normandy sent envoys to him tendering support.[167] Burgundian advance guards rode forward to Beaumont-sur-Oise where they attempted to force a passage without success.[168] Evidently the first strategic move of the Burgundian campaign was to cut off Paris from Picardy and Normandy, regions from which the capital drew considerable supplies. Creil commanded the main road from Paris to Amiens, but its occupation would still have left open the roads into Upper Normandy which cross the Oise at Beaumont and Pontoise, whereas possession of those places would enable Burgundy to dominate the Amiens road without troubling about Creil. On September 3, 1417, the duke moved his headquarters to Chambely and for two days assaulted Beaumont which fell September 5. The success of this operation was facilitated by treason of the seigneur de L'Isle-Adam who, by abandoning the Armagnac cause at this juncture, enabled the Burgundians to cross the Oise south of Beaumont and surround the place.[169] Simultaneously an attack was made on Pontoise with some success. The citizens, having no

Paris, 1875-1879), in addition to de Fosseux's muster (I, 137), there are several other companies mentioned but without giving their sizes (I, 218; II, 42, 295, 438).

[166] Petit, p. 434.

[167] Monstrelet, III, 209.

[168] *Ibid.*, p. 210. See map facing p. 308.

[169] St. Denis, VI, 112-4. It seems possible that this defection on L'Isle-Adam's part was due to anger at being deposed from the office of master of waters and forests in Normandy. He received appointment to this office Oct. 30, 1416, Bib. Nat., fr. 20684, f. 71. On Aug. 31, 1417, he was replaced by Sir Colart d'Harcourt, *ibid.*, f. 75. We do not know the exact date of his defection, except that it was before Sept. 5 and after the first attack on Beaumont which occurred between Aug. 26 and Sept. 2. If the new appointment was made as a result of his treason it was done with unusual promptness.

stomach for resistance, persuaded the garrison to withdraw. Duke John himself appeared before the town, while forces from L'Isle-Adam and Beaumont cut it off from Paris.[170] On September 11 the ducal troops were admitted and demonstrated their intent to starve Paris by destroying all provisions which might be sent thither.[171] Another company had been sent to Senlis, which was in no state for defense, and where the citizens were anti-Armagnac. Although loath to receive men-at-arms, the city dared not resist and opened its gates to Luxembourg on September 8.[172]

The Paris authorities, on the loss of the Oise fortresses, expected an attack from the north via St. Denis, but none came.[173] The duke preferred to complete the severance of communications between Normandy and the capital by occupying the Seine towns after the fall of Pontoise, and to advance against Paris from the west and southwest. Meulan imitated Pontoise. Mantes sent the city keys without demand, and Vernon submitted without resistance. Poissy and St. Germain also were occupied, but an attempt to take St. Cloud was repulsed.[174] At the same time, in order to cut off from Paris supplies from the southwest, troops went against Chartres, before which they appeared September 13, 1417. In addition, new activity was developing higher up the Seine, where the Bur-

170 Petit, p. 434; Cordeliers, p. 238. 171 St. Denis, VI, 114-6.

172 Flammermont, *Senlis*, pp. 201-3; p. j. V, p. 269. William de Bournonville with 20 men-at-arms and 20 archers were placed in garrison here, *ibid.*, p. 270. 173 St. Denis, VI, 116-8.

174 St. Denis, VI, 120; Jouvenel des Ursins, p. 535; Cordeliers, pp. 239-41; Monstrelet, III, 215-6. Sept. 14, 1417, William le Vicomte was appointed bailli of Chartres, Mantes, and Meulan, Bib. Nat., fr. 26042, no. 5223. Sept. 29, William le Standard was appointed captain of Meulan, *ibid.*, no. 5227. Oct. 8 the duke appointed Sir Claude de Chastellus captain of Mantes, Sir Guy de Bar captain of Pontoise, seigneur de la Guiche captain of Meulan, and Sir Jean de Crohen captain of Poissy, *ibid.*, fr. 20375, no. 103 (copy).

gundians stormed Provins and attacked Montaguillon. For a short time it appeared that Burgundy would actually invest Paris, but a sortie on September 30 by recapturing Beaumont added to the discouragement resulting from the repulse at St. Cloud, and caused him to draw farther away, turning his attention to the Seine strongholds above Paris. October 7 Montlhéry surrendered. Marcoussis, Dourdan, and Palaiseau followed its example, after which the duke sat down, October 11, before Corbeil.[175] A week later Chartres opened its gates, an event which carried with it the submission of Étampes, Galardon, and the neighboring fortresses,[176] and completed the isolation of Paris towards the west. Small wonder that the captain of Caen castle, appealing for aid against the English, was informed that the government was wholly occupied with the Burgundians.[177]

Indeed the Armagnacs could do nothing but cling tenaciously to the capital, exercising extreme vigilance against treason from within and surprise from without,[178] while hoping that the Burgundian attack, after spending its strength battering unsuccessfully against the Seine towns, would recede as in 1415. Meanwhile, for want of finances to pay the men-at-arms, discipline had to be relaxed and the country roundabout Paris sacrificed to their ravages,[179] a necessity which must have contributed to the success of the Burgundian blockade. Again the dauphin attempted to raise loans but his success may be

[175] St. Denis, VI, 122-38; Cordeliers, pp. 241-2; "Le Livre des Trahisons," p. 134; Petit, pp. 435-6. We also learn of a spy being sent to learn the conditions of Melun's defenses, Douët d'Arcq, *Pièces inédites*, II, 81.

[176] Dourdan, Nemours, Moret, Château-Laudon, Auneaux, Bonneval, St. Denis, VI, 122; Cordeliers, p. 242; "Le Livre des Trahisons," p. 134.

[177] St. Denis, VI, 108.

[178] Nov. 25, 1417 the Burgundians almost succeeded in surprising the town, *Journal d'un Bourgeois*, p. 82.

[179] St. Denis, VI, 126; *Journal d'un Bourgeois*, pp. 81, 83.

illustrated by his experience with the chapter of Nôtre Dame, which, after two months' haggling, advanced one-fourth of the sum demanded.[180] September 6 the king wrote urgently to the cities of Languedoc, to hasten the collection of the newly imposed aide,[181] but they were hostile, restless, and disposed to delay.[182] Very shortly the ban and arrière-ban was proclaimed in the south with orders to mobilize at Étampes by October 15,[183] but by that date the rendezvous was in the enemy's hands, and there is no evidence of any response to the royal orders. On the contrary the local authorities on the Loire began preparations for "home defense" against a Burgundian advance southward.[184]

The Burgundian plan had aimed at winning Paris without seriously risking the ducal army or endangering its prestige. The duke was suspected of being in treasonable alliance with England,[185] but events give little ground for this belief. It seems much more probable that, while quite ready to take advantage of the English war to overthrow the Armagnacs, John the Fearless had no intention of pulling chestnuts out of the fire for Henry. English and

180 *Ibid.*, p. 81, note 5 citing Arch. Nat., LL 215, ff. 169-171.

181 Dognon in *Annales du Midi*, I, 495.

182 *Ibid.*, p. 442. 183 Vaissette, IX, 1038.

184 Sept. 29, 1417, the duke of Orleans had commissioned recently an officer "à achater canons, arbalestes, trait, et autres abillemens de guerre, pour les provisions des chasteaulx, villes et forteresses." The document of the above date is a receipt by the captain of Crocy for two cannons (an eight-pounder and a five-pounder), 37 lbs. of gunpowder, 4 arbalests, 2 catapults, a "bauldrier a croq pour une moyen arbalests," 100 (bundles?) of arrows, 2 lbs. of "sil" for arbalest cords, 4 axes, a "bec de faucon," 7 lances, 18 stones for the large cannon, 12 stones for the small cannon, and two "falloz garniz de deux XIIes de torteaux," Bib. Nat., fr. nouv. acq. 3642, no. 706. The governor of Orleans was garrisoning Freteval, Yevre, and Châteaudun, and putting Orleans into a state of defense, F. Guessard, "Gauluet, ou Le Sire de Gaules (1380-1423)" (*Bib. de l'École des Chartes*, IX, 441 ff., Paris, 1847-1848), p. 465.

185 Hellot, *Cron. de Norm.*, pp. 30-1; Cousinot, p. 141.

Burgundian ambitions in France clashed. Should Burgundy gain control of Paris and the king he would find himself at war with the English. Consequently operations against the Armagnacs must be tempered with prudence in view of the still greater difficulties which would follow success. Nor was the situation lost upon Henry. For him to strike at Paris before the civil war was decided would be to risk forcing a coalition of factions against him. He could, however, establish himself in Normandy without coming in conflict with the stronger party and could there prepare to turn upon the victor in the war about the capital. Should Burgundy again be defeated as in 1414, or repulsed as in 1415, he might reasonably be expected to stand by while his conquerors were in their turn beaten; whereas a Burgundian victory at Paris would not mean a united France. Considerations of this sort, doubtless, influenced Henry's decision to strike at Lower Normandy rather than Upper, where he would not fall foul of Burgundian interests, but could, at the same time, establish himself and put military and diplomatic pressure on the wavering, semi-neutral, feudal states of the west.

While the Burgundian advance was reaching its high-water mark before the walls of Corbeil, the English were opening a new campaign in Normandy. Under ordinary circumstances a winter campaign would probably have been avoided, but ordinary circumstances did not exist. The Armagnac government was ringed about with Burgundian cities and castles. Only to the northeastward was Paris still open, and for no great distance in that direction. There was no danger that the constable could send any force into Normandy. The Burgundians were too intent upon Paris to divert men against the English. So far their efforts had had most encouraging success, but they had as yet accomplished nothing decisive. How soon Paris and the government would fall into their

hands could not be foreseen. Treachery might any day accomplish what arms had failed to do. When events took such a turn Henry would have to face as strong a foe as met him at Agincourt, perhaps a stronger. It behooved him, therefore, to make the most of his opportunity by occupying Normandy and intimidating the neighboring powers which might be ready to throw in their lot with a triumphant Burgundy.

The capture of Caen and the neighboring fortresses provided the winter quarters which Henry's councillors had considered desirable after the fall of Touques,[186] but the entry of Burgundy into the field had so changed the situation that the idea of going into winter quarters was no longer entertained. The question now was in which direction to advance, for Caen was a great junction from which roads led westward to Cherbourg, southwestward into the Contentin, and southward through Lower Normandy into Maine. Choosing the latter route Henry refrained from marching directly to Falaise, turning aside instead along the line of the Dives, and avoiding that place. The reason is obvious. Falaise was reputed to be very strong,[187] and was strongly garrisoned.[188] Henry could not afford to be delayed by a lengthy siege during which the civil war raging around Paris might be terminated. He aimed at speedy successes which would strengthen his position, increase his prestige, and overawe the neighboring states.

With the beginning of October the English advanced southeasterly from Caen, marching via St. Pierre-sur-

[186] Livius, p. 35.

[187] "inexpugnabile reputatim;" St. Denis, VI, 166; cf. Walsingham, *Ypodigma,* p. 484.

[188] "bien garnie de gens de guerre," Jouvenel des Ursins, p. 534. Some of the soldiers sent there during the siege of Caen were still present, Maignien, p. 21.

Dives[189] and Trun[190] to Argentan before which they appeared October 5.[191] Castles en route apparently offered no resistance.[192] At the same time Warwick moved southward to Thury,[193] probably to act as an outpost towards Falaise for preventing any sudden movement against Caen. Talbot received the office of captain-general of the marches,[194] which evidently means that he was stationed to the west of Bayeux to guard against French enterprises from the Cotentin. It also seems possible that at this time another attempt was made on Honfleur.[195]

189 Oct. 2, 1417, Henry issued documents both at Caen and here, Hardy, pp. 172-3. 190 Henry was here Oct. 4, *ibid.*, p. 174.

191 Elmham, p. 119; Perceval de Cagny (p. 111) says the town surrendered on this date.

192 Cesny (*La Mota de Cheny*) was evacuated between Oct. 3-17, Hardy, p. 172; Viviers on Oct. 4-6, *ibid.*, p. 174; Courcy surrendered Oct. 3, Chaplain, p. 116. The day before John Neville was commissioned to receive allegiances there, Hardy, p. 173.

193 Oct. 2, he was commissioned to receive allegiances there, Hardy, p. 172. Apparently the region was being pacified, for on Oct. 11 the king issued letters of safe-conduct for evacuating Calloué and Do castles, *ibid.*, pp. 176, 178, 180.

194 Oct. 1, *ibid.*, p. 171. Evidently his headquarters were at Caen, *ibid.*, p. 368. When he attempted to ride into the Cotentin he got badly cut up by the Cherbourg garrison, *vide infra*, p. 92.

195 Both Jouvenel des Ursins (p. 534) and St. Denis (VI, 102) describe a vigorous attack which is repulsed. The first writer says it lasted three weeks, the second several days. Both place it before the advance on Caen. The English chroniclers, the Chaplain and Livius, mention only a reconnaissance towards Honfleur at that time. It is possible that the French story of a repulse is a war rumor or a fabrication officially disseminated to deceive the public. Morosini shows several obvious instances of this for a later period. It is also possible that the English historians glossed over a check. In general, however, the French accounts of details of the English conquest are confused and the chronology faulty. A Norman chronicler, on the other hand (Hellot, *Cron. de Norm.*, p. 27), gives an explicit date, Oct. 6, 1417, for an attack by Huntingdon, but he then describes the battle of June 29. Two attacks by the same captain may have confused him. It seems possible, therefore, that the English approached Honfleur three times, once by sea in June, once in reconnaissance in August, and once again in unsuccessful attack in October, and that the French historians, cut off from events in Normandy, got only confused rumors which they recorded as facts.

Such a move would have been good strategy inasmuch as there was reason to suppose that the garrison had been weakened to provide for the defense of Paris. With chances of success thus improved an attempt to gain control of the Seine mouth was worth an effort, especially since such an effort in no way delayed the main expedition. If any attack was made, however, it proved a failure.

Argentan made no resistance.[196] Its surrender gave Henry a position on another direct route to Paris, and he immediately sent a company to secure the strongholds to the eastward as a protection for his line of retreat towards Caen should a hostile army advance westward from the French capital against him.[197] This movement was pushed to Verneuil, within a day's march of the strong fortress of Dreux, held by the Armagnacs. An outpost was also established towards Burgundian Chartres at Châteauneuf,[198] which served to block the road from

196 Apparently it surrendered the day following the arrival of the English. Perceval de Cagny (p. 111) makes a statement to that effect although giving Oct. 5 as the date. The Chaplain (p. 116) and Elmham (p. 120) say that it agreed to surrender if not relieved in eight days. On Oct. 8, letters of safe-conduct for 1700 persons going into France were issued. These, however, were good until Oct. 14, which is eight days from Oct. 6, Hardy, pp. 175-6.

197 Oct. 7, 1417, Henry Fitz-Hugh and John Neville were authorized to capture towns and castles, Hardy, p. 175. Chambois was evacuated between Oct. 11-17, *ibid.*, p. 177. Exmes was evacuated between Oct. 10-13, *ibid.*, p. 177. Laigle surrendered Oct. 13, *ibid.*, p. 306. Oct. 16 Fitz-Hugh and Neville were further commissioned to receive towns, castles, and individuals into royal allegiance, *ibid.*, p. 181. Gacé (*Garcy*) castle was evacuated between Oct. 17-25, *ibid.* The list of castles of April 16, 1418 calls it *Cassey*, Cal. Norm. Rolls, 41.708. Rugles and Verneuil surrendered Oct. 18, Hardy, p. 307. This movement resembles Clarence's reconnaissance to Bernay, *vide supra*, p. 57.

198 Oct. 31, Neville was appointed captain of Verneuil and Châteauneuf, Hardy, p. 193. The latter name does not appear on the list of castles of April 16, 1418 (Calendar of the Norman Rolls—Henry V, *Report of the Deputy Keeper*, vol. 41, p. 708: hereafter abbreviated Cal. Norm. Rolls, 41.708). This may mean that the place had been abandoned, but more

Dreux to Mortagne and Alençon. The king himself remained at Argentan until October 13, when he appointed Lord Gray of Codnore captain.[199] Already the English advance guard had pushed forward to Alençon before which it arrived October 10,[200] Séez and Essay, commanding the line of advance, having made no resistance.[201] As at Argentan, an expedition went eastward to secure the roads and to establish a frontier behind which Normandy could be conquered without fear of French attack. By the end of October English forces were established at Mortagne,[202] Bonsmoulins forming the connecting link with Laigle[203] in the chain of castles to the northward, while farther to the south Warwick took possession of Bellême.[204]

Resistance at Alençon was slight.[205] Its fall involved many of the strongholds to the south commanding the roads into Maine.[206] Throughout November Henry made

likely it means that inasmuch as the captain of Verneuil was also captain of Châteauneuf it sufficed to mention the former alone.

199 Hardy, p. 180. Probably this marks the king's departure.

200 Perceval de Cagny, p. 111.

201 Oct. 9, safe-conducts for the evacuation of Séez were issued, Hardy, pp. 178-9. Oct. 12, Sir John Tiptoft was commissioned to receive the submission of Essay, *ibid.*, p. 180.

202 Oct. 31, John Gray was appointed captain, *ibid.*, p. 193.

203 Oct. 21, Tiptoft was commissioned to capture Bonsmoulins, *ibid.*, p. 183.

204 Chaplain, p. 117; Elmham, p. 124; Brie (ed.) *Brut*, II, 384. Nov. 15, Warwick was commissioned to take allegiances in the châtellenie of Bellême, Hardy, p. 202.

205 A. Hellot, "Chronique d'un bourgeois de Verneuil (1415-1422)," *Bulletin de l'Histoire de Normandie*, III, 214 ff., (Rouen, 1884), p. 219, says the siege lasted a month, but official documents show that the place was evacuated between Oct. 24 and Nov. 1, Hardy, p. 187.

206 St. Remy-du-Plain was evacuated at the same time as Alençon, *ibid.*, p. 189. Beaumont-le-Vicomte had the same fate a few days later, Oct. 27, 1417, *ibid.*, p. 191. The chroniclers record the surrender of Fresnay-le-Vicomte (Chaplain, p. 117. Elmham, p. 124), and Bourg-le-Roi (Hellot, *Cron. de Norm.*, p. 31). Danguel and Nouens were evacuated Oct. 31, 1417, Hardy, p. 194. Jan. 11, 1418, there was an order to muster the garrisons

this place his headquarters. Burgundian success about Paris had reached its limit without bringing events to a decisive turn. Consequently, for the English, danger from that source was considerably lessened. But Burgundianism was spreading down the Loire from Chartres to Vendôme and Tours where the duke and queen had now joined forces. John the Fearless set up his headquarters at Chartres and opened negotiations with Anjou.[207] Already he had promised Tours to demolish the bridges over the Loire, dismantle the rural castles, and come to the city's relief should the English continue their advance.[208] Failing to conquer the Armagnac government he had set up a rival government, but he was not yet free to assume the rôle of national leader against the foreign invader.[209] Henry, however, had no immediate intention of advancing farther if he could secure the southern frontier of Normandy by diplomacy. The English advance to Alençon had excited Breton apprehensions.[210] By the

of Beaumont, Tannis, St. Remy, Danguel, Nouens, St. Aignan, *ibid.*, p. 359. For February 1418, there is a letter to the English captains at Beaumont, Fresnay, Assé, Tannis, St. Remy, Danguel, Nouens, Anthoigne, St. Aignan, Montfort, Loudon, and Maisonlemée, Robert Triger, *Une forteresse du Maine pendant la domination anglaise, Fresnay-le-Vicomte, 1417-1450* (Mamers, 1886: reprinted from *Revue Historique et Archéologique du Maine,* XIX.), p. 138.

207 These resulted in some sort of an agreement for in August, 1418, we find the queen of Sicily complaining of actions "contre le fourme et teneur des souffrances qui sont pour aucun temps entre beau cousin de Bourgogne et nous," Luzarche, p. 29.

208 M. Delaville Le Roux, "La domination bourguignonne à Tours, et le siège de cette ville, 1417-1419 (*Le Cabinet Historique,* XXIII[1], 161-231, Paris, 1877), p. 163.

209 He wrote to the towns declaring the king and dauphin to be prisoners whom he was attempting to release, to which, on Nov. 27, 1417, the Paris government replied with emphatic denial and forbade obedience to the duke or queen, Besse, *Recueil,* pp. 147-153. Monstrelet (III, 230-35) describes the organization of the new government.

210 In addition to the threat to his own dominions the English invasion of Normandy threatened Brittany's financial interests. Since 1412 he had

middle of October Duke John V had determined to go in person to Henry,[211] though apparently he was suspicious of English good faith.[212]

Meanwhile the Angevin authorities wrote to Paris in a panic. The English had overrun Alençon, occupied the castles near Le Mans, and proposed to besiege and assault the latter place as the first step in the conquest of Maine and Anjou. The Burgundians, at the same time, had occupied the county of Vendôme, threatening Anjou from the east, while the garrison of Parthenay was conducting raids from the south. If aid could not be sent they must treat with the enemy. To which appeal the Armagnac government could only reply that the royal power had not yet recovered from Agincourt, that it had been unable to keep together an army for want of funds, and that it could attempt nothing beyond the guard of Paris. Consequently, permission to make a separate truce was accorded.[213] The upshot of the matter was the conclusion of a truce by Henry with Brittany, Anjou and Maine on November 16, 1417, to last until Michaelmas (September 29, 1418) of the following year.[214]

been drawing on the aides de guerre of Evreux for repayment of a 50,000 livres loan to Charles VI. A series of quittances from Oct. 1, 1412, to Feb. 20, 1417, shows repayment of no more than 15,455 livres nor less than 7,515 livres. The exact value of the écu d'or not being specified in each case the actual total cannot be computed, *Archives de Bretagne*, V, nos. 1138-1140, 1153-5, 1157, 1165, 1179, 1184-6, 1204, 1207, 1211, 1213, 1225, 1227, 1229-34, 1236.

[211] Oct. 16, 1417, safe-conduct issued, Rymer, IX, 503.

[212] Oct. 27, Henry had to assure him he would not be molested during his journey, *ibid.*, p. 506.

[213] Bib. Nat., Portefeuilles de Fontainieu 109-110, f. 448. This document is the royal reply of Nov. 10, 1417, but its form is such as to suggest that it is recapitulating a letter from Anjou. E. Cosneau *Le connétable de Richemont, Arthur de Bretagne, 1393-1458* (Paris, 1887), p. 50, note 2, cites a copy of this letter in Archives de la Loire-Inférieure, cass. 76, E. 177. A second letter of Jan. 29, 1418, repeats the permission, Bib. Nat., *ut supra* f. 474.

[214] Hardy, pp. 208-15. Rymer, IX, 511-15. Nov. 22, the ambassadors

Nor was it only with Bretons and Angevins that Henry treated at Alençon. The Burgundian advance in September had caused the Paris government to make diplomatic overtures.[215] Henry was ready to treat for either peace or truce even before setting out on his triumphant march southward from Caen,[216] but apparently the French envoys failed to get in touch with him before late in November.[217] The English demands were those which were later embodied in the treaty of Troyes,[218] but the French were not yet so badly beaten as to accede to them. Nothing came of the negotiations, but the Armagnacs returned to Paris feeling that the rumored Anglo-Burgundian alliance was not so certain a thing as had been imagined.[219]

During this month of negotiations military activity lagged, although the work of establishing the frontier to the east continued. Fitz-Hugh and Neville received new commissions after the fall of Alençon, with extensive powers for conquest and pacification.[220] In the middle of November the Burgundian army was at Chartres,[221] in consequence of which English forces hastened to Verneuil to be ready for any contingency,[222] special orders

prepared to depart, *ibid.*, p. 515. Before the end of the month the Angevins ratified the agreement, Bib. Nat., Portefeuilles de Fontainieu 109-10, f. 462. Dec. 5, Henry ordered its publication in England, Rymer, IX, 527.

215 Sept. 24, 1417, safe-conduct for French ambassadors, *ibid.*, p. 494.

216 Oct. 1, Warwick was empowered to treat for either, Rymer, IX, 496-7.

217 Oct. 22, protection for the archbishop of Reims and six ambassadors, *ibid.*, p. 505. Nov. 10, safe-conducts for four ambassadors including the captain of Falaise, *ibid.*, p. 509. The French appear to have employed dilatory tactics in the course of the negotiations, *ibid.*, pp. 518-9.

218 *Ibid.*, pp. 521-2.

219 Jouvenel des Ursins, p. 535.

220 Oct. 24, 1417; Hardy, p. 189.

221 Cordeliers, p. 243.

222 Nov. 14, orders to Talbot and Humfreyville to send all soldiers of Neville's company staying at Caen to their captain with all speed, Hardy, p. 368: a new commission to Neville the same day, *ibid.*, p. 201. Evidently Northumberland had been sent to strengthen the frontier for on Dec. 3, 1417, a similar order came to send his men as well as Neville's to Ver-

being issued that each captain keep watch with his men at Neville's command.[223] For the moment the English in those parts remained on the defensive, satisfying themselves with raids which they carried to the gates of Dreux.[224] This fortress and Evreux, being Armagnac, formed a convenient buffer between the English and the Burgundians about Paris, a buffer which both sides willingly allowed to exist to help them avoid a clash while consolidating their strength elsewhere.

For Henry such consolidation meant the pacification of western Normandy. Isolated castles had been subjugated during the king's stay at Alençon.[225] With the conclusion of negotiations, however, the next step in pacifying the country became the reduction of Falaise, whither the English army turned. December 1, 1417 troops appeared before the city.[226] So confident was the garrison of its strength "that at first they did not deign

neuil, *ibid.*, p. 369. From the commissions of array, Oct. 27 (*ibid.*, pp. 357-8.) we find that this border force consisted of the retinues of Neville, Fitz-Hugh, Sir John Gray, Porter, Leche, Elmden, Pecche, Stapleton, and Northumberland, probably some 1400 men. A detailed study and tabulation of a large mass of miscellaneous material bearing on the individual captains and their retinues is in Harvard University Library, HU 90.1215, appendix VII.

[223] Hardy, p. 368.

[224] St. Denis, VI, 166. Neville was authorized to raid according to his judgment, Hardy, p. 201.

[225] Oct. 29-Nov. 6, evacuation of La Ferté Fresnel, *ibid.*, p. 192. Nov. 11-15, evacuation of *Quinchamp*, *ibid.*, p. 197. This is probably the Clinchamp-in-Perche mentioned in Rôles de Bréquigny, 189. *Clinchamp* is named with Bonsmoulins, Laigle, Rugles, Mortagne, and Bellême as a place from which Neville could draw men for frontier service, Hardy, p. 230. It has been assumed that the modern Champs between Mortagne and Bonsmoulins is the place in question.

[226] This is the date for the beginning of the siege given by the Chaplain (p. 118). Henry continued to issue documents from Alençon until Dec. 5, Rymer, IX, 527. The earliest document signed "Rex in exercitu suo prope villam Falesie" is of Dec. 7, Hardy, p. 217. The French chroniclers commit great blunders in recounting the siege. Chastellain, *Chron. de Norm.*, p. 181, dates it from Nov. 4; Hellot, "Chron. d'un bourg. de Verneuil," p. 219, declares it lasted more than six months.

to close the gates against the King.''[227] Need for speedy results, as at Caen, no longer existed. Burgundy had withdrawn to Troyes,[228] and the Armagnacs were no more formidable than before.[229] Consequently it was the part of wisdom to adopt a policy which would make the smallest demand upon the English strength. Henry, therefore, made no attempt to storm Falaise. His soldiers merely invested the town, going into winter quarters in wooden huts, while the artillery battered the walls.[230] By December 20, the town was brought to terms, the troops agreeing to evacuate by January 2, 1418.[231] But the castle captain remained obstinate. For another month he held out until his defenses were so badly breached that capitulation was unavoidable.[232] February 1, 1418, he agreed to surrender if not relieved by the 16th.[233] In consequence of this resistance Henry refused the garrison permission to depart until they had repaired the walls which their obstinacy and the English artillery had demolished. The captain himself, he held for ransom instead of allowing him a free departure.[234] As before, neighboring castles

227 Walsingham, *Ypodigma*, p. 484.

228 He left Chartres Dec. 2, 1417, Petit, p. 437.

229 Of the garrison of Falaise, Guillaume de Meuillon, one of the captains, writes ''ilz ne pouvoient avoir aucun secours pour les autres affaires que le roy avoit,'' Maignien, p. 21.

230 Elmham, p. 129; Chastellain, *Chron. de Norm.*, p. 181.

231 Hardy, pp. 312, 227.

232 Elmham, pp. 133-7.

233 Hardy, p. 308.

234 Elmham, p. 138; Walsingham, p. 484. Feb. 10, 1418, safe-conducts for men going into Brittany for laborers to repair the walls, Hardy, p. 245; Feb. 24, ditto, *ibid.*, p. 250; Feb. 16-23, evacuation of Falaise, *ibid.*, pp. 251-2. The captain and another knight were to seek their ransoms and return. April 12, orders to provide carts and carters for repairing the dungeon, Cal. Norm. Rolls, 41.709; May 1, royal protection extended to men engaged in this work, *ibid.*, 710; May 7, 12, vicomtes and captains commanded to provide carpenters, carts, and carters, *ibid.*, May 20, gifts of 800 écus d'or from the king to the citizens to repair the walls, *ibid.*, 686; May 23, order to take 300 écus from the gabelle receipts for repair of the

submitted when the fall of Falaise again demonstrated the hopelessness of resistance.[235]

This ended the first phase of the English conquest. The strategic problem which presented itself in February 1418 was one of holding what had been won against possible revolt, or attack from the east, and of conquering the western region. For accomplishing this the English forces were divided into a field army, for the moment at Falaise, garrisons established in the large cities such as Caen, Bayeux, and Argentan, and a series of frontier outposts to the east. These last group themselves into four "sectors." At Verneuil was the most distant outpost under a captain with very extensive powers and great liberty of action,[236] with authority to draw re-enforcements from the line of fortresses in his immediate rear, viz. Rugles, Laigle, Clinchamps, Mortagne, and Bellême.[237] North of these last named, on the frontier towards the lower Seine strongholds, were the garrisons of Lisieux, and of the Pays d'Auge in general. To the south were the castles commanding the roads to Le Mans, and holding the marches of Maine. Behind this line of defense was a group of fortresses described as "Hexmes et alia loca carissimi consanguinei Regis Thome, Comitis Sarum," which may reasonably be supposed to include the region around Argentan. In this central position Salisbury could assemble his garrisons and go readily to

walls, Charles Vautier, *Extrait du registre des dons, confiscations maintennes et autres actes faits dans le duché de Normandie pendant les années 1418, 1419, et 1420, par Henri V, roi d'Angleterre* (Paris, 1828), p. 27. June 28, mandate to release the French captain "qui bene reparaverat castrum de Falesia ac fossas ejusdem, ratione quarum reparationum prisonarius regis extiterat," Rôles de Bréquigny 1168; cf. Bib. Nat., fr. nouv. acq. 1482, no. 5.

[235] Dec. 28, 1417, orders to take over Condé-sur-Noireau, Hardy, p. 225; Jan. 17, 1418, same for La Motte, *ibid.*, p. 235.

[236] Dec. 27, 1417, new commission to Neville, *ibid.*, p. 223.

[237] This authority was granted Jan. 8, 1417, *ibid.*, p. 230.

any part of the frontier which required strengthening.[238] With defensive measures thus completed, Henry turned his personal attention to administration, leaving the pacification of the Cotentin and Avranchin to his captains.

At Paris, meanwhile, despite financial embarrassments and military reverses, the Armagnac authorities did not relax their efforts to organize resistance against both English and Burgundians. The Burgundian check before Corbeil, paralleling the events of 1415 about Lagny, aroused hopes of a similar collapse of the Burgundian offensive. The constable seized the opportunity to launch a counter-offensive to the full extent of his ability. Paris was almost denuded of troops so that as much resistance as possible might be presented in Champagne and Normandy against the enemy.[239] As the Burgundians moved southwestward it was hoped that Armagnac power would be strong enough to re-establish itself along the Oise. Already Beaumont had been recovered,[240] enabling the Armagnacs to make demonstrations as far north as Beauvais, but their hopes of recovering Pontoise were disappointed.[241] Preparations for continued activity to the northward, however, appear in the orders of the bailli of Vermandois of November 30, 1417, to the city of Noyon, demanding the immediate dispatch of the two best and largest cannons, with gun-stones, powder, and half a dozen "pavans," the town militia accompanied by footmen from the neighboring villages, the best cannoneer, all the ladders "in a wagon," and other matériel for use in the operations which he was conducting. The

238 This distribution of forces is shown by orders for muster and inspection issued Jan. 8, 1418, *ibid.*, pp. 358-9.

239 Jean Raoulet, p. 160.

240 *Vide supra*, p. 68.

241 There was a demonstration northward lasting eight days, beginning a day or two after Nov. 13, 1417, on which date orders to occupy Meru were issued, St. Denis, VI, 154.

difficulties attendant upon such preparations are illustrated by the citizens' decision to comply with these orders only to the extent of sending two cannoneers with gun-stones, powder, and "pavans," "s'il y en avait."[242]

Steps also were taken to resist further invasion southward by harassing the enemy from Dreux,[243] and by preparing to defend the Loire towns. The defection of Tours had opened the way to Poitiers, while the presence of Burgundians at Chartres and Vendôme threatened Orleans and Blois. By advice of the dauphin's council the lieutenant-general of the seneschal of Poitou assembled re-enforcements for the defense of Poitiers.[244] At the same time the imminent danger from the English, then at Alençon, provided an excuse for levying an aide of 14,000 livres on Poitou.[245] Probably, however, these necessities for defense in the Loire valley robbed the Paris government of such forces as would have been assembled by the proclamation of the ban and arrière-ban lately ordered by the count of Vertus in the name of the captive duke of Orleans. "Home defense" prevented the dispatch of such troops to the capital.[246]

[242] Alphonse de La Fons Melicocq, *Une Cité Picarde au Moyen-âge, ou Noyon et le Noyonais aux XIV^e^ et XV^e^ siècles* (Noyon, 1841), pp. 56-7, citing Registre de la hotel de ville, f. 13.

[243] Cordeliers, p. 243.

[244] Over 100 men-at-arms and arbalesters were brought into the city between Nov. 9 and Nov. 22, not to mention the "varlets" accompanying them. There is record of wages paid to the amount of 986 livres, 11 sols, drawn from the aides of Poitou, Bib. Nat., fr. 25766, no. 741.

[245] On Nov. 30, 1417, this is mentioned as having been "lately" ordered, *ibid.*, no. 741^bis^. It is also mentioned in a document of Dec. 8, 1417, which mentions 35 men-at-arms and 8 arbalesters in garrison at Poitiers, *ibid.*, fr. 26042, no. 5235.

[246] Oct. 19, 1417, letter patent of the lieutenant of the governor of the county of Blois to the effect that he has been put in command of "touz les vassaulx et arriere-vassaulx de la dicte conté que ilz voisent à Paris devers mons. le Conte de Vertus, montez et armez pour en la compaignie et soubz le gouvernment le monditsr. le Conte servir le Roy notresr., ou que ilz vienguent on chastel de Blois en estat de deffense et en icellui se

Nor was political activity lacking on either side. November 6, 1417 the viceregal authority formerly conferred upon the queen was revoked and the dauphin appointed lieutenant-general of the kingdom.[247] Duke John was excommunicated.[248] Cities were ordered not to obey the queen or duke,[249] nor to elect pro-Burgundian officials,[250] but to resist when threatened with attack.[251] Abroad negotiations for a treaty with Aragon were initiated.[252] To these the Burgundians replied by attempting to surprise Paris treacherously.[253] Failing in this the duke demobilized his army, sending his troops into winter quarters in the captured cities and fortresses which controlled the roads and waterways to Paris.[254] Already he had commenced to strike at the source of Armagnac resources in Provence and Languedoc.[255] His political counter-attack did not come until January 10, 1418, when the queen, ignoring the revocation of her power as regent, issued letters patent conferring the government upon the duke of Burgundy.[256] This she followed with a decree abolishing the royal taxes.[257]

As before, the royal government utilized the respite afforded by the suspension of active operations, for preparing a counter-offensive on one hand, and a more effective defense on the other. Crippled by the loss of Nor-

tienguent et demeurent pour lagarde icellui,'' Bib. Nat., fr. nouv. acq. 3642, no. 708.

247 Besse, *Recueil*, p. 139.

248 Nov. 23, 1417, St. Denis, VI, 156.

249 *Ordonnances des Roys de France de la Troisième Race* (17 vols., Paris, 1723-1820), X, 427.

250 Nov. 30, 1417, Charles VI to Lyons, Caillet, p. 302.

251 *Ibid.*, p. 304.

252 Besse, *Recueil*, p. 116.

253 St. Denis, VI, 158; Denifle et Chatelain, IV, no. 2087; Monstrelet, III, 237-8; Cordeliers, p. 244.

254 Monstrelet, III, 237; Fenin, p. 85; Cordeliers, p. 244; ''Le Livre des Trahisons,'' p. 135.

255 Vaissette, IX, 1038.

256 Gachard, ''Archives de Dijon,'' p. 245.

257 *Ord.*, X, 450.

mandy, always a liberal source of supply, the king was forced to turn again to Languedoc, already treasonably restless. He wrote letters to the southern cities informing them of the military situation, remitting one-sixth of the tax ordered in August, assuring them that the remainder would be employed to pay the troops summoned from Languedoc, upbraiding the rebellious and disobedient, and calling on the towns to pay the aide on pain of being treated as insurgents.[258] The results were discouraging. The local authorities refused to recognize the dauphin's new powers. A threat to levy the new aide by force served only to excite open resistance and the expulsion of Armagnac officials.[259] Meanwhile the government, fearing to tax Paris further, turned to the Church. From Nôtre Dame it secured some of the cathedral treasures in return for an assignment of "rente perpetuelle." From St. Denis, after three months' resistance, was extracted 242 golden marks.[260] Even comparatively small amounts deposited in the bureau de Dampmartin were, by royal ordonnance, paid over to the treasurer of war.[261] As before, the dauphin demanded loans from towns still loyal, following his demand with letters urging that the aide already imposed be promptly paid;[262] while again, as in 1417, there was borrowing from government officials and from Parisian burghers, to pay the army in the field.[263]

To strengthen the defense in Upper Normandy, Robert de Braquemont received the royal lieutenancy-general over the bailliages of Gisors, Rouen, and Caux, including the city of Honfleur, where the garrison was threatening to surrender to the English unless their wages, now in

[258] Dognon in *Annales du Midi*, I, 496.
[259] *Ibid.*, pp. 444, 498.
[260] St. Denis, VI, 144-6.
[261] Fauquembergue, I, 73-4.
[262] See letters to Lyons of Feb. 11 and Feb. 16, 1418, Caillet, pp. 307-8.
[263] Fauquembergue, I, 57.

arrears, were forthcoming.[264] The appointment was equivalent to a declaration of "martial law," for de Braquemont's authority included power to inspect, munition, victual, and garrison fortresses for defense against the English, brigands and rebels, to demolish such strongholds as were untenable, to reduce castles to obedience, to proclaim the ban and arrière-ban, to appoint and remove all officials, royal or communal, and to arrest, expel, or pardon all rebels and robbers. Similar powers were conferred upon Jean d'Harcourt, captain of Rouen.[265] Shortly afterwards Armagnac himself received authority to examine the provisions and the nominations of officers in all the royal captaincies.[266] Still later, in order to provide re-enforcements for renewing operations in the spring, the ban and arrière-ban, to which the south had not yet responded, was again proclaimed with additional emphasis, summoning the Languedocien vassals to Chartres for May 1, 1418.[267]

In the meantime the constable undertook to retrieve the losses of the preceding fall, and to relieve the pressure on the capital by striking simultaneously north and south at the Burgundian garrisons. During January 1418 the prévôt of Paris, in order to open the way for provisions coming from Maine, Perche, and Beauce, attacked and took Étampes, after which he proceeded to clear the roads northward to Paris by reducing Montlhéry, Marcoussis, and Chevreuse.[268] The Armagnacs had never lost their hold upon the Seine and Yonne above Paris, a route

264 St. Denis, VI, 144.

265 The commission is dated Jan. 2, 1418, *Bib. de l'École de Chartes*, XXXVI, 311-4.

266 Jan. 15, 1418, Stein, p. 23, no. 319.

267 Feb. 2, 1418, Besse, *Recueil*, p. 154.

268 Jouvenel des Ursins, pp. 537-8; *Journal d'un Bourgeois*, p. 84; Cousinot, pp. 167-8. Dourdan also is mentioned as Armagnac at about this time, Cordeliers, p. 243; St. Denis, VI, 150-2, 180-2.

commanded by strongholds at Charenton, Choisy, Corbeil, Melun, Montereau, Sens, and Villeneuve,[269] consequently the capital had not been completely blockaded. Nevertheless these reconquests appreciably eased a difficult situation. In addition, they reopened the road to Orleans and the Orleannais, the center of Armagnacism. Before the operations were complete,[270] however, the constable made a supreme effort in the north to retake Senlis. This was the most ambitious undertaking since the siege of Harfleur, and its object was, as then, to regain a position of prime importance, and to revive Armagnac prestige which, for more than two years, had been on a continuous decline. Senlis was selected for attack because it obstructed the main road from Paris to the royal garrison at Compiègne, and because it was in an exposed position, being a Burgundian outpost in advance of the actual "frontier" which followed the Oise. Along the line of that river the enemy had three contingents. At Pontoise and Meulan was L'Isle-Adam who, from those places, could make the Paris-Beaumont road unsafe.[271] He could not, however, seriously threaten the operations against Senlis because the garrisons left by Armagnac at Paris and St. Denis could protect that part of the Paris-Senlis road which was within range of the force at Pontoise. North of L'Isle-Adam were the brothers Saveuse attempting to operate from Beauvais, but the hostile independence of that commune obliged them to make their headquarters farther from the river at Gournay. Even there they failed to get on with the citizens. Furthermore the Armagnacs at Bresle castle were strong enough to occupy the Burgundian attention in this re-

[269] Cordeliers, p. 254.

[270] The siege of Chevreuse was still in progress, St. Denis, VI, 184; Monstrelet, III, 245.

[271] "Le Livre des Trahisons," p. 135.

gion.[272] In the extreme north Luxembourg held the country between Montdidier and Compiègne, but the Armagnacs from the latter place could make diversions should any relief for Senlis be attempted from that direction.[273]

On February 3, 1418 royal headquarters were established at Creil and siege engines brought up from Paris.[274] Evidently expectations were entertained that Senlis could be taken by blockade and bombardment before relief could arrive in sufficient strength, rather than by assault. The necessary relief the frontier captains could not provide. In response to appeals from Senlis, however, the three Burgundian commanders did make a demonstration via Pontoise toward Paris under cover of which they succeeded in throwing re-enforcements into the besieged town.[275] Meanwhile Duke John sent a force from Troyes to distract the constable, while his son the count of Charolais assembled a relieving force at Arras. In mid-April the latter, quickened by urgings from the besieged, advanced southward, not directly to Senlis, but, as before, to Pontoise. This move seriously threatened the constable's communications with Paris. The latter dared not risk a battle. Defeat would mean ruin. The menace to his line of retreat was so serious that he hastily raised the siege and precipitately withdrew to Paris.[276]

272 Lestendard de Milly was in command at Bresle, Arch. Nat., JJ 173, no. 454. Forces left by the dauphin at Rouen in August, 1417, had fallen back to St. Denis from whence in November they were operating towards Beauvais, St. Denis, VI, 152, 154.

273 Fenin, p. 85; Monstrelet, III, 244.

274 Monstrelet, III, 244; St. Denis, VI, 186-8; *Journal d'un Bourgeois*, p. 84.

275 Fenin, p. 87; Monstrelet, III, 245. This took place early in March: "Le Livre des Trahisons" (p. 136) says March 6, 1418, reporting also a raid by L'Isle-Adam up to the port St. Denis. March 10 the commune of Senlis levied a loan "pour la nourriture" of the force coming to relieve the town, Flammermont, *Senlis*, pp. 271-2.

276 St. Denis, VI, 198; Monstrelet, III, 252-3; Cordeliers, pp. 250-1.

Practically without striking a blow the Burgundians had won a considerable victory, for the collapse of the Senlis expedition marked the end of serious Armagnac resistance in the field. Wanting in resources to pay his men and in ability to gratify their craving for pillage, the constable's control over his soldiers disintegrated, discipline entirely disappeared, and the environs of Paris fell under a reign of terror.[277] The men-at-arms refused to take the field again because "the king could no longer worthily reward military success."[278] The constable could only turn his attention to meeting immediate financial needs by making new levies on Nôtre Dame and St. Denis. From the latter the government demanded 20,000 livres in return for which the monks were granted possession of sixteen butchers' stalls, recently established at Les Halles, with the rights thereto appertaining.[279] The annual income from these amounted to 2050 livres,[280] a return of ten per cent, yet the monastic chronicler cannot restrain his indignation against the Armagnac authorities. "Oh insatiable cupidity, worthy of everlasting execration," he writes, "not content with having appropriated to their own uses, the increase of their fortunes, the construction of castles, the maintenance of regal luxury, the money which they ought to have devoted to the national defense, they had the audacity to take, for similar use, the jewels presented to the royal abbey by the munificence of kings."[281]

Burgundy, on his part, was strengthening his political position throughout the winter, sending subordinates

[277] *Journal d'un Bourgeois*, pp. 86-7. For an incident illustrating a mild phase of this disorder see Douët d'Arcq, II, 79.

[278] St. Denis, VI, 148.

[279] April 22, 1418, letter patent, Arch. Nat. K 59, no. 9, noted in Stein, p. 23, no. 317 and Tardif, no. 1936.

[280] Bib. de Rouen, Collection Leber 5870, t. III, f. 223.

[281] St. Denis, VI, 244.

north and south to conduct minor operations. The prince of Orange, commissioned to conquer Languedoc,[282] mustered some 1300 men at Mâcon in March[283] for a successful campaign. Towns which had submitted were urged to remain true to the duke's cause despite the burdensome presence of unruly men-at-arms.[284] Districts not yet in adherence were similarly exhorted to recognize the Burgundian government, and to pay no more taxes to the dauphin.[285] Yet even that government needed funds, and was forced, despite its abolitions, to make levies and raise loans for carrying on its military enterprises.[286] Some isolated activity against hostile castles[287] occurred in Champagne, but the most important Burgundian gains during the winter of 1417-1418 were in Upper Normandy.

282 Jan. 30, 1418, Besse, *Recueil*, p. 186.

283 Bib. Nat., Coll. Bourgogne, vol. 104, f. 213.

284 Conditions at Tours appear to have been unbearable. Probably the fear of an English advance coupled with the knowledge that Armagnac men-at-arms were not at hand to give aid and would themselves be equally intolerable, kept the city pro-Burgundian. At one time the queen feared that the duke of Brittany might secure the city. Delaville Le Roux in *Le Cabinet Historique*, XXIII, 163-171.

285 April 17, 1418, the queen to Dauphiné, Fenin, appendix, p. 248.

286 Le Compte de Pierre de Gorremont records under April 25, 1418, "Les habitans de la ville de Troyes accorderent à la Royne, la somme de 1000 livres tournois qui fut imposée sur eux pour entrentenir et aider et menir à fin la saincte poursuitte encommecée par ladicte Dame et Monseigneur le Duc de Bourgogne pour la bien du Roy et de son Royaume." April 30, 4000 livres was collected from Langres for the war and 2000 livres from Mâcon with seven loans totalling 1900 livres. Bib. Nat., Coll. Bourgogne, vol. 104, f. 197. In the same month Charolais obtained 1500 livres from Amiens to carry on war against the "companies," which is probably a euphemism for Armagnacs, Maugis, *Essai sur le régime financier*, p. 307.

287 Feb. 2, 1418, Coucy was surprised, Fenin, pp. 127-8. Gorremont records the capture of "Chastelier en Champagne" by Antoine de Toulonjon in March (Petit, p. 614), for which exploit he received 200 livres (April 13, 1418, Bib. Nat., fr. nouv. acq. 3654, no. 247). He also relieved La Ferté-sous-Jouarre besieged by the Armagnacs, in May 1418, Petit, p. 614; Bib. Nat., Coll. Bourgogne, vol. 104, f. 205 v°.

Dieppe opened its gates to a Burgundian captain probably before the end of 1417.[288] This may have been what stimulated the Armagnacs to send de Braquemont into Normandy with extensive powers.[289] If so the results were disastrous, for the appearance of Armagnac troops before Rouen precipitated a revolution in that city during which the royal captain, Jean d'Harcourt, was expelled and Sir Guy le Bouteller, Burgundian captain of Dieppe, admitted on January 12, 1418.[290] Caudebec changed sides with Rouen.[291] Already the river towns between Paris and Rouen were in Burgundian hands.[292] In the course of the spring Louviers and Evreux, seeing that the other Norman towns had been taken by the English with no help coming from the French king in response to their appeals, opened their gates to the Burgundians.[293] The sire de Chastellus with two other captains were appointed by Duke John "au gouvernment sur les marches et fins dou pais de Normandie"[294] with headquarters at Vernon.[295] These co-operated with L'Isle-Adam at Pon-

288 It must have been before Jan. 12, 1418, when the captain was called to Rouen.

289 *Vide supra*, p. 84.

290 St. Denis, VI, 148; Hellot, *Cron. de Norm.*, p. 36; Chastellain, *Chron. de Norm.*, p. 184.

291 *Ibid.*, p. 186.

292 Burgundian garrisons at Rouen, Vernon, Mantes, and Caudebec are mentioned in a document of Feb. 23, 1418, Meyer, *Hist. de Vernon*, I, 176.

293 Chastellain, *Chron. de Norm.*, p. 183 records that Pontoise, Mantes, Vernon, Evreux, and Louviers surrendered in April. The first three had already submitted, but the statement is quite possible for the last two, and may be tentatively accepted for want of evidence to the contrary. April was the time when Clarence was extending the English "frontier" to the Risle (*vide infra*, p. 99), so the generalization from the *Journal d'un Bourgeois* (p. 84), utilized above, seems quite applicable.

294 Charles Porée, *Inventaire de la Collection de Chastellux. Recueil de documents relatifs à la region de l'Yonne, tirés par M. le Conte de Chastellux de divers dépôts d'archives publics et privés* (Paris, 1907), no. 548.

295 Le Compte de Pierre de Gorremont mentions "Monseigneur de Chastellus, Marechal de France en garnison à Vernon et aultres lieux es marches

toise and Bouteller at Dieppe and Rouen.[296] By June 1418 they had subdued and garrisoned the north bank of the Seine and the coast fortresses from Montivilliers to Dieppe. This, however, gave them control merely of the westernmost corner of Caux, and of the two main roads, along the river and along the coast, the intervening country between Dieppe and Rouen remaining under Armagnac control.[297] Such part as was in Burgundian hands was promptly called upon to contribute to war expenses. A fortnight after the revolution at Rouen Burgundian commissioners gave notice that officials had been appointed "à recevoir toutes les revenues, proffis, et emoluments appertenent au Roy notre dit seigneur, à cause de la dicte ville et viconté de Rouen," viz. the income from the demesne, the aides, the gabelle, and the dîme, the same to be utilized for "paiement des gens d'armez et de trait, et autres choses touchans la fait de la guerre."[298] In addition orders came from the duke at Troyes to collect the arrears of aides, tailles, and dîmes[299] which were doubtless similarly used.

de Normandie," Bib. Nat., Coll. Bourgogne, vol. 104, f. 196 v°. Some idea of his strength may be obtained from the record of 4000 livres "pour le payment de ses gages et de ceulx des gens de guerre etans en sa compaignie," *ibid.*, f. 195 v°.

296 Chastellain, *Chron. de Norm.*, p. 183; Hellot, *Cron. de Norm.*, p. 36. There is a document of Chastellus and Guy de Bar, themselves ordered to guard Rouen, delegating that duty to Bouteller, they "estant obligiez aler ailleurs pour le service dou Roy"; Porée, no. 547.

297 See the list of Armagnac and Burgundian captains in *Bib. de l'École de Chartes*, XXXVI, 314-5.

298 Bib. Nat., fr. 20373, no. 1; fr. 20375; no. 104 is a copy of the same.

299 Meyer, *Hist. de Vernon*, I, 176; Bib. Nat., fr. 26042, nos. 5237, 5252 are quittances of the baillis of Evreux and Mantes for money so collected and used.

CHAPTER III

THE CONQUEST COMPLETED—CHERBOURG, DOMFRONT, ROUEN, UPPER NORMANDY, 1418-1419

The major operations terminating in the capture of Falaise were immediately followed by a succession of minor expeditions which subdued the greater part of western Normandy. The very day on which Falaise castle surrendered Gloucester received commission to lead an expedition westward.[1] Reconnaissance into the Cotentin had been conducted in the course of the siege, during which Lord Talbot had been attacked while crossing the Vire near its mouth and badly cut up by the captain of Cherbourg.[2] Already the occupation of Condé-sur-Noireau[3] had opened the road to Vire along which the duke advanced. The policy pursued was the same patient one followed by Henry since September. There is no record of fighting, merely a series of capitulations. From Vire, Gloucester's route turned northward, following the road through Torigny, St. Lô, Carentan, and Valognes, to Cherbourg. In order to pacify the country and to keep open means of communication with the king, castles situ-

[1] Feb. 16, 1418, Hardy, p. 248.

[2] *Chronicon Adae de Usk A.D. 1377-1421* (Sir E. M. Thompson, editor. 2d ed., London, 1904), p. 131; Hellot, *Cron. de Norm.*, p. 32; Chastellain, *Chron. de Norm.*, p. 180. Talbot was relieved of his captaincy-general of the marches on Jan. 28, 1418, Hardy, p. 373.

[3] Probably the "Cawday" castle which Chaplain, p. 120 and Elmham, p. 141 record as captured by Gloucester, Hardy, p. 225. For a map showing these minor operations see p. 308; for subsequent operations see p. 322.

ated near this line of march were subdued in the course of the advance. When the expedition actually got into the Cotentin peninsula Henry sent Humfreyville, captain of Caen, to establish communications by opening the Caen-Bayeux-Carentan road through the occupation of Neuilly-l'Evêque. The duke himself sent companies farther to the west, securing St. Sauveur-le-Vicomte and Briquebec, from which places he could dominate the surrounding country upon which he must depend for supplies while besieging Cherbourg.[4]

Supplementary to Gloucester's advance was Huntingdon's expedition against Coutances. Commissioned to make conquests in the Cotentin on March 10, 1418,[5] Gloucester's occupation of St. Lô two days later opened for him the Bayeux-Coutances road. On March 16 Coutances capitulated.[6] Sir John Assheton had already been appointed bailli.[7] A conciliatory proclamation was issued to the people[8] and the process of pacification begun. That process naturally followed the great road from Cherbourg to Avranches. Northward connection was established with Gloucester by the occupation of Pirou, la Haye de Puits, and Barneville. Southward English arms were carried to the borders of Brittany by the capture of

[4] The chronology of Gloucester's advance is as follows:—Feb. 21, capitulation of Vire (Hardy, p. 289); Feb.-Mar. ? surrender of Torigny (Chaplain, p. 120); Mar. 10, surrender of Hambye castle (Rôles de Bréquigny 84); Mar. 12, capitulation of St. Lô (Hardy, p. 299); Mar. 16, capitulation of Carentan (*ibid.*, p. 300); surrender of Hommet castle (Rôles de Bréquigny 85); Mar. 17, surrender of Pont d'Ouve castle (*ibid.*, 86); Mar. 25, capitulation of St. Sauveur-le-Vicomte (Delisle, *St. Sauveur-le-Vicomte*, p. 334); surrender of Nehou (Elmham, p. 142); unknown date, Briquebec (Chaplain, p. 120). On May 12 Humfreyville was ordered to take over Neuilly l'Evêque (Cal. Norm. Rolls, 41.713); May 15 the castle surrendered (Rôles de Bréquigny 142). The earl of March, said to have accompanied Gloucester (Hellot, *Cron. de Norm.*, p. 35), took "Neaulyn" castle (unidentified) before May 20 (Cal. Norm. Rolls, 41.685).

[5] Hardy, p. 382.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 296.

[7] Rôles de Bréquigny 326.

[8] *Ibid.* 213.

Avranches and the establishment of garrisons at Pontorson and St. James de Beuvron.[9]

This enterprise of Huntingdon was supplemented in turn by Warwick sent against Domfront, the one remaining stronghold in the southwest still in French hands. Its capture would complete the establishment of a secure frontier to the south, while, at the same time, opening the road to Mayenne. Its strategic value, however, was slight. Any new operations southward would be by way of Le Mans, which was a strategic center, while Mayenne was merely a point on the highway to Rennes. Completely isolated, Domfront's fall was certain as long as the general situation remained favorable to the English. Consequently the more economical strategy of blockade was employed, which dragged out the siege for nearly four months but which made no serious demands on the English strength. Commissioned at Bayeux, March 30, 1418,[10] Warwick is said to have laid siege to Domfront, April 2.[11]

[9] There are scarcely any details of this activity. Walsingham (*Ypodigma*, p. 486) records the submission of Avranches as though it were shortly after the fall of Falaise. Chastellain (*Chron. de Norm.*, p. 182) mentions Avranches and Pontorson among Gloucester's conquests. The only other source of information is the list of castle captains for April 16, 1418 (Cal. Norm. Rolls, 41.708). It includes Avranches, Pontorson, St. James de Beuvron, Torigny, La Roche Tesson (near la Bloutiere, arr. d'Avranches), Hambye, St. Denis, Beauchamp, la Haye de Puits, le Mesnil Garnier, Bonnefosse (unidentified), Pirou, Pont d'Ouve, Hommet, Briqueville, Ange (unidentified), Barneville, St. Sauveur-le-Vicomte, Regneville, Parc l'Evêque (near Avranches), Sarse (unidentified), Colombiers (unidentified), Chanteloup, and Valognes. This shows that St. James de Beuvron was occupied before May 1, 1418, the date given by N. Menard, "Histoire de la ville et du château de St. James de Beuvron" (*Mémoires de la Société Académique de Cotentin*, VII, 1-160, Coutances, 1892), p. 115. The occupation of Tombelaine and Grippon, placed in 1418 by E. A. V. Pigeon, *Le Diocèse d'Avranches* (*Mémoires de la Société Académique de Cotentin*, V, Coutances, 1888), pp. 360, 365, may easily have come subsequent to April 16.

[10] Rôles de Bréquigny 1187.

[11] Elmham, p. 145. On April 10 the vicomte of Caen was ordered to proclaim that all men of Warwick's retinue hasten at once to their captain, Cal. Norm. Rolls, 41.709.

The problem before him was to provide his own men with provisions while cutting off those of the garrison.[12] The success of this latter effort may perhaps be questioned in view of the long resistance, but success was ultimate. On July 10 the French agreed to surrender by the 22nd if not relieved by the duke of Alençon.[13]

Although strategically the English position to the south was strong on the map, the actual frontier conditions were in considerable confusion. Early in 1418 the Angevin authorities complained that the garrisons south of Alençon had levied contributions "and imposed large and burdensome sums, by way of tax, black-mail, or otherwise, upon the inhabitants of many parishes under the rule of the queen [of Sicily], although there was a truce, and the people were not subject to the places and fortresses belonging to the king, this being done on the pretext that the castle captains had given certain 'bullettes' to some of those same inhabitants, compelling them to swear allegiance to the king. And in similar fashion they had seized many large estates, manors, fiefs, dwellings, revenues, and possessions neither subject to, nor in the possession of, the king. They also collected and [were] collecting the profits, revenues, and incidental income, belonging to churchmen, nobles, and others. Not content with this they took, stole, and actually carried away the utensils, beds, linen, animals, and other moveables in the houses, manors, and lands aforesaid, and did with them as they pleased. Furthermore they seized and wasted with great excess the provisions of the queen's poor subjects, such as wheat, wine, meat, hay, and oats, not only without payment but actually with violence. In like manner they daily and nightly set upon and pillaged many merchants and others, traversing the country by lanes and byways of that region for fear of loss or injury. In addition the men of Loudon

[12] Elmham, pp. 145-146.

[13] Rôles de Bréquigny, 210.

garrison had abducted a young maid, daughter of the sieur de Segrays,[14] and had damaged both his lands and his honor. Certain men of the fortresses, pretending to be brigands, had also killed many laborers of the country and others, by night, in their beds, so that the latter had no recourse at law or other way of justice open to them. On this account the country became and was depopulated and uninhabitable, the people having taken to flight. Besides, only lately the king's men betook themselves to Sillé le Guillaume, although it was not subject to the king, and into the fief of Thorigné, which places are, and were at the time of the aforementioned truce, in undisputed possession of, and subjection to, the said queen; and they attempted and were attempting to secure the revenues of these same lands and lordships, and the allegiance of the people thereon. And they have already fished the ponds of the fief of Thorigné, the pond of the barony of la Guierche called Maupreau, and many other ponds belonging to churchmen, nobles, and citizens, taking and wasting the fish, and damaging the said fiefs to 10,000 livres value and more since the truce.''[15]

Explicit and vigorous prohibitions were promptly sent to the frontier captains ordering them to cease their lawless practices on either Angevin or Norman territory, to make good all infringements of the truce, and to send all men guilty of violence prisoners to Alençon.[16] That the English menace was widespread appears from the active preparations for defense on the part of the French farther to the east. Re-enforcements went in April 1418 to

[14] It seems hard to believe that this can mean Segré on the Oudon (Maine et Loire), or that there was an English garrison at Loudon (Vienne).

[15] The letter in which Lord Mautravers and Sir Roland Lenthale, ''conservateurs'' of the truce with Anjou, order the excesses to stop obviously quotes the complaints from across the border. It is dated Feb. 20, 1418, and is published in Triger, *Une fortresse du Maine,* p. j., no. 1.

[16] Triger, *op. cit.* p. j., no. 1.

hold Beaugency against the English.[17] Blois was munitioned.[18] Indeed English raiders approached even to Orleans, frightening the inhabitants of the suburbs into the city.[19] Friction seems also to have developed on the Breton frontier, for on April 17, 1418 Sir John Tiptoft and Sir John Assheton were appointed to negotiate with Brittany for maintenance of the truce and reparation for its violation.[20] The English, on their part, had to cope with a guerilla warfare carried on by refugees in the woods and adventurous noblemen along the marches.[21] These became so troublesome that in April Mortain was unsafe, and the earl received license to hold his courts at Vire, where they would be free from annoyance by the enemy.[22] The occupation of Domfront may have improved that im-

17 Bib. Nat., fr. nouv. acq. 3653, no. 1670.

18 April 1, payment of 6 l. t. "A cause de la façon d'un millier de pierres à canon—pour la garnison du chastel de Blois," *Bib. de l'École de Ch.* VI, 193.

19 "les Angloys vindrent près d'Orliens et—s'en vindrent toutes les personnes desdiz forsbours en la dicte ville et firent admener leurs vins et tous leurs biens, et aussi pour doubte desdiz Anglois, l'en fist crier que chascun hostast touz leur biens, huis et fenestres, mangoires à chevaulx et aussi les râteliers, et qui l'on apportast tout à la ville; et avec ce fist l'en abatre des maisons en grant quantité pour doubte desdiz Angloys et pour faire les boulovars"; Arch. Munic. d'Orleans CC 546, Forteresse, mand. 71, quoted in Amicie de Villaret, *Campagnes des Anglais dans l'Orléanais, la Beauce chartraine, et le Gâtinais, 1421-1428* (Bib. de la Société Archéologique de l'Eure et Loir, no. 1079, Orleans, 1893), p. 5, note 1.

20 Rôles de Bréquigny 1361.

21 Jouvenel des Ursins, pp. 534, 539. Ambrose de Loré is the local hero of this warfare. The account of his exploits gives no date except the year 1418. The culminating event, however, was the recapture of Beaumont-le-Vicomte and Fresnay-le-Vicomte, by a force gathering to relieve Domfront. Fresnay was still under an English captain on May 12, 1418 (Cal. Norm. Rolls, 41.710). Domfront surrendered on July 22 (Rôles de Bréquigny 210). Consequently the expedition in question could not have been after the latter date nor much before the former one. If Jouvenel des Ursins' account is chronologically arranged there was considerable border warfare before this despite the truce which was supposed to last until Sept. 29, 1418.

22 Cal. Norm. Rolls, 41.682.

mediate situation, but the generally troublous conditions remained, tending to grow worse with time until this region became eventually the point of vigorous attack upon the English occupation of Normandy.

Simultaneously with their activity to the southward the English began to push eastward along the Caen-Paris road. That sector of the frontier from Lisieux northward had been neglected while Henry was establishing his power farther south. This was done safely because he there confronted the Armagnacs, who, cut off from the capital by the Burgundians, were not strong enough to threaten the English operations. These conditions made it possible to undertake a small offensive in this region in the early spring of 1418 while carrying on other operations elsewhere. The frontier could be extended as far as Evreux without risking a clash with the Burgundians,[23] without encountering serious resistance, and without the necessity of reaching a quick decision. Such a move would also give the initiative in subsequent operations to the English, whatever the course of the French civil war, for from Evreux they had the choice of striking either at Rouen, Dreux, or the Seine strongholds guarding the road to Paris.

Viceregal authority was conferred upon Clarence over "the marches and frontiers of Auge toward Rouen," on February 24, 1418.[24] The French were still active in those parts[25] and the duke's first necessity was to drive them from the neighborhood of Lisieux. The occupation of

[23] The emphasis laid by Henry on the preservation of the truce with Burgundy is shown in the capitulation of Courtonne where it is stipulated that the captain and four gentlemen must submit themselves to the king's mercy because they had broken the truce, Hardy, p. 304. Burgundians taken in captured castles were similarly held, Rôles de Bréquigny 73, articles 9 and 12.

[24] Hardy, p. 254.

[25] Elmham, p. 140; Hellot, *Cron. de Norm.*, p. 34.

Courtonne,[26] Chambrois,[27] and Faugernon[28] cleared the valley of the Touques. He then moved on to that of the Risle, crossing that river at la Rivière Thibouville, and leaving a force before that castle while he advanced upon Harcourt. The two places surrendered very shortly, within three days of each other.[29] Probably at this time a connecting link with the frontier fortresses farther south was established by the capture of Beaumesnil.[30] It may be inferred from a new commission to Clarence of April 4, that by that date Auge, Orbec, and Pontaudemer were completely pacified, and that it only remained to receive allegiances from the inhabitants.[31] Bec, however, was not yet "Englished." Throughout April the abbey sustained a siege and on May 4, in despair of any relief from France, surrendered.[32]

With the spring of 1418 Henry was prepared to come to grips with the strongest power which France could muster. He was established in a considerable part of Lower Normandy, a region in easy communication with England and one which provided a base for offensive campaigning and a refuge in case of reverses. He consequently abandoned as no longer necessary his cautious policy towards Burgundy. As a precursor of the renewal of major operations and as the natural sequence of

26 Surrendered March 6, 1418, Hardy, p. 303.

27 The modern Broglie, surrendered Mar. 9, called in the English texts *Chamboys* (Hardy, p. 295), *Cambroys* (Cal. Norm. Rolls, 41.708), *Cambroiz* (*ibid.*, 710), or *Chamberexs* (*The Paston Letters, 1422-1509, A.D.* (J. Gairdner, editor, 3 vols., London, 1872-1875), II, 6).

28 Elmham, p. 140. This writer also mentions *Tywyl* as though it were in the same neighborhood but identification has not been possible.

29 Harcourt on Mar. 9; Rôles de Bréquigny 73; Thibouville on Mar. 11; Hardy, p. 293.

30 This place appears on the list of captains of April 16, 1418, Cal. Norm. Rolls, 41.708.

31 Rôles de Bréquigny 95.

32 *Ibid.* 131; *Chronique de Bec* (L'abbé Porée editor, Société de l'Histoire de Normandie, Rouen, 1883), pp. 86-7.

Clarence's successes on the Risle, an expedition was launched against Evreux, now in Burgundian hands.[33] Re-enforcements under Exeter had arrived from England.[34] These advanced on Evreux shortly after the capture of Bec,[35] and achieved immediate success, the city capitulating May 20, 1418.[36] About a week later Henry set out from Caen to conduct in person the great campaign of the year.[37] On the march he visited the scenes of Clarence's victories, and arranged the administration of the newly conquered bailliage of Evreux by appointing John Radeclyf bailli.[38] The latter received immediate instructions to demolish all isolated castles and strongholds within the bailliage which could not be easily garrisoned.[39] On June 8, 1418, Louviers was besieged. It surrendered on the 23rd,[40] the people submitting to an indemnity of 8000 crowns.[41] At once, in order to enable him to turn northward without detaching contingents to guard frontiers in his rear, Henry dispatched an envoy to the

[33] *Vide supra,* p. 90, note 293.

[34] Proclamation for embarcation was made April 9, Riley, p. 664.

[35] Exeter's commission is dated May 16, Cal. Norm. Rolls, 41.710.

[36] Rôles de Bréquigny 164: confirmation of the treaty of surrender dated Aug. 23, is in Bib. Nat., fr. 26042, no. 5286.

[37] His itinerary may be outlined from the Norman Rolls. May 28, at Caen (Cal. Norm. Rolls, 41.713); May 30-31, at Lisieux (*ibid.*, 689, 691); June 1-2, at Bernay (*ibid.*, 690, 689); June 4-6, at Bec (*ibid.*, 688, 691); June 6-7, at Neufbourg (*ibid.*, 689, 713); June 9, before Louviers (*ibid.*, 690). For subsequent operations see the map.

[38] June 2, 1418. By a scribe's error this appointment was dated in the chancery roll *May 2.* The error is patent, however, when we note that the document was issued from Bernay, whereas other documents dated May 2 were issued from Caen (Cal. Norm. Rolls, 41.684, 710). Furthermore it is unlikely that a bailli would have been appointed a fortnight before commission to conquer Evreux. That the error is in the roll itself appears from the agreement of the Calendar (41.713) and the Rôles de Bréquigny 126. It is noteworthy that the preceding nine documents on the roll were issued in May.

[39] June 7, Rôles de Bréquigny 197.

[40] Chaplain, p. 122.

[41] Rôles de Bréquigny 1004.

Armagnac captains at Ivry and Dreux, to treat "on such matters as best concern the king's honor."[42] This ambiguity suggests negotiation on other topics than a mere truce, nor was Henry above utilizing diplomacy to aid his strategy by holding out hopes of political advantage to the weaker of the French factions.

For the Armagnacs, weak in the spring, were now in a desperate position north of the Loire. The oft-attempted Burgundian coup d'état at Paris had finally succeeded on May 29, changing completely the aspect of French politics just as the English campaign was opening. Besides the capital the successful party secured possession of the Oise fortresses commanding communications with Picardy, and the upper Seine castles as far south as Melun.[43] Now that Armagnac, the chief irreconcilable, was a prisoner, the Burgundians tried to conclude peace with their opponents for united efforts against the English.[44] The embassy which hastened to Melun after the dauphin, however, arrived too late and returned to Paris with its mission unaccomplished.[45] In Upper Normandy, now seriously threatened by the English approaching Louviers, temporary concord was possible. On June 5 the Burgundian leaders and de Braquemont concluded a truce and alliance of all the Norman garrisons against the English. That the initiative came from the Burgundians seems probable. Against their position at Rouen the English power would certainly be directed. But Pont de l'Arche, commanding the passage of the Seine on the Louviers-Rouen road, was in Armagnac hands. Without

[42] Cal. Norm. Rolls, 41.693.

[43] St. Denis, VI, 228-30. Creil, Pont-St.-Maxence, Compiègne, and Noyon on the Oise; St. Cloud, Charenton, Choisy, and Corbeil on the Seine, *ibid.*, p. 242; Fenin, p. 92; Monstrelet, III, 267; Cordeliers, p. 257.

[44] During March and April negotiations had been in progress but Armagnac had rejected the Burgundian terms summarily, de Beaucourt, I, 78-84.

[45] Fauquembergue, I, 133.

hope of succour the latter would probably submit to Henry, thus breaking the line of the Seine which the Burgundians wished to hold.[46] It was therefore agreed that Rouen and Pont de l'Arche should mutually aid each other against English attack, and that in the general conduct of the war against the invader garrisons of either faction would assist and relieve men of the other in perfect good faith. This agreement was to last until Michaelmas.[47] Such an arrangement on a larger scale a year earlier might have changed the character of the war. Now, however, that the English king had a rich province for a base, additional troops, and the confidence and prestige which success brings, such a local coalition could offer no appreciably greater resistance than he had already encountered. It is also probable that factional rivalries did not at once disappear, and that each party suspected the good faith of the other. The day following the signing of the truce de Braquemont was removed from the office of admiral to make way for a Burgundian,[48] while at Rouen there was still fear of "false Armagnacs."[49] The au-

[46] A document of June 6, 1418 indicates extensive preparations for resistance at Vernon. William le Coq, deputy of Vernon, and William Lalemont, lieutenant of the vicomte, at the Chatelet, pledge Vernon to pay "without constraint" the sum of 931 livres to the master of the royal artillery for 740 lbs. of gun-powder, 2500 "grosse dondaines" (large arrows for arbalests), 3750 "demi-dondaines," 80 "pavays," 200 "fuzèes à getter feu," 2 cannon "à rompie habillements," 3 other cannons, 6 "phalos" (?) 700 "tourteaux" (cakes of combustible matter for filling cressets and providing illumination), 8000 "chausse trappes" (pieces of iron in the form of a spike for throwing at bridgeheads or wooden fortifications), and 25,000 arrows, Arch. Nat., K 59, no. 21.

[47] *Bib. de l'École de Ch.*, XXXVI, 315-18.

[48] *Ibid.*, p. 308. This new official was Charles de Recourt, sieur de Cottinières, who shortly became lieutenant-general of Dieppe and the counties of Eu, Ponthieu, and Aumâle. Bouteller became governor of Normandy for the queen-regent. Braquemont, however, remained at his post and took part in the defense of Pont de l'Arche, Cal. Norm. Rolls, 41.695.

[49] Arch. Nat., JJ 170, ff. 146v°-148v°.

thority of royal lieutenant and captain-general of Normandy was conferred upon Chastellus.[50]

On June 27, 1418 Henry laid siege to Pont de l'Arche.[51] North of the Seine the lords and commons of the country, aroused for defense against invasion, assembled at Étrépagny under Jacques d'Harcourt, but they could not prevent even a small body of English from crossing the river. A footing once established on the north bank, a larger force under Clarence was thrown across the river and a bridge of boats constructed.[52] On July 4 the army crossed in the face of the enemy who dared not dispute the passage.[53] Immediately the fort opened negotiations for surrender[54] and agreed to capitulate if not relieved before July 20 by King Charles or the dauphin,[55] for despite the revolution of May 29 Henry still claimed to be at peace with the duke of Burgundy.[56] Nevertheless Burgundy with Picard forces was now marching Paris-ward to assume control of the capital. July 14, he made triumphal entry.[57] The following day came word from the captain of Pont de l'Arche of his agreement with the English.[58] Shortly after arrived a herald from Henry to learn whether the duke would abide by the truce prorogued at Bayeux until Michaelmas, to whom reply was made that

[50] June 26, 1418, *ibid.*, f. 151.

[51] Chaplain, p. 123. He issued documents at Louviers June 26 (Cal. Norm. Rolls, 41.693). His first one from Pont de l'Arche is of June 28 (*ibid.*, 692). [52] Fenin, p. 100; Monstrelet, III, 276-7; Elmham, p. 175.

[53] Delpit, p. 222; Cochon, p. 380.

[54] July 5, safe-conduct to the captain coming to the king, Cal. Norm. Rolls, 41.694. [55] Delpit, p. 222.

[56] The truce made with Burgundy until Sept. 29, 1417, had been prorogued until Easter 1418, Rymer, IX, 469. On Mar. 29, 1418, it was still further prorogued until Sept. 29, Cal. Norm. Rolls, 41.679; Cal. Fr. Rolls, Henry V., 44.606. Consequently it was still in force.

[57] Petit, p. 442; Auguste Longnon, "Entrée de la reine Isabeau et du duc de Bourgogne à Paris (14 Juillet 1418)" (*Bulletin de la Société de l'Histoire de Paris et de l'Ile de France,* II, 1875), 104 ff.

[58] St. Denis, VI, 260.

the duke hastened to give the English battle.[59] Nothing, however, could be done to save Pont de l'Arche which surrendered according to treaty.[60] The pro-Burgundians blamed the "mauvaistie" of the Armagnac captains,[61] the Armagnacs claimed that Duke John did nothing nor gave promise of doing anything to relieve the castle.[62] Henry, planning an immediate advance, in order to safeguard the frontier in his rear directed the bailli of Evreux to conclude a truce with the vidame of Chartres and the captain of La Ferté-Vidame,[63] while he prepared to carry the war north of the Seine.

Ever since April Rouen had apprehended a siege. During the mobilization for the relief of Senlis the citizens informed the count of Charolais that they could expect aid only from the Burgundian power. To this he had accorded an encouraging response.[64] When Henry took the field and launched an attack against Louviers, the Rouenese turned to Paris for help. This was promptly sent in the form of 300 lances and as many archers;[65] for it was felt at Paris that if Rouen could be held the whole of Normandy might be recovered, but that the fall of that town would mean the loss of the province beyond hope of recovery, and would imperil the whole kingdom.[66] The Parisian forces were followed in July by a bevy of Burgundian captains sent by Duke John while the English

[59] Delpit, p. 222.

[60] Safe-conducts to the garrison and inhabitants were issued July 19, 1418; Rôles de Bréquigny 1175 (the year is wrongly given as 1419, see Cal. Norm. Rolls, 41.695); Chaplain, p. 123; Cochon, p. 381.

[61] *Journal d'un Bourgeois,* p. 105. [62] Jouvenel des Ursins, p. 543.

[63] This is the modern name for La Ferté Arnaud, Cal. Norm. Rolls, 41.714. Chartres feared an attack. The church of St. Saturnin was destroyed lest it shelter the English, J. B. Souchet, *Histoire du Diocèse et de la Ville de Chartres* (Société Archéologique d'Eure-et-Loir, 4 vols., Chartres, 1867-1876), III, 329. [64] Monstrelet, III, 250.

[65] *Journal d'un Bourgeois,* p. 95.

[66] University of Paris to Rouen, Sept. 1418, Denifle et Chatelain, IV, 350, no. 2111.

were still before Pont de l'Arche.[67] To meet the ever present problem of wages orders came that all royal revenues at Rouen be employed to pay the soldiers defending the city, and that profits from the mint be used to provide wages for the garrison at Montivilliers, a force which was doubtless intended to act as a check on the Harfleur garrison.[68] The latter proving insufficient, the king promised the town 2000 livres of which 1200 livres was actually paid.[69] Rouen itself again levied a loan upon its citizens to meet the expenses of the garrison.[70] To augment this the city turned to the cathedral treasury where were seized numerous precious objects there deposited. These were taken to a money changer, and acknowledgment of debt left with the clerical owners.[71] Such measures, with the destruction of boats on the Seine and the burning of the faubourgs,[72] were all that the citizens could take. They could now trust only in their own stubborn determination, the stoutness of their walls, and the ultimate arrival of an army under the duke of Burgundy.

That ambitious politician, now in control of the government, at once found himself confronted with the problem of finance which had proved too much for his rivals. For

[67] Monstrelet, III, 281; Cordeliers, p. 261; "Le Livre de Trahisons," p. 139.

[68] Bib. Nat., Porte. de Fontainieu 109-110, ff. 494, 497v°. On July 10, 1418, Senlis also resolved to ask the king for 20,000 l. t. for strengthening its fortifications, Bernier, *Mon. inédits*, p. 12.

[69] "Le Roy donna aux manans et habitans de la ville de Monstiervilliers 1200 livres tournois sur celle 2000 livres tournois à eux promis par ses lettres du 12 Octobre 1418, afin de mieux resister aux Anglois, qui de jour en jour s'estorcoient de prendre et occuper subtillement la dicte ville," Compte de Pierre de Gorremont, Bib. Nat., Coll. Bourgogne, vol. 104, f. 203.

[70] This was made by the city council July 13, 1418, the citizens being ordered to pay as soon as possible, Bib. Nat., fr. 26042, nos. 5277, 5279, 5290; Brit. Mus., Add. Ch. 6802.

[71] Aug. 23, 1418, 13 silver cups of the priory of Longueville brought 103l. 2s. 6d.t., Bib. Nat., fr. 26042, no. 5285. Other seizures netted 215l. 3s. 1½ d.t., *ibid.*, nos. 5288-9.

[72] Hellot, *Cron. de Norm.*, p. 43.

him, however, new sources of revenue were available, for his authority extended over regions closed to Armagnac tax-gatherers. No sooner had he reached Paris than all alienations of the royal domain were revoked, the proceeds to be used to pay the men-at-arms.[73] Commissioners were appointed "sur les amendes et confiscations de ceulx qui avoient tenu le party de feu Bernard d'Armagnac," and officials were sent to appropriate the revenues at Nogent "appartenant au Roy de Navarre et à Madame de Mortang" for default of homage.[74] Of the income from confiscations made at the expense of "seditious enemies and disturbers of the peace," 24,000 livres was presented to the Parisians as recompense for their rights to a part of the war aide, rights "qui—etaient du tout aboliz et de nulle valeur."[75] Another commission was organized "pour faire emprunts de deniers des gens d'Eglise, bourgeois, officiers, et autre, pour emploier au fait de la guerre contre les anciens ennemis et adversaires d'Angleterre et mesmement pour la secours de la ville de Rouen."[76] Arbitrary demands for money were made on submissive towns.[77] The coinage right was sold for 150,000 francs.[78] And 30,000 livres was borrowed from the duke of Albany, regent of Scotland.[79]

In regard to the military situation Burgundy found Paris almost as troublesome to guard as had Armagnac.

[73] July 16, 1418, *Ord.*, X, 456.

[74] Compte de Pierre de Gorremont, Bib. Nat., Coll. Bourgogne, vol. 104, f. 197v°.

[75] *Ibid.*, f. 201. July 20 Burgundy wrote the seigneur de Bonnieres et Noyelle to seize "toutes les rentes, terres, possessions, revenues, et autres bons meubles et debtes," also all provisions in Peronne, belonging to the captain of Meaux and other Armagnacs, to sell them immediately, and to pay the money to the receiver at Bapaume, Bib. Nat., fr. 26042, no. 5280.

[76] Compte de Pierre de Gorremont, Bib. Nat., Coll. Bourgogne, vol. 104, f. 195. On f. 196v° is record of the repayment of 300 livres.

[77] Le Fons Melicocq, *Une Cité Picarde*, p. 96, note ** mentions such a demand on Noyon.

[78] Fauquembergue, II, 63.

[79] Compte de Pierre de Gorremont, *ut supra*, f. 198.

His enemies controlled the Marne and Seine by their possession of Meaux and Melun, while also commanding the roads from the southwest at Montlhéry and the castles captured in January. From these places they could interfere with the provisioning of the capital, raid to the city gates, and surprise strongholds in the vicinity.[80] When they surprised Compiègne on July 21, 1418, the situation was still further complicated. Here they placed a strong garrison which was able to dominate the great trading routes into Picardy, even as far west as the Pontoise-Beauvais road.[81] Duke John undertook to furnish relief by following the strategy employed by the Armagnacs earlier in the year. He launched an expedition against Montlhéry with a view to opening the roads into Maine, Perche, and Beauce. All available forces, including the Parisian militia, were put into the field,[82] leaving Paris to be defended by a force of only 150 men.[83] To augment this force and ensure against surprise, the king abolished all exemptions among the citizens from watch and ward,

[80] Letters of May 30 and June 4, 1418, tell how the Armagnacs fell back to Melun after the Paris revolution, after vainly trying to recover the city, Garnier in *Bull. de la Soc. de l'Hist. de Paris,* IV, 4850. St. Denis, VI, 286, writes that prices of grain, oil, meat, and wood were quadrupled. For the raid on Paris' suburbs from Montlhéry see Fauquembergue, I, 168. For the capture of Lagny on Sept. 13, and its recapture by L'Isle-Adam see *ibid.,* 166; Cordeliers, p. 264; Monstrelet, III, 287-8; "Le Livre des Trahisons," p. 140. In October Tanguy du Châtel was threatening Senlis and the city appealed to Burgundy for a garrison of 80 men, Bernier, p. 12.

[81] A. Sorel, *La prise de Jeanne d'Arc devant Compiègne et l'histoire des sièges de la même ville sous Charles VI et Charles VII d'apres les documents inédits* (Orleans, 1889), p. 52, quoting registres de l'Hotel de Ville de Compiègne; Cordeliers, p. 262; Monstrelet, III, 278; St. Denis, VI, 254.

[82] Aug. 12 the duke of Burgundy was retained in the royal service with 4000 men-at-arms and 2000 archers at 4000 francs a month, Plancher, III, *Preuves,* no. 307. Monstrelet, III, 291, estimates the Parisians at 7000 combatants.

[83] "Jacques Lamban, conseiller du Roy, Bailly de Vermandois, commis par le Roy à la garde de la Prevosté de Paris, et ordonne captaine des gens d'armes, scavoir cent hommes d'armes et cinquante hommes de trait, pour

conferring power upon the local officers to compel even churchmen to do their part.[84] Despite these efforts the attack, though kept up for three weeks, was barren of results.[85]

At the same time the duke was using diplomacy to secure foreign aid and internal concord in order to carry out his program of freeing Normandy from the English.[86] New envoys were dispatched to Castile and Aragon seeking alliances and military aid "en la prochain saison d'este au service au Roy."[87] In October[88] the Castilian

la garde, seurté, et defense de la ville de Paris"; Compte de Pierre de Gorremont, Bib. Nat., Coll. Bourgogne, vol. 104, f. 199v°; Fauquembergue, I, 186.

[84] Sept. 4, Arch. Nat., K 950, no. 25.

[85] The army arrived before Montlhéry Aug. 22, St. Denis, VI, 268.

[86] "ad unionem et conservationem, ad obviandum Anglorum hostilitate, ne clade bellica in interitum rueret tota gens Normanorum, concessa patria colonis invisis," Denifle et Chatelain, IV, 346, no. 2107.

[87] Aug. 20, payment to Diago d'Oliviere, chamberlain of the duke of Burgundy, "pour subvenir aux frais qu'il luy convenoit faire en son voyage ordonne par le Roy—par devers les Roys de Castille et d'Arragon et ailleurs es partes d'Espagne pour aucunes choses qui touchoient grandement le Roy et l'honneur de son royaume," Compte de Pierre de Gorremont, *loc. cit.*, f. 201. Oct. 7, 3000 livres paid the seigneur de Neufchâtel, grand master of the royal household, who "fut envoye en Espagne par le Roy, pour aucunes grandes besongnes touchans grandement l'honneur et utilité de Roy et son Royaume," *ibid.*, f. 202. This envoy had been in Spain on a royal mission in March 1417, at which time he must have been an Armagnac. An embassy dispatched before June 2, 1418 (*vide infra*, note 89), must also have been Armagnac and was apparently still in Spain. That the question of recognizing one party or the other entered into the policy of either Castile or Scotland does not appear from any of the sources. The loan from Albany, however (*vide supra*, p. 106), is the only assistance known to have reached the Burgundians. This may be due to the fact that by the time either Castile or Scotland was really prepared to give actual assistance the situation in France had been simplified by the murder of Duke John, so that there was but one anti-English party. The Scots had been quite willing to form an alliance with the Burgundians, acting through Charles VI, at the time when they were the chief opponents of Henry. In Spain both Oliviere and Neufchâtel were in Burgundian pay, Compte de Pierre de Gorremont, f. 205v°.

[88] Modesto Lafuente, *Historia General de España* (15 vols., Madrid, 1861-1869), IV, 336.

cortes met, and being informed, apparently falsely, that Henry had declared war on Castile, voted a subsidy to arm a fleet for the French.[89] Envoys were also sent to Gueldres, Mons, Scotland, and Lorraine, to Navarre, and Foix, for aid, while commissioners went into Picardy and Flanders for "les affaires tres importantes."[90] With Scotland an alliance was concluded and promises of aid were obtained.[91] Negotiations with the Armagnacs were pushed. To accelerate them Breton mediation was employed, and the dauphin's wife was sent to her husband "pour luy exposer les moyens pour appaiser les discord—afin de par apres proceder à l'expulsion de ses ennemis et adversaires d'Angleterre qui lors occupaient grand partie de Duchie de Normandie."[92] The peace of St. Maur-des-Fossés resulted. For the moment this seemed to realize the popular hopes of united action, for already the scheme had been advanced that after the establishment of peace, Burgundy should attack the English with all his forces, while the dauphin and Brittany operated in Guienne and Lower Normandy.[93]

89 "Comienza la Cronica del serenismo Principe Don Juan, segundo rey deste nombre en Castille y en Leon, escrita por el noble é muy prudente caballero Fernan Perez de Guzman, senor de Batres, del su consejo" (*Cronicas de los Reyes de Castilla,* II, 227-695, Madrid, 1877), p. 375. Hereafter referred to as "Cronica del Rey D. Juan II."

90 "Le Roy fist venir des Escossois pour la tuition et defense de son Royaume;" Compte de Pierre de Gorremont, f. 196. "Messire Jehan Occoes, dit Hoccorsquin, chevalier, chambelan, fut envoyé vers le Duc de Gueldres, des Mons, et autres Amis, cousins, et allies de Roy demander succours contre le Roy de Angleterre." The bishop of Ross went to Scotland, the bishop of Thérouanne and Sir David Brimeu into Picardy, *ibid.,* f. 206v°.

91 "Il fut fait alliance entre le Roy, le Roy d'Escosse, et le Duc d'Albanie," *ibid.,* f. 207v°. The master of requests followed Ross "vers le Duc d'Albanie et aultres seigneurs dudit Royaume pour les paier et requerir et sommer sur l'ayde qu'ils avoient promis au Roy," *ibid.,* f. 206v°.

92 Compte de Pierre de Gorremont, f. 206v°. For negotiation with Brittany see *ibid.,* f. 206r°; St. Denis, VI, 278; *Journal d'un Bourgeois,* p. 115; Fauquembergue, I, 168.

93 "Avis fait pour le bien de la Paix et union de ce Royaume" dated

During the months of negotiation while the French were attempting to settle their internal political disputes, active operations against the English remained in abeyance. Frontier skirmishing took place along the Seine;[94] Jacques d'Harcourt continued to hold the Paris road at Étrépagny;[95] and a pro-Burgundian bandit carried on indiscriminate guerilla warfare west of the Oise.[96] Officials appointed to office in the conquered province were informed that they must collect their salaries in their bailliwicks despite the enemy or go unpaid.[97] Until the national powers could be united, however, neither faction dared attack the English army whose strength, reputation, and prospects of success were already beginning to gain partisans in Upper Normandy,[98] and which, on July 29, had laid siege to Rouen.

Aug. 4, 1418; Fenin, appendix, p. 274. This was probably only a proposal. It also seems probable that it emanated from the Armagnac side inasmuch as it throws on Burgundy the heaviest task of meeting the English king, thereby risking defeat which would have assured the political supremacy of the Armagnacs.

[94] Aug. 16, there was a skirmish at Quillebeuf. Aug. 17, a French company raided the suburbs of Evreux. Aug. 28, the English won a skirmish near Louviers capturing 180 "personas generosas," Walsingham, *Ypodigma*, p. 487.

[95] Fenin, p. 101.

[96] Monstrelet, III, 282. "Au temps du siège de Rouen, que les Anglais etaient devant la ville, et que Mgr Guy le Bouteiller etait capitaine dudit lieu de Rouen, il vint de nuit, à Saint-Etienne, des brigands qui couraient par le pays, en l'hôtel et manoir seigneurial, parce qu'il y avait des Anglais qui etaient audit hôtel et manoir, et parce que lesdits brigands ne pouvaient prendre ni avoir lesdits Anglais, lesdits brigands metirent et boutirent le feu audit hôtel et manoir, dont une partie dudit manoir arse et brûlee, et n'y demeura que l'hôtel où l'on fait la salle, qui est de present et les lettres et franchises qui avait ledit seigneur Olivier de Damfront furent brûlee;" quoted from "Pièces appartenant à la famille de M. Rondeaux" in P. Duchemin, *Histoire de St. Etienne du Rouvray* (Rouen, 1892), p. 29.

[97] Sept. 26, William de Crames was made bailli of Evreux, "quia patria occupatur ab Anglicis, provisum fuit ut de patria stipendia percipiantur," Fauquembergue, I, 173.

[98] The count of Harcourt was suspected of treasonable designs when

On the southern frontier of Normandy, on the other hand, both parties were actively engaged in irregular warfare against the English and each other. In the early months of 1418 there had been widespread fear of English invasion southward.[99] This fear was kept alive by the activity of the frontier garrisons with whom the truce evidently remained a dead letter. Sir John Cornwall led a raid up to the walls of Le Mans where he burned the suburbs.[100] Nor were the French backward in raiding English territory where they met with some success. Assembling men to relieve Domfront,[101] the bastard of

he withdrew to his castle and held aloof from the war, Monstrelet, III, 258. On July 30, 1418, a man was pilloried and his tongue pierced at Abbeville for saying "qu'il y avait ici dix à douze personnes des plus notables, chargeés des clefs des portes de la ville, qui étaient d'accord avec le comte d'Harcourt pour livrer la place au Anglais, s'ils s'etaient presentés aux portes," Thierry, IV, 237-8.

[99] In February, 1418, Tours was preparing for defense against the English, Delaville Le Roulx in *Le Cabinet Historique*, XXIII, 166. At the same time the count of Vertus felt it necessary to send troops "tres hastivement pour la garde, seurté, et deffense de ville et chastel [de Châteaudun] pour ce que les englois sont à present sur le pays dillec environs en grant nombre," Bib. Nat., fr. nouv. acq. 3642, nos. 714-5. In the following month he sent re-enforcements to Orleans (Arch. Nat., K 59, no. 20[58]), and put garrisons into his castles "pour doubte des englois estans prez" (Bib. Nat., fr. nouv. acq. 3642, no. 719). During April, May, and June he kept men in the castles of Orleanais, Blois, and Dunois "pour doubte des englois qui l'en dit chacun jour vouloir venir en noz diz pays;" *ibid.*, nos. 724-5. For July 1 there is record of expenditures for provisions "pour le despense de plusieurs ouvriers et autres gens de la chastellenie [de Châteaurenault] qui ont fait et repare les fossez, assis le pal, et fait plusiers autres reparacions oudit chastel," *ibid.*, no. 727.

[100] Jouvenel des Ursins, p. 546, places this event in 1418. If so it must have been before June 9 when Cornwall was at Louviers (Cal. Norm. Rolls, 41.711). For 1417 or 1418 there are letters of the queen of Sicily restoring to the canons of St. Pierre de la Cour the gardens usurped by a certain man after "les Engloys eurent brullez tous les forbourgs, et par especial, la rue derriere l'eglise de Saint Pierre, en lequelle estoient les maisons des chanoines;" *Cartulaire du Chapitre royal de St. Pierre de la Cour du Mans* (M. d'Elbeuf and abbé L. J. Denis, editors, *Archives Historiques du Maine*, IV, Le Mans, 1903-1907), no. 151.

[101] Warwick laid siege to Domfront April 2, 1418.

Alençon regained Fresnay-le-Vicomte. An attempt on Beaumont-le-Vicomte accomplished nothing, but when repeated in July by Ambrose de Loré the fortress was captured; "and in this fashion they recovered well on to twelve or fifteen fortresses."[102] The Paris revolution complicated the situation by stimulating Armagnac operations in Touraine. During June an army was assembling at Bourges, which aroused the apprehensions of the Burgundian captain of Tours.[103] July saw the beginning of active operations in the form of an attack on Montrichard, a demonstration before Tours itself, and the capture of Azay-le-Rideau, opening the road to Chinon where the dauphin set up his headquarters August 4, 1418.[104] Operations in so distant a field were impossible for the Burgundian government which could only send encouraging letters to its adherents.[105] In August a truce was arranged "in order that the poor peasants could sow their wheat,"[106] but Anjou, nevertheless, continued to be a field for Burgundian raiders.[107] Simultaneously came an appeal to the king from Mont St. Michel for financial assistance in maintaining the abbey against the English,

[102] Jouvenel des Ursins, pp. 539-40, puts these events in 1417 which contradicts his statement about relieving Domfront. For border warfare see also p. 546. The date for the recovery of Beaumont is inferred from a document of Aug. 4, whereby the bastard of Alençon appointed a captain, Robert Triger, *Le Château et la Ville de Beaumont-le-Vicomte pendant l'invasion anglaise, 1417-1450* (Mamers, 1901), p. 30.

[103] Delaville Le Roulx in *Le Cabinet Historique*, XXIII, 177.

[104] *Ibid.*, pp. 178-184.

[105] July 27 Charles VI wrote to Tours that he intended to order La Hire and other barons of Brittany and Anjou to hasten to the city's aid. The captains were directed to resist the dauphin "le plus diligemment, subtilement, et saigement que faire le pourrez." Luzarche, *Lettres Hist.*, p. 21.

[106] Aug. 13 the count of Vertus wrote to the citizens of Tours acceding to the truce, *ibid.*, p. 25.

[107] Aug. 22 the queen of Sicily wrote complaining that men of her service were held prisoners at Sablé and La Flèche, which were evidently in Burgundian hands, *ibid.*, p. 29.

inasmuch as its revenues were cut off by the enemy. Already the monks had spent 10,000 francs to put the isle in a state of defense and to prepare for a siege. The king responded by ordering the fugitive vicomtes of Avranches and Coutances, and the mint master of St. Lô to pay over 1500 livres to the monks, these officials being held personally responsible for the payment.[108] More effective measures for defending the Mont, however, might be expected if the duke of Brittany could be brought into the field. His truce with Henry terminating at Michaelmas had been prorogued until All Saints, consequently he need not hesitate to consider beginning hostilities, nor to accept 10,000 francs as an inducement to join the French.[109]

Meanwhile the siege of Rouen continued. The details of the actual operations, the vigorous sallies of the besieged, the famine and its attendant horrors need not be recounted.[110] They did not affect the strategy of the campaign. As soon as the Seine was crossed, even before the fall of Pont de l'Arche, the English had overrun the country east and north of the city.[111] For a long siege the problem before Henry was one of provisioning his army. He could draw upon Lower Normandy, for the road was already partly protected by truces as well as castles, and

108 Royal letter of Aug. 3, Simeon Luce, *Chronique du Mont-Saint-Michel, 1343-1468* (2 vols., Société des Anciens textes françaises, Paris, 1880), I, 88. The king also accorded permission to levy an "aide" on beverages to meet the expenses of defending the Mont, "Thomas le Roy et le MS des Curieuses Recherches du Mont Sainct Michel," *Mém. Soc. Antiq. Norm.*, XXIX, 467.

109 "Le Roy donna 10,000 francs au Duc de Bretagne par lettres de 16 Septembre 1418 pour s'etre employé avec ses gendarmes contre les Anglois en Normendie," Compte de Pierre de Gorremont, f. 201v°.

110 See Puiseux, *Siège et Prise de Rouen.*

111 They "chevaucherent toute la valleé et pristrent le chastel de Douville et de Loge empré, jouxta le pont Pierre, et puis chevaucher devant St. Katherine et deschendirent à Ni-de-Quien, et s'alerent logier à Fontaine-le-Bourg, et les autres partout le pauz d'entour," Cochon, p. 380.

in August and September the bailli of Evreux was still further empowered to make truce with the captains of Courville, Maillebois, and Vernon, with authority to encourage commercial relations between Evreux and Vernon by granting safe-conducts until the end of vintage.[112] Foraging in Upper Normandy prevailed but was hampered by the French in the castles between Rouen and Paris.[113] Re-enforcements arrived from England in July, 500 Irish (200 horse and 300 foot) led by the prior of Kilmaynam,[114] and were sent out to meet the French companies.[115] These were followed by Warwick's expeditionary force from the south after the fall of Domfront.[116] This division was sent to open the Seine to provision ships coming from England by capturing Caudebec. For six days only the town resisted,[117] agreeing to a truce on September 9 under which free passage along the river was accorded the English.[118] The capture of Quillebeuf[119] completed the English control of the lower Seine with the exception of Honfleur, which was rendered impotent by its isolation and by the English occupation of Harfleur. The fall of Cherbourg concluded the conquest of Lower Normandy[120] and released for the siege of Rouen Gloucester's forces already augmented by new troops from England.[121]

[112] August 1418, Cal. Norm. Rolls, 41.696-7.

[113] Château-Gaillard, La Roche-Guyon, Bouconvillers, Gisors, Gournay, and Neufchâtel, "Le Livre des Trahisons," p. 140.

[114] P. R. O., Issue Roll 636, m. 9. [115] Monstrelet, III, 285.

[116] Surrendered July 22, 1418, Livius, p. 51.

[117] Chastellain, *Chron. de Norm.*, p. 190.

[118] Rôles de Bréquigny 226. [119] Elmham, p. 190.

[120] Aug. 22, 1418, the city agreed to surrender Sept. 29, Rôles de Bréquigny 221.

[121] Elmham, p. 161. Gloucester's name first appears among the commissions of array on Nov. 6 (Cal. Norm. Rolls, 41.718), which indicates that he arrived after Oct. 6, the date of the previous muster (*ibid.*, 717). Inasmuch as the distance from Cherbourg to Rouen via Evreux and Pont de l'Arche is about 240 miles, Gloucester's army, had it begun to march

That siege, on its part, was dragging.[122] At Caen and Louviers there had been indications of sedition and conspiracy.[123] The dauphin and Duke John might make peace and unite against Henry;[124] indeed they were negotiating to that very end. The duke had repudiated the truce and showed no disposition to consider an Anglo-Burgundian peace. The king of England was not inclined to conquer all France. He did not even wish to maintain an army on the defensive in Normandy lest it be unable to live on the country.[125] He consequently again resorted to diplomacy to keep his enemies apart, turning, as before, to the "outs" before whom he could dangle the hope of recovering Paris in return for recognition of English claims to Guienne, Normandy, and Calais, with a free hand in Flanders.[126] On this basis negotiations for a truce were opened with the dauphin, who, despite the treaty of St. Maur-des-Fossés, had no hesitancy about sending an embassy to meet the English at Alençon.[127]

Henry felt no immediate anxiety about vigorous opposition in the field, for the duke of Burgundy at Paris was

immediately after the surrender, could scarcely have reached Henry before mid-October.

122 A London haberdasher was imprisoned for saying, "for and y were there with III. M men of armys,—y wood breke his sege, and make hem of Roon dokke hys tayle. And fordermore he sayde that he vere not able to abyde there, were hit that the Duk of Borgoyne kepte his enemys fro hym," Ellis, *Original Letters,* 2nd series, I, 78.

123 Cal. Norm. Rolls, 41.714,716; P. Le Cacheux, *Actes de la Chancellerie d'Henri VI concernant la Normandie sous la domination Anglaise, 1422-1435* (2 vols., Société de l'Histoire de Normandie, Paris, 1907), I, 17-20.

124 *Proceedings,* II, 357.

125 *Ibid.,* p. 350.

126 *Ibid.,* p. 351-3.

127 Safe-conducts for these ambassadors are dated Oct. 14, 1418, Rôles de Bréquigny 1182; commissions to the English negotiators are of Oct. 26, cf. Odolant-Desnos, *Mémoires Historiques sur la ville d'Alençon et sur ses seigneurs* (2 vols., Alençon, 1787), II, 9. Doubtless the dauphin was no more sincere than Henry, who was ready from the start to break with Charles and league himself with Burgundy should the latter recognize the English pretensions to the French crown; *Proceedings,* II, 354.

"without any great power of men-at-arms."[128] To the appeals from Rouen, supplemented by urgings from the university, John the Fearless returned "bonne et gracieuse response," with assurances that he was recruiting an army to raise the siege.[129] Like his rivals he found himself, when confronted with the English war, insufficiently supplied with men and money to risk a battle. Repeated proclamations of the ban and arrière-ban proved as ineffective as formerly, for "paucissimi comparuerunt, soubz umbre des debas et divisions de ce royaume, ou par deffaulte de paiement, ou par deffaulte de bonne loyaulté et obeissance, ou autrement par aultre voye, inqua alius sic, alius sic, ibat."[130] Popular patience had been exhausted by Armagnac taxation against which Burgundy had issued many a manifesto, consequently new methods for raising revenue must be found. The fears of the Parisians, with an English siege impending, would make them submissive to financial innovations. In October, therefore, grant was obtained of the right to levy for ten months a tariff upon all wines entering the capital, from which there were to be no exemptions.[131] At Amiens also the proximity of the English army aroused great anxiety,[132] and to that town the king turned for money, writing October 4, 1418 a request that immediately, in the least burdensome manner, the sum of 30,000 francs be collected to relieve Rouen. There, as at Paris, the normally exempt submitted, even the bishop permitting the levy upon his subjects.[133] In return the king graciously allowed the con-

[128] *Ibid.*, p. 352.

[129] Denifle et Chatelain, IV, 350, no. 2111.

[130] Fauquembergue, I, 203; St. Denis, VI, 262.

[131] *Report on the Foedera*, "Archives de France," p. 307; Fauquembergue, I, 177-8, 182. The university voluntarily submitted but was granted exemption, Oct. 27, Denifle et Chatelain, IV, 352, no. 2116. This levy was worth 100,000 francs according to Monstrelet, III, 293.

[132] Calonne, *Hist. d'Amiens*, II, 370-1.

[133] Thierry, *Recueil*, II, 77-78. A rather vague letter to Reims of the same

tinuation of the local tariff for paying the city debts and the expenses of defense.[134] Later in the year commissioners went to the other "bonnes villes du royaume, pour chercher à engager des joyaux et une partie du domaine royal en Normandie [!] jusqu'à concurrence d'une somme de 10,000 livres necessaires pour le recouvrement de la ville de Rouen."[135] As at Amiens taxes were laid on the diocese of Beauvais and the bailliage of Vermandois.[136] Where possible the government again resorted to borrowing.[137] To the confiscations from the Armagnacs, which had increased the revenue during the summer, were added those from men who had submitted to the English conqueror.[138] The unsuccessfulness of these efforts to improvise revenue in a national crisis can be inferred from the complete failure to accomplish the object in view. The only record of results existing shows that considerable sums had to be deflected from immediate military needs to the recompensing of faithful supporters, both cities and individuals, whose lands had suffered by war, or who were straightened to pay their ransoms.[139] By December

date may possibly be preliminary to seeking help there for the army intended to relieve Rouen, *Le Moyen Age*, 2e série, XX, 329-331.

134 Thierry, II, 85-88. 135 *Ord.*, X, 501; Fauquembergue, I, 210.

136 Monstrelet, III, 294.

137 The mint master at Tournai was approached for a loan of 20,000 francs which he reduced to 17,500 francs, Fauquembergue, II, 63-4. The parlement of Paris assessed itself 1000 francs to offer the king for the aid of Rouen, *ibid.*, I, 212. On Jan. 23, 1419, the commissioners appointed to collect loans from the royal officials and the Parisians for the relief of Rouen paid in 1120 livres parisis, Bib. de Rouen, Collection Leber 5870, tome III, Jornalia thesauri, f. 225.

138 Oct. 6, 1418, confiscation of the possessions of Alain le Lay who had joined the English, Fenin, appendix, p. 289.

139 The Compte de Pierre de Gorremont records 20,000 francs to the seigneur de Bonniers (f. 199v°), 24,000 francs to the city of Paris (f. 201), 2000 francs to the seigneur de Saillenay to pay his ransom (*ibid.*), 1000 francs to madame d'Estouteville whose husband was a prisoner in England (f. 201v°), 1000 francs to the master of the duke's household, held prisoner at Carcassonne (f. 202v°), 3000 livres to Jacques de Vierville who had been

5, 1418 the burden upon Paris of supporting the men-at-arms and strengthening fortifications was so heavy that the king granted the city all profits from the mint for two months.[140] Meanwhile, even in the face of great national danger, there was murmuring against the weight of taxes levied in unprecedented fashion.[141]

In addition to the financial problem, the very serious question of food supply also faced the government. The situation of the previous December was now reversed. The Burgundians held Paris, the Armagnacs were at Compiègne, Meaux, Melun, and Montlhéry, and were by no means inactive,[142] while the English controlled most of Normandy. Probably twelve months of war had considerably aggravated conditions by extensive devastation continually recurring, for the Paris basin had been fought over with little interruption since August 1417, not to mention previous intermittent ravaging. No sooner, therefore, did men-at-arms begin to respond to the royal summons, than the difficulty of feeding both them and the capital became greater and greater. On October 15, 1418 the parlement met to consider how to provide food for Paris, how to prevent men-at-arms, claiming to be Burgundian supporters, from interrupting the flow of provisions to the city, and how to persuade them instead to

a fugitive from Paris for six years (f. 202v°), 500 livres to Sir Athis de Brimeu for his Agincourt ransom (f. 204v°)—total 71,500 livres, Bib. Nat., Coll. Bourgogne, vol. 104. Oct. 5, 1418, gift of 2550 livres to Chastellus to assist in paying the ransom of his men-at-arms taken prisoners at Louviers by the English, Poreé, *Inventaire Collection Chastellux*, no. 546.

140 "en faisant ouvrer en la dicte monnoye pendant les mois de Decembre et Janvier et sur le droit de seigneurage apartenant au Roy, à cause de la grande despense qu'ils faisient pour l'entretenement de certain nombre de gens d'armes et de trait etans en la dicte ville pour la garde d'icelle estans [sic]; pour la fortification tellement qu'il leur en coustoit par mois 12000 livres tournois," Compte de Pierre de Gorremont, f. 204v°.

141 "Onus grave, alias non impositum, quamplurimi impacienter ferentes, murmurando incongruum reputabant," St. Denis, VI, 292.

142 Flammermont, *Senlis*, p. j. 9, p. 273.

protect merchants and victuallers.[143] Food was very dear within the city,[144] and in the region towards Rouen, where the new army was assembling, the country was stripped and the enemy in occupation of the towns.[145] By the latter part of November it was rumored in Paris that such forces as had been gathered and pushed forward Rouenward were leaving for want of food.[146]

Insistent appeals from the besieged, menaced with famine, made plain, late in October, the necessity for prompt action.[147] We get some glimpse of the French strength from the record of forces in respectable numbers mustering at Troyes, less than a fortnight's march from Paris.[148] On November 12 the king attended mass at Nôtre Dame preparatory to taking the field.[149] On the 16th proclamation of the ban and arrière-ban was renewed[150] and the royal and ducal baggage sent forward to St. Denis.[151] Thither Charles followed the next day to take the Oriflamme,[152] only to return immediately to Paris on

[143] Fauquembergue, I, 183-4: a week later 400 men were detailed to convoy provisions to Paris, *ibid.*, p. 186.

[144] *Journal d'un Bourgeois*, p. 116-7. [145] St. Denis, VI, 294.

[146] Letter of Nov. 22, 1418, from a citizen of Paris to Sir Jacques Paillart, Brit. Mus., Add. Ch. 74. This too reports high prices at the capital. [147] St. Denis, VI, 290.

[148] Oct. 20, muster against the English of ten Burgundian captains with 354½ "payès." The exact number of men cannot be determined because a "payè" represents merely a simple squire's wages; a squire bachelor or a knight was equivalent to more than one, while an archer would be less. Two items illustrate this; 29 squires bachelor are designated as 39 "payès," and 65 squires and 15 archers as 74 "payès." In addition, there were captains with a "certain nombre," not to mention troops recorded in such a way that it is not clear whether or not they were part of this muster. Compte de Jean Fraignot, Bib. Nat., Coll. Bourgogne, vol. 104, f. 213.

[149] Fauquembergue, I, 192, 194.

[150] St. Denis, VI, 294. [151] Brit. Mus., Add. Ch. 74.

[152] St. Denis, VI, 300 gives Nov. 10 as the date for taking the Oriflamme. This is a week earlier than the strictly contemporary statements of Fauquembergue and Sir Jacques Paillart's correspondent. The monk probably got the wrong Thursday in his notes.

the arrival of an English herald bringing defiance from Henry.[153] Finally on November 25[154] the king and duke again took their departure from Paris, establishing headquarters three days later at Pontoise. Here they remained for a month,[155] attempting to negotiate with Henry, sending renewed summonses to the dauphin to march north and join them,[156] receiving delegations from Paris urging that everything be done to relieve the besieged.[157] Meanwhile Rouen starved and the Armagnac captains continued to pillage to the walls of the capital.[158] The Burgundian companies at Pontoise, suffering from want, took to living off the country, much to the discontent of the people thus forced to suffer the privations of war without seeing any effort to expel the invader.[159] Money, also, to pay the men-at-arms, became scarce, and need for it was immediate,[160] for troops were still assembling and must be paid if they were to be kept together for active operations.[161] In conjunction with these military preparations, a fleet with a convoy of provision ships was to fit out at Abbeville and Le Crotoy, and make its way up the Seine, but apparently nothing was accomplished towards its equipment.[162]

By the end of December the country about Pontoise would no longer support the army, consequently head-

[153] Brit. Mus., Add. Ch., 74.
[154] Fauquembergue, I, 202.
[155] Petit, p. 444.
[156] St. Denis, VI, 302.
[157] Fauquembergue, I, 219.
[158] *Journal d'un Bourgeois*, p. 119.
[159] St. Denis, VI, 300, 304.
[160] Fauquembergue, I, 216.

[161] The Compte de Pierre de Gorremont (f. 204v°) mentions for Dec. 1418, "Messire Guy, Seigneur de Miraulmont, chevalier, conseiller et chambelan du Roy, fut, par son commandement, devers Monseugneur Messire Jehan de Luxembourg pour le faire venir avec le plus grande nombre de gens d'armes et de trait pour aller combattre les Anglois." Quittances for companies in the field or mobilizing are noticed in Villevieille, *Tresor Genealogique*, I, 293, II, 43. The arbalesters of Tournai joined the king at Pontoise, de Smet, *R. C. F.*, III, 370.

[162] Extract from the Compte de Pierre de Gorremont published in Petit, p. 614.

quarters were moved to Beauvais,[163] whither the Picard nobles and the communal militia had been summoned.[164] But even from there the most that could be done was an isolated attack upon the English which they easily repulsed.[165] A pitched battle that might prove another Agincourt the duke dared not risk, even in the face of growing discontent at the government's inaction.[166] Upon the French withdrawal from Pontoise Rouen began to treat with the English.[167] Already the university had written the besieged recounting the efforts made in their behalf but without holding out any hope of relief. "Chiers et bons amis," the letter concluded, "Dieu vous doint bonne prosperite en ce monde et paradis et armes."[168] On January 13, 1419, the royal army began to retreat from Beauvais to Beaumont-sur-Oise.[169] On the same day Rouen

[163] *Ibid.*, 444; Gachard, "Archives de Dijon," p. 240; Fauquembergue, I, 220.

[164] Monstrelet, III, 298-9; Cordeliers, p. 263; Jan. 11 the men of Amiens set out to join the army, Thierry, II, 78.

[165] Monstrelet, III, 301; Fenin, p. 105.

[166] This discontent is reflected in the chroniclers who dwell upon the "mout grant puissance de gens" with which Burgundy did nothing, Fenin, p. 106; de Smet, *R. C. F.*, III, 370. Chastellain, *Chron. de Norm.*, p. 188, accuses the duke of keeping up the spirit of the Rouenese with false hopes. Monstrelet, III, 300 records a promise by Burgundy, made to an embassy sent by Rouen to him at Beauvais, to bring relief by Jan. 7, 1419, i. e. "le quatorzième jour apres Noel." The fact that Burgundy arrived at Beauvais on Dec. 29, 1418 (Petit, p. 444) and that the city began to treat on Jan 2, 1419 makes it seem that, either the embassy met Burgundy at Pontoise, or the story is merely another sign of the popular dissatisfaction with the Burgundian failure. The pro-Burgundian author of the Journal d'un Bourgeois fulminates against "les faulx traistres de France qui ne vouloient que la guerre" (p. 112), and the gentlemen who "on pou s'en mesloient pour la haingue des Bourguignons et Arminalx" (p. 120).

[167] Jan. 2, 1419, safe-conducts to an embassy from the city, Rôles de Bréquigny 1212. Jan. 3, another safe-conduct and appointment of commissioners to treat with the city, *ibid.*, 258-9.

[168] Denifle et Chatelain, IV, 355-6, no. 2120.

[169] Petit, pp. 444-5.

capitulated, agreeing to open its gates in six days.[170] The day before, impressed doubtless by English success, Brittany agreed to prorogue the truce until the following November.[171] Negotiations with the dauphin and the Angevins still progressed,[172] and the leading French nobles on the Guienne frontier agreed to a cessation of hostilities until Easter.[173] Continued victory not only assured to Henry his conquest of Normandy but bade fair to isolate Burgundy diplomatically and to prevent a coalition of French powers.

Meanwhile the Burgundian retreat continued, avoiding Paris whither the news of Rouen's capitulation had travelled fast.[174] The capital was immediately seized with fear that the duke intended to abandon the city to the enemy. Repeated embassies waited upon the king urging him to return at least to St. Denis.[175] By January 16, 1419 the army reached Lagny-sur-Marne.[176] From here Duke John sent assurances to the Parisians that he would guard and relieve the capital, would victual the city, using all diligence to maintain the food supply, would bring his army to its relief if attack was made before the end of May, and would not withdraw beyond Provins except in extreme necessity.[177] Simultaneously letters were written to other cities justifying the Burgundian failure and urging them to remain faithful. The fact that Rouen had been defended by Burgundians and that all efforts to raise the siege had been made by the same party was emphasized. The dauphin was blamed for the failure to conclude civil

[170] Latin text in Rymer, IX, 664; French text in Cheruel, *op. cit.*, notes, p. 39.

[171] Rymer, IX, 663.

[172] *Ibid.*, pp. 662, 670.

[173] *Ibid.*, p. 661.

[174] The failure of the effort to relieve Rouen was known there Jan. 12, 1419, Fauquembergue, I, 229. The surrender was known before Jan. 17, *ibid.*, p. 232.

[175] *Ibid.*, pp. 224-231, 236, 260.

[176] Petit, p. 445.

[177] Burgundy to Paris, Jan. 19, 1419; Fenin, appendix p. 287; cited in Stein, p. 25, no. 334.

peace. That no attack had been made on the English was ascribed to failure of the dauphin and the duke of Brittany to respond to the royal summons to Beauvais, consequently the muster had not been sufficiently large to justify an attack.[178]

The Burgundian strategy of avoiding Paris was wise. Difficulty in obtaining supplies for the civil population was considerable and ever-present. The English and Armagnacs continued to raid close to the city, making movement in the environs very dangerous.[179] To maintain an army there would be impossible. The English might besiege the place but if they did they would find themselves in a region in which the Burgundian army had been unable to subsist for a month. They could, it is true, bring provisions up the Seine. Rouen, however, had shown that a strong city could resist for a long time. It might, therefore, be reasonably doubted if the English could endure the strain of a second siege under still more difficult conditions. Should they make the attempt a Burgundian army in the field would be of more value to Paris than one cooped up within the walls, for by falling back towards Burgundian territory it would be in a position to draw supplies from a more prosperous district of undoubted loyalty, where a force much larger than that at Beauvais could probably be assembled.[180] Accordingly, after placing garrisons on the frontiers of Normandy and Picardy, and in the bailliages of Sens, Meaux, Melun, and Chartres, under the nominal command of the count of St. Pol,[181]

178 Charles VI to St. Quentin, Jan. 29, 1419, Georges Lecocq, *Le Siege de Rouen en 1418, récit du roi Charles VI* (St. Quentin, 1875). Notice of a letter to Mantes of the same day is in A. Durand and E. Grave, *La Chronique de Mantes, ou Histoire de Mantes depuis le IX^e siècle jusqu'a la Revolution* (Mantes, 1883), p. 269. Charles VI to Reims, Jan. 23, *Le Moyen Age*, 2^e série, XX, 331-338.

179 *Journal d'un Bourgeois*, p. 123.

180 Fauquembergue, I, 237.

181 Appointed Jan. 19, 1419, Stein, p. 24, no. 333.

Burgundy took up his position at Provins where he remained until May.[182]

The English, no longer threatened by a hostile army in the field, employed the early months of 1419 in the rapid subjugation of Upper Normandy together with such places south of the Seine as had not yet succumbed. As early as September, 1418, Salisbury had been commissioned to take the field for the suppression of rebellion, but of his exploits we know nothing.[183] Probably he merely undertook a demonstration to overawe such parts of Lower Normandy as showed signs of disaffection without attempting any conquests. By December 1418 he was back in the camp before Rouen.[184] An effort had also been made during the siege to negotiate with French captains in Upper Normandy, but of that too there is no recorded result.[185] With Rouen's surrender, however, Henry took immediate action and sent a force under Exeter to subdue the isolated castles to the west and north.[186] It was likewise planned to push eastward towards Paris as a means of exerting pressure on the French to come to terms, as well as to prepare for a vigorous offensive against the capital should the enemy continue obstinate. For these operations Clarence, after being sent on a short expedition to secure the Rouen-Dieppe road, was commissioned on January 31, 1419.[187] It seems probable that Salisbury returned south of the Seine at this time to co-operate with Exeter's advance along the north bank.

Many castle captains and local lords did not wait to be

[182] Petit, p. 446.

[183] Sept. 12, 1418, Cal. Norm. Rolls, 41.716-7.

[184] His name appears among the captains mustered at Rouen Dec. 7, 1418 (*ibid.*, 720), but not in the musters of the previous October and November (*ibid.*, 717-8).

[185] Sept. 12, 1418, commission to the lieutenant of Harfleur to treat with the captains of Montivilliers and Fécamp, Cal. Norm. Rolls, 41.717.

[186] Jan. 14, 1419, *ibid.*, 728.

[187] *Ibid.*, 724.

subdued but submitted voluntarily to the king. Those to the west saw themselves cut off from all hope of succour by the fall of Rouen. Those to the east feared to become the first victims in a move on the capital. The roads northward from Rouen to Dieppe and Neufchâtel had been opened by the submission of Longueville, Suane, Torcy, Arques, and Nesle.[188] West of this line there was no resistance. Montivilliers surrendered to the lieutenant of Harfleur,[189] who was at once empowered to receive the allegiance of the town and the vicinage.[190] From fortresses between Harfleur and Dieppe, Grainville, les Loges, Fécamp, Gauzeville, Valmont, Cany, and Vittefleur, before the end of January the captains came under safe-conducts to submit to the king.[191] Already before Exeter began his march westward along the Seine, Caudebec, having agreed to abide by the fate of Rouen, had been taken over by the English commissioners.[192]

Exeter encountered no resistance. On January 31, 1419, Lillebonne[193] and Tancarville[194] agreed to surrender within three days. Turning north the duke received the formal submission of Fécamp[195] and the neighboring forts.[196] Within a week he was near Dieppe which opened

188 Jan. 14, Longueville was taken into royal protection, Rôles de Brèquigny 1214. Jan. 27, the lords of Torcy, Suane (who also held Arques), and Nesle submitted to Clarence, *ibid.*, 327. Cochon, p. 380 reports the occupation of Fontaines le Bourg, and Monstrelet, III, 309, mentions St. Germain-sur-Cailly, Bellencombre, and Bacqueville as submitting on Rouen's fall. On Feb. 12, 1419, Sir Thomas Rempston was made captain of Bellencombre, Cal. Norm. Roll, 41.730.

189 Jan. 23, Rôles de Bréquigny 268.

190 *Ibid.* 1216.

191 *Ibid.* 1213; Cal. Norm. Rolls, 41.727.

192 Sent out Jan 23, Rôles de Bréquigny 1213.

193 *Ibid.* 277, supplementing Rymer, IX, 677. Feb. 5, John Herle was appointed to take over the town, Cal. Norm. Rolls, 41.747.

194 Bib. Nat., fr. 26043, no. 5435.

195 Feb. 1, Rymer, IX, 677, supplementing Rôles de Bréquigny 282. Feb. 3, Fastolf was appointed to take over the town, Cal. Norm. Rolls, 41.747.

196 Thiboutot (unidentified) and Gauzeville on Feb. 3, Rymer, IX, 678-9; Rôles de Bréquigny 286-7. Feb. 2, Sir Christopher Curwen appointed to

its gates on February 8.[197] At the same time a subordinate expedition under Exeter's direction was moving eastward along the Rouen-Gisors road.[198] Étrépagny surrendered on February 1.[199] Five days later the captain of Neaufle castle, an outpost of Gisors to the west, received safe-conduct to carry the castle keys to the king.[200] Avoiding Gisors itself, this expedition turned north. On February 9 Gournay capitulated.[201] Neufchâtel acted likewise, if indeed it had not previously submitted.[202] It seems probable also that the occupation of Beauvais was contemplated for on February 2 Warwick was designated as captain,[203] but there is nothing to show that it was attempted.

The foregoing successes put the English in control of the road from Gournay to Dieppe. Local nobles in this region had already submitted to the king.[204] Further advance northward from Dieppe brought Exeter to the

take over Cany castle, Cal. Norm. Rolls, 41.725. Feb. 6, the captain of Vittefleur castle was taken into royal protection, Rôles de Bréquigny 1224.

197 *Ibid.* 319: Sir William Bourchier had been appointed to receive allegiances at Dieppe, *ibid.* 294.

198 This is the only explanation for simultaneous actions under Exeter's authority occurring at widely divergent points.

199 Rymer, IX, 678, supplemented by Rôles de Bréquigny 283.

200 Cal. Norm. Rolls, 41.725. Evidently there was some delay which may account for the slower progress of this force, for on Feb. 9 a second safe-conduct was issued to the lieutenant of Neaufle for the same purpose, *ibid.*, 730. An English captain was appointed Feb. 12, *ibid.*

201 Rymer, IX, 683, supplemented by Rôles de Bréquigny 296.

202 Elmham, p. 206, mentions the capture of Neufchâtel by Salisbury, Fenin, p. 106. A vicomte for Neufchâtel and Gournay was appointed Feb. 8 (Rôles de Bréquigny 1222), and a captain on Feb. 12 (Cal. Norm. Rolls, 41.730).

203 *Ibid.* The appointment of a captain before the capture of a place, usually shortly before, is illustrated by the appointments at Eu, Gournay, Pontoise, Mantes, and Vernon.

204 Jan. 22 the lord d'Abancourt had safe-conduct to come to the king, Rôles de Bréquigny 1213. Feb. 5 Egidius de Rouveray had the same to come from Rouveray to swear fealty, *ibid.* 1220. Preaux appears among the English conquests, Monstrelet, III, 309.

Bresle. Here the submission of Eu, Monceaux, St. Martin le Gaillard, and Guillemcourt[205] completed for the time the conquest of Upper Normandy. The Bresle formed a convenient frontier for the moment. Still further advance would have to be pushed to the Somme. Aumâle may have been more obstinate than these other places for the earliest mention of its submission is in a document of December 1419 and there in a manner which implies that the siege was but recently ended.[206]

South of the Seine expeditions were likewise moving east and west. Salisbury, crossing the river at Rouen, marched, probably via Pontaudemer,[207] to Honfleur which capitulated to him February 25.[208] Clarence, to the eastward, crossed the Seine at Pont de l'Arche and simultaneously summoned Gaillon and Vernon, both of which submitted on February 3.[209] There was no necessity to send troops to Mantes, for the authorities, bearing the

[205] Rôles de Bréquigny 303, 443; P.R.O. Norman Rolls 10 (6 Henry V), part II, m. 3. The French captains agreed to hold the towns until Henry was prepared to take them over. This was an ordinary procedure. The Calendar (41.746) fails to make clear just what the agreement was. It was really a capitulation like those of other towns with some of the customary provisions.

[206] Rôles de Bréquigny 706.

[207] Monstrelet, III, 309 lists this place among the post-Rouen conquests. The earliest appointment at Pontaudemer is of June 2, 1419 (Cal. Norm. Rolls, 42.320). It does not appear to have been a stronghold (the English never had a garrison here during this period), so had not demanded attention during the conquest of Lower Normandy.

[208] Rôles de Bréquigny 313. Chastellain, *Chron. de Norm.*, p. 192 says the siege began Feb. 4. His dates are not trustworthy. He states that Mar. 12 marked the end of the siege whereas the treaty of Feb. 25 stipulated surrender by Mar. 16.

[209] Rôles de Bréquigny 284, 712; Cal. Norm. Rolls, 41.746; Rymer, IX, 679; St. Denis, VI, 310; Hellot, *Cron. de Norm.*, p. 47. Chastellain, *Chron. de Norm.*, p. 192 records the occupation of "Rongny" (unidentified) and Blaru in consequence of the surrender of Vernon and Mantes. The French had planned to defend Vernon, for on Jan. 22, 1419, 1500 francs was ordered delivered to the treasurer of war for improving the fortifications and victualling the town, Fauquembergue, I, 239, 241.

keys, met the English envoys on the road[210] and arranged a capitulation on February 5.[211] Meulan did the same but the garrison at Pont de Meulan by refusing, blocked the river passage at that point.[212] Leaving a force before les Goulets,[213] Clarence crossed to the north bank at Vernon[214] and by occupying Baudemont[215] and securing the actual capitulation of Neaufle,[216] connected his new conquests with the frontier established by Exeter's men.[217]

Despite this completion of his Norman conquest the English king still faced the necessity of conquering France also before he could secure the results of his victories. This move he was loath to take lest in striving for too much he suffer disaster.[218] Already French diplomacy had raised up Spanish and Scottish enemies against him. A month after Rouen surrendered he wrote to the bishop of Winchester in England. "Worshipful fader in god, right trusti and welbeloved, We grete you wel and witeth that we been enformed that the Kyng of Castel maketh a grete armee of vesselx whiche shuld be redy in short tyme, as is sayde, for to do harme ageinst us and oures that that may, which god defende, and in especiale that thaire purpos is to doe thaire powerre for to brynne and destrue oure navies, and the navie of our lande and namely oure shippes at Hampton. And also thaire ordinance is to lande in our Reaume for to doo th'annoye that that may. Wherefore we wol and charge you that by

[210] St. Denis, VI, 310.

[211] Bib. Nat., fr. 26042, no. 5332.

[212] St. Denis, VI, 310.

[213] Surrendered Feb. 26, Rymer, IX, 699.

[214] Probably the new commission dated Feb. 18 marks the beginning of this movement, Rôles de Bréquigny 305.

[215] Elmham, p. 205.

[216] Feb. 23, 1419, Rymer, IX, 696, supplemented by Rôles de Bréquigny 307.

[217] Dangu had been surrendered to the king by its lord in January, *ibid.* 1217.

[218] In Oct. 1418, Henry did not wish to make this move or even to keep his army in the field in Normandy, *Proceedings,* II, 350.

th'avys of our brother of Bedford and of othir suche as semeth to your discreccion, ye ordenne in alle haste for the governance of oure lande, and for the sauf-warde of seurkepyng of oure saide vesselx at Hampton and in other places where as evere thay bee, and that thay of the portes and of the see coost al abowte be warned here of in alle haste, and charged to be wel awaytyng and redy at al tymes, if any suche thyng happen. Geven under our signet en oure castel of Rouen, the XII day of ffeverer.''[219] By the end of three weeks the sheriffs had proclaimed that all men near the coast keep watch against a sudden attack by a hostile fleet,[220] and commissions of array against this expected armada had been issued.[221]

Throughout 1419 the English pursued a defensive strategy, which aimed, on the one hand, to secure and defend the frontiers of their new conquests, and, on the other, to give support to negotiations for peace. For nearly eighteen months they had kept up a continuous campaign constantly crowned with success, yet the French were as stubborn in their resistance as before. If Henry had hoped that the French government, honeycombed with corruption and wracked by civil war, would collapse under his blows he was sorely disappointed. His chief concern after the fall of Rouen was to secure what he had won, and to save himself from the necessity of winning more. ''Ther may non hope be hadde as yette of pees,'' wrote an English soldier with disappointment in April 1419, adding resignedly, ''God putte honde therto

219 P.R.O. Ancient Correspondence, vol. 43, no. 162. That this letter is of 1419 is evident from the fact that on Feb. 12, 1420, Henry was at Vernon (Cal. Norm. Rolls. 42.343), in 1421 he was in England, and in 1422 near Meaux (*ibid.*, 42.423 and 424).

220 P.R.O. Chanc. Enroll. 268 (Close Rolls 6, Henry V), m. 1d°. There had been a similar scare in July, 1418, *ibid.*, m. 17. A guard of forty archers was maintained at Southampton, Issue Roll 633, m. 9.

221 *Cal. Pat. Rolls, Henry V*, II, 209.

when hys wil ys.—Y prey yow ye prey for us that we may come sone oute of thys unlusty soudyours lyf ynto the lyf of Englond."[222] Later in the year Henry himself, writing to the Londoners, complained that his enemies "wol noo pees nor accord have with us, but finally have refused al meenes of pees, we be compelled agein, (therefore), to werre thorough thair default, as he wot that al knoweth, to whoos mercy we trust, for our good wil and redinesse to the pees, to have the better spede heraftur, the which we recomende to your good prayers with al our herte."[223] The best he could do was to secure a truce with the Armagnacs to last from February 12 until April 23, 1419, for the region between the Seine and the Loire.[224]

For more than two months after the fall of Rouen the English king remained in the Norman capital while his captains subdued the Pays de Caux. In anticipation of taking the field he summoned to his support all loyal knights and squires in Normandy,[225] and sent to the English authorities in Guienne and Gascony for additional troops.[226] Late in March royal headquarters were moved

[222] Ellis, *op. cit.*, pp. 77-8. The editor dates this letter 1420 but the mention therein of Gisors, Château-Gaillard, and La Roche-Guyon as yet untaken shows it to be in 1419. It was written from Evreux on April 3 by a soldier apparently in the army under the king's command. Henry was at Evreux on April 3, 1419 (Cal. Norm. Rolls, 41.763), while on April 3, 1420, he was at Rouen (*ibid.*, 42.367).

[223] Delpit, p. 227.

[224] Fauquembergue, I, 270; Cal. Norm. Rolls, 41.731.

[225] Feb. 26, 1419, Bib. Nat., fr. 26042, no. 5365.

[226] The mayor of Bordeaux replied that inasmuch as the revenues of the castle did not suffice to pay the ordinary expenses he could not use part of them to pay soldiers to be sent to Normandy, Brit. Mus., Sloane 4602, f. 53. May 4, 1419, the citizens of Bayonne wrote that a threatened naval attack by the Castilians prevented the sending of troops to Henry, Goodwin, p. 215 citing Cottonian MSS. Caligula D 5. At the same time we find re-enforcements sent to Calais from England: Feb. 26, commission of array for Sir John Savage with 60 men-at-arms and 180 archers, *Cal. Pat. Rolls, Henry V*, II, 213.

to Evreux[227] from whence Warwick went to besiege La Roche Guyon. That fortress succumbed when its walls were undermined.[228] At the same time Henry, turning now to the Burgundian party, appointed commissioners to treat for peace and a marriage alliance with the French king, promising to be bound by all actions of his emissaries relating to the establishment of peace.[229] Negotiations with the Armagnacs still continued but the embassy which came to Henry at Evreux concluded nothing.[230] During April and most of May the king was at Vernon.[231] New summonses to war were dispatched to the Norman vassals.[232] Exeter went to take Château-Gaillard,[233] Gloucester to capture Ivry. The one would complete the conquest of the Seine, the other would give control of the

227 The king was at Evreux from Mar. 25 to April 4, Cal. Norm. Rolls, 41.768, 763.

228 Chastellain, *Chron. de Norm.*, p. 193, puts the date of the capitulation on April 6, but his dates are usually wrong. April 28, Sir Guy Bouteller, late captain of Rouen, who had sworn fealty to Henry, received orders to take over the castle, Cal. Norm. Rolls, 41.771. Elmham, p. 212, puts the surrender in May, St. Denis, VI, 310-2.

229 Mar. 28, 1419, Cal. Norm. Rolls, 41.762.

230 Hellot, "Chron. d'un bourgeois de Verneuil," p. 221; Chastellain, *Chron. de Norm.*, p. 192.

231 April 5-May 26, Cal. Norm. Rolls, 41.763, 775.

232 April 24, orders to the bailli of Caux, Bib. Nat., fr. 26042, no. 5356: April 27, same to the bailli of Rouen, Cal. Norm. Rolls, 42.317.

233 The exact dates for the siege of Château-Gaillard are difficult to determine. That it lasted six months appears from payment made to two masons employed "durant le temps de six moys que le siege estoit devant ledit chastle Gaillart," Bib. Nat., fr. 26043, no. 5489. Chastellain, *Chron. de Norm.*, p. 193, says Exeter laid siege Mar. 31 and that the castle held out until September. This testimony would not be of much weight were it not that Walsingham, who is a reliable source for dates, states that the place fell Sunday, Sept. 31 (*Hist. Anglicana*, II, 330), i.e., exactly six months after Mar. 31. On the other hand Exeter's orders to take over the place are dated April 24, Cal. Norm. Rolls, 41.803. Ordinarily we would conclude that this marked the beginning of operations. Furthermore, according to the Chaplain (p. 132) the castle was not taken until Dec. 8, 1419, on which date Sir John Roos was made captain (Rôles de Bréquigny 700).

upper Eure, serve as an outpost against Dreux, and round out the southern frontier by providing a connecting link between Mantes, the easternmost conquest south of the Seine, and the fortresses of Lower Normandy.[234] On May 10, 1419, Ivry capitulated.[235] In consequence of this expedition English companies overran the Chartraine[236] even as far south as Janville.[237] Further military operations during the next three months were few, but diplomatic negotiations were continuous, Anglo-Armagnac and Anglo-Burgundian, all without result.

The French government also desired peace but preferably with the Armagnacs. Normandy had been completely abandoned,[238] the Rouen garrison following the king and duke to Provins.[239] Paris was feverishly preparing for defense. The authorities urged the king to make peace with the Armagnacs, or at least a truce so that the city could be victualled for the English siege which they anticipated.[240] They sent embassies to the Armagnac captains,[241] and wrote letters to the dauphin exhorting him to grant an armistice for facilitating the establishment of peace.[242] Royal orders were no longer heeded in preparing for resistance; revenues were appropriated,[243] and loans contracted by the government for the diplomatic expenses were used by the Parisians to pay the garrison.[244] Amiens similarly expected an attack, inasmuch as the enemy was raiding to within a few leagues

[234] The Mantes-Breteuil-Laigle road crossed the Eure just north of Ivry.

[235] Rôles de Bréquigny 140. The treaty was inscribed on the roll for 1418 along with all the treaties of that year, consequently Bréquigny dated it 1418, Cal. Norm. Rolls, 41.746.

[236] Hellot, *Cron. de Norm.*, p. 49.

[237] Early in May English appeared suddenly before Janville castle, Brit. Mus., Add. Ch. 76.

[238] Fenin, p. 104.

[239] They arrived before Feb. 19, 1419, Petit, p. 446. Feb. 25, quittance for 1515 l. 2s. 6d. t. paid to one captain out of 6000 livres for the entire garrison, Villeveille, II, 178.

[240] Fauquembergue, I, 252-3.

[241] *Ibid.*, p. 254.

[242] *Ibid.*, pp. 268-9, 287.

[243] *Ibid.*, pp. 257, 268.

[244] *Ibid.*, p. 298.

of the city.[245] The town meeting decreed that grain for a year be provided before the middle of April, that inhabitants arm themselves, each according to his condition, under official supervision, and that neighboring towns be called upon for support.[246] Refugees from Rouen without means of support were expelled.[247] Part of the town income was sold to meet the cost of preparedness.[248] A conference from the threatened towns assembled at Arras to concert measures of defense.[249] At the same time Burgundian officers were actively preparing for the defense of Picardy as a whole, inspecting fortresses, putting them into a state of defense, operating against Armagnac castles, and suppressing "pillards." These Amiens assisted with both men and money.[250]

At Provins activity of another sort was in progress. Negotiations with Scotland, Savoy, and Brittany were under way, partly for aid, partly to resist Armagnac influence, partly with a view to mediation and civil peace.[251] The dauphin was summoned to aid the king according to the treaty of September 1418. He was reproached for abandoning his father in a crisis and threatened with disinheritance.[252] Repeated letters went to loyal cities assur-

245 Thierry, II, 80. 246 Calonne, *La Vie Municipale*, pp. 307-8.

247 Thierry, II, 78, note 6. 248 *Ibid.*, pp. 80-1.

249 *Ibid.*, p. 78, note 6; Maugis, p. 310.

250 Thierry, II, 78, note 6; Maugis, pp. 308, 364. For Mar. 11, 1419, there is an order to pay the captain of Roye 300 francs (each worth 24d), wages for 20 men-at-arms and 20 archers for one month, Beauville, *Recueil*, III, 220; Monstrelet, III, 310, 317.

251 Petit, pp. 446-7; Fauquembergue, I, 244; Compte de Pierre de Gorremont, f. 200v°.

252 Isambert, VIII, 607. In a letter of Feb. 26, 1419, the king upbraided the dauphin because there had been at the Beauvais muster "nuls de ceulx de nostre sang, ne gueres d'autres, qui nous fassent venus servis et accompaigniers, excepte nostredit cousin de Bourg^ne et ceulx de sa compaignie," Besse, *Recueil*, pp. 264, 269. An Armagnac chronicler writes of the plight of the citizens at Rouen and adds "et monseigneur le Daulphine ne les pouvoit secourir, pource qu'il avoit assez affaire de tenir les gens d'armes es

ing them that the government was striving for civil peace, but that efforts to persuade the Armagnacs to abide by their agreement were in vain.[253] Directions for the fortification of Paris against the English were issued.[254] Troops were ordered to conduct provisions to the city. Similar care was taken for the provisioning and garrisoning of Chartres.[255] Officials went out "pour querir et mectre sus le plus grant nombre de gens d'armes et de trait que assembler pourra" for resisting the English,[256] and all vassals and allies were called to the king's camp.[257] No military action, however, was inaugurated, and by the middle of May a truce for three months had been arranged with the dauphin,[258] and serious negotiations for peace were opened with Henry.[259]

For the Armagnacs the English operations against Rouen afforded the same advantage that Burgundy's move on Paris had provided for Henry in August-September, 1417. Duke John's strategy must form itself according to the English war, in which his opponents had the initiative, with small concern for his political enemies on the Loire. Henry's move upon Rouen and Paris freed Armagnac lands from the threat of serious invasion from Normandy. The loss of Paris was a military advantage. It relieved the Armagnacs from the necessity of main-

garnisons contre le Duc de Bourgogne et ses gens, et ausi que les Anglais tenoient tous les passages de dessus Seine, depuis Paris en bas," Alain Chartier, p. 39.

[253] Fauquembergue, I, 254, 281, 289-92; Garnier, *Correspondence de la Mairie de Dijon*, I, no. 19. As early as March 13 Reims was informed that the government had decided to open negotiations with the English; Charles VI to Reims, *Le Moyen Age*, 2e série, t. XXI, 1-3.

[254] *Report on the Foedera*, "Archives de France," p. 175.

[255] Fauquembergue, I, 257, 281. [256] Bib. Nat., fr. 25710, no. 1.

[257] Fauquembergue, I, 281.

[258] *Ibid.*, p. 299; *Journal d'un Bourgeois*, p. 124; Gachard, "Archives de Dijon," p. 47, no. 54.

[259] Fauquembergue, I, 298; Rôles de Bréquigny 1367.

taining the defense of an isolated city, the possession of which produced for them no appreciable political advantages. For the moment they were too weak or too wise to attempt its recovery. They could, however, make the Burgundian position there uncomfortable, while consolidating their own strength in the Loire valley, and preparing for renewed efforts by sending to Spain and Scotland for help. Negotiations with Burgundy alternated with raids in the vicinity of Paris, where scarcity and high prices already resulted from the Armagnac possession of Meaux and Melun. The capital's provisioning was still further interfered with when the dauphin's men regained Beaumont-sur-Oise by treason.[260] While Burgundy was pre-occupied with measures for the relief of Rouen, the dauphin besieged Tours, and after a short siege, bribed the Burgundian captain to evacuate the city.[261] In pro-Armagnac territory the castles north of the Loire were strengthened, munitioned, and garrisoned against possible attacks,[262] while an army assembled to fight the English and to subdue the pro-Burgundian seigneur at

[260] Fauquembergue, I, 278, 282; St. Denis, VI, 316-18, 366; *Journal d'un Bourgeois*, p. 125.

[261] See payment of 14,000 l. t. to Charles l'Abbe, Morice, *Preuves*, II, 990; Monstrelet, III, 293; Chastellain, *Chron. de Norm.*, p. 188.

[262] Feb. 10, 1419, record of work at Châteauregnault castle, Delisle, *Les Collections de Bastard d'Estang*, p. 80, no. 735. Feb. 20, order to expel the wives of pro-Burgundians from Tours and to seize their goods. In April a force totalling 124 men-at-arms and 104 archers were left in garrison at Tours, Chinon, Loches, Châtillon, Langhais, and Rochecorbon, Delaville Le Roulx, *Le Cabinet Historique*, XXIII, 213. Mar. 18, payment for convoy of artillery from Jargeau to "Yere" (Yevre?) castle, Bib. Nat., fr. nouv. acq. 3653, no. 1699. May 12-27, garrisoning and munitioning of Janville against the English, Brit. Mus., Add. Ch. 76-8: June, munitioning and repairing Châteaudun, Lucien Merlet, *Registres et Minutes des Notaires du Comté de Dunois (1369 à 1676), inventaire sommaire* (Chartres, 1886), p. 13: special precautions at Sainte-Suzanne, Robert Triger, "Sainte-Suzanne aux XI^e^ et XV^e^ siècles" (*Revue Historique et Archéologique du Maine*, LXI (1907), 45-78), p. 56.

Parthenay.[263] By the middle of June 4000 men-at-arms were said to be at Bourges, a figure which would eventually be augmented by forces under Foix, d'Albret, and the seigneurs of Auvergne, while requests for military support had been sent to Sicily, Brittany, and Savoy.[264] A less reliable informant puts the dauphin's strength at 15,000 horsemen, adding that there were 300 men-at-arms, not to mention archers, at Melun and Meaux, that all the Loire crossings were held and that Paris was completely blockaded.[265] The count of Vertus, later in the year, called out the vassals of the duke of Orleans, in Berry and Santonge, to do military service under the dauphin.[266] And levies were made on the cities to meet the expenses of all these forces.[267] Another ambassador hurried off to Castile to secure transport for troops coming from Scotland.[268] Some Scots with Genoese had already landed at La Rochelle to join the dauphin's army.[269] To arrange for a larger force to follow these, the count of Vendôme and the chancellor went to Scotland where they secured promises of an army of from 7-10,000 men.[270] By June 28,

263 Morice, *Preuves,* II, 965, 987; Guessard, "Gauluet," *Bib. de l'École de Ch.* IX, 465, 466, note 2.

264 July 15, 1418, Jean Caille, êleu de Lyons, to Lyons, written from Bourges, de Beaucourt, I, 439, p.j. V.

265 June 17, 1418, the bailli of Mâcon to Lyons, *ibid.,* p. 441, p.j. VI.

266 Nov. 20, 1418, payment made to the messenger, Bib. Nat., fr. nouv. acq. 3653, no. 1691.

267 Dec. 8, 4000 francs from Angers; Dec. 25, 1600 francs from Bourges; Jan. 13, 1419, 30,000 francs demanded of Tours newly conquered, Delaville Le Roulx, *Le Cabinet Historique,* XXIII, 212.

268 Mar. 22, 1419, Bib. Nat., fr. 20977, no. 2271.

269 Mar. 21, the mayor of Bordeaux to the king, Goodwin, p. 216, citing Cottonian MSS. Caligula D 5.

270 Ralph Holinshed, *Chronicles of England, Scotland, and Ireland* (6 vols. London, 1807-1808), V, 412, reports this embassy as arriving shortly before Sept. 3, 1419, which date he erroneously gives as that of Albany's death. Scots captured in France in May, 1419, reported that 2000 men-at-arms and 8000 archers under Buchan, March, Orkney, and Athol were

1419, the Castilians agreed to provide an armed fleet to bring this force to France, advancing the necessary money (119,400 francs d'or) for maintaining ships and crew for three months,[271] and by September 5 the Bayonnese reported that it was preparing to sail for Scotland.[272]

Meanwhile the first contingent of Scots made its presence felt by an incursion into Lower Normandy. Mortain was besieged and relieved.[273] Ambrose de Loré with Fresnay as his base, raided northward and won a skirmish near Mieuxec just west of Alençon. But, when shortly afterwards, the newly appointed bailli of Evreux raided southward Sir Ambrose was captured and carried off prisoner to Croisy.[274] On June 18, the French took Avranches by assault, and Pontorson the following day.[275]

coming to help the dauphin, Goodwin, p. 217, citing Cottonian MSS. Caligula D 5.

271 Georges Daumet, *Étude sur l'Alliance de la France et de la Castille au XIV*e *et XV*e *siècles* (Bibliothèque de l'école des Hautes Études, no. 118, Paris 1898), p. 745.

272 Goodwin, p. 216, *ut supra.*

273 Before May 3, 1419, Goodwin, p. 217, citing Cottonian MSS. Caligula D 5. For May 17 there is evidence of the presence in France of Sir William Douglas with 150 men-at-arms and 300 archers; William Forbes-Lieth, *The Scots Men-at-arms and Life-Guards in France; from their formation to their final dissolution. A.D. 1418-1830* (2 vols., Edinburgh, 1882), I, 12-13.

274 This was probably in May 1419; Jouvenel des Ursins, p. 546. The chronology can be ascertained from the statements that Sir Gilbert Halsale was bailli of Evreux and that de Loré was released after eleven months' captivity by the Armagnac capture of Croisy (p. 556). Sir Gilbert was appointed bailli Mar. 12, 1419, Rôles de Bréquigny 1251. Croisy was captured April 6, 1420, *Journal d'un Bourgeois,* p. 137.

275 Luce, *Chronique de Mont St. Michel,* I, 22; Jouvenel des Ursins, p. 552. Jouvenel (p. 546) has an account of the capture by the French of Beaumont-le-Vicomte, which Luce (*ut supra,* note 2) thinks was in this same campaign. Either Jouvenel is repeating himself, or else the French had lost Beaumont since July, 1418, and de Loré had again retaken it. Either is possible. Jouvenel does not associate the recapture of Beaumont with that of Avranches. He does not even put them in the same year. His whole account of the border warfare, however, gives an impression of confused chronology.

Salisbury, royal lieutenant in Normandy,[276] with the baillis of Cotentin and Caen went south at once, and orders were promptly sent to the local nobility to assemble under these officials and repel the invaders.[277] As a result Avranches was recovered July 14, 1419.[278] These incidents served, however, to show the point at which the English position was weakest. There was no natural barrier along which they could establish a strong frontier unless they pushed their conquests to the Loire. To concentrate sufficient power for such an advance meant exposing Normandy to reconquest from the east by the Burgundians, a reconquest which would seriously endanger the English rear. Henry could not undertake vigorous offensives in two directions at once, nor could he weaken his Burgundian front safely because in that direction the enemy was still dangerously strong. Further conquests, therefore, must be directed against this strongest enemy while the weaker Armagnacs were held in check by frontier garrisons. Furthermore the political considerations which attached themselves to a campaign against Paris rather than into Anjou were sufficient, in conjunction with the foregoing military conditions, to determine the direction of English strategy.

More serious than incursions from Maine was the

[276] Appointed April 26, 1419, Cal. Norm. Rolls, 41.772.

[277] June 24, 1419, Rôles de Bréquigny 617.

[278] *Ibid.*, 215. The date given is 1418. This is due to the fact that the treaty was written in on the roll for 6 Henry V, along with a whole series of other similar treaties. The fact that this one is at the end of the roll, in addition to the chronological probabilities, makes it fairly clear that this treaty's presence on the roll of 1418 was an error, or a convenience in arrangement, of the Norman chancery, Cal. Norm. Rolls, 41.746. Probably Pontorson was not recovered at this time. Suffolk had been appointed captain on June 12, before the French took the town, Rôles de Bréquigny 610. On Aug. 27 he was made captain of Avranches, *ibid.*, 650. On Nov. 28, 1419, he received payment in the latter capacity only. Account of William Alington, P.R.O., Ex. Accts. 187/14, f. 16v°. Jan. 2, 1421, he was paid as captain of both places, P.R.O., For. Accts. 61, Bv°.

course of Burgundo-Armagnac negotiations which on July 11, 1419 culminated in a new treaty of peace and alliance against the English.[279] In his promulgation thereof King Charles declared a general amnesty, forbade men-at-arms to war on anybody but the English, ordered the termination of sieges, directed that the forces employed thereat be used against the common enemy to protect the kingdom and recover Normandy, and pledged the Burgundian partisans not to war on the dauphin's subjects.[280] Paris celebrated the peace with great popular rejoicings by day and night.[281] People felt that at last the rival factions had actually united to expel the invader.[282] Duke John sent a "grand mandement" throughout his lands of his intentions to combat the English with the dauphin's help, and sent an envoy to Ghent to concert measures with the count of Charolais.[283] Amiens was informed that the allies were about to join forces, and urged to guard well against hostile attack.[284]

The English, for the moment, were in doubt whether or not the French alliance meant a continuation of the war.[285] Henry was still willing to prorogue the truce which terminated July 29,[286] and continued to receive French embassies.[287] Failing, however, to renew the truce, he replied to the peace of Pouilly with an immediate, sudden advance towards Paris of a kind to impress the popular imagination. On the night of July 30-31 English forces surprised and captured Pontoise, the chief stronghold of Paris' outer defenses. News of this disaster reached the

279 Rymer, IX, 776. July 20, ratified by both leaders, Stein, p. 25, nos. 341-2.

280 Promulgated July 19, *Ord.*, XII, 263.

281 Fauquembergue, I, 307; *Journal d'un Bourgeois*, p. 126.

282 St. Denis, VI, 344-6; Morosini, II, 180.

283 "Le Livre des Trahisons," p. 144.

284 Sept. 5, 1419; Kervyn de Lettenhove's edition of the *Oeuvres de Georges Chastellain* (*Chronique, 1419-1470*, vols. I-V, Brussels, 1863-1866), I, 21, note 1.

285 Rymer, IX, 779.

286 *Ibid.*, p. 782.

287 *Ibid.*, p. 783.

capital with the fugitives who arrived in a pitiful state. At once refugees from the country east of the Oise flocked to Paris, making food again very dear.[288] Immediately the duke and king who were at St. Denis fell back to Lagny to await developments, avoiding Paris whither the count of St. Pol went with a garrison.[289] Later they withdrew to the safer distance of Troyes, again, as in January, leaving the capital expecting a siege and but meagrely garrisoned.[290]

The fact was not lost upon the English that they now had "passage to Parys,"[291] and they stimulated the Parisians' fears when Clarence rode before the Porte St. Denis;[292] but Henry himself was not yet prepared to undertake another siege. He preferred to establish connections between his new conquest and the frontier posts in Upper Normandy by securing the Gournay-Gisors-Pontoise road. Border warfare in the north was becoming troublesome between the Bresle and the Somme. From Le Crotoy, Gamaches, Pont de Remy, Compiègne, and Gisors, French captains continued to carry on "forte guerre" against the English, while the latter raided as far east as Breteuil and Clermont, and desolated Vimeu.[293] Apparently St. Martin-le-Gaillard had been retaken by the French in the course of the summer,[294] and signs of discontent and insurgency were beginning to appear in the Upper Norman cities.[295] After the fall of

[288] *Journal d'un Bourgeois,* pp. 126-8; Elmham, pp. 226-31; Monstrelet, III, 333; Delpit, p. 227. There were not lacking suspicions of treason, Fauquembergue, I, 309 note; Jouvenel des Ursins, p. 552. That Henry had planned to occupy Pontoise appears as early as Feb. 2, 1419, when he appointed a captain for the place, Cal. Norm. Rolls, 41.730.

[289] Petit, p. 450.

[290] *Journal d'un Bourgeois,* pp. 128-9, 135.

[291] Delpit, p. 227.

[292] Fauquembergue, I, 311-2; St. Denis, VI, 354; Elmham, pp. 231-2.

[293] Monstrelet, III, 336, 368; "Le Livre des Trahisons," p. 141.

[294] Monstrelet, III, 335.

[295] July 23, 1419, royal letters authorizing inquiries into seditious activi-

Pontoise the sieur de L'Isle-Adam, who had commanded there, instead of retreating Parisward, moved via L'Isle-Adam to Beauvais where he was co-operating with the other captains in their irregular warfare.[296] On August 18, 1419, Henry left Pontoise, at the same time sending a contingent along the Gisors road to take Bouconvillers.[297] Other places about Gisors were at least threatened,[298] and Gisors itself besieged on August 30.[299] On September 11, the town came to terms with Clarence, agreeing to surrender if not relieved by the 17th.[300] Having achieved his purpose Henry now, as formerly, followed his new successes with new proposals for peace. As a means of exerting "diplomatic" pressure he, at the same time, ordered new advances upon Paris. Gloucester was sent forward along the south bank of the Seine from Mantes to St. Germain which he took,[301] while another force undertook

ties at Rouen and Neufchâtel, Rôles de Bréquigny 1261. Sept. 8, orders for a similar investigation at Dieppe, with directions to execute the guilty, and to arrest and imprison suspects at discretion, *ibid.* 654.

[296] For this border warfare see "Le Livre des Trahisons," p. 143; Chastellain, *Chron. de Norm.*, p. 195; St. Denis, VI, 352; Monstrelet, III, 334-7; Fenin, pp. 106-7, 110-11; Hellot, *Cron. de Norm.*, p. 51. Those at Le Crotoy interfered with communications across the Channel, Delpit, p. 230. Probably the French activities occasioned the necessity of collecting all the boats on the Seine to prevent their use by the enemy, Léchaudé d'Anisy, *Extraits des Chartes, et autres actes Normands ou Anglo-Normands, qui se trouvent dans les Archives du Calvados* (2 vols., Caen, 1834), II, 393, no. 168.

[297] Chaplain, p. 131; Elmham, p. 231. Henry issued documents from this place on Aug. 28-31, Cal. Norm. Rolls, 41.797, 801.

[298] Henry issued documents from "the army before Tarte" Aug. 22-25, and Trye le Chastel, Sept. 4-17, *ibid.*, 797. I have been unable to identify "Tarte," inasmuch as it is impossible to suppose it to be either of the places of that name south of the Seine, near Damville (Eure) or Houdan (Seine et Oise), without other evidence of operations in those regions, of which there is none.

[299] Chaplain, p. 131.

[300] Bib. Nat., fr. 26043, no. 5419; Jouvenel des Ursins, p. 552. The castle resisted until the 23rd, Elmham, p. 234. Sept. 25 is the date of the fall of Gisors according to Walsingham, *Hist. Anglicana,* II, 330. This event excited still greater apprehensions at Amiens, "Le Livre des Trahisons," p. 144.

[301] Elmham, p. 239. He also took Montjoye.

to secure the fortified bridge at Meulan, the last point of resistance on the Paris road along the north bank of the Seine. The surrender of this fort on October 29[302] completed the English conquest. Normandy was now won and secured by frontier fortresses from Avranches to Mantes on the south, from Eu to Pontoise on the north, and, in addition, the approaches to Paris along both banks of the Seine, up to the very outskirts of the city, were in English hands. Only Château-Gaillard showed any resistance, while the French still clung tenaciously to the far southwestern corner at Pontorson and Mont St. Michel. In the meantime French politics had undergone a complete revolution by the murder of John the Fearless at Montereau on September 10, 1419. This precipitated an Anglo-Burgundian alliance before the year ended, which, by opening up new possibilities to Henry's ambitions, turned him to new conquests in France for which Normandy served only as a base.

[302] *Ibid.*, p. 240. On Oct. 28, March and the earl marshal were commissioned to take over the fort, Cal. Norm. Rolls, 41.805.

CHAPTER IV

MILITARY FINANCE

The unique feature of Henry V's military achievements is the continued effort which he maintained during a series of years in a foreign and conquered country. His policy in this respect stands in marked contrast to that of Edward III, whose expeditions into the enemy's country never became more than raids on a large scale. Henry's campaigns show a deliberate scheme for occupying Normandy, a scheme carried out with some regard for strategy, backed by statesman-like policy, supplemented by skillful diplomacy, and maintained during Henry's lifetime with an adequate force supported by regular levies in men and money, first upon England and later upon Normandy. The French failure successfully to combat the invader may in part be ascribed to the fact that the Armagnacs and Burgundians alike had to depend on mercenary armies which dispersed every autumn and had to be re-formed every spring; but the chief advantage enjoyed by the English king lay in the fact that while his opponents were financially embarrassed most of the time, he had a sufficiency of money. This enabled him not only to raise an army but to keep it under his control as well. That this was largely due to Henry's own capabilities may be safely concluded when we find Stubbs alluding to his "success in obtaining money, men, and ships" as "little less than miraculous" when compared with the difficulties encountered by Henry IV.

That the French war was popular seems evident from the readiness with which parliament voted supplies, although until 1417 but little advantage had been gained other than the capture of Harfleur, the retention of which place proved a drain upon the treasury.[1] Under the grants of November 1415, March, and October 1416, were collected sums amounting to some £216,868 9s 10d.[2] No subsequent year of the reign, despite the Norman campaigns, saw such heavy taxation.[3] Nevertheless expenditure for maintaining Harfleur, for negotiating with Sigismund and Burgundy, for organizing the naval expedition of

[1] *Vide supra,* p. 53.

[2] P.R.O., Receipt Rolls 672 and 675. Of this, £34,837 9s 7d, or 16.06 per cent came from the clergy; £101,893 2s 5d, or 46.98 per cent from the laity; £23,425 13s 8d, or 10.8 per cent from loans; and the remaining 26.16 per cent from miscellaneous sources. Sir James Ramsay (*Antiquary,* VIII, 99), by adding the individual items on the roll, secured a total of £227,902. The figures utilized here are those entered in the Receipt and Issue Rolls, and the years are financial years, i.e. from Easter to Easter. It is notorious that the clerks of the exchequer manipulated their accounts and made entries on the rolls to suit their book-keeping (see *Antiquary,* VIII, 96-7 and *Proceedings of the Society of Antiquaries,* 2nd series, XXV, 37). The actual figures, therefore, must always be taken with reservations. Since, however, our interest lies in the fluctuations of taxation, borrowing, and expenditure in relation to events, rather than the investigation of individual items, an attempt to correct the figures in the rolls by addition or subtraction would be more likely to produce confusion than to bring us nearer to the truth. Certainty that all the manipulations of the record had been discovered would be impossible even if the records were complete, and some of the rolls are fragmentary, with the official totals preserved but not all the entries. It seems, therefore, that for the purposes of this study the recorded figures must be considered the best available.

[3]

	Revenue						
	1416	1417	1418	1419	1420	1421	1422
Laity	£101,893	£ 50,121	£ 38,794	£ 38,373	£ 8,237	£ 15,098	£ 15,100
Clergy	34,837	22,984	17,580	19,578	5,291	14,198	1,424
Loans	23,425	34,766	322	5,353	3,451	40,899	14,126
Misc.	56,712	48,031	82,227	66,264	63,452	73,089	49,530
Total	216,868	155,905	138,925	129,570	80,433	143,284	80,181
Deficit	40,017		10,676		38,954		5,726
Surplus		4,616		45,661		5,160	

1416, and for preparing that of the subsequent year, brought the total of expenditures up to £256,885 15s 10d,[4] a deficit of over £40,000. The session of October 1416 had voted two tenths and two fifteenths to be levied in February and November 1417, with authority to raise loans on this prospective income.[5] Canterbury convocation voted two tenths and York voted one.[6] Early in March, 1417, the king began to borrow to meet immediate war expenses, granting to the Londoners half the wool subsidy in return for half of a loan of ten thousand marks borrowed.[7] By letters under the privy seal he summoned

	Expenditure						
Household	97,483	26,490	11,768	14,242	18,076	45,519	26,660
War	125,571	95,123	120,993	41,559	75,562	55,662	26,652
France	81,185	70,637	77,001	8,536	41,419	23,099	8,912
Navy	26,138	6,725	10,548	8,988	7,653	2,326	1,084
Total	256,885	151,288	149,601	83,908	119,387	138,124	85,908

The roll for Easter term, 1419, goes only to August 25, and that for Easter term, 1421, goes only to August 3, consequently the revenue for those years, and the resulting surpluses, must have been larger than the figures indicated. In like manner the roll for Michaelmas term 1422 covers only the period from Oct. 5, 1422, to March 4, 1423, so that there may have been no deficit at all. In the table of expenditures the sums under "France" and "Navy" are included in those under "War." P.R.O., Receipt Rolls 672, 675, 677, 680, 683, 686, 689, 692, 693, 694, 696, 698, 701, 702, 703; Issue Rolls 624, 629, 630, 633, 636, 638, 640, 643, 645, 646, 649, 652, 655, 659.

[4] P.R.O., Issue Rolls 624,629. Of this £97,483 14s, or 37.94 per cent was paid over to the royal household (including £22,784 1s 4d to the camera regis); £81,185 10s 8d, or 31.6 per cent went for military expenses in preserving the conquests of 1415; £26,148 10s 10d, or 10.17 per cent was spent on the navy; and £18,177 14s, or 7 per cent was used for other military purposes; leaving only 23 per cent odd of the revenue for other government activities. Comparison with the issues of 2 Henry V shows that 38.5 per cent went to the household, and 35.5 per cent for military and naval expenses in that year; *Antiquary*, VIII, 99.

[5] *Rot. Parl.*, IV, 95; Kingsford in *E. H. R.*, XXIX, 511-513.

[6] Wilkins, *Concilia*, III, 377, 380.

[7] *Cal. London Letter Books*, I, 176. P.R.O. Issue Roll 629, m. 16 under Mar. 19, 1417, records 5000 marks borrowed from the mayor and commonalty for the expenses of the king's household, and 5000 marks for

leading men of the realm to meetings at Reading and Salisbury to make him loans.[8] Similar missives went to all the clergy, from archbishops to chaplains, requesting them to advance money to the royal commissioners appointed to receive the same,[9] and in May messengers were sent to get the money.[10] There was no escaping these royal "requests," for the commissioners had the authority to assess the amounts to be borrowed,[11] and men who had promised to pay were not permitted to neglect their pledge.[12] With the assembling of the army the need for ready money necessitated renewed borrowing to pay the soldiers, and new funds were secured from the Londoners by pawning to them a jeweled sword,[13] from other cities,[14]

wages of the army. The first sum was apparently borrowed on Mar. 3 (*Cal. London Letter Books,* I, 176; *Cal. Pat. Rolls, Henry V,* II, 67), the second on Mar. 8 (Issue Roll 633, m. 1). The last reference records the repayment on Oct. 4, 1417, of the 5000 marks not covered by the wool subsidy grant.

[8] April 21, 1417, there is record of payment for messenger "missis ad diversis comitis Angliae cum brevibus de privato sigillo Domini Regis diversis magnatibus directis ad comparendum coram domino Rege et consilio suo apud Redyng existente ad certum diem in eisdem brevibus contentu pro certis denariis summis per ipsos eidem domino Rege proximo viagio suo accommodandis:" similarly for the Salisbury meeting, P.R.O. Issue Roll 630, m. 2. In Issue Roll 633, mm. 3, 4, 7, 8, 14, 18, is record of repayments to John Spenser, William Rothenale, John Hende, Richard Whitington, John Victori of Florence, and Thomas Carrewe, of £600 loaned by them in March.

[9] Kingsford in *E. H. R.,* XXIX, pp. 511-2.

[10] P.R.O. Issue Roll 630, m. 2 records payments of messengers sent to the priory of "Crichirche," Canterbury, "pro denariis ab eo mutuandis ad usum Regis pro viagio suo," also to fourteen men in Lincoln, and to others in Oxford, Berks, Southampton, Wilts, Somerset, Dorset, and Cambridge.

[11] Brit. Mus., Cottonian MSS. Cleop. F VI, f. 228 (old pagination 289).

[12] *Ibid.,* Sloane MSS. 4601, f. 54, a letter to a man who had promised to lend nine marks, reminding him that he had not yet paid and urging him to do so at once!

[13] May 10, 1417, there were orders for assessing a loan to pay the wages of "notre gens de notre dit Retinue pour le dit second quarter au temps à eulx assignez, selon notre dicte promesse, sique pour defaute du dicte second paiement notre diete voiage est semblable d'estre retardez et la premier paiement par nous faite estre perdue, à grand damage de nous et de tout notre Royaulme, qui dieu defende," Brit. Mus., Cott. MSS. Cleop. F VI,

from wealthy prelates and ecclesiastics on other and similar securities,[15] and from foreign merchants.[16] Again when the expedition was about to sail, commissioners were sent out to raise another loan throughout the country, but after two months' effort they could report only failure, because the persons approached pleaded poverty.[17] The sum total borrowed during Easter term (April 11-September 29), 1417, was £34,146 17s 7d, of which more than two-thirds was obtained from the few individuals mentioned in the foregoing pages.[18] In addition, the ransoms obtained from the captive French nobles taken at

f. 228 (old pagination 289). In this way £2160 was secured on June 21, 1417 from forty-three citizens. The sword was valued at £2000. It was not to be parted with until Sept. 29, 1418, *Cal. London Letter Books,* I, 202. On May 19, 1419, the king issued letters patent granting the custom on wool at London port as security in place of the sword, *ibid.,* p. 214. In addition, on June 12, 1417, 2000 marks had been obtained from Richard Whittington, Devon Issues, p. 362.

[14] On July 1, 1417 Bristol advanced 1000 marks secured by the tonnage and poundage of that port, *Cal. Pat. Rolls, Henry V,* II, 111.

[15] On July 18, 1417 the bishop of Winchester received the grant of the customs at Southampton in return for a loan of £14,000. A golden crown was given him as security, and the loan was further secured by parliamentary enactment in December 1417, *ibid.,* p. 112; *Rot. Parl.,* IV, 111. Two canons of St. Paul's, the dean of Lincoln, and the bishops of Lincoln and Ely lent the king £500 on June 21, Rymer, IX, 460-1. The same day the Hospitallers advanced 2000 marks, *Cal. Pat. Rolls, Henry V,* II, 279.

[16] The Florentines provided 13,333 "scutis boni et puri auri," P.R.O., Chanc. Enroll. 267 (Close Roll 5 Henry V), m. 16d°.

[17] July 23, 1417, commission to the abbot of St. Albans, Oct. 6, his report to the exchequer, Rymer, IX, 499-500.

[18] P.R.O., Receipt Roll 677. Computing the gold crown at 7s value (Robert L. Kenyon, *The Gold Coins of England, Arranged and described,* London, 1884, p. 211), there remains only £9487 17s 7d which we cannot account for from the preceding references. During the same term there was repayment of loans to the extent of £8,182 3s 4d, P.R.O., Issue Roll 633. In the preceding term £18,500 had been borrowed (Receipt Roll 675) and £19,000 repaid (Issue Roll 629). It has been shown that, in the time of Edward III, loans recorded in the Receipt Roll did not always indicate money actually paid in, but such instances are not thought to have been numerous, *Proceedings Soc. of Antiq.,* 2nd series, XXV, 37.

Agincourt still further augmented the revenue, providing large sums which, when coming to the king furnished means for prosecuting the war, and when accruing to English captains gave new incentive to them and their fellows for supporting with enthusiasm the plans for further conquest.[19]

As the war progressed parliament renewed the taxation inaugurated to fit out the invading army. Allusion has already been made to the collections of February and November 1417 under the vote of the previous October.[20] By parliamentary action in December, 1417,[21] supplemented by votes of the two convocations,[22] a tenth and fifteenth were levied in February, 1418, and again in 1419. In 1420, there were two collections, a whole tenth and fifteenth in February, and a third of the same in November.[23] Authority to contract loans upon the security of these last levies being accorded when the grants were

[19] On May 25, 1417, 30,000 crowns was due from the count of Vendôme, Rymer, IX, 442. Safe-conduct for those bringing this sum is dated April 9, 1417, *ibid.*, p. 446. Apparently the count had to borrow 2,000 crowns from Sir John Cornwall to make up a deficiency, Hardy, p. 217. On May 5, 1416, the duke of Orleans paid Cornwall 10,000 crowns (Brit. Mus., Add. Ch. 11434), and on Oct. 22, 1418, 6,000 crowns (*ibid.*, 11448). In July 1417 the duke of Angoulême borrowed 41,000 livres towards the payment of his ransom (*ibid.*, 72). Jan. 29, 1418, £333 6s 8d from Vendôme's ransom was paid by the exchequer into the camera regis, P.R.O., Issue Roll 633, m. 11.

[20] For Michaelmas term (Sept. 29, 1416-April 11, 1417), £65,776 5s was collected from the laity, and £19,066 13s 5d from the clergy, P.R.O., Receipt Roll 675. These sums, augmented by £7,723 18s from the laity and £13,745 14s 2d from the clergy collected in Easter term, 1417 (*ibid.* 677) represent the income under the February levy. No deduction, however, for arrearages of former levies has been made. The November collection of 1417, together with the early returns of that for February 1418, brought in £42,397 14s 10d from the laity and £9,238 18s 10d from the clergy. *ibid.* 680.

[21] *Rot. Parl.*, IV, 107.

[22] Canterbury voted two tenths to be collected in February, 1418, and February 1419. York voted one tenth, *Deputy Keeper's Report*, 2, appendix, II, 188; Wilkins, III, 381, 389.

[23] Voted by parliament, Nov. 3, 1419, *Rot. Parl.*, IV, 117.

voted, commissions to negotiate such loans were immediately issued[24] but nothing extensive was done.[25] Not until the spring and summer of 1421, when the Baugé disaster made a new expedition imperative, and that in a year when no new subsidy was to be collected,[26] did the king resort to extensive borrowing. Over £40,000 was thus secured during the Easter term[27] (March 23-September 29, 1421), of which £14,000 came from the bishop of Winchester.[28] It is against this levy of forced loans[29] that Adam of Usk inveighs so grievously.[30] Parliament meeting in May authorized the royal council to give security for the debts thus contracted.[31] At the end of the year, however, the burden of Henry's campaigns with the prospect of more fighting to come necessitated another vote of a tenth and fifteenth from parliament to be collected by halves in February and November, 1422,[32] and another

[24] Rymer, IX, 815; *Cal. Pat. Rolls, Henry V,* II, 249-52.

[25] In Michaelmas term 7 Henry V (Sept. 29, 1419-April 7, 1420) only £4,519 19s 11d was borrowed, P.R.O. Receipt Roll 692. In the following term (April 7-Sept. 29, 1420) only £1,396 was borrowed (*ibid.* 693), and only £2,055 3s 10d in the succeeding period (Sept. 29, 1420-Mar. 23, 1421) (*ibid.* 694); total £7,871 3s 9d. During the same period nearly twice this sum (£14,460 8s 10d) was used in repaying debts, Issue Rolls 643, 645, 646.

[26] The parliament of December 1420 had not been asked for a new grant, *Rot. Parl.,* IV, 123.

[27] P.R.O., Receipt Roll 696. This roll goes only to Aug. 2, 1421. It should be noted, however, that £22,737 was expended on repayments during this period, Issue Roll 649. Do these mean renewal of old obligations? For commissions to borrow see *Cal. Pat. Rolls, Henry V,* II, 365, 384-6. Some borrowing was done even in Bordeaux, Brit. Mus., MSS. Sloane 4603, f. 93.

[28] *Rot. Parl.,* IV, 132; *Cal. Pat. Rolls, Henry V,* II, 372.

[29] Rymer, X, 96; *Proceedings,* II, 280-1.

[30] *Chronicon,* pp. 133, 320.

[31] *Rot. Parl.,* IV, 130.

[32] *Rot. Parl.,* IV, 151. Under this grant there was an attempt in March to borrow the full amount of the subsidy to be collected in November, *Cal. Pat. Rolls, Henry V,* II, 416-7. During Easter term, 10 Henry V (April 12-Sept. 29, 1422) £11,086 was borrowed (Receipt Rolls 701-2) and £9,331 repaid (Issue Roll 655).

tenth from the convocations.[33] The income from this grant was distinctly disappointing, and the collection of the clerical tenth met with open resistance.[34] Obviously England demanded a respite from war taxation. The necessity, therefore, of securely establishing the new régime following Henry's death caused the Lancastrian princes to refrain from making demands for money on parliament, and to attempt to throw the entire financial burden of the war upon Normandy and France. First payment of wages to the re-enforcements of 1423 must have been made from the ordinary receipts, while for that of 1424 the government borrowed from the bishop of Winchester, mortgaging to him the wool subsidy, and diverted over two-thirds of the little king's household expenses to the needs of the war.[35] Not until the end of 1429 did the English government again resort to direct taxation.[36]

Considering the period as a whole it is patent that, despite the continuance of the war, the financial burden which Henry's ambition placed upon his kingdom tended

[33] Granted by Canterbury May 12, 1421, by York Sept. 22, Wilkins, III, 399, 403.

[34] Even if we add the amount collected from the laity in Michaelmas term, 9 Henry V (Sept. 29, 1421-April 12, 1422) i.e., £14,920 (Receipt Roll 698), to the £15,100 collected in Easter term, 10 Henry V and Michaelmas term 1 Henry VI (Receipt Rolls 701-3), the total is £6000 short of what Ramsay considers the average for such a collection, *Antiquary*, VIII, 96. It is true that the account for Michaelmas term, 1 Henry VI (Receipt Roll 703) is mutilated so that it is a month short (it ends with Mar. 4, 1423: Easter was April 4); but it is also true that the above figures include arrearages of former grants collected during this period. In October, 1422, writs of assistance were issued to collectors of the clerical tenth in Dorset and Wilts, *Calendar of the Patent Rolls, Henry VI* (6 vols., London, 1901-10), I, 6. Even in May, 1421, the commons had called the king's attention to the people's poverty and the intolerable burden of the war, William Cobbett, *The Parliamentary History of England from the earliest period (A.D. 1066) to the year 1803* (36 vols., London, 1806-1820), I, 339.

[35] *Cal. Pat. Rolls, Henry VI*, I, 214, 227; *Proceedings*, III, 135, 144, 146.

[36] *Rot. Parl.*, IV, 336-7; Wilkins, III, 515.

to become lighter as he extended his authority in France.[37] The heaviest taxation came in 1416, when it was necessary to put forth considerable effort merely to hold the conquest of the previous year. In the four subsequent years there is a steady decline in the sums collected or borrowed, with a tendency to augment the revenue from miscellaneous sources, until the new expedition of 1421 required additional funds. Even then it does not seem probable that the taxation as a whole was as great as in 1417, and the greater part of it was derived from those best able to pay, i.e. by forced loans, and by increasing the miscellaneous revenue. From 1418 on, the real burden of the war was being gradually shifted to Normandy. Nevertheless, at Henry's death, the English exchequer was confronted with a deficit of some £30,000 accumulated during the period 1416-1422, and augmented by outstanding debts for the same term amounting to £25,434 2s, not to mention the great number of "unpaid bills" from the Agincourt year.[38]

[37] The following table will make this clear by illustrating the ratio of the French war expenses to the total revenue of England:

	1416	1417	1418	1419	1420	1421	1422
Household	37.94%	17.58%	7.86%	15.78%	15.15%	32.95%	31.03%
French War	31.79	46.68	52.13	10.17	34.84	16.71	10.37
Navy	10.56	4.44	7.05	10.71	6.41	1.68	1.26
	80.29	68.7	67.04	36.66	56.40	51.34	42.66

It should be recalled that under "Household" and "Navy" there are necessarily many items which represent normal expenditure. In 2 Henry V, the last year of "peace," £40,969 out of £105,959 went to the Household. Only twice was this sum equalled or surpassed (1416 and 1421). Under "French War" are included all expenditures for ordnance, matériel, etc. some of which would apply to home defence on the Scotch and Welsh borders.

[38] There were deficits in 1416, 1418, 1420, and 1422; and surpluses in 1417, 1419, and 1421. The surplus in 1421 was probably larger and the deficit in 1422 smaller than the figures which we have, inasmuch as the Receipt Rolls for those years are mutilated while the Issue Rolls are complete.

Financial administration was conducted, in England under the immediate direction of the exchequer, in the field by the treasurer of war. Such division brought most of the naval expenditure under the purview of the home treasury inasmuch as the Channel squadrons had their bases in England, while arrangements for transport would naturally be made on the English side of the Channel. Certain naval charges, however, would necessarily fall upon the headquarters' treasury when vessels, either of transport or war, were kept for service in Norman waters or up the Seine.[39]

Apparently the treasurer of war was the representative in the field of the royal exchequer. At the same time, however, he was treasurer of the royal household, which meant that he was head of both the wardrobe and the camera regis. It seems clear that the household organization provided the medieval equivalent of a general headquarters with paymaster's, commissary's, and quartermaster's "departments," the whole being under the direction of the treasurer of war. It is noticeable, however, that only infrequently were sums issued from the exchequer to the treasurer of war in his capacity as treasurer of war, those being large amounts sent over to pay the troops.[40] In the accounts these would be supple-

According to the existing figures the total deficit would be £39,936 19s 2d. *Vide supra,* p. 144, note 3.

[39] Some of the naval accounts record payments by the treasurer of war, P.R.O., Ex. Accts. 48/21, 48/22, 48/27, 49/7. Probably these represent payment of wages to mariners, payment falling due at the end of the voyage. Similarly Sir William Philip's account records £27 20d paid the sailors on the vessels which brought Bedford's force to France, P.R.O., For. Accts. 69 Gr°, m. 1-2. The account of the royal balinger *Nicholas de la Tour* contains record of payments, now by the treasurer of the exchequer, now by the treasurer of war, P.R.O., Ex. Accts. 49/10. The master of the *Edmund de la Tour* appears in Philip's account as having been paid like any army captain between Oct. 29, 1421, and Aug. 29, 1422, a total of £60 12s 6d, P.R.O., For. Accts. 69, Hr°, m. 2.

[40] Sept. 28, 1418, £26,000 delivered at Louviers, Pont de l'Arche, and

mented by the sums paid out in England to troops being sent as re-enforcements, and charged to the treasurer's account.[41] On the other hand, money was constantly being issued in large and small amounts, as "household expenses," to the treasurer of war in his other capacity. There were also repeated payments into the camera regis. How this money was used we get occasional glimpses when the Issue Rolls designate a certain sum as intended for bows and arrows,[42] or "pro secretis expensis;"[43] and once there is record of payment from the camera to the treasurer of Harfleur, apparently for the ordinary expenses of the town.[44] Usually there is mere record of the sum, often a large one, and the fact that it was conveyed to the king in France.[45] Probably the intent was to keep the royal headquarters supplied with money which could be spent at discretion.

Normandy under the French kings was a separate governmental division of the kingdom, and the English found there an administrative and financial system ready

Rouen to pay the soldiers, P.R.O., Issue Roll 636 m. 15. Dec. 10, 1418, £4,000 for war expense, *ibid.* 638 m. 11. Mar. 15, 1419, £33,333 6s 8d to pay the troops, *ibid.* m. 18.

[41] This is illustrated by the detailed statement of wages paid by the exchequer to Bedford's contingent in February-March, 1422, which appears as both receipt and expenditure in Sir William Philip's account, P.R.O., For. Accts. 69, Fr°, Ir°.

[42] P.R.O., Issue Roll 640, m. 11.

[43] P.R.O., Issue Roll 655, m. 16.

[44] P.R.O., Ex. Accts. 48/8[2], 3070 livres paid in three parts from the camera, the first and third by the hands of John Rothenale, treasurer of war.

[45] Sept. 3, 1416, £4,000 carried to Calais, P.R.O., Issue Roll 624, m. 14. Oct. 26, 1417, £1,000 delivered to the king in Normandy, *ibid.* 633, m. 3. Sept. 16, 1420, £4,000 delivered at Melun, *ibid.* 645, m. 14. April 15, 1422, £8,148 14s 7d conveyed to Paris and Meaux, *ibid.* 655, m. 2. On May 19 (1420 or 1422), certain treasury officials wrote to the king, "we ben in Harfleu whith zoure goode; that is in Gold coyned XXX, M[li]; in Sylver coyned MM[li]; and in wegges of silver drawyng by estymation to halfe a tonne tyght," and asked for instructions about transporting this treasure to Rouen, Ellis, *op. cit.*, I, 83.

to their hands. There were seven bailliages, Cotentin, Caen, Alençon, Evreux, Rouen, Gisors, and Caux, whose heads, the baillis, administered justice, executed the royal ordonnances, and headed the local militia. Each bailliage was subdivided into vicomtés. For the vicomte the most important duty was the administration of the royal domain, which meant the collection of the ordinary revenue from the king's manors and vassals, and the payment of the same into the chambre des comptes at Caen. To these ordinary revenues had been added, during the first half century of the Valois period, the extraordinary imposts of the aides (taxes on sales and on beverages), the gabelle, and the fouage, which had necessitated the creation of other financial agents. The aides were farmed to the highest bidder, but the gabelle called for the erection of salt "granaries" under grenetiers and contrôleurs. Likewise the fouage required special agents. Assessment was by parishes, and actual collection by certain men of the parish called elûs. These made payment to the sergents, who ordinarily were underlings of the vicomtes, but who in this instance acted as subordinates to the receveurs, officials appointed to take in this revenue, whose bailliwicks corresponded to the vicomtés. This latter tax still retained a feature of its extraordinary character in that it was not permanent but was levied only in time of need and by the consent of the local estates. With this administrative system already in existence, it was necessary for the English conqueror merely to substitute his own countrymen or partisans for the officials of Charles VI in order to avail himself of the Norman resources.

How the new financial administration which Henry established in Normandy was articulated with the treasury of war is not clear until the end of the period under consideration. The records for the years when Sir John Tiptoft was president of the exchequer and Jean Gou-

laffre, receveur-general of finances are almost completely lost. William Alington's first account (April 30, 1419-April 30, 1420) gives no indication of any payments to the royal headquarters, and does show that all but 5121 l. t. 6s 11d of the Norman revenue was expended for Norman affairs.[46] On the other hand a comparison of Alington's fourth account[47] with that of the treasurer of war[48] for about the same period shows that the treasurer-general paid nothing towards the household expenses except provender bought at royal order,[49] while Sir William Philip, the treasurer of war, gives statements of receipts from the Norman chancery, from the Rouen mint, from the ransom of Rouen, and from the vicomtes, baillis, and other officials in France and Normandy. Evidently all of the Norman revenue did not pass through the treasurer-general's hands.

By 1423-4, however, official relations between the civil and military administration, in matters of finance, are more apparent. Surreau's account shows payment of over 70,000 l. t. to John Barton, treasurer of Bedford's household, of which 29,437 l. t. 10s was for wages to be paid the household troops,[50] and 52,000 l. t. was for "household expenses." That this was part of the regular annual budget is evident from the fact that payment was made from the revenue derived from the gabelle and the quartages, which was part of the regular annual income, and not from the extraordinary levy, and from the fact that similar assignments were made in 1425 and 1429.[51]

[46] P.R.O., Ex. Accts. 187/14, f. 35v°. One exception is 200 l. t. paid in Easter term by the vicomte of Conches to the clerk of the king's butler, *ibid.* f. 3r°.

[47] *Ibid.* 188/7.

[48] *Ibid.*, For. Accts. 69, Fr° ff.

[49] *Ibid.*, Ex. Accts. 188/7, f. 28v°.

[50] This was part of a sum of 35,750 l. t. to support a force of 100 men-at-arms and 300 archers for one year. Did the remaining 6,312 l. t. 10s come from the French revenues?

[51] Charles de Robillard de Beaurepaire, "De l'administration de la Normandie sous la domination anglaise aux années 1424, 1425 et 1429"

It must be recalled, however, that the death of Henry V marks a change in financial policy whereby the costs of the war were almost entirely shifted to Normandy and France. Consequently, despite these data from Surreau's account, there still remains uncertainty as to the administrative details of the process by which Norman receipts were used for war purposes by the army in the field. Suffice it that the treasurer of war's chief function was to act as paymaster for troops not in garrison. With the establishment of a Norman financial system, the garrisons were paid by Norman officials as long as they were on duty in their fortresses. If they too were summoned to the royal standard, they came under the financial jurisdiction of the treasurer of war and were paid like other captains.[52]

In further considering the subject of war finance we find that the war itself proved profitable, and that the English king early took steps to make the conquered country contribute towards campaign expenses. From the sale of all prizes taken at sea the king was entitled to a fourth, besides a share of the captured cargoes.[53] By

(*Mémoires de la Société des Antiquaires de Normandie*, XXIV, 170 ff, Caen, 1859), p. 172. This learned author's allusion to this payment as a "dotation" makes it seem probable that he did not appreciate the administrative functions of the household. Payments were also made from the French receipts into the chest of Bedford's household; Charles Ritter, "Extraits du Journal du Trésor (1423-1434)" (*Bib. de l'École des Chartes*, LXXIII, 470-489, Paris, 1912), p. 475.

[52] This is most clearly illustrated by a passage in Surreau's account in regard to "pluseurs parties de deniers qui avoient este paiez par Jehan Barton, Tresorier de l'ostel de monsgr. le Regent—aux cappitaines—pour alez devant Compiengne:"—the captains mentioned being the bailli of Rouen and the captain of Gisors, Bib. Nat., fr. 4485, p. 129.

[53] July 22, 1417, Lord Carewe turned over to the king's "clerk of ships" 28 tons of iron, 88 "pokes" of wool, and £8 6s 8d, the royal fourth from the sale of five prizes. June 14, 1417, he had delivered 85 tons of iron and 321 "pokes" of wool, P.R.O., Ex. Accts. 48/14[2], [3]. Alington records the sale to individuals of the royal fourth of certain captured vessels, *ibid.* 187/14, f. 13r°.

agreement with his captains the king received a third of their "gains of war," viz., booty and ransoms.[54] These "gains" were no inconsiderable item in the profitableness of the war to the individual captains.[55] Agincourt had demonstrated what enormous profits could be realized from a victory involving captives of high rank. Prisoners of royal blood were reserved for the king, but others, distinguished or not, were bought and sold on speculation.[56] In these transactions the king participated, but the income thus derived is unknown for want of record.[57] In addition the king had the indemnities placed upon conquered towns as punishment for their resistance. Louviers was the first to suffer, the sum of 8000 écus being imposed July 5, 1418, half to be collected on August 1 and half on November 1.[58] On the surrender of Rouen, 300,000 écus was demanded from the citizens,[59] of which the first payment of 133,138 écus 10 sols was made to the royal "coffrier" on July 21, 1419.[60] This was not obtained until

[54] An indenture of 1415, in Rymer, IX, 232, will illustrate this. The captains, in their turn, were entitled to a third of their men's "gains." On Dec. 12, 1417, Sir John Radeclyf was sent to Verneuil to collect "thirds" from the frontier captains, Hardy, p. 219. Mar. 29, 1419, Sir Philip Leche was ordered to collect such sums as were due the king from the Cheshire and Lancashire archers, Cal. Norm. Rolls, 42.315. In Surreau's account it appears that these were charged on the captains' wages, Bib. Nat., fr. 4485, pp. 204, 207, 209, and *passim.*

[55] For numerous safe-conducts of prisoners going to seek their ransoms see Hardy, Cal. Norm. Rolls, and Cal. Fr. Rolls, *passim.* In *Les La Trémoille pendant cinq siècles* (5 vols., Nantes, 1890), I, 134 is an acknowledgment by Suffolk for 1000 écus received from William de Gamaches, part payment of his ransom of 4000 écus, *vide supra,* p. 148, note 19.

[56] St. Denis, V, 568.

[57] There is record of royal prisoners going for their ransoms, Hardy, p. 160. Alington mentions a prisoner sold to Thomas Haidon for 36 l. t., P.R.O., Ex. Accts. 187/14, f. 13r°.

[58] Rôles de Bréquigny 1004.

[59] Chéruel, *op. cit.,* notes, p. 41.

[60] *Ibid.,* notes, pp. 55-6. In Sir William Philip's account the écu from Rouen is expressly valued at 25 shillings sterling, P.R.O., For. Accts. 69, Fr°. At this rating the Louviers ransom would have been worth £10,000, the

steps were taken to constrain the citizens,[61] and subsequent efforts to enforce payment were apparently not over successful.[62] The only other ransom of which there is mention is one of 400 écus laid upon St. Valéry-in-Caux, which the king, discouraged by the difficulties which he was encountering at Rouen, granted to an English soldier, provided he could collect the money.[63]

More important were the steps taken to collect revenue from the conquered parts of Normandy. The royal domain of the French kings came at once, by the logic of

Rouen ransom, £375,000, and the first payment of the latter, £166,422. This is incredible and makes it obvious that the clerk should have written 25 shillings tournois. These sums would then be £1333 6s 8d, £50,000, and £22,189 14s 8d respectively.

[61] For April 2, 1419, there is an order to the bailli to seize the property of those who could not pay their share, Chéruel, p. 57. On June 6 there is a similar order in regard to those who have left the city without paying, Rôles de Bréquigny 600. July 23, a commission of five, headed by Warwick and including the seneschal and "coffrier" of the household, was appointed to act in the king's name for securing the ransom or some part thereof, *ibid.* 636. Chéruel (*op. cit.*, p. 58) cites an order of the bailli of Aug. 2, 1420, to the sergents of Louviers, Pont de l'Arche, and Freneuse, directing them to force the absentees who had taken refuge in their sergencies to pay their assessment on pain of imprisonment and sale of their goods. Fallue, *Hist. du diocèse de Rouen*, II, 340 cites a letter on the same subject which he ascribes to Warwick. He gives no date or reference. Probably he is referring to the same document. Nov. 19, 1419, the king ordered the bailli to release the hostages held for the ransom because they were becoming sick, their keep was a great expense, and their detention of no avail in securing payment, Rôles de Bréquigny 691. There is record of seizure and sale of goods in 1421, Chéruel, pp. 59-61.

[62] The only other record of money received is in Sir William Philip's account (P.R.O., For. Accts. 69, Fr°) where he cites £1,930 10s (37,760 fr. at 4 fr. worth 3s, 3,430 fr. at 1 fr. worth 3s, and 10,296 écus each worth 25s (*vide supra* note 60)) as paid him by Rouen between Oct. 1, 1421, and Aug. 31, 1422. Perhaps this was the income from the sale of goods mentioned in the previous note. In 1430 there was still an unpaid balance of 41,073 écus which the king reduced to 24,000 "salus," *Report on the Foedera*, appendix C, p. 150, no. 270. See also *Letters and Papers illustrative of the wars of the English and French during the reign of Henry VI* (Joseph Stevenson, editor, 2 vols. in 3 parts, Rolls Series, London, 1861-64), II, 154.

[63] Sept. 29, 1419, Cal. Norm. Rolls, 41.800.

Henry's pretensions, into English hands. At first we find a special agent appointed to collect the income from a particular locality, a practice which may also have been connected with an attempt to organize the securing of supplies for the army.[64] The permanent administrative organization came later when success had given assurance of actually occupying the country. This can be followed by the succession of appointments made by Henry of civil officials whose primary duties were the maintenance of order and the collection of revenue. This began during the king's first sojourn at Caen, with the appointment of a seneschal at Bayeux,[65] who, a fortnight later appointed a vicomte.[66] Caen, being Henry's base, remained under military rule until the completion of the Alençon campaign, when a bailli and vicomte were installed there.[67] On November 1, 1417, Sir John Tiptoft

[64] On Oct. 4, 1417, Pierre de la Launde received commission to collect all sorts of revenue from St. Pierre-sur-Dives, Courcy, Troarn, and St. Barbe, Hardy, p. 173. This was done while the army was marching south towards Argentan, a time when it would have been very important to have a region along the line of communications, such as this, from which supplies could be drawn. Similarly, Sir John Radclyf was appointed "ad redditus, exitus, proficua, revenciones, et emolumenta quecumque de dominio nostro de Verneull ac aliis locis quibuscumque eidem dominio adjacentibus nobis debita—levandum," *ibid.*, p. 194. This may have been connected with the supplying of Sir John Neville's forces established in this region.

[65] Sept. 20, 1417, Sir John Assheton appointed, Hardy, p. 320.

[66] Oct. 3, John Heroult appointed; confirmed Dec. 12, Hardy, p. 218.

[67] Just before leaving Caen, Henry appointed Humfreyville captain, Sept. 30, 1417, Hardy, p. 159. His retinue had mustered 54 men-at-arms and 125 archers when the campaign began (P.R.O., Ex. Accts. 51/2 m. 33), so we may infer this to be the strength of the garrison. In a document of Dec. 6, 1417, there is explicit mention of a vicomte at Caen, Hardy, p. 370. Pierre Carel, *Histoire de la ville de Caen depuis Philippe-Auguste jusqu'a Charles IX* (Paris, 1886), pp. 297-8, declares that the French vicomte, Gilles à l'Espee, exercised his office only up to the city's fall, and that Jean Anzeré was appointed by Henry in 1418. De la Rue, *Essais Hist.*, II, 266, also makes the latter statement. Probably Anzeré was appointed in 1417. Alington mentions receipts from him for 1417 (Ex. Accts. 187/14, f.

became president of the Norman exchequer,[68] and on January 14, 1418, Sir Lewis Robessart was appointed master of waters and forests.[69] Throughout the campaign which culminated in February, 1418, at Falaise, the process of organizing the conquered districts continued. By February 4, when the last resistance was over, there were vicomtes over Auge, Orbec, Bernay, Caen, Bayeux, St. Sylvin, Condé-sur-Noireau, Falaise, Argentan, Exmes, and Alençon,[70] indicating English control of a region comprising, roughly, the Calvados and the middle section of the Orne. From that date on administrative organization followed close on the army's heels. Alençon, Exmes, Perche, and St. Sylvin were formed into a bailliage under Sir Roland Lenthale early in March.[71] A bailli for the Cotentin was appointed in anticipation of a quick and easy conquest, while a series of vicomtes followed Gloucester's victorious advance upon Cherbourg.[72] Meanwhile the successful push eastward in May, 1418, enabled Henry to bring under his administrative as well as military control the valleys of the Risle and Eure.[73] At the same

3r°). They may have been arrearages. Dec. 24, Sir John Popham became bailli, Hardy, p. 231.

[68] *Ibid.*, p. 205.

[69] Hardy, p. 256.

[70] Hardy, p. 365.

[71] Mar. 8, 1418, Hardy, p. 258.

[72] Mar. 14, 1418, Sir John Assheton was appointed bailli of the Cotentin, Rôles de Bréquigny 326. This may mark the end of his seneschalship at Bayeux. That office was not continued. Michel Gourdel was held responsible as vicomte of Vire from Easter (Mar. 27), 1418, P.R.O., Ex. Accts. 187/14, f. 4v°; Cal. Norm. Rolls, 41.710. On May 25 Jean Coquet was exercising the office of vicomte at Carentan, Vautier, p. 28. There were vicomtes at Mortain and Valognes by May 7, Cal. Norm. Rolls, 41.710. William Girot was confirmed as vicomte and receveur at Valognes on May 27, *ibid.*, 712.

[73] May 20, 1418, Hamery Bigot became vicomte and receveur of Verneuil and Châteauneuf, Rôles de Bréquigny 161. June 2, Sir John Radclyf became bailli of Evreux, *ibid.* 126; Cal. Norm. Rolls, 41.713; *vide supra*, p. 100, note 38. June 7, Colart Anquetil was made vicomte of Evreux, Rôles de Bréquigny 1198. A court also was established, *ibid.* 127, 1198. June 6, William Richehomme became vicomte of Beaumont-le-Roger, and June 7, Hameric Layres was appointed vicomte of Conches and Breteuil, *ibid.* 1198.

time the organization of a central administration, begun already by the appointments of Tiptoft and Robessart, continued with the appointment of a mint master,[74] a chancellor,[75] and a receveur-general.[76] By the middle of 1418, then, the four bailliages of Lower Normandy and their component vicomtés, with the exception of Cherbourg and Domfront, were under English administration, while at Caen there is a "supreme court" for administering justice and a treasury to direct the collection and disbursement of the duchy's revenues.

Organization in Upper Normandy followed close upon military occupation. A bailli was set over Rouen even before the capital of the bailliage had actually surrendered,[77] while a vicomte-receveur was commissioned by the end of the month.[78] Sir Roger Fenys became bailli of Caux on January 23, 1419,[79] and by the end of February there were vicomte-receveurs[80] at Arques and Longueville,[81] Neufchâtel and Gournay,[82] Caudebec,[83] and Gisors

June 16, Richard le Gras became vicomte and receveur for Bernay and Monstreul, *ibid.* There is mention of a vicomte at Bernay as early as Feb. 4, Hardy, p. 365. The fall of Louviers was promptly followed by the appointment of William Pailleux as bailli on July 12, Rôles de Bréquigny 211.

74 Mar. 17, 1418, Conrad Meliver, Hardy, p. 270.

75 April 8, Philip Morgan, Cal. Norm. Rolls, 41.710.

76 May 20, Jean Goulaffre, *ibid.*, 712.

77 Jan. 2, 1419, Sir Walter Beauchamp, Rôles de Bréquigny 1215.

78 Jan. 31, 1419, Jacques Pougnant, *ibid.* 1222. April 11, William Gombaut relieved Pougnant as receveur, *ibid.* 378. (There is no record of a vicomte in Alington's first account). Pougnant became lieutenant to the treasurer-general, P.R.O., Ex. Accts. 187/14, f. 8r°.

79 Alias Fieules, Cal. Fr. Rolls, 44.620; Rôles de Bréquigny 732.

80 From 1419 on the combination of these offices was followed to a considerable extent in the appointments in Lower Normandy also, Rôles de Bréquigny 544, 903, 986, 1300, 1317; Cal. Norm. Rolls, 41.747, 759; 42.313, 317. For an exception see Rôles de Bréquigny 697, but cf. *ibid.* 986. See also *ibid.* 161 and Cal. Norm. Rolls, 41.712.

81 Feb. 5, 1419, Henry le Vigneron, Rôles de Bréquigny 1222.

82 Feb. 8, Henry le Cat, *ibid.*

83 Feb. 15, Robin le Lievre, *ibid.* 290.

and Vernon.[84] To these orders went out to collect all arrears due from the royal domain, especially for the previous Easter and Michaelmas terms,[85] during which probably little had been collected because of the war. At the same time the baillis, in both Upper and Lower Normandy, were directed to proclaim by the sound of the trumpet, that all lands and possessions of nobles and clergy who had failed to do fealty to Henry would be taken into royal hands, and the income collected "comme nostre propre demaine."[86] Consequently, in the following June, the baillis were ordered to seize all lands whose owners could not show letters patent from the king.[87] Already in the previous August, for the bailliage of Evreux at least, orders had been issued to lease the royal lands and to send in the names of the lessees.[88] Other estates might be left to be administered by the English captain of the local castle, the returns being utilized to support the garrison, and any surplus paid over to the treasury.[89]

To this domanial income can be added that derived

[84] Feb. 20, William Lalemont, *ibid.* 1222.

[85] Feb. 6, P.R.O., Norman Rolls 10 (6 Henry V, part II), m. 37d°.

[86] Feb. 9, Rôles de Bréquigny 297. On Jan. 30, Sir William Breton had been empowered to take the Estouteville estates into the king's hands, Cal. Norm. Rolls, 41.724.

[87] Rôles de Bréquigny 599. Some forty years later, when the French rule had been restored, the vicomte of Carentan in his account makes mention of "des heritages qui furent appliques au Domaine par les gens des Commissaires du roy d'Angleterre," E. Lépingard, "Les effets à St. Lô de la conquête de la Normandie par les Anglais (1418-1437)" (*Notices, mémoires, et documents publiées par la Société d'Agriculture et Archéologique et d'Histoire naturelle du department de la Manche*, IX, 164 ff.), p. 167.

[88] Aug. 15 and 18, 1418, Cal. Norm. Rolls, 41.715-6. For record of such leasing see "Etat des fiefs de la vicomté de Conches et de Breteuil affermés au nom de Henri V (1421)" in *Mém. de la Soc. des Antiq. de Norm.*, vol. XXIII.

[89] In May, 1418, the captain of Neuilly l'Evêque, who was evidently collecting the revenues of the châtelainie, received permission to deduct wages for 5 men-at-arms and 15 archers, Rôles de Bréquigny 174.

from the exercise of regalian rights over the Church. Of the six bishops of Lower Normandy, only the bishop of Séez made prompt submission.[90] The possessions of the others came into royal hands and remained there for several years awaiting the owners' profession of obedience to the new régime, or the election of less obstinate prelates.[91] In similar fashion property belonging to abbeys, collegiate churches, and other foundations was, in many cases, taken into royal hands. Restoration, however, was not so long delayed as with the episcopal temporalities, because submission to the conqueror was more prompt. Frequently churchmen were granted the custody of, or license to enjoy, their property, before receiving complete restitution. A preliminary to restoration was a presentation to the treasury of an account (aveu) of the temporal possessions.[92] When the English conquest ex-

[90] He received safe-conduct to approach the king on Oct. 20, 1417, Hardy, p. 183. His temporalities were not restored until April 23, 1418, Cal. Norm. Rolls, 41.683; *Gallia Christiania in provincias ecclesiasticas* (Denis de Sainte-Marthe et al., editors, 16 vols., Paris, 1870.), XI, 698; *vide infra* note 94.

[91] The temporalities of Bayeux were placed in the hands of the dean on April 13, 1418, Cal. Norm. Rolls, 41.681. On Aug. 20, 1421, they were granted to the bishop-elect until Easter, at which time he was to exhibit his papal bulls, *ibid.*, 42.431. They were restored Feb. 14, 1422, *ibid.*, 437. Restitutions were made:—to the bishop of Avranches, Mar. 14, 1420, *ibid.*, 351; to the see of Coutances, April 14, 1420, *ibid.*, 368; to the bishop of Evreux, June 7, 1420, *ibid.*, 389; to the bishop of Lisieux, Aug. 13, 1420, *ibid.*, 379. The last three followed the elections of foreigners, *Gallia Christiania*, XI, 890, 601, 792. Alington records receipts from the regale of Evreux, the temporalities of Bayeux, and of Coutances, P.R.O., Ex. Accts. 187/14, ff. 3r°, 3v°, 6r°. In regard to the episcopal property at Evreux being "en regalle" see Théodose Bonnin, *Analectes historiques, recueil de documents inédits sur l'histoire de la ville d'Evreux* (Evreux, 1839), p. 48.

[92] Cal. Norm. Rolls, 41.748; 42.319. A specimen "aveu" is in A. Dutilleux et J. Despoin, *L'abbaye de Maubuisson (Nôtre-Dame-la-Royale). Histoire et cartulaire d'apres des documents entièrement inédits* (Pontoise, 1882), p. 273. Restoration was not necessarily immediate upon the presentation of "aveu," nor even upon the issuance of official orders, if we may judge from the repetitions. At Maubuisson aveu was made in January 1422, but orders to restore were not issued until February 1425, Dutilleux

tended north of the Seine the religious houses of Upper Normandy had similar experience with English authority. The archepiscopal property of the see of Rouen came into royal hands through Louis d'Harcourt's failure to do homage.[93] On February 1, 1420 the king wrote the treasurer-general ordering the immediate occupation and collection of both spiritualities and temporalities in the dioceses of Rouen, Bayeux, and Séez, which were to be treated as vacant through the absence of the incumbents.[94] In the following year some of the archbishop's property was granted to one William Gardin.[95]

et Despoin, *op. cit., Cartulaire,* p. 47. On May 20, 1418, order of restitution in favor of the priory of Nôtre Dame du Val was issued, Cal. Norm. Rolls, 41.686. Not until May 26, 1419, was a similar one in favor of the convent of Nôtre Dame du Val issued, *ibid.,* 41.784. Similarly restoration to the abbey of Nôtre Dame de Lire was made on July 31, 1418 (Cal. Norm. Rolls, 41.695), while the convent had to wait until Feb. 14, 1419, *ibid.,* 734. Restitution to the convent of Nôtre Dame de Bomport is dated July 22, 1418 (*ibid.,* 695), that of the monastery, Mar. 21, 1419, *ibid.,* 762. The order of restitution for the abbey of St. Evroul was issued April 10, 1418 (Rymer, IX, 572), but it had to be repeated Feb. 17, 1419 (Cal. Norm. Rolls, 41.728); the convent received a grant of custody on May 12, 1419, *ibid.,* 785. The monastery of Nôtre Dame de Bernay secured restitution June 5, 1418 (Rôles de Brèquigny 1165); the convent received custody of its temporalities on Mar. 10, 1419 (Cal. Norm. Rolls, 41.760); on May 17, 1421, the prior and convent were given license to enjoy their possessions until Christmas (Rôles de Bréquigny 1299); restitution was made to the convent Jan. 4, 1422 (Cal. Norm. Rolls, 42.436); repeated in favor of the prior and convent April 27, 1422 (*ibid.,* 448). C. Hippeau, *Monographie de l'Abbaye de St. Etienne de Caen, 1066-1790* (*Mémoires de la Société des Antiquaires de Normandie,* Caen, 1855), p. 472 reports that the fief de l'Isle, taken by Henry in 1417, was not restored until 1428.

[93] As early as Mar. 19, 1419, Pierre le Vigault had been appointed administrator of the archepiscopal temporalities at Louviers, Cal. Norm. Rolls, 41.757; Rôles de Bréquigny 1256. On Mar. 8, Jean Blanchaston jr. became receveur at Dieppe "des terres et revenues pour cause du temporel d'archevesque de Rouen mis en la main du roi," *ibid.* 1250. Alington records receipts from the latter of 1660 l. t. up to Easter 1420, P.R.O., Ex. Accts. 187/14, f. 2r°. In 1422, the same man is still at Dieppe and William Herbert is receveur of temporalities at Louviers and Gaillon, *ibid.* 188/7, f. 2.

[94] Bib. Nat., fr. 26043, no. 5476. Orders went to the vicomtes the same day, *ibid.,* no. 5478.

[95] Sept. 22, 1421, *ibid.,* fr. 26044, no. 5656.

Taking Normandy as whole, therefore, it appears that the property of all the bishops, and the temporalities of at least two-thirds of the abbeys and monasteries, not to mention other religious corporations, was, at one time or another, subject to English administration.[96] Doubtless the income from these estates was seriously impaired by the state of war,[97] a condition which would be shared by the royal domain. Of the actual administration we get but the merest glimpses. The case of the convent of St. Sever, where the custody of its temporalities was conceded only "usque necessariam sustentacionem suam—superplusagio proficuorum reservato regi,"[98] may be typical of such grants. At Fécamp, whence the abbot had fled rather than swear allegiance to the English authorities, the latter appointed one of the monks receveur of the feudal income, giving him an English lieutenant, and forbidding his paying anything to the "soi disant" abbot.[99] The same authorities audited the receveurs' accounts.[100] At the same time Sir John Fastolf was placed in garrison at Fécamp, and William le Prévost at Vitte-

[96] Of the ninety-seven abbeys and priories mentioned in *Gallia Christiania* as flourishing at this time, sixty-six appear on the Norman Rolls with the record of the restitution of their temporalities. In addition the Rolls contain similar records in regard to collegiate churches, lazar houses, hospitals, and other ecclesiastical corporations. In one case, at least, viz., the abbey d'Ardennes, there is record of restitution which does not appear in the Norman Rolls, *Mém. Soc. des Antiq. de Norm.*, VII, 41, no. 492.

[97] For the effect of war conditions on ecclesiastical income see Fallue, *op. cit.*, II, 343, 352.

[98] Rôles de Bréquigny 1179[5]; Cal. Norm. Rolls, 41.699.

[99] Cal. Norm. Rolls, 42.403; Rôles de Bréquigny 1495. The account of Jehan Cuillier, receveur of the abbey, mentions "Jehan Vincent, engles, qui par mons. le bailli de Caux fu ordonne et commis receveur de la revenue de la dit eglise en la compagnie dudit Cullerier,—et en son absence Reg. Martel." His wages were paid by the abbey. Archives de la Seine Inf., Extraits et Notes Historiques, IV, 5464, citing dossier 386, Abbey de Fécamp, f. 48r°.

[100] Cal. Norm. Rolls, 42.428.

fleur, both they and the neighboring garrisons drawing their wages from the abbey revenues.[101]

In the early years of the English occupation this domanial and regalian income was the largest item in the revenue derived from Normandy. During the fiscal year 1419-20 (May 1-April 30), it amounted to 72,910 l. t. or 45 per cent of the total, of which two-thirds was collected in Caen and Cotentin.[102] In the fiscal year 1421-22, it was 76,312 l. t., but was now only 23.6 per cent of the whole. In the meantime there had been extensive alienations so that the income from the bailliage of Rouen must be added to that from Caen and Cotentin to make 67 per cent[103] of this form of income. Two years later, the continued practice of making many grants of land to Englishmen, and of restoring their lands to submissive Normans, had shrunk this form of income to 47,469 l. t. of which 14,366 l. t. is arrearage. Other sources of revenue have meanwhile been found, and the feudal dues now represent only 11 per cent of the whole.[104]

[101] Jean Cuillier, mentioning the income of certain lands in his account writes "peuz cueillis et emportes pour le temps de ce present compte par les Engles des garnisons de Dieppe et Arques." Archives de la Seine Inf., *ut supra,* IV, 4558, citing dossier 386, Abbey de Fécamp f. 32r°. "De la seigneurie de Fécamp neant pour ledit an [Aug. 1, 1420-Aug. 1, 1421] pour ce que messir Jehan Fastolf, chevlier, captain dudit lieu de Fescamp, la tenue et rameillie en sa mains sans rendre aucune chose," *ibid.,* IV, 4557, citing *ut supra,* f. 26r°. "Ferme de Ingouville et St. Vallert bailliee—30 muis de blé dont par Fastolf fu prinse et levee la greigneur partis dicelles—à cause de ses gaiges," *ibid.,* IV, 4558, citing *ut supra,* f. 27v°. For Vittefleur see *ibid.,* IV, 4563.

[102] Alington's first account, P.R.O., Ex. Accts. 187/14, ff. 1v°-7v°. Caen, 14,220 l. t. (f. 4v°), Cotentin, 35,404 l. t. (f. 6r°).

[103] Alington's third account in summary is regained from P.R.O., For. Accts. 61, Bv° ff., where he gives account of his office from May 1, 1421, to August 1422, by subtracting the items of his fourth and last account, which we have in full, covering May 1, 1422-August 1422, in P.R.O., Ex. Accts. 188/7. Caen, 13,260 l. t.; Cotentin, 11,586 l. t.; Rouen, 26,410 l. t.

[104] Surreau's account, Bib. Nat., fr. 4485, pp. 11-22. Rouen, 12,354 l. t.; Cotentin, 6740 l. t.; Caen, 6752 l. t.

The greatest activity in distributing Norman lands came after the fall of Rouen, when the conquest was complete and Henry's lenient policy towards the Normans had had reasonable opportunity to show what measure of success could be expected from it. During 1419 there were some 250 recipients of fiefs, the annual income of which was estimated to be 116,346 l. t. This is exclusive of the great lordships of Graville, Préaux, Dangu, St. Sauveur-le-Vicomte, Eu, and Tancarville for which no estimated income appears in the royal grants. In the preceding period, from August, 1417, there had been only 90 grants, estimated at 40,346 l. t. annual value, not including the county of Harcourt and the barony of Hommet; while in the three subsequent years there were only 50 grants, some of which were re-enfeoffments of the holdings of dead Englishmen, valued at 28,588 l. t.[105] Probably many of these estates failed to bring in the estimated revenue, being like the lands of Sir Gilbert Humfreyville which are described in 1419 as "à present de petite valour pour occasion de guerres et mortalities qui ont este on pais, en son tres grant dommage."[106] Nevertheless the king continued to derive certain financial advantages. Most of the fiefs made annual presentations by way of homage. According to the terms of the grants these are described as swords, daggers, spurs, etc., but apparently each had a definite value in money, which is estimated in a contemporary record of Henry's grants in Normandy.[107]

[105] These figures would indicate the average annual value of a fief to have been about 475 l. t., equivalent to £71 5s. That the livre tournois was worth three shillings sterling is shown by the summary of Alington's third and fourth accounts in P.R.O., For. Accts. 61, Bv°, D.

[106] Rôles de Bréquigny 593. In 1420 the abbey of St. Victor-en-Caux failed to pay its rents, and its moveables were attached by the vicomte of Neufchâtel and the receveur of Rouen in consequence. It pleaded war and mortality as the cause for its poverty and secured a respite from the king. Brit. Mus., Add. Ch. 6808.

[107] *Mém. Soc. des Antiq. de Norm.*, XXIII, "Partie des dons fait par

After Baugé the holdings of those killed were occupied by the baillis.[108] Administration of property in wardship in cases like these was knocked down to the highest bidder.[109] The property of Sir John Grey, count of Tancarville will illustrate. In 1421 the lordship of Monville, being in the king's hands by reason of the minority of the heirs, was publicly offered for rent for three years to the highest bidder, for the king's profit. For three successive weeks no one would bid; but finally, at the October assizes, being again proclaimed, a single bid of 50 l. t. a year was made and accepted.[110] Again on June 11, 1421 the treasurer-general directed the vicomte of Caen to farm out the "heritages" of Sir John Grey, and Jean Larchier secured one holding for 220 l. t. a year, and another for 180 l. t.[111]

It is impossible to describe the actual workings of the financial administration in its early stages for want of documents. From such as exist it appears that money was expended by orders of Sir John Tiptoft, president of the exchequer, to Jean Goulaffre, receveur-general, the former presumably acting under royal direction. On such orders we find the latter paying money to a groom of the royal wardrobe "pour le us et pruffit" of the king,[112] buying a "certain porcion de fer" from Sir Henry Noon for the same purpose,[113] and paying the wages of sailors employed in carrying gun-stones from Rouen to Caen.[114] The only other document is a quittance from Goulaffre dated August 17, 1418, acknowledging the payment of

Henri V, roi d'Angleterre, lorsqu'il se fut rendu maitre de la Normandie," see especially pp. 1 and 9-10.

[108] Rôles de Bréquigny 981, 1020.

[109] Vautier, pp. 116-7, 133, records the auctioning of wardships in 1419 at 20 écus a year.

[110] Brit. Mus., Add. Ch. 302.

[111] Archives du Calvados, F Fonds Danquin, Série Caen.

[112] Mar. 15, 1419, order to pay 5500 l. t., Archives de la Seine Inf., Occupation Anglaise, I, pièces mêlées. It would seem from this that the president of the exchequer was a financial official rather than a judicial one.

[113] Bib. de Rouen, Y 29, tome 2, no. 15.

[114] Archives du Calvados, F Fonds Danquin, Série Caen.

200 l. t., receipts for three months, from the grenetier of Falaise. This shows that the gabelle continued to be levied although Henry had not yet issued an ordinance on the subject.[115] Probably Goulaffre's chief collections were from the occupied domain, for from this source he had, at the end of his term, 13,223 l. t. which he turned over to his successor.[116]

In May 1419 there seems to have been a financial and administrative reorganization. On May 1, William Alington was appointed treasurer-general,[117] an office which apparently combined the powers heretofore exercised by the president of the exchequer and the receveur-general.[118] Orders to pay now came from the king to Alington, who either carried them out himself by making the proper payment, or issued further orders in accordance with the royal mandate to his subordinates, the vicomtes, grenetiers, and receveurs. This appointment was immediately followed by a revenue ordinance formally establishing, in

[115] Brit. Mus., Add. Ch. 10949. This indicates collection as early as May 1418. The grenetier mentioned, Raoul Vaucquelin, received formal appointment or re-appointment by Henry on June 19, 1419, Rôles de Bréquigny 611. On May 22, 1418, Walter Smith was appointed grenetier at Caen, *ibid.* 1198. Alington mentions receipts from Michel du Pont, grenetier of Alençon, from May 6, 1418, P.R.O., Ex. Accts. 187/14, f. 9r°. Robert le Berrier, grenetier at Lisieux, turned in collections for 1418, *ibid.*, f. 8r°. This grenier was not maintained. No appointments to it appear in the Norman Rolls, nor is it mentioned in Alington's fourth account or in Surreau's account. On Feb. 17, 1420, le Berrier closed his account by paying the treasurer 14 l. t. 5s, Archives de la Seine Inf., Occupation Anglaise, I, pièces mêlées.

[116] P.R.O., Ex. Accts. 187/14, f. 1r°.

[117] Rôles de Bréquigny 511.

[118] The presidency of the exchequer disappears, a fact which, taken in connection with the foregoing would seem to indicate that the office was essentially financial and that its creation for Tiptoft marks the establishment of a Norman treasury. The only evidence that the receveur-generalship continued to exist is mention of John Dalton, clerk, as holding the office and receiving a salary of 40 écus in 1422, Alington's fourth account, P.R.O., Ex. Accts. 188/7, f. 23v°. The documents do not show how he participated in the administration. Bedford revived the office as an important position.

the name of the new ruler of Normandy, a gabelle of 30 l. t. the measure, a "quartage" or tax of one-fourth the selling price on all beverages sold at retail, and "l'imposition foraine" of 12 d. t. per livre on all sales of merchandise. Payment was to be made to the receveurs, disbursement by orders from the treasurer-general, who rendered account to the chambre des comptes. Disputes arising from collection went for judgment to the bailli's court.[119] Formal collection, in some instances, began on May 7, 1419, the day of the ordinance,[120] but the fiscal year for this tax did not begin until June 1.[121] At Rouen the collection of the "quartages" alone was sold for 17,000 l. t.,[122] at Bayeux for 1200 l. t.[123] The value of this collection apparently tended to rise during the early years of the English occupation. At Pont de l'Arche the quartages and impositions foraines brought in 1317 l. 5 s. t. during the first year (June 1, 1419-May 31, 1420). The first four months of the following year netted nearly as much, 1011 l. t. 11s.[124] At Vernon and les Andelys the first five months (May 7-September 30, 1419) produced 388 l. t. 2s 6d from the quartages, the following two brought in 363 l. t.[125]

Later in the year (October 16, 1419) orders went to the

[119] May 7, 1419, Rôles de Bréquigny 536. A more lengthy explanation of the quartages and impositions foraines appears in a letter from Alington to the vicomte of Bernay, dated Aug. 26, 1419, Bib. Nat., fr. 26043, no. 5409. If the president of the exchequer was a financial official (*vide supra*) it may be that the English king created a chambre des comptes in November 1417, and called it by the English name (exchequer). The first mention of a chambre des comptes is in a document of Feb. 9, 1419, Rôles de Bréquigny 297. On April 7, Roger Waltham was appointed a master in the chambre des comptes, *ibid.* 365.

[120] See contrerôle for the châtellainies of Vernon and Andely, Bib. Nat., fr. 25766, no. 795.

[121] *Ibid.*, fr. 26043, no. 5409; Rôles de Bréquigny 768.

[122] Rôles de Bréquigny 768.

[123] Archives de la Seine Inf., Occupation Anglaise, I, pièces melées.

[124] Bib. Nat., fr. 26043, no. 5372. [125] *Ibid.*, fr. 25766, no. 795.

vicomtes at Gisors, Vernon, and elsewhere, to ascertain the customary tariffs on the transport of goods and provisions, and to collect the same.[126] Early in 1420 the ordinance concerning the gabelle, quartages, and impositions foraines in Normandy was renewed,[127] and shortly after extended to the extra-Norman conquests.[128] The next year the tax in both regions was continued,[129] becoming then, and in succeeding years, a highly important item of revenue which continued to bring in increasing returns as time passed.[130] During the first year of this new administration, however, the chief source of income was still the domain, income from which amounted to 72,910 l. t., or 45 per cent of the total revenue.[131]

In connection with the quartages and impositions foraines should be considered the local tariffs which the

[126] Cal. Norm. Rolls, 42.328. At the same time the captains at Mantes and Pont de l'Arche received orders not to interfere with this collection, Rôles de Bréquigny 679. [127] Feb. 18, 1420, *ibid.* 1368.

[128] Mar. 12, 1420, orders to the baillis of Mantes, and of Chaumont and Poissy; Rôles de Bréquigny 779. Mantes had been organized in 1419:—Mar. 7, Robert Varin appointed steward and receveur (Cal. Norm. Rolls, 42.313); Mar. 21, Michel Guernier appointed bailli (*ibid.*, 41.769); June 6, Colin Buselet appointed measurer of the grenier (*ibid.*, 42.320). Not until Feb. 19, 1420, was a bailli, Sir Richard Woodville, set over Chaumont and Poissy (*ibid.*, 42.345).

[129] Aug. 27, 1421. It is worthy of notice that it had become necessary to forbid nobles and Englishmen becoming farmers of these taxes, Rôles de Bréquigny 1027.

[130] In the year 1419-1420 (May 1-April 30), the gabelle brought in 26,615 l. t. or 16.5 per cent of the total revenue, and the quartages and impositions foraines 37,899 l. t. or 23.6 per cent, P.R.O., Ex. Accts. 187/14, ff. 9r°, 11v°. In the year 1421-22, receipts from the gabelle had grown 168 per cent over those of 1419-20, to 61,435 l. t. or 19 per cent of the whole; those from the quartages, etc., 25 per cent to 47,556 l. t. or 14 per cent of the whole, P.R.O., For. Accts. 61, Bv° and Ex. Accts. 188/7 (*vide supra*, p. 166, note 103). For the year 1423-24 (Michaelmas-Michaelmas), the gabelle was still over 50 per cent of the figure for the first year, viz. 40,607 l. t., the other two taxes being over 38 per cent, viz. 52,418 l. t., but these were only 9.5 per cent and 12.2 per cent respectively of the whole now, Bib. Nat., fr. 4485, pp. 48, 39. [131] P.R.O., Ex. Accts. 187/14, f. 7v°.

chief Norman towns were permitted to levy in place of the royal taxes, out of which the expenses of fortification and often the garrison's wages were paid. These usually took the form of a tax on beverages sold at wholesale and retail, to which levies of a similar sort on other merchandise were occasionally added.[132] These were granted by Henry in recognition of existing customary rights, and the levy was administered by the citizens under supervision from royal officials to whom they rendered account. Actual collection was farmed to the highest bidder,[133] the various items being separately considered.[134] The customary tax was 25 s. t. per "queue" for wine from other parts of France sold at retail, 20 s. t. for other wines, and 5 s. t. for other beverages.[135]

[132] *Vide infra,* note 135, in regard to Louviers, Rouen, Carentan, and Montivilliers.

[133] Rôles de Bréquigny 1090.

[134] In the Archives Municipales de Lisieux, CC1, is an account of the receipts and expenditures at Lisieux under a tax of this sort granted by Henry V, Jan. 22, 1421, presented by the local receveur and sixteen citizens before the lieutenant of the bailli of Rouen. This will illustrate most of the foregoing statements.

[135] These taxes were called "aides." May 19, 1418, an aide granted to Vire for three years, Rôles de Bréquigny 167. Feb. 23, 1419, maintenance of an aide at Carentan, *ibid.* 306. May 22, 1422, renewal of the latter in detail, *ibid.* 1117. Feb. 27, 1419, an aide for one year at Bayeux, *ibid.* 315bis: April 2, 1422, renewed, *ibid.* 1102. April 3, 1419, an aide for one year at Falaise, *ibid.* 353: Mar. 13, 1420, renewed, *ibid.* 780. Jan. 18, 1421, renewed, P.R.O., Norman Rolls 15 (8 Henry V, part III), m. 23d°. Mar. 30, 1422, renewed, *ibid.* 17 (10 Henry V), m. 27d°. April 13, 1419, an aide for one year at Rouen, Rôles de Bréquigny 407. April 1, 1422, renewed, *ibid.* 1101. May 5, 1419, an aide for three years at Caen, *ibid.* 530. Mar. 15, 1422, renewed for three years with additions for one year, *ibid.* 1091. June 24, 1424, renewed for three years, Carel, *Hist. de la ville de Caen,* p. 135. Dec. 13, 1419, an aide for one year at Evreux, Rôles de Bréquigny 703. Jan. 13, 1420, an aide for one year at Montivilliers, *ibid.* 723. Mar. 14, 1422, renewed, *ibid.* 1090. Oct. 20, 1420, establishment of an octroi at Gisors, *ibid.* 861. Jan. 20, 1421, revival for one year of an old *Cartulaire de Louviers,* 5 vols. Louviers, 1870-83, II, no. 427). The rates are aide current before the conquest at Argentan, *ibid.* 928. Mar. 20, 1422, renewed; *ibid.* 1092. April 21, 1421, grant of an aide at Louviers (*ibid.* 989), which is obviously modelled on a French aide of 1409 (T. Bonnin,

Other sources of revenue were the arrears due the French king for the period before the invasion, for which the new officials made composition,[136] confiscation of sums left in safe-keeping by refugee Norman nobles or by "brigands,"[137] profits from the mint,[138] and from the sale of provisions to English captains.[139] Altogether King Henry secured 160,437 l. t. 19s 4d from his newly won province in the year 1419-20 (May 1-April 30),[140] equivalent to £24,060 13s 1½d, or about 18.56 per cent of the revenue collected in England during nearly the same period. Indeed, compared with the heavy taxation in England of 1416, a year in which there was considerable deficit, it would appear that it cost less in 1419 to hold a conquered province and to maintain an army in the field, than to relieve and hold a single Norman port; for despite the fact that the combined English and Norman income was over £30,000 less than the English receipts in 1416, there was, nevertheless, a surplus in both countries.[141]

Meanwhile the English success had reached its apogée with the establishment of an accord with Burgundy and the conclusion of the treaty of Troyes. Henry prepared to return to England. Normandy could now be legitimately and safely called upon to support even more of the burden of war waged by the recognized ruler, no

higher, which may perhaps be partly ascribed to the depreciation of the coinage. May 15, 1422, renewed, Rôles de Bréquigny 1114. Mar. 4, 1422, grant of an aide to Mantes of one twelfth the selling price of wine sold at retail, P.R.O., Norman Rolls 16 (9 Henry V), m. 5d°. Mantes had requested this of Henry in 1421 and sent two embassies on the subject in 1422. The town had spent considerable on defenses before, in 1420, Grave, pp. 310, 320. There is no record of the Lisieux aide mentioned in note 134.

136 P.R.O., Ex. Accts. 187/14, f. 12. 137 *Ibid.*, f. 13v°.

138 P.R.O., Ex. Accts. 187/14, f. 13v°. This amounted to 7154 l. t. in the fiscal year 1419-20.

139 P.R.O., Ex. Accts. 187/14, f. 14r°. 140 *Ibid.*, f. 15v°.

141 In England this was £45,661, in Normandy 5121 l. t. equivalent to £768 3s; P.R.O., Ex. Accts. 187/14, f. 34v°.

longer merely a successful invader, defending his province against attack. Summoning the Norman estates to Rouen, he secured their consent on January 18, 1421, to the imposition of a direct tax, a "taille," of 400,000 l. t. for supporting the army and the garrisons in the duchy. In order to meet immediate military expenses, Henry ordered a levy of 100,000 l. t. for March 1, 1421, at the rate of 20 s. t. the hearth, "le fort portant le fieble bien et raisonablement."[142] The treasurer-general, director of the collection, immediately sent orders to his subordinates.[143] He informed each vicomte of the sum expected from his vicomté. Within that district apportionment by sergencies and parishes was made at a meeting of the vicomte or his lieutenant, the procureur, and the sergents.[144] The men of each parish made the actual assessment and collection, apportioning the tax according to individuals' ability to pay, reporting the same to the royal agents, and paying over the sums received.[145] On

[142] Rôles de Bréquigny 925.

[143] Letter of Jan. 18, 1421, Bib. Nat., fr. 25907, no. 1263bis.

[144] Shown by an "assiette" for the vicomté d'Auge of December 1422, Archives du Calvados, F Fonds Danquin, Série Auge.

[145] Reports of this sort are numerous. "C'est le roulle de la taille et impost nouvellement miz sus et octroye du Roy, notre seigneur, par les iij estas de normendie, c'est assavoir sur chacun feu de la paroisse de la cronysville, en la sergenterie de la bonneville, la somme de XX, s.t., le fort portant la fieble, assiz, cuilly, et apporte par Jehan Vence et Robin Belloc et autres de la dicte paroisse.

Premierment:—

Robin Belloc	vij s. vj d. t.
Pierrez Bertin	xl s. t.
Jehan Vence	vij s. vj d. t.
Perrot Sene	xl s. t.
Perrot Eremvetre	xl s. t.
Chardot Sene	x s. t.
Jehan Eremvetre	xvij s. vj d. t.
Jehan Eremvetre	vij s. vj d. t.
Roy Sene	xx s. t.
Jehan Sene	x s. t.

April 14, 1421, the bishops or their vicars were ordered to collect within two weeks the dîme which was the clergy's share of this first levy,[146] and on June 2 the treasurer-general and the baillis were commanded to make collection from such of the clergy as were still stubborn.[147] Meanwhile in May the second collection from the laity to gather the sum of 60,000 l. t. had been inaugurated.[148] This second levy differed from the first by demanding payment in "fort monnaie," instead of in the debased coinage which had been accepted in March.[149] Although collection continued throughout the summer, by August there still remained an arrearage of 20,000 l. t.[150] It was consequently deemed prudent to collect the remaining 240,000 l. t. in two terms instead of in one, as had originally been planned. Orders to collect 120,000 l. t. were accordingly issued on August 20, 1421.[151] Subsequently

Somme de ce present Roulle X l. t. certiffir devant moy Colin Mareschal, tabellion—par le dit Sene (sic) et Belloc estre—loyaument assiz à leurs ames et consciencez et que plus de feux n'avoit en la dicte parroisse. Tesmoin mon signe manuel cy miz le mercredy xij jour de mars l'an mil iiii et xx. C. Mareschal." Bib. Nat., fr. 25907, no. 986. See also nos. 992, 994, 998, 1002, 1006. On the back of another such document are eleven names labelled "ensi les mendiants," Brit. Mus., Add. Ch. 11468.

146 Rymer, X, 101. In Rôles de Bréquigny 1022 there is mention of the "premier xme ordonne cueiller en moys de mars derraine passé." This is probably a misreading for May. See Rymer *ut supra* and P.R.O., Ex. Accts. 188/7, f. 17v°.

147 Cal. Norm. Rolls, 42.429. The abbey of Fécamp had to borrow from Jean Bouchart of Dieppe in order to pay this tax, Jean Cuillier's account, Archives de la Seine Inf., Extraits et Notes Hist., IV, 4592, citing dossier 386, Abbey de Fécamp, f. 187r°.

148 May 15, 1421, order to Alington, Rôles de Bréquigny 1375.

149 For parish rolls showing payment of this levy see Bib. Nat., fr. 25907, nos. 1011 ff.; Bib. de Rouen, Y 29, tome 2, nos. 53-8.

150 The March collection netted 85,000 l. t. instead of 100,000 l. t., the May one 55,000 l. t. instead of 60,000 l. t. Of this 12,000 l. t. came from the dîme, Rôles de Bréquigny 1022.

151 *Ibid.* Orders from the treasurer-general went out in September. The receveur at Dieppe was ordered to collect 2,000 l. t. and to bring his receipts to Caen by the third week in October, Bib. Nat., fr. 26044, no. 5658.

another term was added, two levies of 60,000 l. t. each being made in 1422, the second of them after Henry's death.[152] Meanwhile collection of the second dîme, ordered in December 1421,[153] took place in January,[154] and in the following April Henry undertook to collect arrears of the dîme voted to Charles VI before the English invasion, most of which was still unpaid.[155] Considering the taille as a whole, it appears that Henry succeeded in collecting something between 250-300,000 l. t. of the 400,000 l. t. voted.[156]

Henry V's death, followed quickly by that of Charles VI, produced new political conditions which reacted im-

A levy of 4500 l. t. was made on the vicomté of Vire (*ibid.*, no. 5659), and 8,000 l. t. on Carentan (*ibid.*, no. 5660).

[152] May 15, 1422, order to Alington to collect 60,000 l. t., Cal. Norm. Rolls, 42.449. Alington's fourth account (April 30-Aug. 31, 1422) mentions this fourth levy of 60,000 l. t. (incorrectly written 50,000 l. t.) as levied on May 18, 1422. It brought in 50,823 l. t. 10s 9d, P.R.O., Ex. Accts. 188/7, ff. 10v°-17r°. Alington's successor, Richard Woodville, issued orders to collect the fifth payment on Dec. 13, 1422. He apportioned 2,000 l. t. to the vicomté of Auge. See "assiette" of the vicomté, Archives du Calvados, F Fonds Danquin, Série Auge.

[153] Dec. 14, 1421, order to the bishops, Cal. Norm. Rolls, 42.434. Rouen was released from half the dîme, Rymer, X, 225.

[154] P.R.O., Ex. Accts. 188/7, f. 17v°.

[155] Rymer, X, 203. The failure of Alington and Surreau to mention any receipts from this source makes it doubtful if anything was obtained.

[156] Between May 1, 1421, and Aug. 31, 1422, 187,035 l. t. 7s 5d was collected, distributed as follows by bailliages:—Rouen 36,654 l. t. 6s 8d; Gisors 5,143 l. t. 14s 11d; Caux 18,873 l. t. 6s 10d; Evreux 10,100 l. t.; Caen 35,621 l. t. 17s 2d; Cotentin 31,770 l. t. 13s 7d; Alençon 28,728 l. t. 10s; Mantes 1,200 l. t.; Clerical dîme 18,942 l. t. 18s 1d, P.R.O., For. Accts. 61, Bv°. Of this 130,860 l. t. 3s came in during the fiscal year May 1, 1421-April 30, 1422. The letter of Aug. 20, 1421, (Rôles de Bréquigny 1022) mentions 85,000 l. t. as levied in March 1421. Probably, however, some of this was collected during the summer of 1421 and consequently appears in the above account. Nevertheless the maximum figure obtainable is only 272,035 l. t. 9s 4d. This is equivalent to £40,805 5s. In 1423-4, they were still collecting arrears of this levy. Surreau records 3780 l. t. 7s 1d of such arrears of which 651 l. t. 10s 12d came from the dîme, Bib. Nat., fr. 4485, pp. 63-7.

mediately upon the financial situation. Although the personal union of England and France was theoretically accomplished by the proclamation of the infant Henry VI, the division of authority between Bedford and Gloucester made the administrative separation more complete than it had ever been under Henry V. Bedford's household might replace the king's as an administrative organ, but it had no relations with the English exchequer because Bedford himself, being regent of France, had no official connection with the London treasury. The problem which confronted him in much more acute form than it had his late brother was that of making the conquered country pay for the war. His position was an improvement over that of the French government before 1417, only in so far as his possession of a reliable standing army enabled him effectively to exercise his authority. Normandy assumed a much greater importance as a source of revenue than before, because such parts of France as recognized Bedford's rule were either too devastated or too incompletely subjugated to provide even a moiety of the finances collectable from the duchy. Indeed in the latter, Henry V had done his work so well that it only remained for his brother to assure tranquillity by efficient police and by holding the frontiers, while he reduced the isolated, hostile castles in French territory north and east of Paris, and in Picardy. Such a policy, however, entailed two things, repeated levies of money on Normandy, and the utilization in France of troops which might otherwise have been used effectively on the Norman frontier. The first aggravated the discontent of the conquered people. The second laid the duchy open to attacks from the south which quickly threatened the security of the English régime. In fact, they eventually goaded Bedford into an ambitious offensive in excess of

his military strength, an offensive which went to pieces against the walls of Orleans.

In the financial administration the inauguration of the regent's rule was marked by a "shake-up" in the treasury. It may perhaps be inferred that Alington was summarily dismissed, inasmuch as he was not even permitted to complete Easter term, 1422, but was called upon to close his accounts in August. Consequently his fourth account is full of entries recording "nothing received."[157] On September 1, 1422, he was succeeded by Sir Richard Woodville,[158] whose appointment meant a temporary continuation of Henry V's administrative policy. The treasurer-general continued to direct receipts and disbursements, and to take his orders from the regent.[159] This, however, did not continue long. The greater efficiency to be obtained by closer financial union between France and Normandy was too patent to be neglected. On January 2, 1423, a treasurer- and governor-general of all finances both in France and Normandy was appointed in the person of Hemon Belknap,[160] while the receveur-generalship, held by Pierre Surreau, assumed a larger share in the administration, although still subordinate.[161] The duties of the old treasurer-generalship were divided between

[157] P.R.O., Ex. Accts. 188/7. This is especially true of the ordinary revenue.

[158] Bib. Nat., fr. 26044, no. 5750. Record of service from Sept. 29 to Dec. 29, 1422 appears in *ibid.*, fr. 25767, no. 6.

[159] Receipt of Woodville from Raoul d'Estampes, vicomte of Caen, for 767 l. t. 10s of the latter's collections during Michaelmas term 1422-3, Archives de la Seine Inf., Occupation Anglaise, pièces mêlées, I. Quittance of Sir John Montgomery, captain of Domfront, to Woodville, for 1643 l. t. paid him by the vicomte of Pontaudemer, Brit. Mus., Add. Ch. 11484. Orders to pay from Bedford to Woodville, *ibid.*, 87, 11508.

[160] Bib. Nat. fr. 4485, p. 160. Beaurepaire, "L'administration de la Normandie etc.," p. 182, fails to indicate that the date he gives (Jan. 2, 1422) is old style, as in the manuscript.

[161] The one received 600 l. t. a year, and 6 l. t. a day "pour chevauchées"; the other 500 l. t. a year, and 4 l. t. a day, Beaurepaire, *ut supra.*

them. In regard to ordinary disbursements, the regent issued his orders, accompanied with necessary information, as to indenture for instance, to Belknap the treasurer, with directions to have Surreau the receveur make payments accordingly.[162] When, however, he communicated on a subject of such major importance as the collection of a taille, he addressed the two officials jointly,[163] and they acting together sent orders to the vicomtes, prévôts, etc.[164] As his official title indicates, Surreau directed the machinery of receipt, but did so in the name of the treasurer- and governor-general.[165] It was he, too, who drew up the detailed account for Normandy which provides so much of our information for this period.[166]

Bedford wisely assumed a modest military policy at the beginning of his rule, aiming merely to subdue the isolated Dauphinois strongholds in the north, to check or repulse hostile incursions into Normandy and towards Paris, and to protect further the frontiers by reducing such places as Ivry and Mont St. Michel, whose retention by the enemy was a standing menace. Such a defensive program was in the interests of Norman tranquillity and prosperity, things for which the duchy could reasonably be expected to pay. At the end of six months, therefore, in February 1423, the duke assembled the Norman estates at Vernon and asked them for 50,000 l. t. and a clerical

162 Orders to pay captains stationed in Norman garrisons, Arch. Nat., K 62, nos. 6, 7[1], [3]; Bib. Nat., fr. 25767, no. 22; Luce, *Chronique*, I, 147, p. j. XXXIV.

163 Stevenson, *Letters and Papers, etc.*, II, part 1, p. 10.

164 Bib. Nat., fr. 26046, nos. 89, 90.

165 See receipt for 438 l. t. 6s 8d from the grenetier at Honfleur, Aug. 5, 1424, Archives de la Seine Inf., Occupation Anglaise, pièce mêlées, I. See also receipts from the grenetier and the receveur of IIIIes at Caen, Archives du Calvados, F Fonds Danquin, Série Caen.

166 Bib. Nat. fr. 4485: summarized along with Surreau's accounts for 1425 and 1429 by Beaurepaire, "De l'administration de la Normandie, etc." *Mém. Soc. Antiq. Norm.*, XXIV.

dîme, to be collected before August 1, and to be used in paying the army sent against Ivry, Mont St. Michel, and other places which threatened Normandy.[167] Orders to assess and collect this sum were issued as early as April.[168] At the same time Bedford was attempting to draw from France the costs of enterprises northward. In January 1423 he directed the expenses for maintaining 200 men-at-arms and 300 archers besieging Meulan, and defending St. Valéry and Gamaches, to be expended from the French receipts. To clear the Armagnacs from the region south of Paris a special subsidy was levied on the capital, appeals against which made to the parlement were overridden by mandates from the regent.[169] Meanwhile certain of Charles VI's jewels were sold and the income similarly devoted to military expenses.[170] He attempted to tax the French clergy on the plea of sending a special embassy to defend the Gallican liberties at a council which Martin V proposed to hold at Pavia in May 1423, but the clergy, at least in the province of Reims, openly

[167] For the French recapture of Ivry *vide infra,* p. 301. Beaurepaire, "Les États de Normandie sous la domination anglaise" (*Travaux de la Société d'Agriculture de l'Eure.* 3e série, V, 345 ff., Evreux, 1859), p. 362. Surreau's account for the following year records collection of arrears of this levy amounting to only 2072 l. t. 8d which seems to indicate a successful collection. See success of subsequent levies, *infra* note 176. At the same time he records 4128 l. t. 8s 1d arrears from the five levies of Henry V's taille, now two or three years old. Bedford had to postpone collecting half of the 1000 l. t. apportioned to Dieppe on the fifth levy of Henry V because of the unusual expenses sustained by the town (April 2, 1423). Bib. Nat., fr. 26046, no. 51. Surreau mentions arrears from the dîme of 1423 amounting to 8307 l. t. 15s.

[168] April 22, 1423, order to levy 1,000 l. t. on the vicomté of Evreux, *Bull. de l'Hist. de Norm.,* VII, 430. June 14, royal orders to make collection sent to the treasury officials. July 8, the latter order 200 l. t. collected from the prevoté of Meulan, Bib. Nat., fr. 26046, no. 89. July 23, similar order to collect 2,000 l. t. from the vicomté of Caudebec, *ibid.,* no. 90.

[169] Ritter, "Extraits du Journal du Tresor," *Bib. de l'École des Chartes,* LXXIII, 472; Fauquembergue, II, 127-8.

[170] Bib. de Rouen, Collection Leber 5870, tome III, f. 227.

resisted.[171] On undertaking to capture Le Crotoy he collected some of the expenses from the surrounding region.[172]

But when summer came in 1423 it became evident that the military effort was in excess of the resources, in hand or in prospect, even before the February taille had been collected. "It is necessary to consider," wrote Bedford on June 4, 1423, "how to pay the soldiers and men-at-arms retained at the king's wages for the defense of Normandy on St. John's Day (June 24), when a quarter's pay falls due, for there is nothing to give them because the funds intended for the soldiers have been spent on the siege of Le Crotoy, which still drags on, on the journey to Amiens, and on the expeditions into Champagne and Brie." In consequence the estates were re-assembled at Vernon in July and persuaded to vote another taille of 60,000 l. t. for paying the army defending Normandy and operating to the southward.[173] But again the progress of events necessitated still further exertions, and the prospects for the future required heavier taxation. For a third time, in

[171] Louis Soullié, "Opposition des chapitres cathédraux de la province ecclésiastique de Reims au gouvernment du duc de Bedford, 1423-1428" (*Revue de Champagne et de Brie,* 2e série, II, 744 ff., October, 1890), pp. 745-6.

[172] Aug. 23, 1423, order to levy 3,000 l. t. on Amiens, E. Prarond, *Notices historiques, topographiques et archéologiques sur l'arrondissement d'Abbeville* (2 vols., Abbeville, 1854), II, 169. Dec. 20, 1423, quittance for 4,000 l. t. levied on Abbeville, Alcius Ledieu, "Documents inédits sur le siege du Crotoy en 1423," *Bulletin Mensuel de la Société d'Histoire du Vimeu,* I (St. Valery-sur-Somme, 1905-7), 389, cf. H. Dusevel, "Quelques documents inédits sur Abbeville et ses environs" (*Mémoires de la Société d'Emulation d'Abbeville,* XI, 191 ff. Abbeville, 1867), p. 201. The division of expenditure between France and Normandy is illustrated by an order to the treasurer to pay Salisbury for services in Normandy, Alençon, Maine, Champagne, and Brie, "c'est assavoir (sur) noz finanse de Nordie de ce qui lui est ou fera deu à cause des charges qu'il a eues en Normandie et on Maine, et sur nos finances de France de ce qui lui est deu à cause des charges qu'il a eues esdiz pais de Champagne et de Brie," Bib. Nat., fr. 26047, no. 335.

[173] Beaurepaire, "Les États de Normandie," p. 365.

December, the Norman estates assembled, this time at Caen, and responded to the government's demands with a grant of 200,000 l. t. for the recovery of Mont St. Michel, Ivry, Dreux, Gaillon, Nogent-le-Rotrou, Senonches, and Beaumont-le-Vicomte, and to extirpate brigands "qui en divers lieux de notre dite duchie ont fait on temps passé et font presentement maulx, pilleries et roberies."[174] At the same time a dîme was levied on the clergy "sans le congié du pappe."[175] Collection was made in three terms, January, March, and June, with very considerable success, only 5.5 per cent being left to come in as "arrearages."[176] Most of this latter can be accounted

[174] Bib. Nat., fr. 4485, p. 1.

[175] Bib. Nat., fr. 4485, p. 126; Cochon, *Chron. Norm.*, p. 393.

[176] Dec. 19, 1423, orders from Bedford to Belknap and Surreau to collect 80,000 l. t. by Jan. 15, 1424, Stevenson, II, part I, p. 10. Dec. 21, 1423, letter from the treasurer- and receveur-generals apportioning 1,200 l. t. to the vicomté of Evreux, Bib. Nat., fr. 26046, no. 178. The assiette for Evreux shows 1,215 l. t. *ibid.*, no. 173; Surreau records receipt of 1,200 l. t. *ibid.*, fr. 4485, p. 78. There is a fragmentary assiette for Harcourt, *ibid.*, fr. 26046, no. 174; Surreau records receipt of 1,000 l. t. *ut supra*, p. 74. Dec. 21, 1423, letter apportioning 1,200 l. t. to Dieppe, Bib. Nat., fr. 26056, no. 175; Surreau received 1,200 l. t. 6d, *ibid.*, fr. 4485, p. 77. 1,800 l. t. was laid on the vicomté of Conches and Breteuil, *ibid.*, fr. 26046, no. 176; Surreau received 1,799 l. t. 19s 2d, *ibid.*, fr. 4485, p. 78. The 2,000 l. t. laid on the vicomté of Alençon was all collected, *ibid.*, fr. 26046, no. 177; 4485, p. 83. Of the 2,500 l. t. laid on the vicomté of Caudebec Surreau records income of 2548 l. t. 1s 1d, *ibid.*, fr. 26046, no. 179; 4485, p. 76. An assiette for Vire shows an apportionment of 2,700 l. t. of which Surreau received 2,600 l. t. Bib. Nat., fr. 26046, no. 190; 4485, p. 80. Mar. 10, 1424, Bedford ordered the levy of 60,000 l. t., *ibid.*, 4485, p. 3. Mar. 21, 1,400 l. t. was apportioned to the vicomté of Conches and Breteuil and collected, *ibid.*, fr. 26047, no. 224; 4485, p. 93. 3,000 l. t. was apportioned to the vicomté of Cherbourg, but Surreau received only 478 l. t. 9s 2d, *ibid.*, fr. 26047, no. 225; 4485, p. 96. Orders directing the "esleus" and the vicomte of Mortain to take measures for levying their portion, Brit. Mus., Add. Ch. 11511: 1600 l. t. was apportioned to this vicomté but nothing was collected, Bib. Nat., fr. 4485, p. 82. June 3, 1424, Bedford ordered the levy of 60,000 l. t. June 16, 1575 l. t. was apportioned to Neufchâtel and Gournay and collected, *ibid.*, fr. 26047, no. 273; 4485, p. 105. Of the 2,000 l. t. levied on Caudebec 1993 l. t. 19s 9d was turned in, *ibid.*, fr. 26047, no. 274; 4485,

for by the inability to make collections in the border vicomtés of Avranches, Mortain, Verneuil, and Perche. This income financed the war for about nine months during which the military effort culminating at Verneuil in August, 1424, put such a strain on the treasury that on October 1, 1424, the Norman estates were again convened at Paris. There, sitting conjointly with the French estates, they voted another levy of 60,000 l. t. similar to those collected in March and June.[177] Of this, 50,000 l. t. was for paying the troops the wages due them up to Michaelmas, 1424, 3000 l. t. was to be used on fortifications at Harfleur and Honfleur, and the remaining 7000 l. t. was intended to help defray the expenses of the Mont St. Michel expedition.[178] Returns, however, were less

p. 104. 450 l. t. was levied on Condé-sur-Noireau and collected, *ibid.*, fr. 26047, no. 275; 4485, p. 109; cf. Stevenson *op. cit.*, p. 35.

Summary:

	Collected			*Shortage*		
Levy of January, 1424	76,104 l. t.	6s	1d.	3,895 l. t.	13s	11d.
Levy of March, 1424	56,595	1	10	3,404	18	1
Levy of June, 1424	56,213	12	7	3,786	7	5

Total collection 188,913 l. t. 6d.
Total shortage 11,086 l. t. 19s 5d.

Of this shortage 7,900 l. t. had been apportioned to the frontier vicomtés where it was uncollectable, Bib. Nat., fr. 4485, pp. 82, 96, 98. Returns from the dîme, July 7 *et seq.*, 4718 l. t. 4s 3d, *ibid.*, pp. 71 ff.

177 Stevenson, II, part I, p. 32. Oct. 12, 1424, Bedford ordered collection to be made by Nov. 1, Bib. Nat., fr. 4485, p. 9. Apportionments were as follows:—Harcourt, 600 l. t., *ibid.*, fr. 26046, no. 181; Surreau received 650 l. t., *ibid.*, fr. 4485, p. 116; Verneuil, 1200 l. t., *ibid.*, fr. 26047, no. 329; nothing collected, *ibid.*, fr. 4485, p. 111; Beaumont-le-Roger, 500 l. t. apportioned (the assiette indicates 516 l. t. levied), *ibid.*, fr. 26047, no. 330; Surreau received 400 l. t., *ibid.*, fr. 4485, p. 119; Gournay and Neufchâtel, 1575 l. t., *ibid.*, fr. 26047, no. 331; Surreau received 1500 l. t., *ibid.*, fr. 4485, p. 118; Conches and Breteuil, 1400 l. t., *ibid.*, fr. 26047, nos. 332, 341; Surreau received 1372 l. t., *ibid.*, fr. 4485, p. 119.

178 "lequel aide luy aestre octroye par les gens diceulx trois estas assemblee en la ville de Paris en ce present mois d'octobre pour le convertir et emploier, c'est assavoir, L^M livres tournois en paiement des arrearages et

satisfactory than on previous occasions, only 49,371 l. t. 16s 4d being collected on time,[179] and of this the regent felt constrained, while collection was in progress, to deflect nearly half to the support of the expedition being organized against Maine.[180] And finally, in November, it was found necessary to restore the gabelle to its old burdensome figure, to which it had been raised by the Armagnacs and which Henry V had reduced with a magnanimous flourish in 1418,[181] in order to support the new armies.[182]

Was this taxation burdensome? This question necessitates a comparison between the relation of tax to population in England and Normandy. At the end of the fourteenth century the inhabitants of England and Wales are estimated at 2,500,000.[183] During the period 1416-1422 the

restes deubz aux cappnes et soudoyers dudit pais à cause de leurs gaiges de l'annee finye à la Saint Michael desraine passee, IIIM livres tournois pour certaines necessaires besoignes advises estre a faire à Harfleur et Honnefleu, et le demourant enpaiement des soudoiers estans à siege tant par mer comme par terre devant la plache du Mount Saint Michael,'' *ibid.*, fr. 26046, no. 181.

179 *Ibid.*, fr. 4485, pp. 114 ff. This leaves 17.7 per cent uncollected.

180 23,430 l. t. from the bailliages of Caen, Cotentin, and Alençon was thus used, *ibid.*, pp. 120-4. In addition to the taille itself there were fines from cases arising under its collection which went to the receveurs. Sept. 24, 1423, receipt for 70 salus d'or from the vicomte of Caen, Archives de la Seine Inf., Occupation Anglaise, pièces mêlées, I. See also Archives du Calvados, F Fonds Danquin, Série Falaise. ''Amendes tauxes, tant on diocese de Sees que en la vicomte de Falaise, sur le fait des aides ordonnees pour la guerre depuis le XIe jour de Decembre, l'an mil quatre cens vingt et trois, jusques au XVIIIme jour d'Aoust, l'an mil quatre cens vingt et cinq, par nous Phelippe Lecloutier, esleu oudit diocese sur le fait diceulx aides, icelles amendes tauxes par les conseil et en la presence de Guiot de la Villette, advocat du Roy, notre sire, en la vicomte dudit lieu de Faloise, Jehan Dupont, procureur du Roy, notre dit seigneur, sur le fait des dis aides, et de Raoul Vauquellin, recepveur diceulx aides, et baillies à Guilbert Lever audit Raoul Vauquellin.'' They total 113 l. t. 13s.

181 P.R.O., Norman Rolls 9 (6 Henry V, part I), m. 25do.

182 Bib. Nat., fr. 26047, nos. 342, 343, 344.

183 This is Seebohm's estimate based on the poll tax of 1377. Frederic

annual taxation averaged £135,023, or a trifle less than 13d per head. Of this the direct taxation due to the war averaged £27,365 or about 2⅔d per head. At this time a carpenter's daily wage varied from 4½d to 6d a day, and it is estimated that he enjoyed employment about 230 days a year.[184] In Normandy the population in 1328 is estimated at 1,250,000.[185] It seems reasonable, in view of our knowledge of the Black Death, to conclude that this figure must be halved in considering conditions in the early fifteenth century. Without entering upon the controversial question of the recuperative powers of medieval populations, it must be admitted that the recurrence of wars in Normandy during the fourteenth century, and

Seebohm, "The Black Death and its place in English History" (*Fortnightly Review*, II, 149, 268. London, 1865), p. 153. Rogers combats it and argues that the population was probably between 1,500,000 and 2,500,000, *Fortnightly Review* III, 191; *A History of Agriculture and Prices in England, 1259-1793* (7 vols. Oxford, 1866-1902), I, 57; IV, 131. Cunningham, in *The Growth of English Commerce and Industry during the early and middle ages* (4th edition, 3 vols., Cambridge, 1905), I, 331, note 4, attacks Rogers' arguments and concludes that the population could have been over 2,000,000. The latter figure is the one accepted by Denton, *England in the Fifteenth Century* (London, 1888), p. 130. Reference to articles supporting this latter figure will be found in Denton's footnotes. A summary of the returns from the poll tax of 1377, the basis for these estimates, is in Oman, *The Great Revolt of 1381* (Oxford, 1906), appendix II, p. 162 *et seq.* Cunningham's disagreement with Rogers has inclined me to favor the higher estimate as given in the text, especially as Rogers is attacking, not this figure, but one twice as large which Seebohm considers to have been the population before the Black Death. The lower figure would raise the annual average taxation per head to over 16d, and the average for direct taxation due to the war to 3¼d per head.

184 H. D. Traill, *Social England* (revised edition. 6 vols., London, 1901-4), II, 543-4.

185 This is based on a list of "Paroisses et feux des bailliages et sénéchaussées de France" drawn up for the use of the royal officers of finance in 1328, published by Dureau de la Malle in *Bib. de l'École de Ch.*, II, 170, and discussed by him in *Mém. de l'Acad. des Inscrip. et Belles-Lettres*, XIV, 2me partie, p. 36. For discussion of the whole problem see E. Levasseur, *La population française: histoire de la population avant 1789* (3 vols., Paris, 1889-92), I, 155 *et seq.*; for Normandy, p. 169.

the returns of the plague,[186] would have seriously retarded any return to the figures of 1328. In March, 1421, Henry V levied 100,000 l. t. of the taille voted in January, at the rate of 20 s. t. per hearth.[187] Inasmuch as the parish rolls recording the collection of the taille, such as we possess, show that the number of livres levied on a parish corresponded to the number of householders named in the roll, notwithstanding the inequality of the sums paid by each,[188] it seems apparent that in levying 100,000 l. t. Henry estimated that there were 100,000 hearths subject to the fouage. This seems a very low estimate when we consider that in 1328 there were 280,000 hearths in the Norman bailliages, not including Alençon.[189] The ravages of war and pestilence must indeed have been heavy to have reduced the population by nearly two-thirds. Averaging at the customary ratio of four and a half persons to the hearth,[190] Henry's estimate would indicate about 450,000 people, a figure which guesses as to the numbers of those not subject to the tax, nobility, mendicants, etc., can scarcely raise above 600,000,[191] which is

186 See Alfred Coville, *Recherches sur la misère en Normandie au temps de Charles VI* (Caen, 1886).

187 Rôles de Bréquigny 925.

188 *Vide supra*, p. 174, note 145.

189 Levasseur, I, 156-7.

190 *Ibid.*, pp. 159-164.

191 The distribution of the tailleable population may perhaps be indicated by the apportionment of the tax by bailliages. This is most clearly shown for the levy of January, 1424.

Rouen	25 per cent	Cotentin	17.5 per cent
Gisors	2.875	Alençon	12.5
Caux	13.375	Mantes	1.5
Evreux	4.5	Poissy,	
Caen	21.25	Pontoise, etc.	1.5

Bib. Nat., fr. 4485, pp. 71 *et seq.* The collection ordered in December, 1422, shows comparatively slight variations, P.R.O., Ex. Accts. 188/7. In 1328 we find the number of hearths distributed as follows: Rouen 21.65 per cent, Gisors 22.13, Caux 15, Caen 18.22, Cotentin 23.

about half the population of 1328. For the year 1419-20, when the English collected only the ordinary revenue, the financial burden upon the people was very close to the English average, viz. 5 s. t. 4d (9½d sterling). By 1421-22 this had been increased to 10 s. t. (1s 6d sterling), and in 1423-24 to 14 s. t. 3d (2s 2d sterling). The uncertainty as to the accuracy of the population estimates makes it necessary to consider these figures as merely tentative. If the population had been as great as in 1328 the above results would have to be halved. It seems doubtful if they would have to be increased in any circumstances. At this time a Norman carpenter got a daily wage of 5 s. t.[192] (9d sterling). In the years of heaviest taxation in England (1416, 1417) the average per head was only 1s 9d and 1s 3d sterling respectively. From this it appears that at its worst taxation in England threw on the country an average burden per head equivalent to three and one-half days' wages for a carpenter at the maximum wage. This was at the beginning of the period of conquest. By the end of our period England had been relieved and Normandy was bearing taxation the average individual burden of which equalled less than three days' wages for a carpenter. The difference, however, which cannot be measured, lies in the fact that in the latter instance the tax was levied by an alien conqueror upon the country which had been the seat of war.

These considerations of Norman taxation include, in addition to the taille, the regular annual income, which in 1423-24 amounted to 160,829 l. t. 7s 6d,[193] and in addition Bedford had the French treasury receipts, which in 1423

192 Georges d'Avenel, *Histoire économique de la propriété, des salaires, des denrées, et de tous les prix en general, depuis l'an 1200 jusqu'en l'an 1800* (6 vols., Paris, 1894-1912), III, 589.

193 Domain, 33,457 l. t. 17s 3d; quartages, etc., 52,368 l. t. 2s 8d; mint, 10,102 l. t. 6s 7d; gabelle, 40,607 l. t. 15s 2d; arrearages, 24,275 l. t. 5s 10d.

totalled 125,896 l. t. 12s 11d, and in 1424, 146,303 l. t. 1d.[194] He also appealed to the pope for permission to tax the French clergy to the extent of 12,000 gold florins.[195] Whether or not this was done does not appear. Taken altogether, we may estimate his annual revenue at about 560,000 l. t. equivalent to £84,000.[196] That this was insufficient may quickly be concluded upon comparison with the English exchequer receipts and expenditures between 1416 and 1422. In only one of the years for which there is complete record, 1420, was the English income so low, and there was a deficit of £38,000. In 1419 and 1422 only, under Henry V, were the war expenses within £84,000, and of these 1419 was a year of negotiations rather than war, while the record for 1422 is incomplete, ending, as it does, with the death of Henry. Usually the expenditures of the English exchequer were at least £35,000 in excess of the above sum, with the expenditures from the Norman treasury unconsidered. Bedford, of course, had none of the expenses for running the English government, but such relief was counterbalanced by the necessities of the Paris government. Inadequacy is still further illustrated by the fact that in Bedford's first year the Norman exchequer reported a deficit of 2666 l. t. 13s 5d, with an additional one of 3235 l. t. 1s 9d for the following year,[197] while the French treasury in 1423 had a shortage of 4896 l. p. The latter, it is true, in 1424 had a surplus of 5855 l. p. 4s 7d,[198] but even that, taking the two years together,

[194] Ritter in *Bib. de l'École des Chartes,* LXXIII, 472-3, 478-9, 480, 482.

[195] Soullié, p. 747. If the florin was worth as much in 1424 as it was in 1346, this would be equivalent to 146,400 l. t., J. N. Natalis de Wailly, *Mémoire sur les variations de la livres tournois depuis le régne de Saint Louis jusqu'a l'établissement de la monnaie décimale* (Paris, 1857), p. 62.

[196] This result is obtained by adding to Surreau's receipts for 1423-4 (Bib. Nat., fr. 4485, p. 145) the mean between the French receipts for 1423 and 1424. If the receipts for the same months as Surreau's account were substituted the result would be about 28,000 l. t. less.

[197] Bib. Nat., fr. 4485, p. 436. [198] Ritter as above, note 194.

left 4942 l. t. 10s 4d, equivalent to £741 7s 6d, on the wrong side of the ledger, not to mention the unpaid wages of the troops.

The end of 1424, therefore, finds the regent faced with serious problems. His military prestige is at its height by reason of the victory of August 17, but Normandy is not in a tranquil state, the enemy, although defeated, is by no means crushed, and, worst of all, his finances are proving insufficient for maintaining merely a successful defensive. The alternative was a vigorous offensive pushed home while Normandy could still be successfully taxed. Victory, by protecting the southern frontier, would serve to tranquilize the duchy, to beat down still further the dauphin's resistance, and possibly to gain new regions from which to draw resources.

CHAPTER V

MILITARY ORGANIZATION

Inextricably bound up with the problem of money is the still more important one of men. No military discussion is possible without some attempt to estimate the relative strength of the contending armies. The size of medieval armies, however, is somewhat of a controversial question, and one in the consideration of which there is often temptation to reject as valueless contemporary statements as to numbers, and to substitute hypotheses of more or less possibility based upon attendant circumstances.[1] Fortunately for the period under discussion, especially for the English side, there is considerable evidence of a most trustworthy character consisting of treasurers' accounts, royal orders to pay, muster rolls, and the like, which makes it possible to estimate Henry's military power with some feelings of assurance.

Early in January, 1417, Henry sent letters under the privy seal to the leading lords and knights of England ordering them to certify what forces they would provide for the coming campaign. Even before, in the previous December, an agent had been sent into Gascony for

[1] See Sir James Ramsay, "The Size of English Armies in the Middle Ages," *E. H. R.*, XXIX, 221. Friedrich Niethe, *Die Schlact bei Azincourt* (Berlin, 1906), pp. 34-6, avers that the French army at that battle must have been smaller than the English, although all evidence on that point is very positively to the contrary. And Delbrück practically accepts his conclusion, Hans Delbrück, *Geschichte der Kriegskunst in Rahmen der politischen Geschichte* (3 vols. Berlin, 1900-7), III, 479.

"balistarii,"[2] who later came to England under two Gascon lords, to join the expedition.[3] On February 1, 1417, writs went to the sheriffs ordering proclamation that the English captains who had received the January orders appear before the king and council by mid-February to make indentures and receive the first installment of their wages (i.e. for one quarter).[4] No sooner was this done than messengers went out with orders still further to proclaim that all who were retained for service in France provide themselves in England with provisions for half a year, and hold themselves ready to observe the time and place of mustering.[5] A month later it was announced that May 10, 1417, was the date.[6] At the appointed time captains began to arrive at Southampton[7] and in order to pay their wages for the second quarter according to their indentures, the king had to raise a loan.[8] Some had al-

[2] Dec. 18, 1416, £10 paid to this agent and £364 on the wages of 20 men-at-arms and 100 "balistarii," P.R.O., Issue Roll 629 m. 5.

[3] These were Lord de St. Pierre and Menauton de St. Marie; see a letter of Dec. 30, 1416, ordering the authorities at Bayonne to provide sailors for transports, Brit. Mus., Sloane MSS. 4601, f. 77. The latter of these captains claimed before the privy council to have served with 10 men-at-arms and 50 arbalesters for three and a half years "durant tout la conquest du pays de Normandie," *Proceedings*, III, 105. Apparently Lord de St. Pierre had a company of equal size, Brit. Mus., Sloane MSS. 4601, f. 134.

[4] Rymer, IX, 433; *Cal. London Letter Books*, I, 175; P.R.O., Chanc. Enroll. 266 (Close Rolls 4 Henry V), m. 5d°. Proclamation was made Feb. 6. There is record of quite a number of indentures made early in February, Brit. Mus., Sloane MSS. 4600, f. 283v°; 4601, f. 32, 134; P.R.O., Ex. Accts. 48/11, 49/15.

[5] Feb. 15, 1417, P.R.O., Issue Roll 629, m. 10; *Cal. London Letter Books*, I, 174.

[6] Mar. 17, 1417, messengers sent out, P.R.O., Issue Roll 629, m. 10.

[7] P.R.O., Ex. Accts. 49/12. Suffolk claims to have had at Southampton by May 1, 1417, 5 knights, each with 24 horses, 24 squires, each with 6 horses, and 90 archers, each with 4 horses, i.e. 120 men and 624 horses, armed and victualled.

[8] May 10, 1417, letter giving directions for assessing a loan to pay the wages of "notre gens de notre dit Retinue pour le dit second quartier au

ready been paid two quarters' wages by the treasurer of war at the time of their indenture.[9] Others received the second installment at the beginning of the second quarter,[10] while still others, as in the Agincourt campaign,[11] received royal jewels as security.[12] Some new indentures were also made in May, the captains mustering at the end of the month.[13] These were followed by orders that all gentlemen who held land from the king or enjoyed pensions should appear at Southampton by June 22, provisioned for three months, on pain of forfeiture. On their arrival they were to receive their first quarter's pay.[14] Meanwhile the previously indented forces had been summoned by proclamation of June 8, to hasten to Southampton, and the sheriffs were directed to arrest all soldiers and sailors found in their bailiwicks thereafter.[15]

On the same day the muster of the expeditionary force began.[16] Its total fighting strength was some 10,000 men.[17]

temps à eulx assignez, selon notre promesse sique pour defaute du dicte second paiement notre dicte voiage est semblable d'estre retardez et la premiere paiement par nous faite estre perdue, à grand dammage de nous et de tout notre Royaulme que dieu defende,'' Brit. Mus., Cottonian MSS. Cleop. F VI, f. 228 (289 old pagination). Already 5000 marks borrowed from the Londoners had been turned over to the treasurer of war, P.R.O., Issue Roll 629, m. 16.

9 P.R.O., Ex. Accts. 49/12.

10 Sir Thomas Rokeby's account, *ibid.*, 15.

11 Joseph Hunter, *Critical and Historical Tracts:—I. Agincourt* (London, 1850).

12 May 27, 1417, record of jewels turned over to Lord Willoughby; P.R.O., Ex. Accts. 46/33.

13 Brit. Mus., Stowe MSS. 440, f. 41.

14 P.R.O., Chanc. Enroll. 267 (Close Roll 5 Henry V), m. 21d°.

15 *Ibid.*, m. 15d°; *Cal. London Letter Books,* I, 175.

16 *Cal. Pat. Rolls, Henry V,* II, 137.

17 The sources for this figure are (1) the incomplete muster roll, P.R.O., Ex. Accts. 51/2; (2) Titus Livius (pp. 31-3); (3) scattered information from Issue Rolls 629 and 630, Brit. Mus., Sloane MSS. 4601, Stowe MSS. 440, etc., where may sometimes be found notes taken from indentures now lost. Obviously, as Sir James Ramsay (*Lancaster and York, a century of English History* (2 vols., Oxford, 1892), I, 251) points out, Livius derived

The fact that seven more captains, some of whom played conspicuous parts in the conquest, are mentioned in documents of 1417 as being with the king, may mean that their contingents also were present in the army from the start. Their companies are specifically mentioned in the early commissions of array of 1418. It is, however, possible that they recruited companies and enrolled them in the king's service early in 1418 after the successful campaign of the preceding winter. That Titus Livius, who evidently used the indentures, had no record of additional captains other than those named seems probable from the fact that he mentions 87 knights, whom he does not name, besides the dukes, earls, and barons. Now the present list of captains has record of 43 knights who commanded companies and 44 other knights who served in other contingents.[18] The exact figures are 2221 men-at-arms and 7794 archers under 83 captains. These do not include the household troops which in the Agincourt campaign num-

his figures from the indentures. This, however, ought not to make us suspect that the musters differed radically from the indentures when we discover that of the 18 companies where the two can be checked, 10 have more men than the indenture required, only 3 have less, and one has both, i.e. more archers and fewer men-at-arms, and that the surplusage is 23 men-at-arms and 198 archers, while the shortage is only 18 men-at-arms and 37 archers. It seems safe, therefore, to accept Livius' figures for the companies of Clarence (Ramsay erroneously says Gloucester and accordingly adds his total incorrectly), Talbot, and Ferrers of Chartley, the latter also appearing in Sir William Dugdale, *The Baronage of England* (3 vols. London, 1675-6), I, 266. A detailed study of all this material and the facts in the very numerous commissions of array which appear in the Norman Rolls as well as a considerable body of information from numerous muster rolls, indentures, orders to pay, and the like, found in London, Paris, Rouen, and Caen, is in Harvard University Library, HU 90.1215, appendix VII. Here each company and its captain is followed through the entire period under consideration.

[18] It was often customary for the earls, barons, etc., to specify in their indentures how many knights they would have among their men-at-arms. Livius writing from the indentures would have had this information. At the muster, however, 15 more knights appeared in the smaller companies.

bered 152 men,[19] and under Bedford in 1423 were 100 men-at-arms and 300 archers.[20] It should also be recalled that in Harfleur there was a garrison of 184 men-at-arms and 406 archers.[21] An estimate, therefore, of 10,000 fighting men seems reasonable, and its probable correctness is sustained by the sum issued to the treasurer of war for soldiers' wages. Between March 11, 1417, and July 15 this amounted to £81,374 9s 6d,[22] over and above the pay for sailors, artificers, gunners, etc.,[23] to which must be added £364 for the Gascon contingent.[24] Between the time of the first indentures and embarkation there were three quarterly pay days, consequently, had the whole army been under arms for nine months the treasurer would have needed only £91,267 3s 8d.[25] This comparatively small difference is easily explained by the fact that some of the captains did not indent until May instead of in February, that the royal retainers, if indeed they were paid from this fund at all, would have been paid for but one quarter instead of three because they did not muster until June 22, and that certain of the captains who indented in February received only two quarters' pay instead of three.[26] As a last consideration of size it must be recalled that such an army as this would have had some 15,000 horses for the use of the fighting men.[27]

[19] Nicholas Harris Nicolas, *The History of the Battle of Agincourt and the Expedition of Henry the Fifth into France* (London, 1827), pp. 97-101.

[20] Bib. Nat., fr. 4485 p. 147. [21] P.R.O., Ex. Accts. 48/19.

[22] P.R.O., Issue Roll 629, mm. 12-16; 630, mm. 1, 3, 6, 8, 9.

[23] These received £12,343 2s 6d; *ibid.*, mm. 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 10.

[24] P.R.O., Issue Roll 629, m. 5.

[25] Wages in the English army were: dukes, 13s 6d per day; earls, 6s 8d; barons, 4s; knights, 2s; men-at-arms, 1s; archers, 6d; with "regards" of 100 marks a month for every 30 men-at-arms.

[26] Sir Thomas Rokeby was paid for one quarter on Mar. 20 and for another on June 26, and then received nothing from the treasurer of war for a year, P.R.O., Ex. Accts. 49/15. Suffolk was paid for six months in February and not again until July 1418, *ibid.* 49/12.

[27] The roster contained 2 dukes, 6 earls, 13 barons, and 102 knights.

During the period of recruiting and mustering there had been great activity for providing transport. While the king was making the first indentures with his captains in February, 1417, commissioners went out into the southern and eastern counties to commandeer vessels of twenty tons or more with their masters and mariners.[28] At the same time orders to arrest ships went to the local port officials, to the warden of the Cinque Ports, and to the lord high admiral of England.[29] Vessels so seized were released when their masters agreed, on pain of fine[30] or forfeiture,[31] to appear at Southampton when summoned. Like the soldiers the sailors received from the treasurer of war the first installment of their wages.[32] The owners, for their part, were paid 3s 6d per ton per quarter, according to the parliamentary enactment of 1415.[33] In March, efforts to secure shipping were renewed, and all vessels under indenture were ordered immediately to Southampton.[34] Already many Dutch ships had been impressed,[35] and three Venetian and six Genoese cogges forced into English service,[36] despite protests from the Venetian senate.[37] During the three following months indications of

Usually a duke had 50 horses, an earl 24, a baron 16, a man-at-arms 4, and a mounted archer 1, Rymer, IX, 227-33. Suffolk greatly increased these figures, *vide supra,* p. 191, note 7. Probably most of the archers were mounted.

28 Commissions dated Feb. 3, 1417, *Cal. Pat. Rolls, Henry V,* II, 85.

29 Jan. 24-Feb. 6, P.R.O., Chanc. Enroll. 266 (Close Rolls 4 Henry V), mm. 6-7.

30 *Ibid.,* m. 4.

31 P.R.O., Ex. Accts. 48/21, no. 3.

32 A master received 6d a day, a mariner 3d, with 6d a week "regards," a boy 1½d a day, *ibid.,* no. 2.

33 *Ibid.* 48/22; *Cal. Pat. Rolls, Henry V,* II, 115; *Rot. Parl.,* IV, 79.

34 P.R.O., Issue Roll 629, m. 14.

35 P.R.O., Ex. Accts. 48/15, 48/21, 48/22, 48/24, 48/25, 48/28, 48/29, 48/30, 49/3, 49/4, 49/5, 49/8, 49/9.

36 Morosini, II, 128.

37 Rawdon Brown, *Calendar of State Papers and MSS. relating to English affairs existing in the archives and collections of Venice* (7 vols., London, 1864-90), I, 58-9. When Henry later requested certain quantities of

active naval mobilization appear in the record of proclamations that seamen and ships hasten to Southampton,[38] of orders to port officials to send on ships with all speed,[39] and the frequent issuance of considerable sums to the treasurer of war for paying the sailors.[40]

To convoy the expedition, maintain communications, and keep control of the Channel, there were the ships of the "royal navy,"[41] and squadrons specially organized "for safeguarding the sea." The latter consisted of eleven ships manned by 315 men-at-arms and 632 archers under the command of Sir Thomas Carrew, with headquarters at Dartmouth,[42] and another group of ships

cables and cordage for ships which he was building, the senate declined to supply him.

[38] April 5, 1417, P.R.O., Chanc. Enroll. 267 (Close Rolls 5 Henry V), m. 17d°; *Cal. London Letter Books,* I, 171. May 3, payment to messengers carrying proclamations, P.R.O., Issue Roll 630, m. 3; May 11, *Cal. London Letter Books,* I, 175.

[39] May 12, pay for messengers to hasten the ships, P.R.O. Issue Roll 630, m. 4. June 5, orders for all ships held for royal service at Bristol, Plymouth, Dartmouth, Andover, Guildford, and Basingstoke; June 15, same for those at Great Yarmouth arrested by the admiral's lieutenant under commission of May 20; June 22, new orders to the mayor of Bristol to send certain specified vessels, Chanc. Enroll. 267 (Close Rolls 5 Henry V), mm. 14, 17.

[40] Between Feb. 8 and July 15 these amounted to £14,791 8s 1d, P.R.O., Issue Roll 629, mm. 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 16; 630, mm. 1, 3, 6, 8, 9. Most of this seems to have been paid to sailors on ships held in the Thames "sub arresto pro viagio Regis." £255 2s 9d of this was paid in retainer for Dutch ships and sailors.

[41] For record of the 6 "great ships," 8 barges, and 10 balingers see Ellis, *Original Letters,* series 2, I, 68. The account of the *Jesus de la Tour* shows agreement to serve from May 21, 1416 to Feb. 3, 1419, with 200 mariners. On Jan. 28, 1417, wages to the extent of £66 13s 4d were paid, P.R.O., Ex. Accts. 48/26. Feb. 14, £8 6s 8d wages for men on the royal balingers were issued, Issue Roll 629, m. 9. Feb. 27, £340 18s 6d for the same, and £53 6s 8d for the crew of the *Trinitie Rial, ibid.,* m. 11. Mar. 19, £160 for sailors on the *Holigost* and *Trinitie, ibid.,* m. 16. April 29, £113 6s 8d for those on three royal ships, *ibid.,* 630 m. 3. May 3, £50 for those on one royal ship, *ibid.,* m. 3. Total £792 11s 10d.

[42] P.R.O., Ex. Accts. 48/14, no. 4; 48/13; 48/14, no. 1. Indenture was made in January 1417 for six months' service beginning March 1.

manned by 300 men-at-arms and 600 archers under Pons de Castelhon and Sir John Mortemer mustering at Winchelsea.[43] In addition the warden of the Cinque Ports received orders dated March 26, 1417, to be prepared to keep 57 ships at sea in the royal service for forty days with at least 20 men-at-arms (and 40 archers?) in each, at the cost of the Cinque Ports, and to have them at Southampton by May 8.[44]

Of actual naval activity, however, we get only glimpses: the dismissal of the transports at Touques,[45] the dismissal of the Dutch ships at Caen in September, 1417,[46] at the sieges of Rouen and Honfleur bringing food, artillery, etc.,[47] balingers plying between Caen and Harfleur,[48] and the capture by Sir Thomas Carrew of a Spanish ship and five French ones in the harbor at St. Valéry.[49] In 1418 when there was fear of attack by a Castilian fleet new preparations were made in the eastern and western parts of England "to keep the sea," Exeter, lord high admiral, agreeing to maintain 364 men-at-arms and 776 archers in 15 vessels under Sir John Arundell during the spring and summer.[50] At the same time Sir

[43] *Cal. Pat. Rolls, Henry V*, II, 85. These captains received half their wages on indenture; Feb. 8, £2880 3s to Carrew, £1378 13s to Castelhon, £1369 11s to Mortemer, with £378 18s 9d for sailors on four of Carrew's ships, P.R.O., Issue Roll 629, mm. 8-9. The other half was paid when they mustered in early March, also £2500 for the sailors, *ibid.*, m. 11, and on Mar. 19, £440 5s 8d to sailors on four of Castelhon's ships, *ibid.*, m. 16.

[44] P.R.O., Chanc. Enroll. 267 (Close Rolls Henry V), m. 17.

[45] *Vide supra*, pp. 58-59.

[46] Hardy, pp. 320-29. Some of these ships were not paid the full complement of their wages until the next reign, P.R.O., Ex. Accts. 48/21, 48/15, 48/22, 48/27, 49/1, 49/2, 49/7. Some indeed were paid nothing by Henry V after their indenture, *ibid.*, 48/29, 48/30. There are between twenty and thirty unpaid accounts, all Dutch, out of a possible 239. For the presence at Caen of royal balingers see *ibid.*, 49/16, no. 2.

[47] *Ibid.*, no. 1.

[48] *Ibid.* 48/23, 49/6. See also the account of the balinger *Nicholas de la Tour, ibid.* 49/10.

[49] P.R.O., For. Accts. 57 (1 Henry VI), E.

[50] Indenture was made Feb. 14, 1418, when Exeter was paid £1717 12s

Richard Lescrope with 120 men-at-arms and 240 archers in 8 vessels with headquarters at Kingston-on-Hull was guarding the sea towards Scotland.[51] There also appears to have been a third contingent of 60 men-at-arms and 120 archers under John Cole and Thomas Treverak serving at sea towards the south and west in 6 balingers and 2 ships, a force which was used in October 1418 to convoy the archbishop of Canterbury to Normandy.[52] In the following year Hugh Courtenay, earl of Devon, took over the safeguard of the seas, indenting with 380 men-at-arms and 780 archers to serve in 9 vessels from May 1 to August 1, 1419.[53] At the same time Henry's agent in

6d. At the muster on Mar. 3 at Southampton a similar sum was paid. The squadron consisted of 3 carricks, 2 "great ships," 4 barges, and 6 balingers, manned by 3 constables, 3 carpenters, 12 masters, and 896 sailors, to whom was paid £600, P.R.O., Issue Roll 633, mm. 13, 15, 16. On Mar. 30, £2860 was sent from London to pay these sailors, and on May 9 they received £794 13s 1d more, *ibid.* 636, m. 4. Orders to muster Exeter's men appear in *Cal. Pat. Rolls, Henry V,* II, 148, 199.

[51] April 27, orders to collect 4 "great ships" and 4 balingers for this company. April 29, commission of array for this company serving for six months, *Cal. Pat. Rolls, Henry V,* II, 200. May 9, payment of £1110 4s wages of the soldiers and £474 10s wages for sailors, P.R.O., Issue Roll 636, m. 4.

[52] This squadron was manned by 501 mariners and 24 boys to whom £522 11s 1d was paid July 16, 1418, P.R.O., Issue Roll 636, m. 11. Service was from St. James Day (July 25) to Michaelmas. On July 16, Cole and Treverak received £80, P.R.O., Ex. Accts. 49/25, nos. 40, 41. See also *Cal. Pat. Rolls, Henry V,* II, 202, 204. They were paid £150 on Oct. 3, and £141 on Oct. 20, with £58 8s 1d for the sailors, P.R.O., Issue Roll 638, mm. 1, 3, 11. The only evidence that these forces were in addition to those of the previous year is a letter of Oct. 19, 1418, of Henry to William Hankeford and the justices of the king's bench in regard to Pons de Castelhon serving at sea for half a year from Mar. 1 with 150 men-at-arms and 300 archers, in Brit. Mus., Sloane MSS. 4601, f. 289. It is most probable that the year has been wrongly copied. Sir Thomas Carrew was serving in France in June, 1418, Cal. Norm. Rolls, 41.711. Brit. Mus., Stowe MSS. 440, f. 41v° erroneously places in 1418 the naval forces of 1420.

[53] On Mar. 11, he received £1765 8s wages for his soldiers, and £390 for the sailors; on Mar. 14, £343 6s 8d for the sailors; on May 20, £1765 8s for the soldiers, and £979 2s 4d for 4 constables, 4 carpenters, 1103

Aragon wrote that there was opportunity for increasing the English naval forces by securing ten or twelve armed galleys and two great ships then building in that country.[54] Again in 1420 the earl of Devon indented in February to maintain 500 men-at-arms and 1000 archers at sea from April 30 to November 1, making war on all Genoese, Scots, Spaniards, and Dauphinois, but on no others, agreeing to surrender all prisoners of note to the king with reasonable compensation to the captors. On May 5 he mustered his men at Southampton and put to sea in 5 ships and 10 balingers.[55]

In succeeding years there was no need, apparently, for special forces patrolling the narrow seas.[56] Henry was paramount in northern France, Burgundy was his ally, the dauphin, even with Spanish support, unable or unwilling to dispute the control of the Channel, beyond which the English never had the mastery. Outside the Channel there was comparative equality. Neither in 1419

mariners and 50 boys, manning 3 carricks, 8 balingers, and 5 ships, P.R.O., Issue Roll 638, mm. 15, 17; 640, m. 4. On May 1, orders to muster were issued, *Cal. Pat. Rolls, Henry V*, II, 267. The entry of Mar. 11 (*vide supra*) mentions 370 men-at-arms, that of May 20, 380 men-at-arms. The wages paid show the latter figure to be correct.

[54] Ellis, *op. cit.*, I, 72. At Bayonne a great ship was building for Henry, *ibid.*, p. 69.

[55] Feb. 18, 1420, Courtenay was appointed royal lieutenant, *Cal. Pat. Rolls, Henry V*, II, 262. Feb. 29, he received £1095 7s wages for his company of 240 men-at-arms and 480 archers; Lord Botreaux received £606 5s for a company of 130 men-at-arms and 260 archers; Sir Thomas Carrew received £362 5s for 80 men-at-arms and 160 archers; and John Hanley received £222 10s for 50 men-at-arms and 100 archers. In addition £640 was paid out to 4 constables, 4 carpenters, and 118 mariners; and on Mar. 6, £174 16s for ships, P.R.O., Issue Roll 643, mm. 19, 21. For records of muster see P.R.O., Ex. Accts. 48/9, no. 2. May 6, wages were paid on mustering: £1123 10s 8d to Courtenay; £223 10s to Hanley; £599 10s to Botreaux; £370 6d to Carrew; and £968 10s 7d for sailors and ships, P.R.O., Issue Roll 645, mm. 1, 2.

[56] In 1421 Courtenay was serving in France, P.R.O., Ex. Accts. 50/11, no. 15.

nor subsequently could Henry prevent the transport of Scots to France. Indeed, in December, 1420, parliament complained that the Scots were harassing the wool trade by capturing English ships, and petitioned that measures be taken to safeguard the northern seas.[57] And English captains were unable to invade Biscayan waters with impunity.[58] The coasts of England, although not free from alarm, remained unattacked, and only once, in 1421, was there momentary fear along the coast of Upper Normandy.[59]

It only remains to note that the expense for these policing squadrons appears to have been divided between the treasurer of the exchequer and the treasurer of war. It will be observed that, after 1417, although the naval commanders indent for six months' service, the exchequer records show payment for but three.[60] The division of expense appears even more clearly in Sir Thomas Carrew's indenture for 1420, wherein is express stipulation that half his wages be paid in England and half at Harfleur.[61] The reason for this is clear when we find that Sir Thomas was bound to operate on the Norman coast, and was authorized to transport persons from England to Harfleur during the latter part of June.[62] The account of the royal balinger, *Nicholas de la Tour,* also shows a

[57] *Rot. Parl.,* IV, 127.

[58] On Dec. 30, 1419, the English sustained a naval defeat off La Rochelle, de la Roncière in *Rev. des Quest. Hist.,* LXVII, 77.

[59] On May 2, 1421, a priest was brought before the lieutenant of Montivilliers who declared that he knew of a great fleet which was coming to aid the dauphin. Rumor had it that the citizens of Montivilliers were prepared to side with the French if they appeared in the neighborhood, Archives de la Seine Inf., G 5268. On Mar. 2, 1421, Sir William Bardolf had been appointed admiral of a fleet about to sail, and was commissioned to array his men at Dover, *Cal. Pat. Rolls, Henry V,* II, 329. The balinger *Nicholas de la Tour* received £66 4s 6d on Mar. 11, 1421 for serving in this fleet, P.R.O., Ex. Accts. 49/16, no. 1.

[60] *Vide supra,* p. 152.

[61] P.R.O., Ex. Accts. 48/9, no. 2.

[62] P.R.O., For. Accts. 57 (1 Henry VI), Ev°.

series of payments from both the exchequer and the treasurer of war.[63]

For a consideration of the English fighting strength on land there are available for study three classes of records, in addition to the original muster roll which provides a very important foundation. These are (1) the numerous commissions of array which appear in the Norman Rolls, (2) the information about re-enforcements to be found in the Issue Rolls, and (3) the individual indentures, muster rolls, etc., in regard to English captains placed over Norman castles and bailliages.[64] The first of these afford information about the number of contingents only, because the commissions merely name the various captains without indicating the size of their retinues. To attempt to utilize these documents, therefore, it is necessary to assume that each captain maintained his company at its full strength according to his indenture. He was expected to do so, and both Norman and French Rolls are full of safe-conducts and "royal protections" for men of various retinues who were crossing over into Normandy during the war presumably to fill up the gaps. We find proclamation being made in London that all who were willing to go to Rouen or elsewhere in Normandy for the king's service attend the lord mayor who would provide free shipping and victuals.[65] The actual fighting

[63] From the exchequer £715 18s 7d, from the treasurer of war £498 2s 5d, "surplus" paid by the exchequer in Dec. 1423, £141 13s 5d, P.R.O., Ex. Accts. 49/16.

[64] For a detailed study and tabulation of all the information gathered from these sources and arranged under the names of the individual captains and garrisons see Harvard University Library, HU 90.1215, appendices VII and VIII, pages 199, 210.

[65] Riley, p. 665. At another time the sheriff of London proclaimed that all soldiers in London who were going to France must start at once on pain of imprisonment, P.R.O., Chanc. Enroll. 268 (Close Rolls 6 Henry V), m. 20d°. The order is dated May 3, 1418, so this may refer to the spring re-enforcements. In connection with the protection granted to men going

with its attendant losses was very insignificant. Caen was the only place stormed, the others were merely blockaded. There were no real battles, only skirmishes. Sickness may have taken its toll, but there is no mention of serious losses from this cause until the campaign of 1421. Lack of documents prevents any extensive verification of the companies under individual captains. Suffolk, in his account, shows that he kept his ranks full from May 1, 1417, until December 4, 1418, and that up to April 12, 1419, he had been short but one knight out of a total of thirty lances. During the next quarter when Pontorson, of which he was captain, was captured by the French, his retinue lost three more knights and seven archers,[66] but the total wages paid him during the fiscal year 1419-20 would indicate that he had again brought his company up to the required strength.[67] Sir Thomas Rokeby's account makes it clear that in November, 1420, he still had a company of 3 men-at-arms and 9 archers according to his indenture of February, 1417.[68] For the companies of Sir Richard Arundell, Lord Bergavenny, Lord Bourchier, Menauton de St. Marie, John Styward, and Sir Reginald West the documents still exist to show that the full strength was maintained during the early years of the conquest.[69]

to join retinues in France we find revocations for failure to go, *Cal. Pat. Rolls, Henry VI,* I, 195.

[66] P.R.O., Ex. Accts. 48/11. The figures given correspond correctly with the wages paid.

[67] Alington records payment of 11,671 l. t. 6s 3d, which is equivalent to £1750 13s 11d. This is a year's wages for more than 30 men-at-arms and 90 archers, the size of Suffolk's original company, but the excess is explainable by the fact that some of the men-at-arms were knights, P.R.O., Ex. Accts. 187/14, f. 16v°.

[68] *Ibid.* 49/15. The quarterly payments made July 10 and Nov. 13, 1420, are the same as those of Mar. 20 and June 26, 1417.

[69] Sir Richard Arundell, P.R.O., Ex. Accts. 51/2, m. 41; Cal. Norm. Rolls, 41.711, 715, 717, 718, 719; 42.318; Williams, *Gesta,* p. 144, note 3; Cal. Norm. Rolls, 42.322, 324, 326.

Lord Bergavenny, P.R.O., Ex. Accts. 51/2, m. 5; Cal. Norm. Rolls, 41.713,

This makes it seem reasonably safe to draw conclusions as to conditions in 1418 from documents of 1420 in respect to numbers. If, for instance, we find Sir John Cheyne had a retinue of 6 men-at-arms and 18 archers in 1419, and that his company mustered regularly during the preceding year, may we not assume that his strength then was twenty-four men? In other instances the only method for estimating the size of a retinue is from the sums paid as wages by the Norman treasurer-general. This will apply to garrisons and baillis' retinues only, and not to all of them.[70] The results thus obtained are probably considerably below the actual figures because they are necessarily based upon the assumption that the captain or bailli was in service under the Norman administration during the entire period of the treasurer-general's account, whereas, in all probability, he was serving with the field army during part of the time, and was consequently in the pay of the treasurer of war.[71]

718, 719; 42.322, 326; Rôles de Bréquigny 671; Bib. Nat., fr. nouv. acq. 1482, no. 3.

Lord Bourchier, P.R.O., Ex. Accts. 51/2, mm. 22-3; 187/14, f. 19r°; Cal. Norm. Rolls, 41.713, 715.

Menauton de St. Marie, *Proceedings*, III, 105; Cal. Norm. Rolls, 41.711; P.R.O., Ex. Accts. 187/14, f. 19v°.

John Styward, Brit. Mus., Sloane MSS. 4601, f. 134; Cal. Fr. Rolls, 44.590; Cal. Norm. Rolls, 41.711, 715, 717-9; 42.314, 322, 324, 326; Rôles de Bréquigny 174.

Sir Reginald West, P.R.O., Ex. Accts. 51/2, m. 44; Cal. Norm. Rolls 41.682, 714; Rôles de Bréquigny 699.

[70] Alington's first account (P.R.O., Ex. Accts. 187/14) makes no mention of anything paid to Sir Walter Beauchamp as bailli of Rouen although he had been appointed to that office on Jan. 1, 1419 (Rôles de Bréquigny 1215). It is notable also that Sir Walter was not serving with the field army during the period covered by the account as far as the commissions of array show; see under his name in Harvard University Library, HU 90.1215, appendix VII.

[71] During 1419-20, Humfreyville, as captain of Caen, received from Alington 9272 l. t. 2s 6d, P.R.O., Ex. Accts. 187/14, f. 18v°. This would have been a year's wages for 25 men-at-arms and 75 archers. This may have

That army, as has been shown,[72] consisted of 2221 men-at-arms and 7794 archers when it landed in Normandy, contingents of unknown size being ignored. The commissions of array for the following year mention forty-four new captains. Of these some were re-enforcements raised by the English government in the ordinary fashion. Early in February, 1418, the government made indentures for a year's service with certain nobles;[73] on March 14 it issued commissions of array;[74] and in April proclaimed that all soldiers hasten to Southampton to embark.[75] An incursion of Scots is said to have delayed sailing[76] but by the middle of May this force was in Normandy.[77] It consisted of 500 men-at-arms and 1500 archers under the duke of Exeter.[78] At the same time Sir John Savage with

been the strength of the Caen garrison at that time, but we cannot but suspect that it was larger when we find that in 1423 and 1424 the muster rolls show a force greater by 30%. At Rouen, Exeter agreed to keep 100 men-at-arms and 300 archers, but the wages paid during the following year would have sufficed for only 40 men-at-arms and 120 archers, *ibid.*, f. 16r°. At Evreux, Sir Gilbert Halsale indented 30 men-at-arms and 90 archers, but the payments by Alington would suffice for only 22 men-at-arms and 66 archers, *ibid.*, f. 19r°. The constant ratio of one man-at-arms to three archers makes computation of fighting strength from wages paid a much safer and easier matter than it would otherwise be.

[72] Harvard University Library, HU 90.1215, appendix VII; *vide supra*, pp. 192-3.

[73] See order on the treasurer of England, Rymer, IX, 545.

[74] *Cal. Pat. Rolls, Henry V*, II, 201.

[75] Riley, p. 664; *Cal. London Letter Books*, I, 195.

[76] Elmham, pp. 163-4.

[77] May 16, 1418, Exeter, its commander, received commission to subdue Evreux, Cal. Norm. Rolls, 41.710.

[78] These were divided into five companies: Exeter with 5 bannerets, 18 knights, 236 men-at-arms and 780 archers; the earl of Mortain with 1 knight, 39 men-at-arms and 120 archers; Clarence with 1 baron, 5 knights, 53 men-at-arms and 180 archers; Fitzhugh with 2 knights, 77 men-at-arms and 240 archers; Humfreyville with 2 knights, 58 men-at-arms and 180 archers. On Mar. 3, 1418, this force received £7103 9s wages for the first quarter, Devon Issues, p. 354. At the same time the sailors on the transports received £843 10s, P.R.O., Issue Roll 633, m. 16. On May 9, £61 3s 8d to pay the sailors, and on June 1, £8089 10s 5d for the soldiers, was issued

60 men-at-arms and 180 archers went to re-enforce Calais,[79] and 200 horse- with 300 foot-men were later brought over from Ireland.[80] Of the other new contingents mentioned in the Norman Rolls the size of seven is known at subsequent dates,[81] and totals 100 men-at-arms and 300 archers. On the other hand there disappear from the rolls the names of four captains whose companies numbered 26 men-at-arms and 92 archers.[82] Altogether we may estimate an increase of 774 men-at-arms and 2008 archers, without considering the captains, about whose retinues we know nothing beyond their existence. It is quite possible that these new companies were formed by men who had come over to Normandy under some other captain, and who, when their year was completed, allured by the king's success, set up their own standards and entered the royal service, instead of re-enlisting with their former leader. They could organize retinues from the men of dead captains (such as Sir Brian Stapleton), or from recruits summoned from England on their own account.[83] Taking the year as a whole, it would appear

to the treasurer of war, *ibid.* 636, mm. 4, 7. This pay for the second quarter would normally have been paid at the muster. The fact that it was issued to the treasurer of war instead of paid directly to the captains, as in March, indicates that this force was already in Normandy.

[79] These mustered at Dover May 8, 1418, where they were paid £1025 5s 5d, P.R.O., Ex. Accts. 49/21, 49/23.

[80] July 1, 1418, £91 17s issued to bring them to England, Devon Issues, p. 356; Oct. 17, £100 for shipping them across to Normandy and for victuals, P.R.O., Issue Roll 638, m. 3. Oct. 27, commission to take ships for their passage to France with 54 horses, the expenses being charged to the Irish leader, *Cal. Pat. Rolls, Henry V*, II, 202.

[81] See Harvard University Library, HU 90.1215, appendix VII, under Assheton, Baskerville, Cheyne, Lenthale, Montgomery, Robessart, and Rothelane.

[82] See *ibid.* under Bourghop, Gray of Ingleby, Stapleton, and Van Clux.

[83] Many of the captains whose names first appear in the musters of 1418 played prominent parts in the conquest, see *ibid.*, Sir Robert Babthorpe, Nicholas Merbury, Sir Thomas Rempston, Richard Walkstede, and Sir Richard Woodville.

that the strength of the English army in Normandy was well over 13,000 men.[84]

In 1419, the problem of recruiting became more serious. Henry wrote from Rouen that he could not finish the war without more men. He called upon all gentlemen throughout England to come to his assistance, assuring them of his peculiar favor, and ordering the names of those who were willing to respond and those who were not to be sent to him. Bayonne and Bordeaux were appealed to for cross-bowmen but returned discouraging replies.[85] The privy council sent out blank letters under the privy seal to agents appointed to raise recruits, indicating the number of men expected from each district. To these the commissioners in Norfolk replied that "trewly what for Povertee and certeines Infirmitees of Many of hem, we can note gete on[e] that wol [of] his gode will go, ffor a Resonable Cause is, these persones of this Shire that moost able ben, ar over in Service with Our said Sovereyn Lord. So that finally, to certifie zow, We can nat se that the Kyng may be Servid of any Mon her in this Contre, as hit is desirid, the which is to us grete Hevynesse and disease."[86] This shortage of men is reflected in the other sources. No record of re-enforcements appears in the Issue Rolls. The commissions of array show only eighteen new captains, of whom only one, Sir Gilbert Halsale, had a company of known size. Five others, however, became leaders of some prominence.[87] The names of thirty-four

[84]

Original force	10,015
Re-enforcements (minus estimated losses)	2,782
Garrison at Harfleur	705
Total	13,502

Harvard University Library, HU 90.1215, appendices VII and VIII *passim.*

[85] Goodwin, pp. 214-5, citing Brit. Mus., Cottonian MSS. Caligula D 5.

[86] *Proceedings,* II, 246-7 (Brit. Mus., Sloane MSS. 4602, f. 154).

[87] These were Sir Robert Brent, Sir John Clifton, Lord Fitzwalter, Sir

captains cease to appear on the Norman Rolls, and of these fifteen had had companies which numbered 216 men-at-arms and 634 archers. One of the latter, however, and four others received Norman fiefs, so that it is very possible that they were establishing themselves in their new possessions, or were even serving the king as vassals instead of as hired captains.[88] One other, Sir Ralph Cromwell, with 31 men was probably in garrison at Bec-Hellouin of which place he had been appointed captain.[89] The garrison at Harfleur continued to dwindle, being but 311 men in March 1419 and 221 men in November. Nevertheless, supposing always that each captain kept his retinue complete, our records show that Henry still had some 12,000 men at his disposal.[90]

By the spring of 1420, it became possible to dispatch a new contingent under Bedford across the Channel. Recruiting began in January,[91] and steps were taken the next month to assemble transports at Southampton;[92] the captains received their first payment early in March;[93] during April the troops mustered at Southampton,[94] re-

John Kygheley, and Sir Henry Noon; Harvard University Library, HU 90.1215, appendix VII.

88 *Ibid.*, Sir Thomas Bowet, Sir John Holland, John Mortymer, Sir Robert Shotisbroke, and Sir Richard Stafford.

89 *Ibid.*, Sir Ralph Cromwell.

90

Original force	10,015
Re-enforcements of 1418 (minus losses)	2,083
Garrison at Harfleur	221
Total	12,319

91 On Jan. 9, 1420, Bedford was commissioned to treat with Mereduth at Owen to serve the king in Normandy, *Cal. Pat. Rolls, Henry V*, II, 254.

92 Feb. 24-9, orders to take all ships from Thames mouth, 20 ships from the Norfolk and Suffolk ports, and all ships along the south coast from Bristol to Southampton, *ibid.*, p. 275; P.R.O., Issue Roll 643, m. 20.

93 Mar. 6, £4094 9s 9d issued to 28 captains for 294 men-at-arms and 885 archers, *ibid.*, mm. 20, 22.

94 The muster roll of one company is dated April 5, P.R.O., Ex. Accts.

ceived the second installment of their wages on May 6,[95] and landed at Harfleur before the end of the same month[96] nearly 1300 strong.[97] In addition to the thirty-one captains who accompanied Bedford, twelve new names appear in contemporary documents as captains serving with the king. Two of these had retinues of eighty and ninety-three men respectively.[98] Others who had heretofore been participating in the war now appear for the first time with their own companies.[99] On the side of losses we find seventeen captains no longer mustered. Four of these had retinues totalling 541 men.[100] Two others had

49/36, no. 2. April 13, commissions of array to muster forces between April 18-30 were issued, *Cal. Pat. Rolls, Henry V,* II, 319.

[95] £4626 9s 11d for 31 companies numbering 324 men-at-arms and 992 archers, with 24 miners; £735 8s 7d for transport, P.R.O., Issue Roll 645, m. 2.

[96] May 1, the transports were summoned to Southampton, *Cal. Pat. Rolls, Henry V,* II, 319. On June 6, the lieutenant of Harfleur wrote a letter to the king mentioning Bedford's recent landing, Ellis, *op. cit.,* p. 85. The editor erroneously dates this 1421.

[97] A muster roll of 282 men-at-arms and 993 archers of this force, dated May 6, 1420, is in P.R.O., Ex. Accts. 49/36. Late in June payment was made for 50 men-at-arms and 100 archers going to Normandy with the captive duke of Bourbon, Devon Issues, p. 363. It is also notable that on July 7, £3016 15s 8d "wages of war" was issued, and on Sept. 16, £3200 wages for troops with £180 7s 11d for sailors, P.R.O., Issue Roll 645, mm. 12, 14. The juxtaposition in the latter instance suggests a contingent about to set sail. The £3200 would be one quarter's pay for about 230 men-at-arms and 690 archers. Had these sums been intended to pay soldiers already in France they would have been issued to the treasurer of war. In the muster of December, 1420, in addition to the captains who accompanied Bedford in May, there is mention of those lately joined to Bedford's company, Cal. Norm. Rolls, 42.393. Probably, therefore, the re-enforcements of this year should be estimated at about 2200 men.

[98] Harvard University Library, HU 90.1215, appendix VII, George and John Nessefield.

[99] *Ibid.,* Sir Ralph Boteller, Sir William Bowes, Sir John Fastolf. Boteller had 20 men-at-arms and 60 archers. Fastolf had 9 men-at-arms and 17 archers in the army of 1421. See "Table of the Expedition of 1421," Harvard University Library, HU 90.1215, appendix IX.

[100] Sir Richard Arundell, Northumberland, Nicholas Pecche, Lord de St. Pierre, Harvard University Library, HU 90.1215, appendix VII.

been enfeoffed and may have taken their places in the ranks of the Anglo-Norman feudatories. Probably the total strength continued to be in the neighborhood of 13,000 men at least.[101]

To this army of "regulars" Henry could add the feudal levies of the duchy, and his intent to avail himself of these appears in his earliest enfeoffments. Special reservations in regard to the duty of performing local military service are most frequent in these, especially those made in February and March, 1418. It may be that the reason for specifying that the Englishmen who were receiving certain Norman fiefs should be prepared to assemble with their retainers, in case of need, for the defense of Bayeux, Caen, Falaise, Vire, St. Lô, or Coutances, was to prevent dispute at later times over Norman custom about which the new vassal would probably be ignorant.[102] After these early grants had established the precedent, the proviso could be dropped. Another possible explanation is that Henry, fearing for his new conquests, felt constrained to make special arrangements for their defense at a time when he was contemplating operations in another direction. In addition to rallying for the defense of some nearby town, some grants especially enjoined the main-

101

Field army in 1419	11,986
Re-enforcements (minus losses)	1,704
Total	13,690

If we admit the presence of the July-September contingent discussed in note 97 the English forces would be more than 14,500 men. The Harfleur garrison no longer represents a separate entity, Lord Grey of Heton having been sent from the field with his men to garrison the place and be captain.

102 Hardy, pp. 246-7, 250, 252-3, 257-8, 261-6, 271, 276-7, 279, 282, 315; Rôles de Bréquigny 74, 80, 121. There is one grant of this sort for February, 1419, made to a Norman who had sworn allegiance, *ibid.*, 289. Like many of the above, it is for a fief near Caen and makes it seem possible that there were certain fiefs to which this proviso was regularly attached, although this is the only instance of its appearance after April, 1418.

tenance of a garrison in the castle granted and the defense of the surrounding country against hostile incursions.[103] That Henry also had in mind the customary military service due him as "duke of Normandy" appears from his carefully reserving his rights in this respect when granting Orbec, Auge, Pontauton, and Pontaudemer to Clarence,[104] and from the provisos which occasionally appear in other documents.[105] Nor did he delay to make immediate use of this prerogative, summoning the feudatories to arms when the campaign of 1418 opened,[106] and repeating the summons the following year.[107] What the strength and reliability of these levies was can only be surmised. Henry granted some 500 fiefs to his supporters during the conquest, and where minute investigation has been made it has been found that the majority of the petty Norman nobility submitted.[108] Consequently it

[103] Hardy, p. 255; Rôles de Bréquigny 79, 88, 132, 176.

[104] Feb. 27, 1418. "Reservatis nobis—serviciis que gentes de ecclesia, barones, milites, nobiles, proceres et alii de terris praedictis nobis in exercitu nostro juxta consuetudinem—facere debent," Hardy, p. 318.

[105] Mar. 7, 1418, in a grant near Vire, "proviso semper quod idem Petrus et heredes sui—ad equitandum nobiscum—in guerris nostris infra ducatum—ad custus suos proprios quociens in hac parte fuerint praemuniti prompti sint et parati," Hardy, p. 268. June 1, 1418, in a grant in Perche, "proviso semper quod idem Willelmus et heredes sui ad deserviendum nobis et nostris in guerris nostris Francie ad custus suos prompti sint et parati," Rôles de Bréquigny 189. See also a grant in the Cotentin of April 1, 1419, *ibid.* 349. The reason for these rare provisos does not appear. Possibly these fiefs had obtained from the French kings exemptions which Henry was now abolishing.

[106] Mar. 16, 1418, orders from the king to the bailli of Caen to proclaim that "tous nobles, gentelez, feuffiez normans demourants et enheritiers—qui sont venuz a notre grace et jurez noz hommes lieges et subggez—armez, montez, et appareilliez pour le fait de guerre," are to muster at Caen by April 12: bailli's orders to the vicomte of Caen issued Apr. 2, Bib. Nat., fr. 26042, no. 5259.

[107] Feb. 26, 1419, Bib. Nat., fr. 26042, no. 5365; April 24, *ibid.*, no. 5356; Cal. Norm. Rolls, 42.317; Rôles de Bréquigny 617.

[108] Frederic Fontaine de Resbecq, "Les Rapports du Gouvernement

seems safe to assume that a very considerable part of the feudal strength of Normandy was available. How large a force could be mustered it is practically impossible to say. About 5000 Norman gentry are named in the Norman Rolls as having been maintained in possession of their lands and goods after swearing allegiance to the conqueror, but to suppose that an equal number of fighting men could be secured in the duchy by proclaiming the ban and arrière-ban is more than questionable. It has also proved impossible to arrive at any definite conclusion by consulting the record of the feudal contingents from Normandy serving in the army of 1242[109] because they do not represent the kind of a levy which Henry made in Normandy and because it is evident that Henry did not adhere to established custom in regard to military service, at least from the most important Norman fiefs, a fact which would subject to serious doubt conclusions based solely on conditions under the French kings existing more than a century previous to the period under consideration. But aside from numbers or reliability it was better policy to have the Normans in the royal camp than remaining idly at home brooding over their conquered state and free to plot "treason."[110] Of more importance from the military point of view were the clauses in some

Anglais et de la Noblesse Normande dans la Vicomté de Valognes pendant l'occupation (1418-1450)" (*Mémoires de la Société Archéologique, Artistique, Littéraire et Scientifique de l'arrondissement de Valognes,* IX, 16-42, Valognes, 1912).

[109] *Recueil des Historiens des Gaules et de la France* (24 vols. Paris, 1869-1904), XXIII, 726.

[110] The Normans certainly were utilized. Sir Jean Carbonell helped negotiate the surrender of Evreux, Rôles de Bréquigny 216. The nobles of the Cotentin helped to recapture Avranches, *ibid.* 617. Sir Guy le Bouteller occupied Beaumont-le-Vicomte for the king in 1420, *ibid.* 763. Two Normans helped arrange the surrender of Melun, Nov. 17, 1420, Cal. Norm. Rolls, 42.381. Certain Normans deserted Bedford on the eve of Verneuil, Jehan de Waurin, *Recueil des cronicques et anchiennes istories de la Grant*

enfeoffments specifying that the grantee maintain a company of certain strength with the king for the duration of the war. By the end of 1421 these contingents numbered nearly 400 men.[111]

Consideration of the problem which confronted Henry,

Bretaigne, a present nomme Engleterre (William Hardy editor, 5 vols., Rolls Series, London, 1864-91), III, 120.

[111] The fiefs in regard to which specifications of this sort were made are, the "hereditates" of Henri Desquay, Hambye and Briquebec (Hardy, pp. 247, 319), Tancarville, Aumâle and Pleville, Eschaufou, Montgomery, Bonnetable (*Histoire d'Harcourt, Preuves,* IV, 1473-4, 1439-40, 1258; III, 339, 761), Creully and Courseulles and Villers-Bocage, Beaumesnil, Harcourt, Hommet, Bec-Crespin, Cany, Acquigny, St. Sauveur-le-Vicomte, La Haye-Pesnel and Lingèvre, Boni and Blaru and Villeneuf, Eu, Condé-sur-Noireau, La Roche-Tesson, Orglandes and Desmouville and La Rogue, Bleville, and the lands granted to Thomas Hatfeld (Rôles de Bréquigny 176, 182, 205, 253, 262, 275, 304, 340, 341, 449, 608, 620, 755, 759, 916, 555, 1044), and Yvetot (A. Beaucousin, *Histoire de la principauté d'Yvetot,* Rouen, 1884, p. 84). Of the above Tancarville and Eschaufou grants are published in the Rôles de Bréquigny (280, 395) without any mention of their military obligations. The documents are not published in the *Histoire d'Harcourt,* merely summarized, so it cannot be ascertained whether this military levy was stipulated in the grant or written on the margin. This discrepancy naturally raises the suspicion that other of the Norman grants may have had military obligations not recorded by Bréquigny. The omission of the grant of Aumâle from the Norman Rolls increases the suspicion of the incompleteness of our record.

It is noticeable that the ratio of men-at-arms to archers is almost always one to two instead of the normal one of one to three. The reason does not appear. Why these fiefs were singled out for this service and not others is equally obscure. That the value of the fief had something to do with it appears in the case of Thomas Hadfeld (1421, Oct. 16) upon whom a military burden was placed because the fief granted to him in May, 1419 (Rôles de Bréquigny 555), as worth 400 écus per annum, was found to be worth 1600 écus (*ibid.* 1044). These obligations are evidently innovations without any relation to the duties owed by the Norman nobles for the same fiefs under the French rule. This appears from comparison with records for Normandy under the Capetian kings, *Recueil des Historiens des Gaules et de la France,* XXIII, 605-783. In addition to specifying both knights and archers in no apparent ratio to the knight service due under the French régime, Henry exacts service "for the duration of the war" instead of merely for so many days a year.

namely the occupation of a conquered country, necessitates some attempt to ascertain what proportion of his men were detailed for garrison service, where they would be occupied with the duty of maintaining order and guarding against hostile incursions. Appointments to captaincies over captured strongholds punctuate the whole chronology of the war and may be assumed to mark the establishment of at least temporary garrisons. Probably these forces were not entirely withdrawn from active participation in the major operations by the appointment of their leaders to local commands.[112] To take

[112] Where comparison is possible the wages paid by the treasurer-general, who paid for garrison service, are often insufficient for the force indented. For instance, on Nov. 2, 1419, Bergavenny indented as captain of Gisors with 60 men-at-arms and 180 archers (Bib. Nat., fr. nouv. acq. 1482, no. 3). Alington's account for the year May 1, 1419-April 30, 1420, records payment to him of only 4473 l. t. 2s 11d (P.R.O., Ex. Accts. 187/14, f. 17r°), which would be three months' pay for only 49 men-at-arms and 147 archers. Again Lord Grey made indenture as captain of Argentan with 24 men-at-arms and 72 archers (Bib. Nat., fr. nouv. acq. 1482, no. 8), but received from Alington in the above mentioned year 4917 l. t. 13s 4d (P.R.O., Ex. Accts. 187/14, f. 19r°), a year's wages for but half that force. Simon Fleet's account for Harfleur (*ibid.*, 48/7) vividly illustrates the very considerable forces which were absent from garrison duty during the year. There is an order of 1419 to the captains and baillis to send to the king all men not needed for defense (Oct. 10; Cal. Norm. Rolls, 42.328). In both 1421 and 1422 the captains were commanded to send their men to the army for active campaigning (Aug. 13, 1421; Aug. 9, 1422; *ibid.*, 431, 452). The utilization of garrisons in the field is still more graphically shown by Surreau's account (Bib. Nat., fr. 4485) which specifies in great detail the contingents drawn from the Norman fortresses for the operations of 1423-24. Another instance appears in a letter of Bedford of Oct. 21, 1423, explaining that the Rouen garrison had been ordered to the siege of Le Crotoy and that while withdrawn from Rouen the men were no longer to be paid by the receveur-general, but ordering that official to pay them for the month previous to their departure, Brit. Mus., Add. Ch. 6819. If, however, a Norman official, after having been paid to take the field, failed to do so, the money was credited to the receveur-general as garrison wages (case of Sir William Breton, bailli of Caen, Bib. Nat., fr. 26046, nos. 151, 153). In 1424 we find the treasurer-general refusing to pay Sir William

a specific year, 1418, we find that of the total force in Normandy (assumed to be 13,421 men irrespective of unknown quantities), at least 2089 men were assigned to garrison service.[113] In addition there are 23 strongholds of importance,[114] whose captains are mentioned in the Norman Rolls. Of these nine[115] have explicit records of a later date (between 1418 and 1424), the minimum of which would indicate 104 men-at-arms and 312 archers. Still further, there are 55 lesser places whose captains are mentioned in the rolls of which 19 were enfeoffed during the year, thereby releasing the royal garrison. If we assume a minimum average garrison of 3 men-at-arms and 9 archers,[116] these 60 unenfeoffed places would indicate a force of 720 men. The total number in garrison service for 1418 then reaches over 3000, a figure which

Breton full wages because, when appointed bailli of Caen and captain of Bayeux on Sept. 29, 1423, he failed for some time to muster his men at Caen and Bayeux and remained at Mantes and Rouen instead. Bedford had to give special orders that he be paid (Bib. Nat., fr. 26047, no. 203). When a special levy was made on Normandy for a particular expedition in defence of the duchy, then the garrisons in the field were paid by the Norman officials. Surreau's account illustrates this in several instances.

[113] 168 men-at-arms and 753 archers are known to have been so assigned, while 267 men-at-arms and 801 archers have a probability amounting almost to certainty. A detailed study of all the Norman castles, their captains, and the number of men in garrison, is in Harvard University Library, HU 90.1215, appendix VIII.

[114] *Bec, Beaumont-le-Vicomte, Bellême, *Bonsmoulins, Condé-sur-Noireau, *Coutances, *Domfront, *Exmes, *Fresnay-le-Vicomte, Laigle, La Motte, Lisieux, *Louviers, Mortagne, Nouan, *Pont de l'Arche, Rugles, St. Aignan, St. James de Beuvron, St. Remy du Plain, St. Sauveur-le-Vicomte, Sillé-le-Guillaume, and *Touques, *ibid.*

[115] Starred in the preceding note.

[116] In the explicit records only one stronghold, Pont d'Ouve, has a garrison of less than 3 men-at-arms and 9 archers, and it was scarcely more than an outpost of the Carentan garrison. Many of these sixty places, it will be observed, were important frontier posts where we would expect garrisons of some strength. The figures given, therefore, assume the appearance of an irreducible minimum, *ibid.*

must be regarded as a minimum.[117] For 1419, when the English strength was only 12,207, the numbers assigned for garrison duty were larger, due probably to the occupation of Upper Normandy and to the fact that so much of the year was employed in negotiations, rising to at least some 4000 men.[118] The wages paid by Alington during his first year of office would have supported less than 400 men-at-arms and 1200 archers (including the baillis' retinues) actually serving the Norman government.[119] His account mentions garrisons only at Alençon, Argentan, Arques, Avranches, Caen, Carentan, Cherbourg, Conches, Coutances, Dieppe, Domfront, Essay, Evreux, Exmes, Falaise, Gisors, Harfleur, Honfleur, Regneville, Rouen, St. Lô, Valognes, Verneuil, and Vire; with baillis over (Alençon), Caen, Caux (Cotentin), and Evreux.[120] Probably this means that the lesser places were retained under the jurisdiction of the treasurer of war, because the Norman revenues did not suffice for the support of

[117] Summary for 1418:

Ascertained	168 men-at-arms	753 archers
Highly probable	267	801
Possible (9 castles)	104	312
Assumed (60 castles)	180	540
Total	719	2406

[118] Summary for 1419:

Ascertained	595 men-at-arms	1757 archers
Highly probable	120	365
Possible (10 castles)	122	366
Assumed (74 castles)	222	666
Total	1059	3154

[119] P.R.O., Ex. Accts. 187/14, f. 20v°.

[120] The names in parentheses are those of bailliages where the captain of the chief town was also bailli but where Alington makes no allusion to the latter office. He makes no mention whatever of a bailli over Rouen, although Sir Walter Beauchamp had been appointed in January 1419, Rôles de Bréquigny 1215.

all the garrisons. For the year 1420 the numbers for the preceding year fall off but little.[121]

It is at the beginning of 1421 that a survey of the English garrisons really becomes significant as showing how they undertook to hold the conquered province. Henry had concluded the treaty of Troyes, which seemed to accomplish the objects for which he was warring. With Burgundy his ally and the dauphin quiescent he could return to England leaving Clarence in charge on the continent. The military problem was one of occupation, defense, and the maintenance of order, to solve which a force of about 4000 men was deemed sufficient. To meet the expense of this army Henry had procured from the Norman estates a grant of 400,000 l. t.[122]

The method whereby this problem of occupation was solved calls for a study of the manner in which the English distributed themselves over the country. The great Cherbourg-Caen-Evreux road formed the back-bone of Lower Normandy, and along this the royal garrisons were stationed at the most important points: Sir Walter Hungerford with 120 men at Cherbourg; Thomas Bourgh with 36 men at Valognes; William Rothelane with 8 men guarded the passage of the Vire at Pont d'Ouve, with the garrison of Carentan, under the command of the bailli of Cotentin (headquarters at Coutances) nearby, controlling the junction of the roads from Coutances and St. Lô with the great highway.[123] There was probably a garrison of

[121] Summary for 1420:

Ascertained	684 men-at-arms	1904 archers
Highly probable	12	26
Possible (12 castles)	110	330
Assumed (74 castles)	222	666
Total	1028	2926

[122] *Vide supra*, p. 174.

[123] The strength of the Carentan garrison is not known for 1421. Sir John Assheton, the captain, was also captain of Coutances and bailli of

twenty at Neuilly l'Evêque and at Bayeux were 36 men under Sir John Popham, who also in his capacity of bailli of Caen had a second retinue of 80 men. At Caen, where Sir Gilbert Humfreyville was captain, the size of the garrison is not known. Sir Gilbert had brought about 340 men across the Channel in 1417-18,[124] but probably maintained no such force at Caen. In 1419-20, he received pay in his capacity of captain for about 100 men.[125] After Baugé, Alington could rally there a force of 53 men-at-arms and 109 archers.[126] Under Bedford, the garrison was apparently supposed to be 30 men-at-arms and 90 archers.[127] In addition there were also present at Caen the men attached to the chief administrative officers, the treasurer-general,[128] the chancellor,[129] and the seneschal,[130] who may have totalled 160. Farther eastward Lisieux, covering the passage of the Touques, also formed a link in the chain of little strongholds which followed the line

Cotentin. The sums paid him in 1419-20 would have sufficed for only 18 men-at-arms and 54 archers in all, P.R.O., For. Accts. 61, D. In 1423 there were 32 men at Carentan, and 40 at Coutances (before Sept. 29, 1423). The men at Carentan also served as the bailli's retinue, Bib. Nat., fr. 4485, p. 187; Harvard University Library, HU 90.1215, appendix VIII.

124 *Ibid.*, appendix VII.

125 P.R.O., Ex. Accts. 187/14, f. 18v°.

126 P.R.O., For. Accts. 61, C°.

127 Arch. Nat., K 62, no. 7⁴; Brit. Mus., Add. Ch. 93; Bib. Nat., fr. 25767, no. 67; 26047, no. 234.

128 In 1419, Alington maintained a retinue of 6 men-at-arms and 18 archers (P.R.O., Ex. Accts. 187/14, f. 20v°), which had been increased to 8 men-at-arms and 24 archers by 1422 (*ibid.* 188/7, f. 22v°).

129 There is no evidence that Philip Morgan, appointed April 8, 1418 (Cal. Norm. Rolls, 41.710), maintained a retinue, but when Sir John Popham became chancellor, Sept. 29, 1422, he agreed to maintain 12 men-at-arms and 36 archers, Bib. Nat., fr. 26044, no. 5759.

130 Sir Richard Woodville, who succeeded Sir Hugh Luterell as seneschal on Jan. 8, 1420, mustered 20 men-at-arms and 60 archers; P.R.O., Ex. Accts. 49/37, nos. 2, 3, 5.

Consultation of the maps following pp. 308 and 322 will be useful in connection with this discussion.

of that river. These, beginning at Gacé near the source and ending with Touques and Deauville at the mouth, formed a north and south line of communication and defense in a region lacking places of first class importance, and served to overawe the Pays d'Auge. A similar line of castles marked the line of the Risle, differing from that of the Touques in its alternation of feudal and royal castles. What force of men these represent can only be guessed in the absence of figures for all but Touques (24 men), Bernay (20 men), and Bec-Hellouin (40 men).[131] Finally at Evreux came the juncture with the Rouen-Chartres road which led southward into hostile territory, while the great road itself, crossing the Eure, linked Normandy with the English on the middle-Seine and about Paris. At this exposed and important position was a force of 120 men under Sir Gilbert Halsale, bailli and captain, with 40 more to the north at Louviers and 32 to the southwest at Conches, not to mention those at Ivry who served as an outpost towards the French at Dreux. Taken altogether, we may safely reckon more than a thousand men stationed along this central line of over 160 miles.

To the south lay the main frontier, facing the enemy and threatened by him at both ends and in the center. In the extreme southwest, at Avranches and Pontorson, was Suffolk and 120 men with the feudal forces of the Cotentin behind him, plus the bailli and perhaps 40 men at Coutances and 24 of Hungerford's men at Regneville. Possibly 300 men could be mustered for the defense of this region. To the east lay Domfront, a stronghold manned by 160 men under Sir John Montgomery. Northward, but

[131] If we assume the minimum average of 12 men (*vide supra*, note 116) for Deauville, Faugernon, Lisieux, Courtonne, Chambrois, Courcy, Gacé, Laigle, Rugles, Beaumesnil, Beaumont-le-Roger, la Rivière de Thibouville, and Harcourt, there would be some 260 men along the two rivers.

probably not in direct, easy communication with either Avranches or Domfront, was young Lord Fitzwalter[132] with 80 men at Vire. The intervening region about Mortain appears to have been exposed and insecure.[133] The other half of the southern frontier had for its nucleus five strongholds all under Salisbury's command, Exmes, Essay, Alençon, Bonsmoulins, and Verneuil, representing a strength of 480 men. This force could, of course, be supplemented by the bailli of Alençon with 40 men, by 96 men under Lord Grey at Argentan,[134] and, if necessary, by the 120 men at Falaise. In addition there was a buffer group of enfeoffed castles supported by a second line of royal strongholds south of Alençon toward Le Mans. Sir Robert Brent seems to have been a petty lord of the marches at the beginning of 1421, having been enfeoffed with Assé-le-Riboul, Ballon, and Sillé-le-Guillaume, and being captain of Fresnay-le-Vicomte. These places absorbed the shock of border warfare such as we get glimpses of in the tales of Ambrose de Loré and the losses and recoveries of Beaumont and Fresnay. Evidently the English were dominant in this region in January, 1421. Between Alençon and Verneuil lay only the feudalized fortresses of Clinchamp and Longny, unless there remained a royal garrison at Mortagne, of which there is no mention after 1418. With Verneuil the frontier ends "in the air," blocked from direct communication with Paris or control of the Avre-Eure valley by the hostile castle at Dreux, although in touch with Evreux via Dam-

[132] In January, 1421, he was only eighteen, Dugdale, I, 223.

[133] *Vide supra,* p. 97. Alington was able to make collections in this region in 1419 and 1422 (P.R.O., Ex. Accts. 187/14, f. 6r°: 188/7, f. 15v°), but Surreau for 1423-24 reports nothing collected, Bib. Nat., fr. 4485, pp. 36, 82, 96, 122.

[134] Probably the muster of 131 men at Argentan on May 21, 1421, represents a re-enforced garrison as a result of Baugé, Bib. Nat., fr. 25766, no. 800.

ville. Considering both royal and feudal forces together there may have been 1400 men along this southern border.

In the north the defenses again group themselves into two roughly parallel lines, that of the Seine and that of the northern frontier, both converging on Paris. The peculiar situation here lay in the facts that the northern frontier was much less exposed to attack, and that the English connection between Paris and Normandy was by means of a narrow strip of territory along the river which had to be strongly held. Henry could not attempt to spread English garrisons over northern France as he had over Normandy, but he knew the political necessity of clinging to Paris and of keeping sure hold on the connections between that city and his Norman territory. At the west end of the Seine line, Honfleur and Harfleur controlled the river mouth, representing, with Montivilliers, some 240 men. Eastward the line followed the old Roman road through Lillebonne, enfeoffed to Exeter, with Tancarville, enfeoffed to Grey, a little south, thence through Caudebec and Rouen to Pont de l'Arche. These last three strongholds, re-enforced by the baillis of Caux and Rouen, probably mustered over 400 men. South of the Seine, the line continued to follow the river through Gaillon, Vernon, and Mantes to Meulan and the other outposts of Paris guarding the river-crossings. It is notable that enfeoffments in this region are to powerful and reliable leaders. La Roche Guyon, held by the renegade Sir Guy Bouteller, was balanced by Château-Gaillard. Baudemont and Dangu along the course of the lower Epte were in the hands of two prominent English captains, Hungerford and Woodville, while Croisy, the connecting link between Evreux and Mantes, belonged to the king's uncle Exeter, who also held the captaincies of Rouen and Conches and occupied Paris during Henry's

absence in England as second in command to Clarence.[135] The royal garrisons in this "sector" numbered 200 men, and taking the line as whole, royal and feudal, we may assume a strength of 900.

The northern frontier apparently had for its basis the Paris-Pontoise-Gisors-Neufchâtel-Dieppe road. The conquest in that direction had not yet gone beyond the Bresle but any line of defense which followed the line of that river would have had to be based on the Paris-Beaumont-Beauvais-Eu road. Henry contemplated this at one time, apparently, and had already designated Warwick as captain of Beauvais,[136] but never carried out the plan. The line as established was shorter than that on the southern frontier and communication along it was simpler. Consequently it could be held with half the men, despite the necessity for large garrisons near Paris. At Dieppe there were 36 men; at Arques and Torcy 64. Bellencombre on the upper Arques was garrisoned but we do not know in what strength. Neufchâtel, guarding the line of approach from the northeast toward Rouen, had 40 men, while Gournay had 24. Behind this part of the line were a few feudal castles held by Englishmen, controlling the roads to Harfleur and Rouen. Another more considerable group lay northward between the Bethune and the Bresle, performing a frontier service similar to that of the castles along the Sarthe south of Alençon,[137] and like them stiffened by royal garrisons. The latter consisted of the triangle Eu, Monceaux, and Guillemcourt, places which were usually under the same commander.[138] These garrisons probably mustered be-

[135] Rôles de Bréquigny 1372.

[136] Feb. 2, 1419, Cal. Norm. Rolls, 41.730.

[137] Sir Philip Leche, at one time captain of Arques and lord of Pontranquart, appears in the chroniclers as the leading figure of the partisan warfare in this region.

[138] This was so, certainly, in 1421-1422, when Sir Ralph Bouteller was

tween 40 and 80 men.[139] The most strongly held part of the line began at Gisors. This place, being an important road center, had 80 men under Sir Richard Woodville's nominal command, with 16 additional men at Chaumont, and a retinue of 36 with the bailli of Gisors. Étrépagny (8 men) and Bouconvillers formed links with Rouen and Pontoise. The latter stronghold was as heavily garrisoned as Rouen itself, having 240 men under the earl marshal, while a garrison of 80 men held the next important crossing up the Oise at Beaumont. All told there were probably 700 men along this northern border.

Of the discipline in the English armies of this period a fairly definite idea may be formed from the ordinances for regulating army life which are extant. The earliest is one issued by Richard II, in 1386.[140] Henry V issued similar regulations at the opening of both his Norman campaigns,[141] but those of his day which still exist were issued at Mantes, perhaps in 1419.[142] To these can be added a set of rules for the castle garrison at Rouen,[143] and numerous special orders treating of discipline. Additional information of early fifteenth century practices can be obtained by studying the regulations for the Anglo-Burgundian army issued just before Cravant,[144] and those made by Talbot during one of his later campaigns.[145]

The chief authorities for maintaining order were the earl marshal and the constable of England. The latter

captain, receiving wages sufficient for a retinue of 20 men-at-arms and 60 archers, P.R.O., For. Accts. 61, D.

[139] Pierrecourt was under the bailli of Caux, at least under the régime of Sir Roger Fenys (alias Fieules), Cal. Norm. Rolls 41.707; Rôles de Bréquigny 792.

[140] Published in Nicolas, *The Battle of Agincourt*, pp. 107-112.

[141] Chaplain, p. 15; Livius, p. 33.

[142] Samuel Bentley, *Excerpta historica or, Illustrations of English history* (London, 1833), pp. 30-40.

[143] Rôles de Bréquigny 653.

[144] Monstrelet, IV, 159-60.

[145] Bentley, pp. 40-43.

office was held by the duke of Clarence and was strengthened by a special commission authorizing him to punish all who broke the army regulations.[146] All men were enjoined to obey these two and the king on pain of forfeiting body and goods.[147] They alone had power to issue safe-conducts.[148] They supervised the selection and assignment of "lodging" for the troops, receiving from the individual captains notice of the men selected as "harbergers." The military court established to try offenses and hear grievances was under their direction, and into their custody went the horses and harness of condemned offenders until the latter could pay their fines or find surety.[149] Obedience to their duly commissioned subordinates was rigorously enforced, violent resistance to arrest being punishable by death if a royal officer was hurt,[150] while attempting to resist the execution of a military sentence made the offender liable to the same punishment.[151]

In certain instances at least, when smaller expeditions went off from the host, the commander was specially empowered to make army ordinances and to enforce discipline.[152] Under these leaders there appear to have been "chefteynes" of the three "batailles" i.e. the van,

146 Aug. 1, 1417, Hardy, p. 316. In the allied force of 1423, two marshals were appointed, a Burgundian and an English, Monstrelet, IV, 159.

147 Bentley, p. 30; Nicolas, p. 107.

148 Bentley, p. 35; Nicolas, p. 111. Specially granted in other instances, Hardy, pp. 167, 171.

149 For mention of a court-martial held by Sir Ralph Cromwell, lieutenant for the duke of Clarence, and Sir Percival Lyndeleye, lieutenant for the earl marshal, see Hardy, pp. 265-6. An idea of when the court was organized may be obtained from the fact that on Aug. 20, 1417, Walter Intebergh was made royal attorney "in curia nostra militari," *ibid.*, p. 200.

150 Bentley, p. 39.

151 *Ibid.*, p. 37.

152 This was the case with Huntingdon when he invaded the Cotentin (March 17, 1418, Hardy, p. 381), and with Salisbury when he set out against the Seine towns (Jan. 23, 1419, Cal. Norm. Rolls, 41.708), and with Huntingdon again when ordered to co-operate with the Burgundians

main body and rear,[153] and "chefteynes of the warde" (a medieval "officer of the day" or "officer of the guard") who, with royal license, could grant permission for "rodes." It was probably these who established the watch, and every man must keep the watch with the men-at-arms, and archers assigned to him, for the time set, on pain of death.[154]

For the rest the individual captains received copies of the regulations, with instructions to read them to their men.[155] The latter, in addition to obeying the higher officers, were to obey their captains in keeping watch, in foraging, and in doing "all that longeth a souldeour to doon." Offenders against their captain's authority, "after the warde of the courte," must come to agreement with him in regard to compensation or punishment before the marshal would return their horses and harness.[156] In garrisons, naturally enough, the captain's authority became more extensive. All men were to be obedient to him "yn tyme of nede." He or his deputies and none other governed "the serche of the wache and warde," having "al maner reule and governance, as weele be day as be nyght, of the walles, gates, issues, and dyches of the castel and citee." He was to have "cognicion and determinacion" of all bargains among his soldiers, to be judge in all disputes, and to suppress all disturbances in the garrison, being specially directed to have a prison "to punyssh al meffaisons of whom he hath knowlache of."[157]

For the most part these ordinances are concerned with

against Roye (Dec. 26, 1419, Rôles de Bréquigny 706). In the last instance he was to proclaim that none of his company take any goods or cattle against the will of the owners, except victuals for man and beast, and then only reasonably and with moderation.

[153] Bentley, p. 40; Nicolas, p. 109. Chronicles of the Agincourt campaign give the impression that these were appointed just before the battle.

[154] Bentley, p. 33; Nicolas, p. 111.

[155] Bentley, p. 39.

[156] Bentley, p. 31; Nicolas, p. 108.

[157] Rôles de Bréquigny 653.

eliminating unauthorized activity on the part of the men, for preventing disorder in the army, and for protecting the country from violence and pillage. All men must remain in their places under their captains' pennons unless detailed as "harbergers,"[158] and no matter what tidings came or what outcry arose, they were not to leave their places in "the bataille" without permission.[159] In case of sudden attack, all men were to assemble about the king or about their captains, unless the attack be upon their immediate position.[160] None could ride to the fore or rear without orders,[161] or go foraging "before them that shall appoynte the lodgeyngs," on pain of losing horse and harness if a man-at-arms, or an ear if an archer or varlet.[162] Men were not to take lodging other than that assigned, nor to leave the latter except by orders from competent officers,[163] and every captain was to have watch kept within his lodging both day and night.[164] In order further to ensure control of the men through the captains, it was forbidden for any man to remain with the force unless his captain and company were a part thereof,[165] and individuals were likewise prohibited, on pain of death, to raise a banner for forming a new company and departing on some other expedition. All wore the cross of St. George on their arms as an identification mark.[166] Companies must muster whenever required and captains were not to have at their musters men who did not belong to their company,[167] neither could they try to entice men from other captains' service to their own.[168] Inasmuch as the responsibility for maintaining companies at full

158 Bentley, p. 30; Nicolas, p. 107.
159 Bentley, p. 40; Nicolas, p. 109.
160 Bentley, p. 36.
161 Monstrelet, IV, 160.
162 Nicolas, p. 112.
163 Bentley, p. 31; Nicolas, pp. 107, 112.
164 Bentley, p. 39.
165 *Ibid.*, p. 40.
166 *Ibid.*, p. 34; Nicolas, p. 110.
167 Bentley, p. 33.
168 Bentley, p. 35; Nicolas, p. 111.

strength fell upon individual captains, the necessity for this regulation is patent. In the interests of order men were forbidden to keep women. Anyone finding a harlot about the camp could take all her money, drive her from the army, and break her arm.[169] For preserving health, captains were directed to compel their men "to berye ther careyn and bowelles abowte ther lodginges and within earth, that no stynch be in ther lodginges."[170]

Measures were likewise taken to prevent unauthorized military activity. Raids could be undertaken only with leave from the "chefteyn of the ward," which he could give only with royal license.[171] Assaults and attacks without the presence of a "man of astate" were forbidden, and any attack must be broken off immediately on orders from the king, constable, or marshal.[172] Strongholds which had been demolished were not to be rebuilt or strengthened without orders, nor were the people to be compelled to make repairs or keep watch, except according to local custom.[173] Without special leave none was to burn,[174] on pain of death, nor to destroy vines, vineyards, and fruit-trees.[175] Foraging was regulated in the interests of the whole army and of the country. Any man finding provisions in excess of his needs should save the superabundance for others. In the subjugated country foragers were not to take wheat for their horses. If they requisitioned cattle, they must be reasonable, neither taking nor killing great oxen or milch cows, but small beasts only, for which they had come to agreement with the owner. If a soldier had taken cattle as booty, he was

169 Bentley, p. 43.

170 *Ibid.*, p. 41.

171 *Ibid.*, p. 39; Nicolas, p. 109.

172 Bentley, p. 34.

173 *Ibid.*, pp. 37-8.

174 *Ibid.*, p. 39. Jouvenel des Ursins, p. 561, reports Henry as saying that "la guerre sans feu ne voloit rien, non plus que andouilles sans moustarde."

175 Bentley, p. 41.

forbidden to drive it away but must keep it with the army, realizing his gains by selling meat to his comrades.[176]

Henry aimed to restrain, as far as possible, the violence which naturally attends upon war, with a view, doubtless, to making his rule acceptable to the conquered by favorable contrast with his opponents' misrule and weakness. Special prohibition against sacrilege headed the army regulations and was enforced;[177] death was threatened to those who attacked women and unarmed ecclesiastics; and particular effort was made to protect women in child-bed.[178] None was to take goods or provisions from places under royal protection except with the owner's consent.[179] Royal safe-conducts must be respected on pain of death, and it was prohibited to capture or rob Normans who could show their "bullettes" of allegiance.[180] The country entered into obedience was not to be pillaged, nor the inhabitants forced to provide beasts, wagons, or tools against their will.[181] Under Bedford a captain, in order to get credit for the gains of war due the king, had to certify "qu'il n'a eu aucune apatis, durant le dit temps, pris vins ne autres provisions sur le pays ont il n'ait fait faire satisfacion et paiement pour ycy."[182] Anyone who took plunder "within the grounde appatised," or who bought the same was punishable by death, and to prevent secret transactions all booty must be brought to the common market and there proclaimed for sale on pain of arrest and fine.[183] In addition it was necessary to publish prohibitions against thievery in the army itself. Soldiers must not rob each other's lodgings of booty, victuals, or "other lyvelode," nor despoil victuallers and merchants coming to the army, on very

176 Bentley, pp. 39, 41.
177 Elmham, pp. 318-9; Bentley, p. 30.
178 *Ibid.*, p. 37; Nicolas, p. 107.
179 Bentley, p. 42.
180 *Ibid.*, p. 41.
181 Bentley, pp. 36, 38.
182 Bib. Nat., fr. 4485, p. 134.
183 Bentley, pp. 40-1.

severe punishment, and there was reward for informers against these offenses.[184]

There were precautions taken against disturbances and seditious outbreaks which attempted to nip contentions in the bud. The king hoped to accomplish this by prohibiting disputes about arms, prisoners, lodging, and the like, by forbidding general gatherings of the men to consider grievances, and by decreeing that disagreements and complaints be brought for settlement before the constable and marshal. Old feuds were not to be debated, and seditious or tumultuous outcries, such as the rallying cry of some great family, or "havoc," or "to horse," were prohibited on pain of death or fine, with 100 shillings reward to the informer. Neither were soldiers to reproach each other with belonging to a certain nation, Welsh, Irish, French, etc., lest a brawl result. Offenders could be put to death "for ther noys making."[185]

The greatest possibility for contention, however, lay in the question of prisoners. These represented the most profitable gains of war, and offered the greatest inducement to soldiers to engage in battle. The king's interest demanded rules which would assure the men the enjoyment of their winnings, and, at the same time, get from them as much fighting as possible. A compromise must be made between the soldiers' desire to capture and secure a "generous" enemy, and the king's to win a battle and to keep the peace in his own army. In dangerous situations it might be ordered that no man make prisoners until the field be clearly won.[186] More generally, however, there were rules in regard to rights to a prisoner who had

[184] *Ibid.*, pp. 31, 38; Nicolas, p. 108.

[185] Bentley, pp. 31-2, 38; Nicolas, pp. 108-9. The Cravant proclamation carefully reminds the men that the English and Burgundians are in accord and friends, Monstrelet, IV, 159.

[186] Monstrelet, IV, 160. The killing of the prisoners during the battle of Agincourt is another instance in point.

surrendered and given his "faith" during the battle, and for preventing disputes over the possession of a prisoner.[187] In order to maintain a reserve without arousing discontent among the men, the soldiers might be formed into groups of five or seven, two or three of whom, as the captain ordered, would abide by the standards while the others fought and took booty and prisoners to be divided equally among all at the end of the day.[188] In the public interest also were the rules that a prisoner be brought promptly to the captain and by him to the king, constable, or marshal, "so that he may be examyned of the newes and conveyance of th'enamyes," and that a prisoner be not allowed to wander about the army "so that he not espie the privetes of the hoste."[189] Norman or British traitors and renegades when taken did not enjoy treatment as ordinary prisoners. It was, instead, required that they be surrendered to the military authorities for punishment, the captor receiving 100 shillings.[190] Further restraint appears in the orders that no man sell or ransom his prisoner without license from his captain, who was entitled to a third of the ransom, and that no prisoners leave the army for their ransoms without safe-conduct, which could be issued only by the king or his deputy.[191]

When in the enemy's presence there were certain additional rules about reconnaissance, "bon guet, et ascoutes."[192] Horsemen had to dismount and fight on foot, leaving their horses half a league in the rear. This move was an essential feature of English "tactics," and its incorporation in the orders issued before Cravant, with the threat of death to those who disobeyed, and confiscation of any horse found nearer than the prescribed distance, was probably for the benefit of the Burgundians,

187 Bentley, pp. 31, 33; Nicolas, pp. 109, 111.
188 Bentley, p. 43.
189 Bentley, pp. 34-5; Nicolas, p. 110.
190 Bentley, p. 38.
191 *Ibid.*, p. 36; Nicolas, p. 110.
192 Monstrelet, IV, 159; Waurin, III, 101.

for whom this would be novelty.[193] Archers must provide themselves with stakes eleven feet long and sharpened at both ends, and the captains were responsible for their yeomen complying with this requirement.[194] This also was an English peculiarity. It first appeared at Agincourt where the use of stakes proved fairly successful. In it we may observe the earliest combination of a defensive weapon and a shooting weapon in the hands of one man, a combination which does not again appear until the introduction of the bayonet in the mid-seventeenth century. Each man, archer, merchant, or man-at-arms, was furthermore required to make a thirteen foot fagot for use in filling the ditches at a siege, while every seven gentlemen had to provide a ladder, and every two yeomen a pavise.[195] These last are found in Talbot's regulations and may be innovations of his, but even so they are a logical development from Henry's orders about the archers' stakes.

How successful were the attempts to maintain strict discipline and prevent outrages cannot be definitely said. The repetition of orders for restraining the soldiers bears witness to the king's zeal, and at the same time implies that his efforts were not completely successful. When active operations closed in 1419, there came a series of orders upon the conduct of garrisons. That it would be more difficult to restrain small groups scattered over the entire duchy is obvious. The soldiers without an enemy to attack would have considerable time hanging heavy on their hands. They no longer had royal supervision over their foraging, an activity in which lay most danger and opportunity for oppressing the country folk. The garrisons were small groups set among a people recently hostile, whom they probably despised individually

[193] Monstrelet, IV, 159-60.
[194] *Ibid.*; Bentley, p. 42.
[195] Bentley, p. 42.

and feared collectively. That irritating clashes and instances of petty tyranny should occur was only to be expected. That the central English power was constantly on the alert to restrain the soldiers and protect the people cannot be questioned. How efficiently its orders were executed does not appear.

As early as December 8, 1418, the vicomtes were ordered to proclaim that all who had suffered injury from the English garrisons appear before the vicomtal court to obtain redress.[196] In the following April, however, the king had to write to the baillis enjoining proclamation that no soldiers, men-at-arms, or any officials whatsoever, in castles, towns, or garrisons, take any provisions, money, or silver from the king's subjects, neither horses, animals, wagons, nor grain, without paying for it promptly and in good money.[197] Later in the year it was found necessary to insist that all men in garrisons abide within the castle,[198] to draw up a code for regulating garrisons,[199] and to forbid English soldiers to remain in a castle or town unless they had been detailed for duty therein.[200]

For a year conditions apparently were tolerable inasmuch as the next general order of this sort does not come until January 24, 1421, and it attacks new abuses. Gatewardens were forbidden to levy unauthorized tolls on pain of repaying six-fold, and twice as much for a second offense with a month's imprisonment besides. Passports must not be sold. Men who took animals without the owner's consent, a consent which must be testified to

196 Cal. Norm. Rolls, 41.720.

197 April 10, 1419, Cal. Norm. Rolls, 42.313. Letter of the bailli of Caux to the vicomte of Neufchâtel and Gournay of April 26 in Bib. Nat., fr. 26042, no. 5345.

198 Aug. 18, 1419, Rôles de Bréquigny 648.

199 Sept. 6, 1419, Rôles de Bréquigny 653.

200 Oct. 10, 1419, *ibid.* 675. This may have been intended as a measure against desertion.

before a royal official, were to be punished as criminals. Garrison commanders, especially those at Pontoise and in the Seine towns, must not confiscate safe-conducts. Men were not to seize cattle or provisions in order to make the owners redeem them or lower their price, but must pay for what they take; nor were they to seize or stop goods against the merchants' will on penalty of double the value.[201] Three months later, however, the king wrote the various captains that he had heard complaint of spoliations and of the levying of exactions in money and food. He again forbade these things and enjoined the captains to keep watch by day and night, not to permit the soldiers to keep women, and to aid the royal officials.[202] To make these orders effective Sir John Radeclyff went out on a tour of inspection to report on the conduct of captains and garrisons.[203] Even then the orders of January had to be repeated in December.[204]

On Henry's death complaints multiplied. Whether this was due to increased insubordination among the soldiers, following the removal of the king for whom "they had a wonderful reverence, fear, and love,"[205] or whether it was an effort, by early clamor, to secure reforms from the new administration cannot be determined. Six weeks after the king's demise Bedford must needs proclaim that no soldier, English or Norman, despoil the king's lieges.[206] Apparently the difficulty was due, in part at least, to a growing, hostile activity among the people. On October 20, 1422, Bedford again wrote the baillis. Many Normans, it seems, had been arrested and held for ran-

[201] P.R.O., Norman Rolls 15 (8 Henry V, part III), m. 10 d°. (Cal. Norm. Rolls, 42.409).

[202] April 25, 1421, *ibid.* 16 (9 Henry V), m. 33d°.

[203] May 5, 1421, Cal. Norm. Rolls, 42.428.

[204] Dec. 16, 1421, P.R.O., Norman Roll 16 (9 Henry V), m. 15d°.

[205] Elmham, p. 249.

[206] Bib. Nat., fr. 26044, no. 5774.

som by English captains and soldiers for giving aid to brigands. This was contrary to royal ordinance and the baillis were to stop it.[207] The whole situation is described in detail in another letter from the regent, written January 31, 1423. In this Bedford sets forth that despite the fact that the garrisons have been "well and duly" paid, "nevertheless we have recently learned from the great and piteous clamor that within the duchy of Normandy—many who call themselves our officers, baillis, captains, etc., have committed and are committing great wrongs, excesses, and abuses, under color of exercising their offices,—to the prejudice of the public welfare,—such as breaking into churches and carrying off the goods contained therein, seizing and violating women, married and otherwise, cruelly beating the poor people, carrying off their horses and other beasts of burden, and their seed corn, occupying the residences of churchmen, nobles, and others against their will, demanding heavy tolls and quantities of merchandise at city gates which they ought to guard, making levies of food on towns and parishes of obedient subjects, forcing men to perform guard duty at towns and fortresses more than was due and extorting from them huge sums for their default, seizing our poor subjects, beating them, judging them arbitrarily, and confining them in prisons or in their homes, pillaging them of their goods or seizing the same and either paying nothing or else fixing their own price. And furthermore, it is said, that the baillis and captains do not keep the men in their garrisons, as they should, that the baillis, who are oft-times captains also of the places in their bailliages, farm out their clerkships, seals, and lieutenancies to unworthy persons, and abuse the taking of provisions and other things at their own price and pleasure." To investigate and rectify these abuses the duke sent a com-

[207] Bib. Nat., fr. 26044, no. 5782.

mission headed by the president of the parlement of Paris and the seneschal of Normandy into the duchy.[208]

Before considering further the question of English discipline it is necessary to set forth the difficulties of the authorities in coping with the problem of desertion. This presented itself from the very beginning of the war, for on September 29, 1417 Henry wrote to the sheriffs of England that "divers of our lieges, who lately came with us to our kingdom of France—have deserted us in the midst of these our enemies, and, without our license, have, in great multitudes, falsely and traiterously withdrawn and returned to our kingdom of England."[209] As a measure against this, an order was issued forbidding English soldiers and subjects to return to England without royal leave, and ordering captains of ports in Lower Normandy to arrest any who attempted to embark without a passport.[210] In addition certain individual captains in the army received authority to arrest and imprison such men as had quitted their service without leave.[211] When the campaign moved into Upper Normandy, directions were issued to officers at Harfleur, and later to those at Calais, to hang all deserters from the king's army,[212] and Sir Richard Walkstede was detailed to search all vessels in Rouen harbor before their departure.[213] Nevertheless the trouble continued, and the year 1419 is filled with a series of orders to royal officers and custodians of passage in

[208] Chéruel, *op. cit.*, p. j., pp. 86-88.

[209] Hardy, p. 329. In the previous year likewise there had been trouble with deserters, P.R.O., Chanc. Enroll. 266 (Close Rolls 4 Henry V), mm. 13, 15, 16.

[210] May 26, 1418, Cal. Norm. Rolls, 41.712.

[211] June 18, 1418, commission to Sir Hugh Stafford (Lord Bourchier), Cal. Norm. Rolls, 41.714.

[212] Aug. 15, 1418, commission to Sir Hugh Luterell, lieutenant of Harfleur, *ibid.*, 716: Feb. 24, 1419, same to Sir William Bardolf, lieutenant of Calais, *ibid.*, 732.

[213] Oct. 28, 1418, *ibid.*, 718. He had already received authority over all soldiers and sailors at Harfleur, Aug. 22, 1418, *ibid.*, 716.

England,[214] to the admiral of Normandy,[215] to the lieutenants of Norman ports,[216] to baillis,[217] and sheriffs[218] to arrest deserters and men attempting to return to England without passports. Apparently these measures proved temporarily successful, for not until 1421 do similar orders appear. These latter indicate that the royal orders had succeeded in preventing men from returning to England, but that they have not put a stop to desertion. Instead, by confining the deserters to Normandy, they had burdened the country with a disorderly element which was beginning to be troublesome. Again the port authorities were ordered to allow no Englishman to depart from the duchy without leave.[219] In a document of the month of May there is mention of English soldiers "who do not belong to the retinues of any captains of our garrisons" and who were therefore not subject to discipline or control. These the king summoned to Salis-

[214] May 20, 1419, orders to John de la Pole and others to arrest all archers from certain parts of Cheshire and Derby, and all men from the retinues of the king and Sir Philip Leche who have returned to England without leave, Cal. Norm. Rolls, 42.321. June 30, 1419, orders to the custodians at Plymouth, Chichester, Southampton, St. Botho, Melcombe, Sandwich, Dartmouth, Lynn, Bridgewater, Great Yarmouth, Gippewich, Dover, and Bristol to arrest all lieges and subjects of whatever station (merchants excepted), who come over from Normandy, P.R.O., Chanc. Enroll. 269 (Close Rolls 7 Henry V), m. 14.

[215] Aug. 3, 1419, power to arrest all persons crossing to England without leave, Cal. Norm. Rolls, 42.323.

[216] Sept. 30, 1419, orders to the lieutenants at Eu, Dieppe, Harfleur, Honfleur, Caen, Cherbourg, and Regneville, *ibid.*, 328; Oct. 30, similar order to Henry Lounde for the port of Rouen, *ibid.*, 330; Nov. 13, new orders to port officials in England and Normandy to arrest those with passports ante-dating Nov. 1, *ibid.*, 355.

[217] Order to proclaim the new orders of Nov. 13, *ibid.*; Nov. 18, a bailli of Rouen ordered to arrest two deserters from Lord Bourchier's company, *ibid.*, 331.

[218] Nov. 10, 1419, the sheriff of Stafford directed to arrest five of Lord Bourchier's men in England without leave, *ibid.*, 330.

[219] April 3, 1421, Rôles de Bréquigny 982.

bury's army for the opening of a campaign.[220] In the autumn, however, it became necessary to send the bailli of Rouen with a posse to hunt out, arrest, and imprison deserters hiding in the Pays d'Auge,[221] and the real difficulties of the situation appear in a commission of August 24, 1422, empowering the captain of Pont de l'Arche to arrest "certain vagabond English who wander from place to place robbing and inciting the soldiers to desert."[222]

As for our information about English discipline from other sources the statements are of various sorts. English chroniclers were impressed with Henry's punishment of those guilty of breaking his ordinances,[223] and even the French historians who made contemporary records drew striking contrasts between the English and French, not to the credit of the latter.[224] From the rolls and elsewhere we get occasional notices showing rigor in suppressing violence,[225] punishment for the violation of safe-conducts,[226] and execution for desertion.[227] To the Irish commander Henry wrote during the siege of Rouen, complaining that the violations of army regulations by his men were intolerable, and directed him to punish offenders.[228] Finally there is a letter from the lieutenant of Harfleur reporting Bedford's landing in 1420 which records that "he gouverned hym and all zour men in hise

220 Rôles de Bréquigny 995.

221 Oct. 8, 1421, *Ibid.*, 1039.

222 Cal. Norm. Rolls, 42.452.

223 Livius, p. 63; Elmham, pp. 318-9, 288 (the latter declares that Henry made the Burgundians also obey); Walsingham, *Ypodigma*, p. 478.

224 St. Denis, V, 557 (This was in respect of the Agincourt campaign.); *Journal d'un Bourgeois*, p. 83; Monstrelet, IV, 14-5.

225 Hardy, p. 366.

226 *Ibid.*, pp. 265-6.

227 *Ibid.*, p. 364. July 29, 1420, execution of an English traitor at Mantes, Bib. Nat., fr. 26043, no. 5542. For Aug. 10, 1424, there is quittance for 4 l. t. 6s 8d "payer au maistre de la haute justice du Roi nostre Sire, pour avoir traine plusieurs Anglois et les avoir pendu," Archives du Calvados, F Fonds Danquin, Série Falaise; Hunger, *Quelques Actes*, I, 59, no. 37.

228 Dec. 14, 1418, P.R.O., Norman Roll 9 (6 Henry V, part I), m. 5d°.

company in swych wyse, that I have ihad noo complainte of ham eftir hyse partyng.''[229] On the other hand there is evidence of friction between English captains and local authorities, between individual soldiers and Normans. An affray occurred at Evreux, over the right of despoiling the episcopal mansion when the bishop was killed in the Paris massacre of June 1418, which resulted in the imposition of a fine of 20 queues of wine upon the citizens by the English captain.[230] In 1420, the citizens of Mantes complained to Henry of the exactions of the earl of March,[231] and two years later the canons of Rouen informed Bedford that travelling was dangerous because the English soldiers attacked travellers.[232] Arrest of individual Normans sometimes followed from a suspicion, probably not without some general foundation, of ''treasonable'' dealings with the enemy,[233] as well as from soldierly cupidity and violence.[234]

On the whole it seems fairly clear that the continuous efforts to maintain discipline and order did produce results so that the English forces were more orderly and manageable than the French, but that the situation was

229 Ellis, *op. cit.*, I, 86.

230 Pierre Le Brasseur, *Histoire civile et ecclesiastique du Comté d'Evreux* (Paris, 1722), p. 279. This mentions the ''Duc de Lancastre'' as the English leader, but this can so easily have been a misinterpretation of Thomas of Lancaster (duke of Clarence), or a misreading of Exeter (''Excestre'') that the error is not sufficient to vitiate the story. Le Brasseur evidently had before him an agreement between the duke and the citizens dated July 27, 1418, for his account is very explicit, even to naming the ''procureurs et eschevins'' who signed for the town.

231 Grave, p. 319.

232 Fallue, II, 356.

233 Rôles de Bréquigny 1284.

234 Le Cacheux, *Actes de la Chancellerie*, I, 38, 101, 141; Cal. Norm. Rolls, 42.395. To these we may add from *Le Livre de Compte de Thomas du Marest, curé de St. Nicolas de Coutances, 1397-1433* (C. de R. de Beaurepaire, editor, Paris, 1904), p. 146, the account of Thomas' expulsion from his house in Coutances by the English in 1420. He had also suffered at the hands of the French in 1417 (p. 152).

one which provoked and encouraged abuses. The mutual suspicion arising from a state of war, the cupidity of individuals, the difficulty of living peacefully with a hostile population, especially near the frontier, the presence of deserters who tended to become vagabonds and bandits, not to mention the brigands who had infested the country even before the English invasion, all contributed to the development of a friction more likely to increase with time than to diminish, and sure to be exaggerated into atrocities by the conquered people and their sympathizers, contemporary and subsequent.

Evidence of the lawlessness of the French and Burgundian men-at-arms exists in very considerable quantity. The French king had his own difficulties with desertion and its attendant banditry.[235] As for garrisons their unmanageableness everywhere appears. Quite apart from the chroniclers, who exhaust their vocabularies in describing the atrocities committed by the men-at-arms, the local records bear repeated witness to their depradations and exactions. Towns resorted to bribery "pour être exempt de gens de guerre."[236] Those in which garrisons were stationed constantly agitated for their withdrawal. The captains demanded money from the citizens to pay their men. The citizens, while complying and making additional "gifts" to the captain, complained about excesses and sometimes extracted from the latter the promise "qu'il mettra les soudoyers pres de lui loger en chambres ou ilz paieront leur despense prinse en la

[235] For the year 1414, there are documents showing that many of the feudal levies from the Pays d'Auge, having been summoned to join the expedition against Soissons, after receiving their wages, returned home. They were ordered to return by public proclamation on pain of outlawry, and the royal officials were directed to extirpate as bandits those who disobeyed, Arch. Nat., K 58[9]; Brit. Mus., Add. Ch. 6794.

[236] Gift of 100 moutons d'or to the bailli of Vermandois from Noyon, La Fons Melicocq, *Une Cité Picarde*, p. 64, citing the Reg. de l'hotel de ville, f. 15.

ville, ne pilleront, ne yront courre en la benleue.''[237] The men-at-arms constantly broke truces in their efforts to secure ransomable prisoners,[238] or in the conduct of partisan warfare.[239] Burgundian captains levied blackmail upon interurban trade and demanded provisions from the towns,[240] while Armagnacs pillaged and burned the country without restraint,[241] and to an extent that interfered with the collection of taxes.[242] Only for a moment, in 1416, did the constable d'Armagnac succeed in enforcing discipline with vigor,[243] but the succession of reverses which he sustained in the next two years completely undermined his authority by destroying his prestige and by making it impossible for him to pay his soldiers.

Regular pay was the sine qua non of maintaining discipline, for without it the army must live by pillage. The English policy, therefore, centered upon paying the army, providing a sufficient market where the men could buy provisions, and then restraining them from preying upon the Normans whom Henry wished to conciliate. If the king were to remain ''in Normandy amongst hem that obeyen hym, he must paie his soudeours of his hoost as thei shulde be compelled to paie for thaire vitailles in the countre, the whiche must nedes be doon or else, withoute recoverie, Normandy shulde be lost from hym.''[244] This

[237] Delaville Le Roulx (pp. 163-5) describes conditions at Tours in 1417. See also pp. 193-6.

[238] Delaville Le Roulx, pp. 165-9; Luzarche, pp. 28-30.

[239] Senlis, desirous of keeping peace with the Armagnacs in 1420, got into difficulties through its inability to restrain the Burgundian garrison at Baron, Flammermont, p. j., 11.

[240] *Ibid.*, pp. 228, 234.

[241] Douët d'Arcq, *Pièces inédits*, II, 99, 102-113. Bernard d'Auvergne, marching north for the Agincourt campaign, burned the villages where he lodged en route; Baluze, *Histoire Généalogique d'Auvergne*, II, 452.

[242] In 1417 Charles VI had to remit the aide levied on the inhabitants of Trappe, because they had been plundered and made prisoners by the garrison of Dreux, Brit. Mus., Add. Ch. 6786.

[243] *Vide supra*, pp. 27-9.

[244] *Proceedings*, II, 351. The difficulties arising from failure to pay wages are illustrated by conditions in Guienne in 1423, where ''the soldjors

may not have been so necessary in the early stages of the conquest. The men had brought supplies with them from England, and, until the summer of 1418, there is no mention of restraint upon foraging, although there may have been such. Whether or not there was, the wages of the army fell into arrears,[245] a condition, however, which the unbroken series of successes must have tended to alleviate, "for trewly, be youre leve," wrote one captain, "ther the tyme of worchyp for yong men ys now," inasmuch as "all that on syde of Normandy ys Englysch, except Chyrbrow and Huflett."[246] Another from the siege of Cherbourg in the summer of 1418 wrote "that our souverayne kyng, by a (v)yse of his wyse and discreet counsaill, haven ordeyned of the dutchie of Normandie, that after that the commys be sworn and become his lieges, that no maner a souldeor shud tak no maner a vitailles but that he paye therefur, like as the partie mowen accorde; consideryng ye of the long time that we have been her, and of the expensis that we have had at every siege that we have come to, and have had no wages son that we came out of Ingelond, so that we have spent al that ever we had, wherefore—y beschsche you hertly—to send me—£20."[247] This interval during which wages

of the castle of Fronsak are not, as they say, payed their wages to support their lives have none other but by robery and pillage, and break all safe-conducts, French or English, which they daily do, insomuch that the victuals, whereby the city of Burdeux shuld be sustayned, cannot be supplyed and preserved by their friends for fear of those of Fronsak," *Proceedings*, III, 46.

[245] On Jan. 11, 1418, Sir John Pelham wrote from Caen, "y am here withoute wages," Arthur Collins, *The Peerage of England* (5th edition, 8 vols., London, 1779), VIII, 109.

[246] *Ibid.*, a letter of March 19, 1418.

[247] *Ibid.*, p. 106. It may be that the needs of the Norman campaign caused the English government again to let the wages of the Calais garrison fall into arrears, for Sir William Bardolf, the lieutenant, begins to make complaint, Brit. Mus., Sloane MSS. 4601, f. 179 (also f. 233), a copy in Cottonian MSS. Caligula D 5, cited by Goodwin, p. 162. For difficulties of

went unpaid is still further illustrated by the accounts of Suffolk[248] and Sir Thomas Rokeby[249] which show that, after receiving six months' wages in 1417, nothing more was paid them by the treasurer of war until the middle of 1418, and then only one quarter's pay. In considering further the charge that Henry neglected to pay his troops,[250] it should be noted that, as far as his later campaigns are concerned,[251] the evidence which has been preserved, although from several different sources, is, nevertheless, in regard to the same few persons,[252] and for no others. The inference, therefore, cannot lightly be dismissed that had there been others, at least those whose claims were advanced under Henry VI and settled, record thereof would appear in the Foreign Accounts.[253] In 1419

the English in paying the men at Calais see G. A. C. Sandeman, *Calais under English Rule* (Oxford, 1908), pp. 23-5.

248 P.R.O., Ex. Accts. 48/11, 49/12; For. Accts. 60 (4 Henry VI), A.

249 P.R.O., Ex. Accts. 49/15; For. Accts. 57 (1 Henry VI), C.

250 Ramsay, *Lancaster and York*, I, 320.

251 This is taking no considerations for the Agincourt campaign and the arrears connected therewith, which were considerable. Huntingdon's claim for £8157 14s 9d presented to parliament in 1423 (*Rot. Parl.*, IV, 247) does not specify with what period of the war it was connected, and it may very possibly have come from the campaign of 1415.

252 Sir Thomas Rokeby's claim for £164 8s 2d appears in both P.R.O., Ex. Accts. 49/15, where all the various documents are collected, and in For. Accts. 57 (1 Henry VI), C, where there is a summary of the same documents in connection with a series of other expenses, while his complaint is registered in a letter published in *Proceedings*, III, 90 (also in Ellis, *op. cit.*, I, 97). The same coincidence in Ex. Accts. and For. Accts. appears for Suffolk (*vide supra*, note 249), the earl marshal, captain of Pontoise (Ex. Accts. 50/19; For. Accts. 56 (10 Henry V), Ev°); Sir Richard Woodville, seneschal and captain of Gisors (Ex. Accts. 49/37, 49/38; For. Accts. 69 (13 Henry VI), Pv°, m. 1); Sir Robert Harling (Ex. Accts. 50/4; For. Accts. 73 (17 Henry VI), K); Sir John Fastolf, captain of Meulan and St. Antoine (Ex. Accts. 50/5; For. Accts. 74 (18 Henry VI), G); John Feriby, captain of Touques (For. Accts. 74, L), and Sir Humfrey Courtenay (Ex. Accts. 50/16; For. Accts. 73 (17 Henry VI), Ev°). The whole "surplusage" totals only £3638 2s.

253 In *Proceedings*, III, 105, is the plea of Menauton de St. Marie, one

and 1420, Sir Gilbert Halsale, captain of Evreux, was having such difficulties in getting paid[254] that his soldiers were on the point of deserting the city, although the king had issued orders to pay them on March 28, 1420.[255] This trouble, however, was probably due to the fact that attempt was being made to make the citizens of Evreux support the garrison as they had done under the French régime.[256] Whatever the cause of the difficulty, by August 1420 Sir Gilbert had been paid,[257] and this case of exasperating delay is perhaps more typical than those of actual non-payment.

The method of payment was simple. On making a contract (indenture) with the king to serve for a specified period with a company of so many men-at-arms and archers, at a ratio of one to three, a captain received some portion of the "wages and regards" in advance, normally three months' pay. When the company mustered for embarkation a similar sum was paid, so that the army was paid for half a year ahead. In 1417, the treasurer of war did the actual paying with money issued to him for the purpose by the exchequer,[258] but in subsequent years wages paid to the companies forming in England were merely charged to the treasurer of war's account "by the hand of so-and-so."[259] Upon their first two payments and the "gains of war" the soldiers must subsist for nine months, because, according to the original agree-

of the Gascon captains, for payment of 2000 nobles, arrears for three and a half year's service. He was given a lucrative office in lieu of payment.

254 Complaint in 1419 (?) that since Michaelmas he had received neither pay nor provisions, *Cat. anal. de Joursanvault*, p. 321, no. 1786.

255 Order of July 18, 1420, Bib. Nat., fr. nouv. acq. 1482, no. 7.

256 See *Travaux de la Soc. d'Agriculture de l'Eure*, 4th series, VII, 240, note 2, and 241.

257 P.R.O., Ex. Accts. 187/14, f. 19r°.

258 P.R.O., Issue Roll 630, m. 1.

259 See the account of Sir William Philip, treasurer of war, for 1421-2, P.R.O., For. Accts. 69, Fr° ff.

ment, subsequent payments were to be made at the end of each succeeding quarter. By 1422, however, we find that the army in the field was being paid monthly after the expiration of the first quarter, which, as before, was paid in advance.[260] This practice may have been started in 1418, in which year, during the campaign, the companies were mustered every month,[261] and usually a muster was preliminary to a payment of wages. Payment each time was made in accordance with an order from the king to the treasurer of war, recapitulating the terms of each captain's indenture, the rate of wages, the number of men, and the period for which payment was to be made. On the margin of this document the treasurer wrote the sum paid and filed it with the captain's quittance.[262] He continued to receive money from the English exchequer with which to pay the army in the field, but by the end of 1421 the amounts from this source were only about one-fifth of the treasurer's receipts, the remaining 80 per cent or "receipt foraine" being drawn from Normandy or from the profits of war.[263]

With the organization of the conquered territory and the establishment of garrisons, the Norman treasury began to take over the support of the latter. This shift may have been gradual according to the strength of the Norman treasury. The documents for the administration of Tiptoft and Goulaffre are too few to show how much of the financial burden was borne then. Under Alington, although it was his chief duty to collect revenue and disburse the same to garrison captains, as has already been

260 P.R.O., Ex. Accts. 50/14, no. 14.

261 Cal. Norm. Rolls, Henry V, *passim*.

262 P.R.O., Ex. Accts. 50/10, 50/11, 50/12 are monthly files of this sort.

263 Sir William Philip's account shows £11,125 3s 11d from the exchequer and £43,955 2d from the "receipts foraine," P.R.O., For. Accts. 69, F. These sums are equivalent to 74,167 l. t. 12s and 293,033 l. t. 5s, respectively.

remarked, the treasurer's books do not account for all the garrisons.[264] Only under Bedford did the continental exchequers assume the entire burden. As before, the captains contracted to maintain a certain number of men as a garrison or a bailli's retinue for a specified period. For their payment, which was quarterly, the king issued orders to the treasurer-general, who either disbursed the money from the treasury, or ordered the receveurs, vicomtes, or grenetiers to pay the local captains, in money or kind, out of the local receipts, and to render account.

As a preliminary to payment each company was mustered and inspected to see that it was up to strength and properly equipped. With the opening of the campaign in 1418, commissions of array for the mobile army appear almost monthly, the captains reviewing each other's men along with the royal officials.[265] A similar practice existed for the garrisons until the spring of 1420. As early as July, 1419, the office of seneschal of Normandy had been revived[266] and bestowed upon Sir Hugh Luterell, lieutenant of Harfleur.[267] It is possible that this appointment was closely associated with the change in the financial

[264] *Vide supra,* p. 215. Exeter, as captain of Conches, received his first quarter's wages in 1419 from the treasurer of war, P.R.O., Ex. Accts. 187/14, f. 16r°. This was his first payment as captain (he was appointed Mar. 26, 1419; Rôles de Bréquigny 790), and was probably in advance. It is possible that his retinue continued with the army and therefore remained within the treasurer's jurisdiction. There is mention of 300 l. t. paid the garrison of Vire by Tiptoft, P.R.O., Ex. Accts. 187/14, f. 16v°.

[265] Cal. Norm. Rolls, Henry V, *passim.* There had been a general review in January 1418 (Rymer, IX, 542-4) and a partial one in the previous October (Hardy, p. 357). Is this lack of musters connected with the failure to pay wages?

[266] The first mention is in the treaty for the capitulation of Avranches, July 14, 1419 (not 1418, *vide supra,* p. 138, note 278); Rôles de Bréquigny 215.

[267] He is mentioned as seneschal in documents of July 26, 1419 (*ibid.* 640) and April 18, 1420 (Bib. Nat., fr. 26043, no. 5508).

administration which is marked by Alington's appointment as treasurer-general, May 1, 1419.[268]

But the seneschal's duties apparently were to be developed. Not before April, 1420, are there signs that Luterell was acting as military supervisor.[269] In July and August, 1419, it was the treasurer-general who inspected conditions at Caen, Bayeux, and Coutances, and reported the state of the country to Salisbury, the king's lieutenant.[270] At the same time special commissioners went to inspect the garrisons along the Seine and on the eastern frontier.[271] On August 27, 1419, Alington was commissioned to array the garrisons every three or six months,[272] and under this authority he was still acting in November, 1420.[273] The first mention of similar activity on the seneschal's part is in the commission of April 16, 1420, giving Salisbury full power over all castles and cities south of the Seine, with authority to summon the seneschal and treasurer-general, "si necesse fuerit," for supervising the garrisons to see that they were strong enough and sufficiently supplied with provisions and "habillements of war."[274] At the same time, however, it was deemed necessary to issue special commissions to the seneschal, authorizing him to array garrisons in the bailliages of Rouen, Caux, Gisors, Mantes, Vexin-François, and Alençon,[275] and giving him powers of supervision

[268] They are associated in various documents, Rôles de Bréquigny 640, 824.

[269] He is not mentioned in Alington's first account.

[270] P.R.O., Ex. Accts. 187/14, ff. 20v-21r. At this time the seneschal was serving with Salisbury before Avranches, Rôles de Bréquigny 215.

[271] Cal. Norm. Rolls, 42.322. [272] *Ibid.*, 325.

[273] Nov. 22, 1420, Alington to John Brinkely and Richard Hammes, delegating his power to inspect the garrison at Falaise, with orders to report to the chambre des comptes, Archives du Calvados, F Fonds Danquin, Série Falaise. [274] Rôles de Bréquigny 824.

[275] April 15, 1420; Cal. Norm. Rolls, 42.372. Does this mean that he already had authority in Caen, Evreux, and the Cotentin? On April 13, the

over the king's baillis, vicomtes, and other officials.[276] From the commission appointing Sir Richard Woodville seneschal (January 8, 1421) may be learned that by that date this official was expected to supervise all commanders of towns and strongholds in the duchy as to their provisions, munitions, and artillery, to take musters from time to time in order to hold captains to the terms of their indentures, sending a detailed report to the treasurer-general,[277] to make inquiry into the soldiers' conduct, and into the administration of baillis, vicomtes, and other officials.[278] On March 11, 1423, letters of re-appointment were issued to Woodville, consciously copying the seneschalship of the twelfth century with added authority for overseeing garrisons.[279] With this appointment the system of military administration was completed. It remains to be seen how that system functioned, in the years during which the English sought to defend and consolidate their French and Norman conquests before again taking the offensive.

treasurer-general went with the bailli of Caen to inspect two western fortresses, Rôles de Bréquigny 818.

[276] April 17, 1420; Cal. Norm. Rolls, 42.372.

[277] On Sept. 1, 1422, Woodville himself became treasurer-general and held the office until Jan. 16, 1423, Bib. Nat., fr. 26044, no. 5750; Archives du Calvados, F Fonds Danquin, Série Caen.

[278] Rôles de Bréquigny 924. It seems probable that some of the judicial functions of the former master of waters and forests had been added to this office. On the day of his appointment as seneschal, Woodville was appointed to the office "magistri generalis reformatoris omnium aquarum, forestarum, et silvarum nostrarum" in Maine, Cal. Norm. Rolls, 42.398.

[279] Sauvage, "Une Procedure devant la Sénéchaussée de Normandie en 1423," *Mémoires de l'Academie des sciences de Caen*, 1910, pp. 149-51. See also Beaurepaire, "La Sénéchaussée de Normandie," *Precis anal. des trav. de l'Acad. de Rouen*, 1883, pp. 423-46. For the duties of the seneschal in Plantagenet times, see Hardy, pp. 120-1 and F. M. Powicke, *Loss of Normandy* (Manchester, 1913), pp. 70-1.

CHAPTER VI

PROVISIONS AND MATÉRIEL

The relation of subsistence and its attendant problems to military operations and policy is one of such importance that, unsatisfactory as the available evidence is, it is essential that the subject be approached and such information as exists set forth. It is hardly necessary to make investigation into the economic state of the country. Anything approaching exactitude is impossible for want of statistical information, while broad generalizations in regard to the country's misery or prosperity do not apply with sufficient definiteness to specific times and places to be of value. Agriculturally the province was, in normal times, one of the most prosperous in France. It could also supply horses, fish, and the various common beverages of the day. But these were not normal times, and like the other parts of France, Normandy had suffered from war and plague.[1] Nevertheless there is nothing to show that the duchy could not support the invading army with ease, while the numerous licenses to trade issued by the English king[2] give the impression that economic life was by no means at a standstill.

At the initial muster of the invading force, as has already been mentioned, each captain was expected to be

1 See Alfred Coville, *Recherches sur la misère en Normandie au temps de Charles VI* (Caen, 1886), and Charles de Robillard de Beaurepaire, *État des campagnes de la Haute Normandie dans les derniers temps du moyen âge* (Evreux, 1865), pp. 621 ff.

2 Cal. Norm. Rolls and Cal. Fr. Rolls, *passim.*

supplied with provisions for two months. When these were exhausted the captains individually replenished their stock. Inasmuch as our documents are almost exclusively official, only occasionally do we find mention of these private "commissaries."[3] In certain instances the levy of export duties upon supplies shipped from England by such agents would be waived.[4] Most records are concerned with supplies for the royal household. At the same time that the king was making indentures he was also issuing commissions of purveyance to procure bacon for the French expedition,[5] and empowering the lord mayor of London to purchase corn for victualling the ships.[6] After the army had landed on the continent and the first two months were past there appears evidence of

[3] Dec. 17, 1418, mention of a purveyor for Exeter, Cal. Norm. Rolls, 41.720. Sept. 21, 1419, royal protection for Simon Rokelond of London, in Lord Willoughby's service, coming to victual Rouen castle of which Willoughby was captain. Sept. 23, same for Thomas Grange of York, in Sir John Neville's service, coming to victual Verneuil of which Neville was captain, *ibid.*, 797. Feb. 23, 1420, license issued to the captain of Torcy to transport wine from Pontoise for the castle's use, *ibid.*, 42.358. Jan. 26, 1421, license issued to Sir Gilbert Humfreyville, captain of Melun, to buy grain in Caen and Cotentin for the garrison, *ibid.*, 407. Feb. 20, same for Sir John Fastolf, captain of the bastille of St. Antoine at Paris, *ibid.*, 408 (Rôles de Bréquigny 1363). July 23, same to servants of Sir James Audeley to ship grain from Kingston for Sir James's household in Normandy, Cal. Fr. Rolls, 44.630. Nov. 24, 1423, safe-conduct to a Dartmouth merchant going to France to victual certain castles, *ibid.*, 48.227.

[4] *Proceedings*, III, 21, P.R.O., Chanc. Enroll. 268 (Close Roll, 6 Henry V), mm. 3, 20; *ibid.* 269 (Close Roll, 7 Henry V), m. 17; *ibid.* 270 (Close Roll, 8 Henry V), m. 18; *ibid.* 271 (Close Roll, 9 Henry V), mm. 22-3.

[5] Mar. 1, 1417, *Cal. Pat. Rolls, Henry V*, II, 56. One of these commissions is published in Rymer, IX, 437. Indication of purveyance in France appears in record of purchase by the king's butler of 26 pipes of wine for 965 l. t. from Falaise merchants in 1421, Brit. Mus., Add. Ch. 299.

[6] Mar. 3, 1417, *Cal. London Letter Books* I, 172. The activity of these agents was sufficient to secure mention in a local chronicler. "Rex capi et colligi—pluria milia quarteriorum frumenti et parnas baconum plurimas absque numero pro suis victualibus secum ducendis in partes transmarinas," Kingsford in *E.H.R.*, XXIX, 512.

official co-operation with the private purveyors who were transporting food for the army from England. Talbot, as captain-general of the marches west of Caen, received authority to issue safe-conducts to whosoever wished to cross over to England in search of provender;[7] while the king having learned that certain "victualia" of Sir John Fastolf had been stopped by the lieutenant of Harfleur, ordered them sent to the army at once.[8] In England the signs of activity in this direction appear in three commissions for impressing ships to transport divers quarters of beans, peas, and oats, bought in England for the royal household.[9] Probably, as in 1415, the lord mayor was ready to provide shipping for those prepared to go to the army "with corne, brede, mele, or floure, wyne, ale, or biere, fysshe, flesshe, or any viteille, clothe, lynnen, wollene, or eny merchaundise, sheytys, breches, doublettys, hosene, shone, or eny other manere ware of armure, artilrye, or of other stuffe."[10] During the campaign, whenever any Norman castle surrendered Henry expressly stipulated that such provisions as remained should be left behind unhurt by the departing garrison, but what the results from this were does not appear. Probably in places which offered real resistance the supplies remaining after capitulation were negligible. From the beginning of 1418, however, there are indications that civilian enterprise was beginning to respond to the needs of the English army. Royal letters of protection to English, Norman, and Breton merchants, to seek food and drink for the army, safe-conducts for others bringing provisions to the army, and licenses to trade, become numerous throughout 1418, 1419, and 1420.[11] General li-

[7] Oct. 2, 1417, Hardy, p. 171.
[8] *Ibid.*, p. 367.
[9] *Cal. Pat. Rolls, Henry V,* II, 138.
[10] Riley, p. 628.
[11] Hardy, pp. 249, 232, 236-7; Cal. Norm. Rolls, 41.681-2, 687, 690-1, 696, 699, 701-2, 704, 707, 709-11, 716-17, 780, 801, 804-6, 809-10; 42.326, 329-30, 337, 339, 344, 355, 357-9, 362, 364, 382.

censes to trade are most numerous during the latter part of 1419 and during 1420 and indicate a lively trade with Brittany. All of this was probably not connected with the matter of supply, but much of it may well have been, inasmuch as Brittany was a grain exporting region.[12] In one instance an agent even went into Orleans and Blois, the enemy's country, to obtain wine for the king.[13] Particular activity in the provision trade after the fall of Rouen is notable from the numerous documents issued to merchants going and coming with food and drink for the town.[14] Two years later, in 1421, the treasurer of war himself imported 1600 bushels of grain into the March of Meaux, after the siege, for distribution among the poor.[15]

With the organization of a Norman administration the official activity to provide for subsistence becomes more apparent. The earliest mention that soldiers must not seize their provisions from the "loyal" inhabitants is of March 1418[16] but probably this prohibition had been in force from the start. In connection with the siege of Domfront the first "commissary orders" appear. On May 6, 1418, the vicomtes of Falaise and Vire were commanded to have grain brought to Condé-sur-Noireau, there to be baked into bread and sold to the besieging troops. They were likewise directed to proclaim that the weekly market be transferred from Tenchebrai to Domfront, during the siege of the castle.[17] Warwick, it seems, had appointed certain men to direct the victualling of his army, but had

[12] *Ibid.*, 41.791*-2,* 793,* 794,* 796,* 797,* 798,* 800*-1,* 803*-4,* 805,* 808, 809*; 42.330, 332, 333,* 334, 335, 336,* 337,* 338,* 339, 340,* 341-5, 348,* 349,* 350,* 351,* 359, 362*-3,* 364-6,* 368, 369, 373, 376,* 378, 384,* 400,* 402,* 409, 412*-3,* 426,* 432, 434*-5, 441,* 444,* 445,* 450. Asterisks indicate reference to Breton trade. Licenses for Breton trade had been issued in 1417, Hardy, pp. 149, 158, 186-7, 199, 203.

[13] May 4, 1418, Cal. Norm. Rolls, 41.710.

[14] Cal. Norm. Rolls, 41.707, 723-5, 728-30, 748, 791.

[15] P.R.O., For. Accts. 69, Jr°, m. 1.

[16] Collins, *Peerage,* VIII, 109.

[17] Cal. Norm. Rolls, 41.712.

not succeeded in preventing shortage. It may be, therefore, that these royal orders were intended to meet a difficult situation which was developing, and which was successfully met.[18] The earl was merely following the general policy which Henry inaugurated at the siege of Falaise, and maintained at Rouen and Meaux.[19] At the siege of Rouen the king had had to provide armed protection against French attacks for merchants coming to the host,[20] with the result that when the city surrendered there was such abundance in the English camp that a sheep could be bought for 6 s. p.[21] Gloucester also during the siege of Cherbourg established a market to supply the troops.[22]

With the completion of the conquest the utilization of the administrative machinery is more in evidence. The baillis and vicomtes were ordered to provide grain for the royal household and fodder for the king's horses,[23] and one of the king's special agents received orders to arrest and imprison anyone who interfered with the royal purveyors.[24] Through the royal officials were issued proclamations to provision merchants ordering them to repair to the army and sell their wares for the soldiers' benefit.[25] They also, at times, were authorized to prevent

[18] Livius, p. 51.

[19] Elmham, pp. 130, 317.

[20] Livius, p. 63.

[21] Waurin, II, 263. For contemporary prices of sheep elsewhere in France see D'Avenel, IV, 104-5. They range from 7 sols 6 deniers to 25 sols.

[22] Livius, p. 53.

[23] Cal. Norm. Rolls, 41.716, 721, 747.

[24] *Ibid.*, 718.

[25] Jan. 15, 1419, orders to the vicomtes of Pont de l'Arche, Orbec, Auge, Pontaudemer, Bernay, Montreuil, Beaumont-le-Roger, and Harcourt to summon merchants to Rouen, *ibid.*, 748. April 3, 1419, orders to the bailli of Evreux to proclaim that merchants of his bailliage hold market twice a week at Ivry while Gloucester was occupying the town, *ibid.*, 42.314. May 1, 1419, the captains of Arques and Dieppe ordered to send provisions to Mantes every week during the king's stay there, especially fish, *ibid.*, 318. The baillis of Louviers, Rouen, Caen, Cotentin, and the vicomtes of Rouen, Evreux, Beaumont-le-Roger, Conches, Breteuil, Harcourt, Orbec, Auge,

delays in transportation.[26] It was also their duty to stop the export of grain to the enemy.[27] With the establishment of garrisons subsistence came still more immediately within the official purview. The vicomtes could be used as "victuallers" as well as paymasters. Indeed the change merely meant that they paid wages in kind. Considering that they must have had supervision over very considerable estates it is perhaps surprising that more was not done in the way of issuing provisions in lieu of wages. In Alington's first account (1419-1420) there is record of the provisioning of Avranches, Vire, Regneville, Falaise, Argentan, and Exmes, but to the value of only 1200 l. t. odd out of a total of wages amounting to over 142,000 l. t.[28] The manner whereby the army received supplies from the Norman officials can be gathered from a letter of March 15, 1422. In this the treasurer-general directs the vicomte of Carentan to collect at once 50 beeves and 600 sheep, the best procurable, paying for the

Pontaudemer, Montreuil, Caudebec, Montivilliers, and Arques, directed to order merchants to supply the Mantes market every week during the king's stay, *ibid.*, 319. This would seem as if Henry were attempting to draw on the resources of the greater part of Normandy. Oct. 10, 1419, orders to the baillis to dispatch at once all victuallers in their districts with provisions and forage for the army, *ibid.*, 328.

[26] May 1, 1419, writs of assistance issued the baillis of Evreux and Caux and the steward of Auge for enforcing the order to merchants for provisioning the army at Mantes, Cal. Norm. Rolls, 42.319. Orders to the captains of Pont de l'Arche, Louviers, and Gaillon not to tax merchants bringing provisions, *ibid.* Aug. 17, 1419, abolition of duty on wines for the use of the town and castle of Cherbourg, *ibid.*, 324. Oct. 16, 1419, prohibition on the captains of Mantes and Vernon to interfere with the levy of duty on goods and provisions, *ibid.*, 328.

[27] Jan. 30, 1421, Henry to the baillis ordering them to stop the sending of grain to Compiègne, Meaux, Dreux, etc.; Feb. 9, the bailli of Caux to the vicomte of Neufchâtel and Gournay, Bib. Nat., fr. 26044, no. 5595. Mar. 15, the prohibition proclaimed, *ibid.*, no. 5606.

[28] P.R.O., Ex. Accts. 187/14, ff. 14r°, 33r°-36v°. The items appear in three places throughout the account but the three do not add up to quite the same total in each case.

same from his vicomtal receipts, and to deliver them to a royal agent.[29] Cattle so collected seem to have been handed on from vicomte to vicomte until, supposedly, they reached the army,[30] where they seem to have been delivered to the treasurer of war.[31] Another illustration of the manner in which the system worked is shown by letters of the earl of March, captain of Vire, telling how he ordered the vicomte of Vire to provision the garrison to the amount of 200 l. t., under which order the vicomte had bought 3 pipes of wine, 2 pipes of cider, and 30 bushels of wheat.[32]

In 1420 there apparently was an attempt further to systematize the victualling of castles by appointing Thomas Holgill, who had been victualler of Rouen,[33] and who later was described as "vitellarius regis,"[34] purveyor of provisions for Rouen, Pont de l'Arche, Château-

[29] Bib. Nat., fr. 26044, no. 5710. For April 1, 1422, there is record of purchase by the vicomte of 749 sheep and 92 beeves, *ibid.*, nos. 5717-8.

[30] Receipt by the vicomte of Carentan of beeves and sheep for the king's household from the vicomte of Coutances, *ibid.*, no. 5719. Receipt by the vicomte of Falaise of beeves and sheep to the value of 2904 l. t. 10s, *ibid.*, no. 5747. See also no. 5754.

[31] Sir William Philip records receipt of 4900 l. t. in beeves, sheep, wine, and other victuals for the royal household, P.R.O., For. Accts. 69, Fv°, m. 2.

[32] Aug. 4, 1419, Brit. Mus., Add. Ch. 282. The wheat was bought from merchants at 5 s. t. the bushel. The wine cost 90 l. t. with 7 l. t. 10s for transport. The cider was bought from the monks of Plessys Grimoult and the parishioners of St. Ioire des Groiseliers at 100 s. t. the pipe. Alington mentions 182 l. t. 10s spent for victualling Vire, P.R.O., Ex. Accts. 187/14, f. 4v°. In addition to these and those under note 29 there is notice of the receipt of more than 2000 bushels of wheat and oats from the Bayeux region "pour lestor et garnisture" of Caen, *ibid.*, f. 14v°. Why this was not charged against Humfreyville, captain of Caen, is not clear. Possibly he may have been in the field with the king and not in garrison. The price of wheat had evidently risen. In June 1416 the French vicomte of Carentan got wheat for Armagnac's army and navy for 3 s. t. 9d the bushel, Bib. Nat., fr. 26041, no. 5082. Now the price was 4s 2d or 6s the bushel. P.R.O., Ex. Accts. 187/14, ff. 19r°, 18v°.

[33] Rôles de Bréquigny 336.

[34] Rôles de Bréquigny 1296.

Gaillard, Vernon, les Goulets, St. Germain, "Conflans" (sic), Montjoy, Arques, Neufchâtel, Gournay, and Gisors, i.e. the royal strongholds of the Seine and Upper Normandy.[35] Six months later came the appointment of Simon Fleet as victualler south of the Seine[36] with orders to provision Caen, Cherbourg, Avranches, Vire, Domfront, Falaise, Alençon, Fresnay-le-Vicomte, Essay, Exmes, and Bonsmoulins.[37] Of the activities of these two men there is little record beyond the receipt by the lieutenant of Pont de l'Arche of 36 measures of wheat worth 126 l. t. from Holgill,[38] the appearance of this same Holgill on a commission to inquire into the case of certain vessels detained on suspicion of carrying provisions to the enemy, and a mandate to Fleet, conjointly with the provost of Harfleur, to send all vessels ladened with grain then in the Eure (sic) to Rouen.[39]

That the treasurer-general continued to direct the victualling of castles appears from a letter of July 18, 1422. "Guillaume Alington, escuier, tresorier general de Normendie, à Jehan Anzier, viconte de Vire, salut. Nous vous mandons que touz les fourmens, sailles, et avoines qui depresent sont en votre garde pour les garnisons du châtel dudit lieu de Vire, tant par vous achattez que receuz des rentes du Roy, qui bonnement ne se pourront garder, vous vendes, bien et loyaument, à prix raisonnables—que fere pourra, par l'advis et conseil du capp^ne du lieu ou son lieutenant, etc."[40] The participation of the captain in the transaction is noteworthy as confirming

[35] May 1, 1420, Cal. Norm. Rolls, 42.369 (duplicate in Bib. Nat., fr. 26043, no. 5514). He still held office Jan. 25, 1421, Cal. Norm. Rolls, 42.400.

[36] Nov. 13, 1420, *ibid.*, 381.

[37] Jan. 12, 1421, Cal. Norm. Rolls, 42.401.

[38] Mar. 14, 1422, Bib. Nat., fr. 26044, no. 5709.

[39] May 2 and April 17, 1421, Cal. Norm. Rolls, 42.426. See also *ibid.*, 42.429. In Alington's final account there is mention of Fleet as victualler of the castles of Lower Normandy at a salary of £20 a year, P.R.O., Ex. Accts. 188/7, f. 24r°.

[40] Bib. Nat., fr. 26044, no. 5736.

the supposition created by March's letter that the military commander who was on the spot exercised a controlling authority over the civil official in matters relating to the provisioning of castles. This is further confirmed by the fact that, although the above letter is addressed to the vicomte, it is the captain who reports.[41] It might also be observed that when the vicomte of Falaise, in November 1422, reports extensive purchases of cattle for the regent's use, the captain countersigns the parchment.[42] Finally there is a letter from Bedford to Treasurer-General Belknap directing him to have the bailli and vicomtes of the Cotentin "prendre sur les habitans desdictes vicontés, pour juste et raisonnable pris, des bles, vins, farines, bestail, et autrez vivres et provisions, jusque la somme ou valeur de VIII^{C}, III^{XX}, XIII l. t. XVs," the same to be delivered to the captain of Tombelaine and credited upon his wages.[43] As far as Surreau's account shows, however, it would seem that the practice of paying wages in kind was being abandoned. The only instances where it appears are in connection with the captains of Vire, Avranches, and Tombelaine, who at the time were serving in the field rather than in garrison.[44]

All this time, however, supplies of food continued to come from England in varying quantities. From the start the victualling of Harfleur had been carried on from England and continued so to be until the conquest of

41 Aug. 2, 1422, he reported collected from "Rentes," 80 bushels of wheat and 880 bushels of oats; loss by birds and vermin, 70 bushels of oats; receipts from the sale of the remainder, 32 l. t. 16s 8d, *ibid.*, no. 5746.

42 *Ibid.*, nos. 22-25.

43 July 23, 1424, Bib. Nat., fr. 26047, no. 300. July 31, the bailli orders the vicomtes of Coutances and Carentan to spend 446 l. t. 17s 6d each for provisions and deliver their purchases at Tombelaine, *ibid.*, no. 304. This payment is entered in Surreau's account (Bib. Nat., fr. 4485, p. 183), but without indication that it was in provisions. As the preceding payment is so designated we may perhaps assume a clerical error.

44 Bib. Nat., fr. 4485, pp. 186, 179.

Upper Normandy gave opportunity for the city to draw supplies from the surrounding country.[45] Such provisions as came from England were consigned to the victualler of Harfleur and by him sold to the garrison, the returns forming a very considerable item in the city treasurer's receipts.[46] It is possible that the town served as a sort of depot from which supplies were forwarded up the river when the English were operating about Rouen, but the evidence is too scant for certainty.[47]

In England, from the beginning of the campaign, there was an attempt to stimulate a cross-Channel trade in food stuffs for the benefit of the army. In October, 1417, Bedford directed the sheriffs to proclaim that anyone who would ship victuals for the army to Caen might do so without paying customs, on giving security as to the destination.[48] From Caen merchants who availed themselves of this opportunity could easily follow the army's line of march southward. When Henry reached Rouen and concentrated his whole strength about that town, the greater difficulties in provisioning appear at once in a letter of August 10, 1418, to the Londoners. "We have leyd the siege afore the cite of Roan," wrote the King, "—atte which siege us nedeth gretly refreshing for us and for our hoost,—whereof we—pray you effectuelly that in al haste that ye may ye wille do arme as manie

[45] Between May 24, 1417, and Dec. 5, 1419, there was issued from the English exchequer £1412 9s 3d for provisioning Harfleur, and £1275 1s 4d for transporting provisions thither, P.R.O., Issue Roll 630, mm. 6, 8; 633, mm. 11, 15; 636, mm. 5, 10, 11, 13, 15; 638, mm. 1, 3, 15, 18; 640, mm. 3, 4, 10, 11, 14, 15; 643, mm. 1, 11; *Cal. Pat. Rolls, Henry V*, II, 173.

[46] P.R.O., Ex. Accts. 48/8, mm. 2, 4.

[47] For evidence of ships plying between Harfleur and Rouen in 1418-19 see Simon Fleet's account, *ibid.* 48/7, f. 26. When the Portuguese galleys passed up the Seine they took on 16 cows and 200 sheep for the army at Harfleur, *ibid.*, f. 2.

[48] P.R.O., Chanc. Enroll. 267 (Close Rolls 5 Henry V), m. 13d°; *Cal. London Letter Books*, I, 188.

smale vessels as ye may goodly witth vitaille, and namly with drinke, for to come Harfleu, and fro thennes as fer as they may up ye river of Seyne to Roan ward with said vitaille.—For the which vessels ther shal be ordeyned suffisant conduyt.''[49] The convoy was still needed, for Caudebec had not yet capitulated, and there was danger of attack from Honfleur.[50] It was probably as a result of this letter that the lord mayor proclaimed that those who had ''wyn, ale, beer, fisshe, flesshe, or eny other maner vitaille to refresshing the Kynges hoost or ony strenghe that he hath take in thilke costes,'' should ''come to William Sevenok and other certain Aldermen and Cominers —and—declare un to hem the certaine quantite of ther vitaile, and they shal assigne and dispose hem redy shippyng for her passage.''[51] By September 8, the aldermen could reply to Henry that they had obeyed his instructions, and that in addition they were sending him a gift of wine, ale, and beer.[52]

With the fall of Rouen, the conquest of Upper Normandy, and the lull in the war which followed, the king seems to have felt that he could rely upon Normandy. Consequently it was forbidden to export grain from England without special license.[53] Probably this was merely a means for taxing a profitable trade. With the approach

[49] Delpit, p. 223.

[50] P.R.O., Ex. Accts. 48/8, m. 2. Norman tradition recounts how the English sailors protected themselves, by navigating so as to interpose sandbars between their vessels and the French, Chastellain, *Chron. de Norm.*, p. 190. In the Issue Rolls there is occasional mention of convoys for provision ships crossing the Channel, P.R.O., Issue Rolls, 636, m. 4; 638, m. 15; 640, m. 14; 649, m. 17; 652, m. 1; 655, mm. 6, 13. The need of these appears from Sir William Philip's mention of 2456 bushels of oats taken ''super mare per inimicos de Crotey,'' P.R.O., For. Accts. 69, Gr°.

[51] Riley, p. 664.

[52] *Ibid.*, p. 666; Delpit, p. 225.

[53] Feb. 9, 1419, P.R.O., Chanc. Enroll. 268 (Close Roll 6 Henry V), m. 2. No such licenses appear in the French Rolls for 1419, nor do any of those in the Norman Rolls indicate trade with England.

of another winter, however, the proclamation was renewed that food could be shipped to Normandy duty free on the giving of security as to its destination.[54] Only with the opening of 1421 do we begin to find licenses to trade in food stuffs between England and Normandy, and then they are but few.[55] Apparently, however, the authorities were still kept busy providing shipping for provisions, if we may judge from the numerous items in the Issue and Patent Rolls.[56] Inasmuch as purchases for the household and for Harfleur are specified when mentioned in the rolls it would seem that the other provisions mentioned were intended for the army. Whether they were purchases by private purveyors acting for individual captains or were the exports of enterprising merchants does not appear.

Under munitions the most important items were archers' supplies and ordnance. There is evidence of very continuous activity to provide both of these throughout

[54] Nov. 7, 1419. The writ published in Delpit, p. 230, from the London archives, gives Nov. 1, 1420, as the term for this privilege. P.R.O., Chanc. Enroll. 269 (Close Roll 7 Henry V), m. 6d° substitutes the feast of St. George (April 23, 1420). The latter might indicate that the measure was a winter expedient.

[55] Jan. 10, 1421, protection to a London poulterer going to Normandy with provisions for the army, Cal. Fr. Rolls, 44.621. Feb. 28, license to two Rouenese to ship grain bought in England to Rouen; April 30, same for an English merchant to transport grain and beans to Harfleur, *ibid.*, 622. July 1, same to two English merchants to transport grain to Rouen, *ibid.*, 627. Feb. 13, 1422, same to a Londoner to ship grain to Rouen, Dieppe, Honfleur, or Caen, *ibid.*, 634. May 7, 1423, same to three Tewkesbury merchants to ship grain and beans bought in Gloucester to Rouen, *ibid.*, 48.227.

[56] We have explicit record of more than 40,000 bushels of oats and nearly 50,000 bushels of wheat (the largest single shipment was 13,620 bushels) being shipped to France, besides ale, beer, "sucar," canvas, salt fish, horses, oxen, sheep, and "provisions," Hardy, p. 363*; *Cal. Pat. Rolls, Henry V*, II, 138,* 204,* 253,* 271, 274, 275,* 326, 327,* 387, 388, 390, 421*; P.R.O., Issue Rolls, 638, mm. 5,* 12, 14, 15,* 17; 640, mm. 3,* 4, 5, 8, 11,* 15; 643, mm. 1, 5,* 16,* 17, 18, 22; 645, mm. 1,* 2, 3, 6, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13; 646, mm. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8; 649, mm. 2; 652, mm. 1, 4, 14; 655, mm. 2, 7, 9, 11, 18. An asterisk signifies shipment for the royal household.

the campaign, but it has been impossible to estimate either the needs of the army or the quantities supplied. Henry V's contribution to English archery legislation was preliminary to the campaign of 1417. In October, 1416, Parliament enacted that the patin makers be forbidden to use ash for making clogs and patins lest the supply be consumed to the detriment of the fletchers who had always used that wood in making bows and arrows. To this the king consented on condition that the fletchers sell their "settes à plus aise et resonable price."[57] In the next month workmen were impressed to make 200,000 arrow-heads.[58] This was followed in February, 1417, by writs to the sheriffs ordering them to take six wing feathers from every goose in their counties, paying a reasonable price for the same, and sending them to London by mid-March.[59] In that month a fletcher received commission to impress men of his "mistery" in preparation for the expedition, with power to requisition supplies.[60]

Probably this matériel was intended primarily for the royal retinue only. Each captain was responsible for the equipment of his company as well as for its provisioning. Whether the king undertook to deal in arms as he did in victuals is not known. Neither the treasurer of war nor the treasurer-general of Normandy appear to have handled any such business, nor are there any stray documents to indicate it. On the other hand the existence of such a practice seems highly probable. Perhaps if we had the accounts of the master of ordnance such sales would appear. The only articles which would be handled in

[57] *Rot. Parl.*, IV, 103.

[58] Nov. 14, 1416, *Cal. Pat. Rolls, Henry V*, II, 82.

[59] Feb. 10, 1417, Rymer, IX, 436. It might seem that this was an unusual proceeding from the fact that a contemporary London chronicler takes pains to mention it, Kingsford, *E.H.R.*, XXIX, 512.

[60] Mar. 26, 1417, *Cal. Pat. Rolls, Henry V*, II, 103.

large quantities would be bows and arrows, especially the latter of which the supply must be constantly replenished. Such records as we have indicate this continuous replenishment of the supply of arrows, but, though the figures run into the thousands, it hardly seems possible that we have record of enough for some ten thousand archers. True there was no very considerable fighting during the whole campaign, so that only at the storming of Caen and in the fighting about Rouen and Cherbourg can there have been any large expenditure. Furthermore there was always the possibility of recovering a considerable quantity of the arrows shot after the battle was over.[61]

In September, 1417, commissioners went out to requisition bows, arrows, bow-strings, arrow-heads, cross-bows, *et al.*, and to impress labor and transport for the same,[62] while a new collection of goose feathers was made in certain counties.[63] By October, a consignment was ready to be shipped to Caen,[64] and another was in preparation in November including a new order for 200,000 arrow-heads.[65] With the beginning of spring came a new series of expenditures for matériel which continued until the death of Henry V.[66] That they stop then may be taken as

[61] Le Cacheux, *Actes de la Chancellerie, etc.*, I, 148, tells how certain men of Rouen were detailed to pick up arrows during a sortie. For similar action by the English archers at Poitiers see *Chronicon Galfridus le Baker*, p. 150.

[62] Sept. 1, 1417, *Cal. Pat. Rolls, Henry V*, II, 120.

[63] Sept. 20, 1417, payment to messengers sent into Kent, Essex, Hertford, Norfolk, Suffolk, Canterbury, Huntingdon, Bedford, and Buckingham, P.R.O., Issue Roll 630, m. 12.

[64] Oct. 4, 1417, 20 marks paid for coffers to contain bows and arrows; Oct. 26, £23 6s 8d for manufacture and transport of archers' supplies, *ibid.* 633, mm. 1-2.

[65] Nov. 9, 1417, *Cal. Pat. Rolls, Henry V*, II, 144; Dec. 27, £20 was paid out for arrow-heads, probably on this order, P.R.O., Issue Roll 633, m. 9. In December, £135 was spent for bows and arrows. How many this would buy can be more or less grasped from the fact that in 1418, £34 2s 4d could buy 260 bows and 50,500 arrows, *ibid.* 636, m. 5.

[66] Between March 1, 1418, and July 17, 1422, we find expenditure from

another indication that the supply went to the royal household, which ceased to play the part of general headquarters with the accession of the infant Henry VI.[67] Something approaching the number of arrows bought can be estimated from the fact that a "garba" (24 arrows) evidently cost a trifle more than 3d sterling.[68] From this it appears that in 1418 there were bought for the king at least 150,000 arrows; that in 1419 this was considerably more than doubled (over 375,000); that in 1420, when there was very little fighting, but when, it may well be, the newly conquered castles were being munitioned, there was purchase of some 400,000 arrows, a figure which the campaign of 1421 raised to over 425,000. That these figures are not complete is clear from the fact that they cannot include computations from items of expenditure which do not specify the exact amount spent on arrows alone.[69] There is also reason for believing that the manufacture of arrows was carried on in Normandy under royal direction. We have already seen fletchers impressed for the expedition, and in 1420 commissioners were sent

the English exchequer of £446 18s 3d for bows and arrows, £318 6s for bows alone, £325 13s 4d for bow staves, £755 1s 5d for arrows, £343 3s 2d for arrow-heads, £2 for eight gross of bow-strings, £266 4d for manufacture of bows and arrows—total £2457 2s 6d, P.R.O., Issue Rolls, 633, mm. 15, 18; 636, mm. 5, 7, 8, 11, 15; 638, mm. 1, 3, 10, 14, 15; 640, mm. 2, 7, 10, 12, 13; 643, mm. 3, 4, 11, 21; 646, mm. 3, 10; 649, mm. 3, 9; 652, mm. 1, 3, 12, 13, 21; 655, mm. 4, 6, 9, 13. Twice there are orders to the sheriffs to collect 1,190,000 goose feathers for arrows (Dec. 1, 1418, *Cal. Pat. Rolls, Henry V*, II, 178; July 16, 1420; P.R.O., Chanc. Enroll. 271, m. 16). And twice there are orders for 400,000 arrow-heads (May 5, 1421, and Feb. 23, 1422, *Cal. Pat. Rolls, Henry V*, II, 384, 391).

[67] The iron and lances captured at Caen were turned over to the master of ordnance and the treasurer of the household, P.R.O., Ex. Accts. 187/14, f. 34r°.

[68] In P.R.O., Issue Roll 636, m. 5, under May 13, 1418, we find 2106 garbas of arrows purchased for £27 19s.

[69] P.R.O., Issue Rolls, 633, mm. 15, 18; 643, m. 21; 652, mm. 12, 13; 655, m. 6.

out to secure men "non soldarios" to make arrows.[70] On the other hand, in all the records of payments contained in the four accounts which we have, there are only two instances recording the issuance of munitions, in these cases bows and arrows, to castle captains in lieu of wages in money.[71] From this it would appear that the custom was not common. After the treaty of Troyes Henry addressed himself to the French master of arbalesters in regard to munitions, but it is notable that things pertaining to archery are scarce on the list of matériel found at Paris. A few thousand arrows are all that appear, with indications that the cost of manufacture was much higher than in England.[72]

The "Ordnance Department" was headed by the king's clerk of ordnance, an official attached to "headquarters" who supervised the artillery. It was to his account that the English exchequer issued funds expended in England for guns, saltpeter, sea-coal, sulphur, and gunpowder, and the cost of transporting the same to Normandy.[73] Caen appears to have been an artillery depot, whither stores from England came[74] and were deposited in the

[70] Cal. Norm. Rolls, 42.360.

[71] These were to Ogart, captain of Vire, and Fastolf, captain of Alençon and Fresnay-le-Vicomte, Bib. Nat., fr. 4485, p. 130. For the French there is record of several issues of arms to the count d'Aumâle without any indication of value, *Hist. d'Harcourt, Preuves,* IV, 1684-5.

[72] Chastellain, *Chronique* (Lettynhove ed.), I, 189, note 1. See also p. 199, note 1. Arrows are quoted at 8 s. p. the dozen. This is equivalent to 2s sterling. In England a dozen arrows cost three half pence. In the receipts for matériel given by the count d'Aumâle to the dauphin's master of artillery the presence of bows and arrows in considerable quantity is notable, and may indicate an attempt to adopt English methods of warfare, *Hist. d'Harcourt, Preuves,* IV, 1685.

[73] These issues are continuous throughout Henry V's time, P.R.O., Issue Rolls, 624, mm. 7, 8, 14; 630, mm. 4, 6, 13; 633, mm. 1, 4, 13, 16, 18; 636, mm. 1, 4, 5, 7, 9, 10, 14; 638, mm. 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 10, 15; 640, mm. 2, 3, 6, 8, 14, 15; 643, mm. 1, 3, 17, 19; 645, mm. 3, 4, 6, 8, 11; 646, mm. 1, 8; 649, mm. 3, 5, 12, 14; 652, mm. 2, 6, 10, 14; 655, mm. 7, 18.

[74] For a shipment made in the fall of 1418 see *ibid.* 636, m. 14.

"ordnance house" until wanted by the king. In the neighborhood were the quarries which the king had reserved to himself for making gun-stones, as well as for providing material for fortifications.[75] At Rouen the English probably found an arsenal connected with the navy yard which the French kings had there.[76] This they continued, and very early in the conquest we find royal officials buying iron which was probably intended for cannon.[77] Other artillery was also handled there, for we learn of six arbalests being sent to Rouen to be refitted.[78] The following letters may illustrate more vividly the working of this department.

"By the Kyng"

"Trusty and wellbeloved We grete you wel:—And forasmuche as We have understande yat oure grete gonnes at Caen may nat be brought doun to ye water syde to be shipped in ye vessell yat we sent yider yrfore, We wol and charge yow yat ye doo sende unto us agein oure said vessell charged wiy ye lij. M l yren for ye whiche we wrote unto yow late by oure letters under oure privie seel and as many gonnestones of ye grettest sort yat lyen upon ye wharf yere as our said vessell may resonnably bere And also al ye see col yat was last in John du pont is howse in Caen cleped ye howse of oure ordennance, And yat yis be hasted as we trust unto yow. Geven under oure signet in oure towne of Mantes ye XXVI day of October."

Shiryngton[79]

"By the King"

"Trusty and welbeloved We wol and charge yow that

[75] Rôles de Bréquigny 128.

[76] De la Roncière, *Histoire de la marine française*, II, *passim*.

[77] Bib. de Rouen, Y 29, tome II, no. 15.

[78] Bib. Nat., fr. 26044, no. 5745.

[79] Bib. Nat., fr. 26043, no. 5439. This letter is probably of 1420.

anoon thees oure lettres seen ye ordonnie to sende in al haste to oure coffrers at Rouen X M l iren of oure iren that is at oure toun of Caen and failleth not thereof in no wyse.

"Geven under oure signet in oure oost at Saint faron beside Meaulx the XI day of fervier."[80]

"By the Kyng"

"Trusty and welbeloved We wol and charge yow yat in al ye hast ye may ye sende unto our cofrer to Rouen all ye gonne stoones yat been at oure tounes of Caen and Harefleur wiy al ye salt pietre, cole, and brymstoon yat is at Harefleu. And also sendeth yider ye X M l iryn like as we have geven yow in charge tofore this tyme. And yat ye faille nat hereof in no wyse. Geven under oure signet in oure ost at ye toun of Meaulx ye XVIII day of Marche."[81]

Repeatedly commissions were issued for both England and Normandy authorizing the impressment of carpenters to make engines of war or to build carts for carrying cannon, or stone-cutters and masons to make gun-stones, or tailors for the king's tents, and giving power to requisition all necessary supplies.[82] The use of these men in the field is illustrated by the retinue of Robert Cottes, "maistre des ordonnances de l'artillerie de mons. le Regent," who took with him to the siege of Le Crotoy, two masons and six carpenters, in addition to his cannoneers, presumably to construct, set up, and repair, siege engines.[83] On the whole one gets an impression of considerable activity.

With the organization of a Norman administrative

[80] Bib. Nat., fr. 26044, no. 5700.

[81] Bib. Nat., fr. 26044, no. 5712.

[82] Hardy, pp. 362-4; Cal. Norm. Rolls, 41.716, 42.327; *Cal. Pat. Rolls, Henry V*, II, 133, 134, 136, 140, 141, 148, 200, 208, 262, 268, 269, 270, 329, 386, 387, 391, 421, 422.

[83] Bib. Nat., fr. 26046, no. 66.

machine the requisitioning and transport could be performed by local officials. If gun-stones were to be shipped from Caen to Rouen in 1418 the king's clerk of ordnance hired the shipping and collected the costs from the receveur-general who acted under orders from the president of the exchequer.[84] If an expedition was to be made, the vicomtes received orders to provide wagons, harness, and carpenters, paying for the same out of their receipts.[85] They in turn sent out their sergents to collect the things required.[86] Evidently orders for such actions had to come from the central authority, for when the bailli of Gisors, on his own responsibility, employed river transport for munitions, his vicomte refused to pay the bill until ordered to do so by Bedford.[87] Lastly it appears to have been the vicomte's business to provide artillery for castles in his vicomté,[88] though here too they were probably acting on orders from the central administration.[89]

The repair of fortifications was similarly directed for such places as remained under immediate royal control. It will be remembered that at Argentan, Bayeux, Caen, Carentan, Evreux, Falaise, Gisors, Lisieux, Louviers, Mantes, Montivilliers, Rouen, and Vire the local authorities had been empowered to levy tariffs on beverages for the maintenance of the fortifications. The collection and

[84] Aug. 14, 1418, *vidimus* of a receipt for 20 l. t., Archives du Calvados, F Fonds Danquin, Série Caen. [85] Luce, I, 146, p. j. XXXIII.

[86] Sept. 15, 1424, receipt by the sergent of Caen of 100 s. t., expenses "d'avoir pourveu et assemble de pluseurs villages en ladicts ville de Caen pluseurs gens charetiers, charettes et chevaulx qui ont conduite et menee de Caen es parties d'Argethen une certaine bombarde avecques pluseurs pierres de canon et aultre abillements de guerre," Bib. Nat., fr. 26047, no. 314.

[87] Brit. Mus., Add. Ch. 7938.

[88] Artillery for Vernon bought by the vicomte of Gisors, Bib. Nat., fr. 26043, no. 5503; same for Pont de l'Arche bought by the vicomte of Pont de l'Arche, *ibid.* 26044, no. 5745.

[89] All the castles which surrendered expressly agreed to leave their artillery intact.

expenditure of this income remained in local hands, subject merely to an auditing of accounts by the king's officials.[90] Even without these royal licenses it was evidently the city's duty to keep the defenses in repair. It would seem, however, that the castles were under official care, for we find the vicomte of Carentan in 1420 ordered to repair "le mantelet ou petit muret estant entour le chastel du dit lieu de Carentan, pour la sauve-garde d'icelui chastle,"[91] and in 1422 the treasurer of war made payments for the new castle at Rouen,[92] while at Gisors there is an order to the bailli to hire workmen "ad faciendum le Bolwerke de Gisors et ad reparandum fortificationes et mundandum fossata."[93] Elsewhere also the care of fortifications fell upon the royal officials, acting on orders from the king.

"By ye Kyng"

"Trusty and weel beloved we grete yow weel and for as muche as we have understoude be youre lettre to us sent desiringe to wite if yee sholde ordeine masons and carpenters for repairement of oure castel of Pountorson, wherfore we wul and charge yow yat ye ordeine that hit be repared and amended as weel as ye two Toures at ye brugge, and hasteth yat hit were doon, and we have certiffied our Cosin of Suffolk how yat wee have charged yow ther with, and also we have charged our forseid Cosin yat ye gouvernaunce of Averance and of ye contree yer a boute be amended, and god have yow in his kepynge. Given under our signet at our town of Seint Albon ye XXVII day of ffeverer."[94]

[90] *Vide supra*, p. 172, especially the reference to Archives Municipales de Lisieux, CC1.

[91] Le Chauteur de Pontaumont, *Histoire de la ville de Carentan* (Paris, 1863), p. 105.

[92] P.R.O., For. Accts. 69, m. Hro.

[93] Rôles de Bréquigny 684; see also P.R.O., Ex. Accts. 50/7, 51/9.

[94] This letter is of 1421, Bib. Nat., latin nouv. acq. 2344, no. 21. See also Hunger, *Quelques Actes*, III, 82, no. 44.

Costs might be paid by the treasurer-general directly,[95] by the vicomtes,[96] the receveurs,[97] or the officers of the gabelle,[98] from their respective receipts. Then again this expense might be met by a special local levy. In Coutances, for instance, the bailli of Cotentin was directed to collect contributions from the châtellenie and vicomté to repair the town fortifications, summoning the notables to advise him as to ways and means for making the repairs and for levying the contributions, but this was not to become a precedent.[99] At Bec the abbey had to tax its tenants half a florin per acre, and at another time, by special grant from the king, 12d per man per month, for fortifying the place.[100] When repairs of this sort were finished specially commissioned inspectors, usually the captains of the places repaired, visited and examined the same, and reported.[101]

As for secret service, we can scarcely say more than that there was one. How extensive it was or how efficient still remains very much of a secret. It seems safe to assume that the frontier captains kept up a continuous spying, for we find the captain of Calais asking for £100 a year for "espial" for the safeguard of that town.[102] During his campaigns Henry used these Calais spies to find out the French intentions in Picardy.[103] The treas-

[95] P.R.O., Ex. Accts., 187/14, f. 25; 188/7, ff. 25v°, 26r°.

[96] Hunger, *ut supra.* [97] Brit. Mus., Add. Ch. 7930.

[98] Bib. Nat., fr. 4485, pp. 151-2.

[99] Jan. 20, 1421, Rôles de Bréquigny 929.

[100] *Chronique de Bec,* p. 145.

[101] F. Liard, *Domfront pendant la guerre de Cent Ans de 1337 à 1453* (Domfront, 1884), p. 83; Hunger, III, 72. These may have given orders to the local officials for making expenditures, Brit. Mus., Add. Ch. 7930. For records of repairs see P.R.O., Ex. Accts. 48/7, 48/8; Brit. Mus., Add. Ch. 10950; Bib. Nat., fr. 26043, no. 5483; fr. 26044, no. 5613; fr. 26046, nos. 15, 30, 62, 155, 186; Léon Puiseux, "Note sur un fragment de registre du receveur de la ville de Caen au XV^e siècle" (*Bulletin de la Société des Antiquaires de Normandie,* I, 60 ff., Caen, 1860), pp. 74-78.

[102] *Proceedings,* II, 210, note. [103] *Ibid.,* pp. 343-4.

urer-general's accounts show expenditures for spying.[104] Finally Sir John Assheton, bailli of Cotentin, in 1420 mentions one, Piket and his wife who "bien floghen out of Aungers unto Rochell, for feer of the Dolfyn, for he hade sende to Aungers, for to have arrested Pyket." Statements which Sir John follows with a description of conditions at Angers, from all of which it would seem that Piket and wife were English secret agents supplying information to the bailli of Cotentin.[105] Advance information concerning the preparation of raids northward from Maine seems to have reached the English in Normandy, perhaps through spies.[106] Beyond these few facts no more can be said.

[104] P.R.O., Ex. Accts., 187/14, 31v°; 188/7, f. 31v°.

[105] Rôles de Bréquigny 1376. For a spy at Mont St. Michel, *vide infra*, p. 314.

[106] *Vide infra*, pp. 270, 274, 285, 291, 313.

CHAPTER VII

THE CONQUEST DEFENDED—FROM THE MURDER OF MONTEREAU TO THE BATTLE OF VERNEUIL, 1419-1424

For a short period following the murder of Montereau, Dauphinois fortunes seemed to give promise of being about to enter upon a series of successes. The elimination of John the Fearless momentarily demoralized the Burgundians. Shortly after that event, despite the English fleets, arrived a Scottish army 6000 strong under Buchan and Wigton. Scarcely had these forces reached France when preparations were begun to bring over another contingent.[1] The Seine fortresses above Paris remaining in Armagnac hands, with Dreux and Meaux, seriously threatened the capital. From Dreux the garrison raided north of the Seine, liberating Ambrose de Loré from Croisy[2] and even attempting a coup de main at Mantes;[3] from Meaux the French ravaged the environs of Paris, seizing provisions, killing, burning, and outraging.[4] Border warfare with the Burgundians along the frontiers of Blois was favorable to the dauphin's men.[5]

[1] De Beaucourt, *Histoire de Charles VII*, I, 320, 331, note 7, 332-3.

[2] April 6, 1420, *Journal d'un Bourgeois*, p. 137; Jouvenel des Ursins, p. 556.

[3] Grave, p. 320, records one for 1420 which may very possibly be connected with this April raid.

[4] *Journal d'un Bourgeois*, pp. 136, 143; A. Longnon, *Paris pendant la domination anglaise, 1420-1436* (Paris, 1878), p. 18.

[5] One of Narbonne's captains drove the Burgundians from Illiers, Bonne-

To the north Armagnac garrisons from Le Crotoy, Compiègne, and Guise, not to mention smaller places, made communications between Paris and Flanders hazardous and harassed the English in Upper Normandy. Furthermore the French still clung to Mont St. Michel and, emboldened no doubt by local successes, continued to direct attacks upon the English frontier along the main roads leading towards Avranches and Alençon, the region most remote from English headquarters. Early in 1420 they undertook a raid, but evidently did not get very far north nor accomplish much, for the authorities were alert.[6]

Salisbury, king's lieutenant in the southwest, was disposed to assume the offensive in defense of this frontier and met with considerable success. As a restraint upon the Mont a "bastille" was erected at Ardevon,[7] while a force of some ninety men occupied Tombelaine, at least temporarily.[8] The dauphin replied by sending

val, Voves, Sancheville, and Patay. Later in the year La Ferté-Villeneuil was recovered. L'abbe Marquis, "Le Dunois avant Jeanne d'Arc, invasion Bourguigonne et Anglaise" (*Bulletin de la Société Dunois,* VI, 377 ff., Châteaudun, 1890), p. 396.

[6] Jan. 27, 1420, there is mention of a messenger sent by the bailli of Cotentin to Cherbourg and St. Sauveur with letters "touchans les nouvelles de certain course et chevauchée que l'en disoit avoir esté entreprinse à faire par les Francois—affin de y mettre resistance," Delisle, *St. Sauveur-le-Vicomte,* p. 339, p. j., 249. The lady of Ferrières and certain of her people were carried off to Le Mans; Mar. 19, 1420, license to treat for their ransom was issued, Cal. Norm. Rolls, 42.359. This Ferrières is probably the one south of Mortain. For partisan warfare in the northeast see A. Lapierre, *La guerre de Cent ans dans l'Argonne et le Rethelois* (Sedan, 1900).

[7] Dec. 24, 1419, orders to John Swinford to build and garrison a "bastille" at Ardevon, Vautier, p. 136.

[8] April 1, 1420, muster of John Nessefeld with 24 men-at-arms and 69 archers at Tombelaine, Bib. Nat., fr. 25766, no. 794. This occupation may have been possible from the fact that "la rivièr de Caynon (Couesnon) passa et courut lonc temps entre le Monte et Tumbelains," in this year, evidently before May 1; Luce, I, 22. See also Etienne Dupont, "Tombelaine, Une Citadelle anglaise et ses bastilles en France pendant la guerre de Cent

Aumâle to assume command of the abbey fortress,[9] whereupon the abbot who had already been preparing to submit to the conqueror,[10] abandoned his monastery and went over to the English. Meanwhile the earl had been pushing southward from Alençon, retaking Ballon,[11] Beaumont-le-Vicomte,[12] Montfort-le-Rotrou,[13] and Fresnay-le-Vicomte.[14] When the French threatened to relieve Fresnay he sent a detachment against them which cut them up near Le Mans, drove them into that city, and returned with prisoners and rich booty.[15] In his rear English agents were re-establishing or strengthening Henry's

Ans." *Revue de Bretagne*, XLII, 57 ff. (August 1909); see especially pp. 64-7.

[9] Luce, I, 22.

[10] Safe-conduct had been issued him as early as May 9, 1419 (Cal., 41.775); another appears of July 23, 1420 (*ibid.*, 42.374; also see 42.391). For his reasons for submitting see Denifle, I, 75, no. 204.

[11] Feb. 28, 1420, abbé R. Charles, *L'invasion anglaise dans le Maine (1417-1428)* (Mamers, 1890), p. 24 quoting a fragment from a chronique de St. Vincent.

[12] Mar. 1, Sir Guy Bouteller was authorized to take the castle into the king's hands, Rôles de Bréquigny 763.

[13] Mar. 3, taken and burned, *vide supra*, note 11.

[14] April 19, Triger, *Une Forteresse de Maine*, p. 87.

[15] "Eodem anno, dominica IIa quadragesima, videlict Va nonas marcii fuerunt congregati in civitate de Maunce, in comitatu de Mayne—XV^{M} Franci et Scoti, profecturi ad comitem de Salysbury, qui lacuit in obsidione de castri et ville de Freney, ad debellandum eundem; quod innotuit ei. Et tunc comes Huntyndonie et comes mariscallus, magister Nevyll, miles, dominus Johannes Cornewayll, dominus John Lethe, milites, et multi alii capitanei cum suis familiis numero III milium C^{v} occurrerunt dictis Francis et Scotis parum a dicta civitate de Maunce. Interfecti ibidem fuerunt Franci et Scoti numero III^{M}, et capti fuerunt marescallus Francie, VI milites Scoti, V^{c} cotarmours, et certeros Francos fugaverunt in civitate predicta de Maunce, inter quos Willelmus Douglas de Dounlangrith (Drumlanrig) miles de Scocia, fugit, et vexillum ejus captum fuit, et oblatum in ecclesia Sancte Marie Rothomagensi. Et dicti Anglici ceperunt totum aurum unde dicti fuerunt Scoti vadiati, quorum quidem habuerunt in cofris XII millia de coronis, et multa alia jocalia et bona multa; et de Anglicis tantum tres occisi fuerunt, et non plures. Benedictus Deus!" F. Michel, *Les Ecossias en France, les Français en Ecosse* (2 vols., London, 1862), I, 118, note 1, quoting "Historia policronica," Bodleian, Digby 201, f. 281r°. The year

authority.[16] The end of spring found the frontier pushed back to Le Mans and Ste. Suzanne.[17]

The Breton situation also served as a check upon the dauphin in the west, for John V, openly favorable to Henry, had had a truce with the English since November, 1417, and was suspected of being in secret alliance with them. Furthermore, on December 9, 1419, he concluded a truce with Philip of Burgundy just when the latter was entering the English alliance.[18] He was permitting the invaders to draw provisions from his realm, he had forbidden his subjects to serve the dauphin, he had attempted to prevent the Scots from landing, and he had seized the opportunity afforded by the war to encroach on the duke of Alençon's possessions.[19] To check this hostility the regent turned to the Penthièvre, the representatives of the rival house of Blois, who, however, were then at peace with the ducal house. Under French stimulation they treacherously seized and imprisoned

given is 1421 but it was in 1420 that the second Sunday in Lent came on March 3. Walsingham, *Historia Anglicana*, II, 331, gives the date as May 16, 1420. Can the month and day be a copyist's error? The earlier date is more in accord with the other dates of Salisbury's operations. Jouvenel des Ursins, p. 546, puts this incident in 1418 which only serves to illustrate how unreliable he is for the chronology of border warfare. It was the marshal de Rieux who was taken.

[16] Feb. 1420, letter of Sir John Denis, late lieutenant of Essay, and Robert Croseby, late constable of Essay, to the treasurer-general saying that they had received his orders to make inquiry about certain men who were taking towns and receiving men into obedience throughout the bailliage of Alençon. They reply that they are too busy to do this, but that they know that Walter Hampton, commissioner of the earl of March, and John Newton, esq., are going about taking allegiances and occupying towns, Brit. Mus., Add. Ch. 285.

[17] On May 10, 1420, there was a successful sortie from Le Mans against the English, Charles, *op. cit.*, p. 25. Jouvenel des Ursins, p. 556, mentions Ste. Suzanne as the castle nearest the English.

[18] De Beaucourt, I, 202, note 2.

[19] Mar. 16, 1420, the dauphin to the Penthièvre, Cosneau, *Richemont*, appendix XIV, pp. 494-6.

Duke John on February 13, 1420. But if the French government hoped to secure a hold on Brittany similar to that enjoyed by Henry through his possession of Arthur of Richemont and Jeanne of Navarre, widow of Henry IV,[20] respectively brother and mother of the duke, it was disappointed. The Breton duchess immediately undertook with vigor to regain her husband by force[21] and waged successful war upon the Penthièvre until in July they gave in their submission.[22] In the course of the struggle the Bretons appealed to Salisbury, then at Argentan, and to Henry, for military aid[23] and Richemont's release. Henry, however, with the treaty of Troyes just concluded, felt too confident to accede to these requests without compensation, hoping by negotiation to secure Breton recognition of the treaty and possibly active support in the field. The liberation of Duke John on July 5, 1420, forced him to grant Richemont a temporary release,[24] while negotiations continued with a view to obtaining Breton adherence to the treaty of Troyes.

As for conditions on the southwestern frontier, there is a report from the bailli of Cotentin for June 15, 1420. In it that official wrote that Aumâle had left Mont St.

[20] The former had been captured at Agincourt, G. Gruel, *Chronique d'Arthur de Richemont, connétable de France, duc de Bretagne, 1393-1458* (A. le Vavasseur, editor, Société de l'Histoire de France, Paris, 1890), p. 118. The latter had been arrested in England in the fall of 1419 charged with sorcery directed against the king, *Rot. Parl.*, IV, 118; Devon Issues, p. 362.

[21] Morice, *Preuves*, II, 1008-16.

[22] See J. Trévédy, "Attentats des Penthièvre contre le Duc Jean V (1420-1422)." *Revue de Bretagne*, XXXIX, 318; XL, 109-221; XLI, 140 (1908-9).

[23] June 27, 1420, the duke's secretary to Henry, writing from Honfleur, J. J. Champollion-Figeac, *Lettres des rois, reines, et autres personnages des cours de France et d'Angleterre, depuis Louis VII jusqu'à Henri IV* (2 vols., Paris, 1839-47), II, 381.

[24] For a French idea of Henry's state of mind, see the speech put into the king's mouth in his reply to the Breton ambassadors, Bouchart, *Grand Chron.*, f. 177. Rymer, X, 8.

Michel garrisoned by only a hundred men and straitened for wood and water so that the French "myght abide noon gret distresse and sege were layde about yaim." The war with the Penthièvre had drawn the Bretons from the Norman frontier. He had had no news of any "styrringe of the frensch men to Costantin ward," the country was pacified, Angers was stripped of defenders, and the populace in the intervening region would welcome the English as a relief from the dauphin's men.[25] Evidently the bailli hoped for orders to advance southward, and the dauphin apparently expected such an attack,[26] but Henry was elsewhere engaged, utilizing his forces against Melun and leaving the border authorities to remain on the defensive.[27]

In the east during 1420 the Anglo-Burgundian allies occupied the strongholds along the Yonne and the Seine, stationing L'Isle-Adam at Joigny to hold the frontier.[28] Here the Dauphinois made themselves troublesome by recapturing Villeneuve-le-Roi, from which the transport of provisions from the upper Seine valley to Paris could be hindered. L'Isle-Adam attempted to regain the place, but on the arrival, January 29, 1421, of a French force under William de Chaumont and the vicomte of Narbonne, and the receipt of rumors that the dauphin had hastily dispatched over a thousand men to garrison the

[25] Ellis (I, 74) dates this report 1419. Rôles de Bréquigny 1376 puts it in 1421. That it is 1420 appears from its allusion to the war of the Penthièvre which had not broken out in June, 1419, and was over in July, 1420, and from an allusion to the abbot of the Mont having applied for a safe-conduct to come into obedience. By Mar. 26, 1421, the latter had sworn allegiance, for on that date Henry appointed him one of the conservators of the Breton truce, Cal. Norm. Rolls, 42.412.

[26] Aug. 25, 1420, he gave orders to prepare Poitou for defense, *Ord.*, XII, 286.

[27] Aug. 24. 1420, letter of Suffolk setting forth what he has done "pour la tuission et defence de la ville d'Avrenches devant laquelle lendison venir les adnemis," Bib. Nat., fr. 26043, no. 5547. [28] Monstrelet, IV, 9.

town, he burned his camp, abandoned his wagon train, and withdrew again to Joigny. Lionel de Bourneville, sent to supersede L'Isle-Adam, merely raided into the upper Aube valley and distributed his men in garrisons at Chartres and places in France from whence they raided Beauce as far as the forest of Orleans.[29]

Meanwhile, early in 1421, Henry had returned to England, and his lieutenant, Thomas, duke of Clarence, intending possibly to prevent a Franco-Scottish invasion of Normandy by attacking the enemy in Anjou,[30] advanced southward, presumably from Alençon. Avoiding Le Mans by crossing the Huisne at Pont de Gennes,[31] he struck at Angers. The towns along the Loire prepared to defend themselves.[32] The regent's government sent troops to threaten the English retreat.[33] Angers, in the meantime, had beaten off the invaders, and Clarence being unprepared for a siege in hostile country so far from his base, withdrew to Beaufort. Here on March 23, 1421, from captured foragers, he learned that Buchan and Lafayette were at Baugé. The English numbered about 1500 men of all sorts.[34] Selecting 150 of those best mounted and armed, Clarence rode off to surprise the French before they became aware of his presence, leaving Salisbury and the remainder of the force at Beaufort. The scheme

[29] *Ibid.*, p. 35, "Le Livre des Trahisons," pp. 161-4; letter of the Armagnac captains, Jan. 29, 1421; de Beaucourt, I, 454, p. j. XVII; Cousinot, p. 155.

[30] This is the opinion of Chastellain, *Chronique*, I, 223.

[31] Charles, *Invasion Anglais*, p. 25.

[32] Blois sent an agent into Anjou "(pour) savoir la commire des Anglois—affin de savoir qu'il seroit à faire pour la seureté des villes et pais de mondit seigneur le duc (d'Orleans);" A. Joubert, *Documents inédits sur la Guerre de Cent Ans* (Angers, 1890), p. 8.

[33] Dauphin to Tours, Mar. 20, 1421, Luzarche, p. 35.

[34] This is the estimate of the official French dispatch, published in A. Lecoy de La Marche, *Le Roi René, sa vie, son administration, ses travaux artistiques et littéraires* (2 vols., Paris, 1875), I, 39, note 1.

was over-bold and met with complete and disastrous failure. The duke and many English noblemen were killed or captured.[35] The French did attempt to take Clarence alive as a means of regaining some of the Agincourt prisoners, but he fell in the mêlée.[36] When Salisbury appeared with the major part of the English expedition the French withdrew across the Loire[37] leaving their enemies to fall back via La Flèche and Le Mans into Normandy.[38]

Although strategically insignificant, the moral effect of this encounter was enormous. The death or capture of an English duke and five earls broke the spell of Agincourt. Most extravagant rumors of English losses spread through southern France into Italy.[39] At Paris the government called upon all officials to renew their allegiance to the treaty of Troyes, and suspects, including L'Isle-Adam, were arrested by Exeter, the English lieutenant.[40] To Reims and other towns Charles VI wrote urging them to remain faithful and to be on their guard against false rumors and surprise attacks, minimizing the battle, and

[35] See the list in Williams, *Gesta*, p. 274. Popular opinion in England said the day was lost "by cause they wolde nott take with hem archers, but thought to have doo with the ffrenshmen then selff wythoute hem. And yet whan he was slayne the archers come and rescued the body of the Duke, which they wold have caried with hem, god have mercy a pon his soule, he was a valyant man," Brit. Mus., Cottonian MSS. Claudius A VIII, f. 10v°.

[36] Cousinot, p. 180; Joubert, *ut supra.*

[37] Monstrelet, IV, 39; Cordeliers, p. 293; Hellot, "Chron. d'un bourgeois de Vernueil," p. 222; Walsingham, *Hist. Angl.*, II, 339.

[38] Jean de Bourdigné, *Chronique d'Anjou et du Maine, avec un avant propos de M. le comte de Quatrebarbes, et des notes par M. Godard-Faultrier* (Angers, 1842), p. 143. For this campaign in general see *ibid.*, pp. 141-2; Jouvenel des Ursins, pp. 564-5; Fenin, pp. 153-5; *Journal d'un Bourgeois*, p. 151-2; Elmham, chapter 114.

[39] Morosini, II, 202-3, notes 4-6; 204-5, 210-15.

[40] Fauquembergue, II, 14-5, 17-8; Monstrelet, IV, 37. Subsequently released, L'Isle-Adam was rewarded by Bedford with fiefs in Picardy confiscated from Jacques d'Harcourt and valued at 4000 l. t. yearly income, *Hist. d'Harcourt, Preuves*, IV, 2147.

promising that Henry and Philip of Burgundy would soon take the field with strong powers.[41]

The value of the victory became evident in the following months, during which the dauphin was negotiating with the estates for money and with Brittany for military support. Both sides had been bidding for the Breton alliance, and an English embassy had been with the duke since the middle of February.[42] But after the battle it became obvious to Henry that further negotiation, for the moment, was futile.[43] The Breton estates favored the French alliance,[44] and even before a treaty was formally concluded, Richard of Brittany, the duke's brother, had joined the dauphin at Le Mans with 2000 men.[45] At Sablé on May 8, 1421, a Franco-Breton alliance was signed.[46] The Breton contingent was eventually increased to 4000 men-at-arms and 1500 archers.[47]

To obtain money both sides were confiscating the property of the opposing partisans,[48] but for the regent this was insufficient. Early in 1421 he called together the notables at Selles and upon their advice assembled the estates general at Clermont in Auvergne on May first.[49] To the request from the archbishop of Bourges, speaking for the dauphin, for 1,200,000 l. t. to pay the "belle et notable compaignie de gens d'armes et de trait" with which Charles was about to take the field, the deputies

41 April 7, 1421, *Le Cabinet Historique,* I, 59.

42 Commissioned Feb. 12, 1421, Cal. Fr. Rolls, 44.622.

43 The mission lasted from Feb. 18 until April 7, Deprez, p. 30, no. 600.

44 Bouchart, f. 181.

45 May 5, 1421; de Beaucourt, I, 456, p. j. XX.

46 Morice, *Preuves,* II, 1091. 47 Bib. Nat., fr. 26044, nos. 5670-5672.

48 Jan. 8, 1421, ordonnance of Charles VI against the Armagnacs; *Ord.,* XI, 113. In March, 1423, there is mention of a special commission "ad recipiendum confiscationes et forefacturas," Bib. de Rouen, Coll. Leber 5870, t. III. f. 227v°.

49 Feb. 8, 1421, Dauphin to Lyons, A. Thomas, "Les États Generaux sous Charles VII," *Le Cabinet Historique,* XXIV[1], 212.

responded with a grant of 100,000 l. t. from the clergy and 700,000 l. t. from the laity of Languedoil. They accompanied this grant with the request that Normandy, when recovered, be spared from pillage, that the abuses practised by the garrisons of Auvergne be remedied, and that the men-at-arms be restrained from living on "le povre peuple."[50] As in former years the government anticipated this income by extensive borrowing to meet current expenses, pledging the demesne as security.[51]

During these weeks the military situation developed slowly, waiting, on one side upon diplomacy and finance, on the other upon King Henry's return to the continent with a new army. Salisbury with the Anglo-Norman forces barred a French advance into Normandy from Le Mans, where were the dauphin's headquarters, and for

[50] Charles de Grandmaison, "Nouveaux documents sur les États Generaux du XV^e siècle" (*Bulletin de la Société Archéologique de Touraine*, IV, 139-55, Tours, 1879), pp. 147, 149-51; de Beaucourt, I, 458, p. j. XXII. Such complaints were not new. On Jan. 21, 1421 Orleans sent a deputation to the dauphin "luy requérir commant l'en ne prist nulz laboureurs et nulz chevaulx et que marchandise se peust faire seurement et qu'il feist deffendre à gens d'armes qu'ilz ne meffeissent aucunement ne à marchant, ne à laboureur, sur peine de la hart," Villaret, "Campagnes des Anglais etc." p. 4, note 1, quoting Archives municipales d'Orleans, CC651, mand. 53. For depredations by the Scots see *La Semaine du Fidèle* (19th year, no. 13, Le Mans, 1881), p. 299. Châteaudun made a present to two officials "pour leur peine d'avoir fait vuider les gens d'armes qui destruisoient tout le pais et embloient le bestail et le vendoient," Merlet, p. 15. See also Rôles de Bréquigny 1376.

[51] April 8, 1421, the monks of Mont St. Michel loaned 3000 l. t. to Aumâle, Luce, *Chron.* I. 108, p. j. XI. For the expense of transporting the earls of Douglas and Mar with a new Scottish army the regent borrowed, in April, 1421, 13,000 écus d'or from the governor of La Rochelle, who commanded the transport fleet, and from two others. This same governor advanced 19,000 écus more for victualling the ships and covering the loss during two previous voyages to Scotland of six large ships. The first loan was repaid in 1424. The total borrowed from these three men was 36,000 écus, for some of which the crown jewels were pledged, Arch. Nat. J 183, nos. 136-141; Perceval de Cagny, p. 123. May 30, 1421, loan of 10,000 l. t. was solicited from Lyons, de Beaucourt, I, 458, p. j. XXII.

over two months, apparently, the two forces faced each other in this region in constant expectation of a clash.[52] It may be that the Armagnacs pushed to within sight of Alençon but without accomplishing anything.[53] Despite Clarence's defeat the French captains still preferred to try their strength against the Burgundians rather than the English. Consequently they advanced northeastward from Le Mans against Chartres, the occupation of which would relieve Dreux from isolation and threaten Paris. Between June 10 (?) and June 25 they occupied or captured Montmirail, Boisruffin, Beaumont-les-Autels, Villebon, Nogent-le-Roi,[54] Maurepas, Tillières, and Gallardon,[55] recovered most of Beauce, and besieged Chartres.[56] Simultaneously the Dreux garrison made an incursion into Normandy and captured Bec.[57]

[52] April 7, 1421, Charles VI wrote "et de present est l'armeé ensemble soubz beau cousin de Salesbery.—Il est à penser que de ce pourriez estre troubles"; *Le Cabinet Historique,* I, 60. May 5, Jean Caille, elû of Lyons wrote home from Le Mans that the English were only twelve miles away, and that a clash was expected soon, de Beaucourt, I, 456, p. j. XX. Under May 16 is the entry "dominus noster regnum Regens, cum exercitu suo est in hoc civitate (Le Mans) hospitatus, profecturus in Normanniam contra Anglicos," Charles, *Invasion Anglais,* p. 30, quoting Archives de la Sarthe, G 18 f. 46v°.

[53] Monstrelet, IV, 40. His account of Salisbury's being driven back to Bec sounds very much like a confused tale of subsequent events.

[54] June 20, 1421, Fauquembergue, II, 20.

[55] "nos dites enemis vindrent devant nostre ville et tour de Galardon laquelle par force et violence prinrent et y firent pluseurs grans et enormes maulx aux habitans icelle," Arch. Nat., JJ 172, no. 478. "la Roy de France se mist sus et ala à Gallardon et le print d'assault et fist copper la teste au cappitaine nomme le Roucellier," Bib. Nat., fr. nouv. acq. 4518, f. 26 v°; Johannis de Fordun, *Scotochronicon Genuinum* (Thomas Hearne, editor, 5 vols., Oxford, 1722), pp. 1218-19.

[56] Perceval de Cagny, pp. 121-2; St. Denis, VI, 462-4; Luzarche, pp. 37-40; de Beaucourt, I, 461, p. j. XXIV; Hellot, "Chron. d'un bourg. de Vern.," p. 222.

[57] June 13, 1421, *Chronique de Bec,* p. 90; chanoine Porée, *Histoire de l'Abbaye du Bec* (2 vols., Evreux, 1901), II, 183, note 2; H. Denifle, *Le desolation des eglises, monastères et hôpitaux en France pendant la guerre*

This French movement against Chartres left Salisbury free to strike at Anjou, which he promptly did. By June 14 he had made a foray as far south as Angers, returning with "the fareste and gretteste Prey of Bestes, as alle the seiden that saw hem, that evre they saw," after an unsuccessful attempt to capture Château-Gontier by treason and surprise.[58] "And trewly," he wrote the king, "we were afore diverse Places, that what Time hit liketh zow to sette on hem, or to commaunde any other Man to sette on hem, they be nat able, with Goddes Grace, to holde ajenst zow no whyle."[59] News from Bec, however, called Salisbury from the Angevin frontier. By the time he reached the abbey the neighboring garrisons had recovered it, but the incident impressed upon the earl the need for more strongly guarding the regions now threatened by the enemy, so he took up a new position on the frontier of the Chartrain.

By this time Henry had returned to France. In the course of six months English prestige had been shaken and the possession of Normandy and Paris threatened in a manner which might become serious. In addition to the dauphin's operations in the south, there were annoying activities on the part of the Armagnac captains in the Somme and Aisne valleys. Although isolated from the regent's forces south of the Loire, such captains as Jacques d'Harcourt at Le Crotoy, the sieur d'Offemont, La Hire, and Poton de Saintrailles, carried on a warfare of raids and surprises, which desolated the country and made communications dangerous. On occasion, by cooperative action, they could assemble in force large

de Cent ans (2 vols. in 3, Paris, 1897-99), I, 71. Fear of such incursions as this may account for the order to prepare Maulevrier for defense, May 9, 1421, Rôles de Bréquigny 1298.

[58] A. Joubert, *Une Tentative des Anglais contre Château-Gontier en 1421 d'apres des documents inédits* (Mamers, 1888).

[59] Rymer, X, 131; Adam of Usk, pp. 133, 319.

enough to give battle to an army, but they lacked sufficient organization and cohesion to conduct strategic operations. Their suppression was essential to the retention of Henry's conquests and was an important item in his military programme, but it was not vital and in June 1421 his chief concern lay farther south where more serious troubles threatened.[60]

An army of from four to five thousand men, organized in May and mustered in June,[61] came from England to meet the new French attacks. Probably these would have been used to pacify Picardy, whither Henry went on landing at Calais, had not news arrived that Chartres was endangered. The king hurried at once to Paris "as wel for to sette our fadir of Ffrance as the saide good toune of Paris in seure gouvernance."[62] His forces he concentrated at Pontoise, Mantes, Meulan, and Vernon, whither Duke Philip came to consider the plan of campaign. The dauphin, however, was unwilling to risk battle and withdrew from Chartres to Vendôme while the English were mobilizing on the Seine. This enabled the allies to divide their forces, each turning to protect his own

[60] For conditions in Picardy and elsewhere see Fenin, pp. 152-3, and appendix, pp. 296-9; Chastellain, "Chronique," I, 232-4; "La Livre des Trahisons," pp. 148-51; Jean Raoulet, pp. 175-7; Douët d'Arcq, *Pieces inédits,* II, 19; La Fons Melicocq, *Une Cité Picarde,* pp. 93-4. Le Crotoy could get supplies by sea (Rôles de Bréquigny 1296) and annoy the Channel traffic despite English naval superiority, *Cal. Pat. Rolls, Henry V,* II, 400.

[61] A detailed, tabulated study of this army in 1421 and 1422 will be found in Harvard University Library, HU 90.1215, appendix IX, based chiefly upon P.R.O., Ex. Accts. 50/1, 50/4, 50/7, 50/10, 50/11, 50/12, 50/13, 50/14, 50/15, 50/16, 50/17, 50/50; For. Accts. 69; supplemented from For. Accts. 73, K; Brit. Mus., Stowe MSS. 440; *Cal. Pat. Rolls, Henry V,* II, *passim; Proceedings,* II, *passim;* and Dugdale. May 27, 1421, order to proclaim mobilization at ports of embarkation; P.R.O., Chanc. Enroll. 271 (Close Roll 7 Henry V), m. 23 d°.

[62] He landed June 10, Elmham, p. 309. Gallardon was stormed June 25; Henry reached Paris July 4 and left July 8, Fauquembergue, II, 19-20; July 10, Henry to London, Delpit, p. 231.

interests, Philip to pacify Picardy, and Henry to reassure the safety of his southern frontier by capturing Dreux. Besieged July 22, 1421,[63] that fortress capitulated August 8 and opened its gates on the 20th,[64] while at the same time the English reasserted their control of the whole surrounding region by recovering Bonneval, Epernon, Gallardon, Nogent-le-Roi, Tillières, and Croisy.[65]

For the moment Henry anticipated that the French would resume the offensive, and the Norman garrisons were ordered, in consequence, to assemble at Chartres by August 23 to resist them, while the baillis proclaimed the ban and arrière-ban and summoned all soldiers to the royal standard.[66] But the dauphin had already determined merely to remain in observation along the Loire with his headquarters at Vendôme,[67] shifting his offensive eastward against Burgundy,[68] out of reach of the English king. Unopposed Henry made a demonstration in the Orleanais as far as the Loire itself, but accomplished little. Indeed the ravages of famine and disease made the campaign so costly in men that it was almost equivalent to a disaster. The situation at Paris, however, was relieved by the recovery of Villeneuve-le-Roi, a relief which Henry proceeded to augment still further by capturing Meaux, the last center of Armagnacism in the Paris basin.[69]

[63] Cochon, p. 387. On July 26, stones for bombards and cannon were brought to the siege from Mantes, Bib. Nat., fr. 26046, no. 58.

[64] Arch. Nat., JJ 171, nos. 442-449.

[65] For the foregoing, see Elmham, pp. 309, 311; Fenin, pp. 155-7; Cochon, pp. 386-7; Chastellain, "Chronique," I, 236-40, 278-80; Hellot, *Cron. de Norm.*, p. 66; *ibid.*, "Chron. d'un bourg. de Vern.," p. 223; *Journal d'un Bourgeois*, p. 157; Delpit, p. 231.

[66] Cal. Norm. Rolls, 42.431.

[67] Dauphin to Lyons, July 9, 1421, de Beaucourt, I, 461, p. j. XXIV.

[68] July 26, 1421, ordonnance for the defense of Burgundy from attack from Lyons and Mâcon, Plancher, *Preuves*, IV, 12.

[69] Elmham, pp. 312-4; Jouvenel des Ursins, p. 566; Monstrelet, IV, 69-70; Cousinot, pp. 157-8; Hellot, *Cron. de Norm.*, pp. 66-7; Alain Chartier, f.

That Henry could thus leave the Norman frontier to protect itself indicates that he had little fear of the French at Vendôme. They too had suffered from dearth and disease,[70] and had felt constrained to keep a force watching Henry from a distance as long as he threatened Orleans.[71] Indeed it would appear that the French campaign had halted until new supplies of men and money could be collected. In July, the estates of Languedoc sitting at Carcassonne voted 200,000 l. t. for the war.[72] Early in the same month a war council at Blois determined upon a general summons for all fighting men to assemble at Vendôme by August 25.[73] On that date, however, the results of the summons were such that it had to be repeated.[74] An embassy was then dispatched to Castile to

44d°; St. Denis, VI, 464-6; "La Livre des Trahisons," pp. 165-6; Fauquembergue, II, 27-8. There is constant allusion to the English losses by hunger and disease. Study of the documents confirms the probability of very considerable loss, Harvard University Library HU 90.1215, appendix IX. Here we find that 47 companies, which at full strength would have numbered 2413 men, by the end of 1421, had been reduced to 1280. The figures for full strength are for the May indenture. In the fall there was a general re-indenture when captains might have taken occasion to reduce their contingents. That they did so, except as a result of losses, seems unlikely inasmuch as the siege of Meaux was then in progress, but this should be remembered in considering the extent of the English losses during the campaign.

[70] *Ord.*, XI, 126; de Beaucourt, I, 461, p. j. XXIV. The army could not be held together "pour les grans vivres et logis dont avoient besoing," instructions for the ambassadors to Castile, Daumet, p. 222, p. j. 56.

[71] Dauphin to Lyons, Sept. 6, 1421, de Beaucourt, I, 231.

[72] Vaissette, IX, 1068, puts this in mid-September, but a document of Aug. 29, 1421, mentions things "nagueres par les gens des troys estas dudit pays de Languedoc donne et ottroye," Bib. Nat., fr. 26044, no. 5652. Mar. 22, 1422, the regent remitted to certain towns in the diocese of Carcassonne their share of the 150,000 (sic) l. t. voted by the estates of Languedoc in July, 1421, Arch. Nat., K 60, no. 18[1]. Probably this sum was the laity's share, the other 50,000 l. t. coming from the clergy. That the vote was 200,000 l. t. appears from Bib. Nat., fr. 26044, no. 5716. For attempts to raise money by mortgaging the demesne see *Ord.*, XI, 141, 159.

[73] *Ord.*, XI, 126.

[74] Bib. Nat., fr. 26044, no. 5650.

complain that the Spanish fleet which had been threatening England during the spring[75] had returned home, to request the dispatch of an army under some Spanish grandee, and to borrow enough money to pay that army for half a year.[76]

In the meantime Dauphinois companies were sent into Lower Normandy to give the English such annoyance as they could.[77] To meet these Henry sent Suffolk into the marches to protect the country, with orders to destroy Chanteloup and Bricqueville between Avranches and Coutances, from which the men had probably been withdrawn in August for the king's campaign.[78] By September 22, Aumâle had organized a French force to attack Normandy "presentement." From the fact that Charles ordered his finance commissioners to pay the count 8000 l. t. as a month's wages for his force at the rate of one franc per lance it would seem as if it were a considerable army according to the standards of the time, but when the regent expressly stipulated that no records of musters or reviews were to be demanded of Aumâle, we cannot but suspect "graft,"[79] and must assume that the French were in no such strength. Richard of Brittany and Marshal Severac were also operating in Lower Nor-

[75] Mar. 19, 1421, Henry to the constable of Wight warning him of an expected attack, *Proceedings,* II, 362.

[76] Sept. 1, 1421, instructions for the ambassadors to Castile, Daumet, pp. 222-5, p. j. 56. Henry, on his side, was negotiating with Aragon for an alliance or an assurance of neutrality, *Proceedings,* II, 285.

[77] "se sont mis en plusers parties et sont les aucuns allez vers la Basse Normendie, les autres vers Gyen et selon la riviére de Loire, et les autres vers Angoumois pour assegier une plasse nommée Montberon," Daumet, p. 222. For activity near Gien see Plancher, *Preuves,* IV, no. 13.

[78] Henry was waiting for Suffolk to join him at Beaugency in September, Elmham, p. 312. Sept. 28, Suffolk was appointed governor of the marches of Lower Normandy, Cal. Norm. Rolls, 42.434. Orders to Suffolk and Assheton, bailli of Cotentin, of the same date, Rôles de Bréquigny 1036. In August troops had been summoned from these two castles, Cal. Norm. Rolls, 42.431.

[79] *Hist. d'Harcourt, Preuves,* IV, 1681-3.

mandy,[80] and the situation became so menacing that Gloucester went into the Cotentin to support Suffolk, and the ban and arrière-ban was proclaimed.[81] Early in December the French struck. Aumâle besieged and captured Ballon and possibly Tanis, but an English attack southward upon Dangeau drew him away from further invasion of Normandy.[82] The next month, however, the Scots again took Avranches, and Salisbury had to be dispatched from before Meaux to recover it.[83] Farther east the garrisons at Senonches and Nogent-le-Rotrou harassed the border,[84] while the captain of Étampes even had the hardihood to storm Meulan on April 6, 1422. Here he held on for nine days until Salisbury recovered the place.[85]

In consequence of these difficulties in Normandy, Henry issued much more drastic regulations. When Bec was recovered, he gave special orders that none of the captives were to be ransomed, an order, which in December, 1421, he extended to cover all Normans taken prisoner of war.[86] Captives of other nationality, who could not therefore be so readily suspected of bad faith or rebellion, were

[80] Before Oct. 12, 1421, Brit. Mus., Add. Ch. 11474.

[81] Nov. 9, 1421, order to assemble at St. Lô within a fortnight. Garrisons were exempt, Rôles de Bréquigny 1052. See also Jean Chartier, *Chronique de Charles VII, roi de France* (Vallet de Viriville, editor, 3 vols., Paris, 1858), I, 31-2; Bouchart, f. 181.

[82] *Hist. d'Harcourt, Preuves,* IV, 1685. Tanis was in French hands in 1424, Jean Chartier, I, 43.

[83] Monstrelet, IV, 80-1; Fordun, pp. 1219-20. The date is ascertained approximately from the order of Jan. 10 directing men-at-arms and archers to hasten to Salisbury, Cal. Norm. Rolls, 42.437.

[84] Le Cacheux, *Actes de la Chancellerie,* I, 63, tells how Laigle attempted to buy peace. See also p. 79.

[85] Fauquembergue, II, 42-3; *Journal d'un Bourgeois,* p. 168; Cousinot, pp. 184, 189. April 7, 1422, all English subjects ordered to join Salisbury at Mantes, Cal. Norm. Rolls, 42.448. See Bib. Nat., fr. nouv. acq. 1482, no. 12, for evidence of guerillas before Dec. 5, 1421. Jan. 13, 1422, permit to the garde des sceaux des obligations of Auge to live in Lisieux "propter confluentiam brigandorum in partibus d'Auge," Rôles de Bréquigny 1315.

[86] Rôles de Bréquigny 1000, 1061.

not to be ransomed "nisi in auro vel marcis argenteis, in massa vel vasis."[87] As early as the preceding summer the king wrote to his baillis that he had learned that many nobles and others, former liegemen, had either gone over to the enemy or taken to careers of brigandage. Inquests were to be instituted to discover the names of such persons and their goods were to be seized within a fortnight.[88] To prevent, as far as possible, aiding and abetting guerillas, the wives of all those "extra obedientiam" were to be expelled from the duchy,[89] and to protect Caux, Rouen, and the Vexin, the captains of river castles were warned to be particularly alert,[90] while extensive efforts were made to secure all the boats on the Seine and to keep them under supervision.[91] Weakly garrisoned castles were destroyed lest they become "concursus brigandorum."[92]

Meantime the king maintained his lines about Meaux and kept up negotiations with a view to undermining the Franco-Breton alliance of May, 1421. In June of that year Suffolk and Richemont went to Brittany to detach the duke from the dauphin.[93] By the end of November the latter had secured permission to lead a Breton force to Henry's aid at Meaux.[94] Despite his alliance with

[87] *Ibid.* 1088. Probably this was also an attempt to exclude the debased French coinage, or the counterfeits which the Dauphinois were making, Rôles de Bréquigny 1058. [88] June 27, 1421, Rôles de Bréquigny 1001.

[89] Dec. 2, 1421, *ibid.* 1314. [90] Dec. 6, 1421, Cal. Norm. Rolls, 42.435.

[91] May 1422, *ibid.* 448. These were to be taken up on a certain day and collected at certain towns under the supervision of the water bailli of Rouen and the captain of Pont de l'Arche. Aug. 13, 1422, order for English officials to inspect the river banks and destroy all boats moored in unassigned places, Cal. Norm. Rolls, 42.452.

[92] Rôles de Bréquigny 1078, 1138.

[93] Gruel, p. 189. Suffolk was recalled in September to participate in the Loire campaign and was then sent to guard the southern marches, *vide supra*, p. 284.

[94] Nov. 29, 1421, the bailli of Gisors ordered to protect the men-at-arms of Arthur, count of Ivry, Cal. Norm. Rolls, 42.419.

Charles, Duke John evidently continued his truce with Henry, for the latter maintained a commission to redress infractions thereof,[95] and a meeting with the Bretons was arranged for November 11, 1421, at Pontorson.[96] In addition to the captive Richemont, the English king had another hold on the duke in the person of his mother, Joanna of Navarre, Henry's stepmother, whose imprisonment in England caused anxiety at the Breton court.[97] He also undertook to secure the person of the fugitive count of Penthièvre, Duke John's rival and enemy, now held prisoner in Hainault by the marquis of Baden.[98] At the end of 1421, however, nothing had been accomplished. Breton privateersmen made war on the English at sea, running between St. Malo and Le Crotoy,[99] even daring to raid the harbor of Caen.[100] By December 1, 1421, the situation was so unsatisfactory that Henry suspended all intercourse with Brittany.[101] With the return of spring, however, the duke, evidently convinced that the English position was secure, renewed negotiations in person.[102] The fall of Meaux on May 10 decided him and ambassa-

[95] Appointed March 26, 1421, Cal. Norm. Rolls, 42.412; renewed Aug. 8, *ibid.* 414; renewed Oct. 10, *ibid.* 417. [96] *Ibid.* 434.

[97] "Et en oultre desiroit nostredit Seigneur aller ezdites parties de par de la devers lesdits Seigneurs (i.e. Bedford and Burgundy in 1423), pour poursuir la delivrance et revenuë par-deça de Madame la Royne d'Angleterre sa mere, que n'a pas pru obtenir par ambaxeurs, jacoit ceque par plusieurs fois y ait envoyé, desirant, il et ses freres et seurs, comme bons, vrais, enfans et charitables, veoir la personne de leur mere, qui tant longtems a esté loingtaine de ses enfans et tant desire les veoir, qu'il n'est chose qui lui puisse donner confort ne resjoissement, jusques ad ce qu'elle puisse venir par deça les veoir et visiter, et y estre en sa franchise et liberté," Plancher, *Preuves,* III, no. 314.

[98] July 17, 1421, commission to negotiate with the marquis, Cal. French Rolls, 44.629. The calendar erroneously prints "Poictou" for Penthièvre.

[99] *Ibid.,* 44.631; *Cal. Pat. Rolls, Henry V,* II, 444; Rôles de Bréquigny 1377; Luce, *Chronique,* p. 122, p. j. XVIII.

[100] Early in 1423, Arch. Nat., JJ 172, no. 268.

[101] Rôles de Bréquigny 1313.

[102] April 24, 1422, safe-conduct for the duke, Cal. Norm. Rolls, 42.441.

dors went up from Rennes to Paris to give in the ducal adherence to the treaty of Troyes.[103]

Negotiations to the same end with the count of Foix during 1422 came to no definite results.[104] Elsewhere also Henry sought diplomatically to undermine the dauphin, by negotiating with Sigismund for the cession to him of Dauphiné and Languedoc,[105] and by concluding an alliance with Genoa,[106] while at the same time he was seeking recruits in Germany and Portugal.[107]

In the north where Burgundy was in command, despite his victory of August 30, 1421 at Mons-en-Vimeu over the combined Armagnac garrisons, the situation remained practically unchanged throughout the winter of 1421-22.[108] Partisan warfare continued, with Jacques d'Harcourt, now lieutenant for the dauphin north of the Seine,[109] as the moving spirit among the Armagnacs and Sir Jean Luxembourg directing the Burgundians. The English

[103] June 6, safe-conduct for an embassy, *ibid.*, 42.443; June 26, instructions to the ambassadors, Morice, *Preuves*, II, 1112; July 17, another safe-conduct, Cal. Norm. Rolls, 42.444; July 27, arrival of the embassy at Paris, Fauquembergue, II, 54.

[104] Mar. 3, 1422, Charles VI appointed Foix governor of Languedoc, Besse, p. 332. April 20, the English exchequer issued £2318 2s 8d to three ambassadors going to the count, P.R.O., Issue Roll 655, m. 2. For negotiations over the treaty of Troyes, in July 1422, see Vaissette, IX, 1071.

[105] Cal. Fr. Rolls, 44.629.

[106] Oct. 26, 1421, J. Dumont, *Corps Universel Diplomatique du Droit des Gens* (8 vols., Amsterdam and the Hague, 1726-31), I, 155.

[107] Cal. Fr. Rolls, 44.633; Deprez, nos. 602-4.

[108] For Burgundy's campaign see René de Belleval, *La Journée de Mons-en-Vimeu et le Ponthieu après le traité de Troyes* (Paris, 1861), which is based on the chroniclers. Additional matter of interest will be found in Calonne, *Histoire d'Amiens*, II, 376; La Fons Mélicocq, "1421, Documents inédits. Siege de St. Riquier—bataille de Mons-en-Vimeu" (*La Picardie*, III, 145-55, Amiens, 1857); F. C. Louandre, *Histoire d'Abbeville et du Comté de Ponthieu jusque 1789* (3rd edition, 2 vols., Abbeville, 1883), I, 333.

[109] Appointed Nov. 6, 1421, Bib. Nat., Portefeuilles de Fontainieu 111-112, f. 246.

garrisons along the Bethune had driven out of Vimeu the French raiders from Le Crotoy and St. Valéry,[110] and in the spring of 1422 Sir Ralph Bouteller, captain of Eu, Monceaux and Guillemcourt, co-operated with the Burgundians in clearing Picardy of hostiles.[111] Upper Normandy evidently remained untouched. When Meaux surrendered, May 10, 1422, the greater part of the Armagnac resistance in the north collapsed. Henry sent Warwick into Vimeu to reduce Gamaches and St. Valéry.[112] These were eventually placed under command of Sir Ralph Bouteller, who evidently played the rôle of captain of the northern marches.[113] The king himself set out to receive on June 18, 1422, the surrender of Compiègne,[114] which had capitulated on the capture of Meaux, intending later to advance against Le Crotoy,[115] while Burgundy reduced Guise,[116] thus completing the most important part of the conquest of the north from the Armagnacs.[117] But his

110 Monstrelet, IV, 76.

111 Fenin, pp. 179-80. April 26, 1422, he was empowered to take men from the Picard garrisons (Ham and Guisnes?) to strengthen his retinue, Cal. Norm. Rolls, 42.448.

112 June 11, 1422, Gamaches capitulated, Arch. Nat., JJ 172, no. 361. July 9, the treasurer of war paid Warwick £666 13s 4d for the army that besieged St. Valéry, P.R.O., For. Accts. 69, Fvº, m. 2, Grº, m. 1, Hvº, m. 2. This would be a month's pay for about 600 men. Probably St. Valéry capitulated in July, agreeing to surrender Sept. 4, 1422, Monstrelet, IV, 101-3. Probably the order of Aug. 9 for the Norman garrisons to send men to Sir Ralph Bouteller at Eu was in preparation for the "journée" at St. Valéry, Cal. Norm. Rolls, 42.452.

113 For numerous Armagnac surrenders see Monstrelet, IV, 97; Fenin, p. 177; *Report on the Foedera* "Archives de France," p. 246; *Annales de la Société Historique et Archéologique de Château-Thierry,* 1872, pp. 113-4, 116-20; Arch. Nat., JJ 172, nos. 73, 96, 100, 128; Beauville, *Histoire de Montdidier,* I, 140.

114 Fauquembergue, II, 51; Elmham, pp. 328-9.

115 Monstrelet, IV, 104.

116 Waurin, III, 4-5. For Burgundy's summons to his captains see Beauville, *Receuil de documents inédits concernant la Picardie,* I, 95.

117 Fenin, p. 182. There were minor strongholds which still held out, Waurin, III, 5; Sorel, *La prise de Jeanne d'Arc,* pp. 70-1. The roads were not yet safe, Beauville, p. 94; Flammermont, p. 233.

plans were upset by renewed French activity on the upper Loire. There the Dauphinois had captured La Charité-sur-Loire[118] and were besieging Cosne. Abandoning his northern campaign Henry turned southward, sending Bedford forward to join the Burgundians in relieving Cosne. He was himself too sick to keep up with the army, and almost before the siege had been raised, he died at Bois Vincennes on August 29, 1422.[119]

The king's death, coming at a time when the Armagnacs in the north were merely "scotched," revived their activity, both in that region and elsewhere. Repulsed before Cosne they struck in Lower Normandy. Shortly before this, some local seigneurs had failed in an attempt on Fresnay-le-Vicomte and been badly mauled by the garrison while withdrawing.[120] Now the count of Aumâle and the vicomte of Narbonne led a raid as far north as Bernay. Attacked on their retirement towards Maine near Mortagne they repulsed their assailants and returned triumphantly into French territory. It is a little difficult to determine the date of this raid. Perceval de Cagny gives August 14, 1422, as the day of battle[121] and the monk of St. Denis also puts these events in August.[122] On the other hand, Jean Chartier recounts this raid after the death of Charles VI (i.e. October or later),[123] and the "Chronique de Mont St. Michel" has a similar arrange-

[118] They had at least 2500 men there and were gathering more, Morice, *Preuves,* II, 1120-4; de Beaucourt, I, 470, p. j. XXXII.

[119] Monstrelet, IV, 106; Fenin, pp. 184-5; Elmham, pp. 329-30; Cousinot, pp. 159-60.

[120] Jean Chartier, I, 14-15; *Chronique de La Pucelle* (Vallet de Viriville, editor, Paris, 1859), pp. 185-6. Bourdigné (p. 152) gives the victory in this skirmish to the French, but he is evidently confused with another skirmish which occurred in Maine, *Chronique de La Pucelle,* p. 186. Sir Richard Woodville, seneschal of Normandy, was in charge at Alençon and Fresnay, Brit. Mus., Add. Ch. 8011.

[121] Perceval de Cagny, pp. 124-5.

[122] St. Denis, VI, 474-8; Jouvenel des Ursins (p. 567) merely repeats the monk's first chapter on this raid.

[123] Jean Chartier, I, 15-18.

ment,[124] while Cousinot places it after Henry's death.[125] The greater probability of the later date is strengthened by the fact that on October 9, 1422, the bailli of Caen ordered his vicomtes to proclaim that all accustomed to bear arms be prepared for service under Bedford.[126] This was followed on October 11 by orders for all soldiers to return at once to their captains,[127] and for all Norman lieges to assemble at Domfront by November 4.[128] There was also a prohibition upon pilgrimages to Mont St. Michel,[129] probably with a view to cutting off information from the enemy. These would seem to indicate that an attack was expected for early in November. They are too long after August 14 to be regarded as an immediate consequence of an attack at that time, if there was one. They are the sort of orders which we find issued at other times when the French made raids.[130]

The new English régime, headed by Bedford, was faced with a task of considerable difficulty from the very fact that Henry had so dominated military and political affairs during his life. Much of the fear which his enemies felt for the English arms seems to have centered upon the person of the king. French chroniclers of the next generation dwell on his "ferocity" and "savagery,"[131] but his contemporaries saw in him a statesman of large purposes, stern justice, and skilful generalship, feared and

124 Luce, *Chron. de Mont St. Michel,* I, 24.

125 Cousinot, *Geste des Nobles,* p. 161.

126 Bib. Nat., fr. 26044, no. 5772.

127 Luce, *Chronique,* I, 119, p. j. XVI.

128 Bib. Nat., fr. 26044, no. 5777.

129 Luce, *Chronique,* I, 120, p. j. XVI.

130 Possibly Perceval de Cagny and St. Denis confused the dates for the attack on Fresnay with the events of the Bernay raid. For matériel issued to Aumâle for this raid see *Hist. d'Harcourt, Preuves,* IV, 1685.

131 R. Blondel, "De Reductione Normanniae" (*Narratives of the Expulsion of the English from Normandy, 1449-1450.* J. Stevenson, editor, Rolls Series, London, 1863), pp. 17, 220.

respected by his followers among whom he enforced discipline, a protector of the common people, a terror to his opponents,[132] "and among the monarchs of the age easily the first."[133] Small wonder that the Armagnacs saw in his death renewed hopes for successful resistance, for Bedford had yet to prove himself a prudent and energetic statesman, capable of preserving and extending his brother's conquests.[134]

His first task was to secure Breton adhesion to the English cause, for the ambassadors from Rennes had not yet sworn to recognize the treaty of Troyes. On October 8, 1422, they did so,[135] Bedford in return agreeing to make no peace with the dauphin which did not include Brittany,[136] and Charles VI graciously according the Breton duke 15,000 livres annually from the royal dues in the duchy.[137] Then came six months of negotiation for a triple alliance between Bedford, Burgundy, and Brittany[138] resulting in the treaty of Amiens, April 17, 1423,

[132] St. Denis, VI, 380, 480; Fenin, pp. 186-7, 196; Perceval de Cagny, p. 126; Jouvenel des Ursins, p. 567; de Smet, *R.C.F.*, III, 371; Aeneas Silvius, *De Viris Illustribus* (*Bibliothek des Literarischen Vereins in Stuttgart*, vol. I, Stuttgart, 1842), pp. 40, 42.

[133] Pius II, *Commentarii rerum memorabilium quae temporibus suis contigerunt, 1405-1463* (Rome, 1584), p. 280.

[134] For an almost contemporary French estimate of Bedford see Thomas Basin, *Histoire des règnes de Charles VII et de Louis XI* (J. Quicherat, editor, Société de l'Histoire de France, 4 vols., Paris, 1855-59), I, 47.

[135] Bib. Nat., Porte. de Fontainieu 111-112, f. 284.

[136] *Ibid.*, f. 286.

[137] Morice, *Preuves*, II, 1119.

[138] Oct. 19, 1422, a Franco-British embassy was about to go to Brittany (Bib. Nat., fr. 26044, no. 5781), where it remained from Jan. 18 until April 9, 1423 (*ibid.*, fr. 26046, no. 55); Dec. 13, 1422, safe-conduct for Brittany to come and treat with Bedford for peace and Richemont's marriage (*ibid.*, Porte. de Fontainieu, 113-14 f. 103). To quiet Breton suspicions Bedford had to write on Feb. 12, 1423, asserting his good faith and assuring the duke that he might bring as large a force as he chose, *ibid.*, f. 109. On Feb. 25, came renewed sureties and safe-conducts, *ibid.*, ff. 115, 117. In the fall the lands of Duke John's enemy, Oliver of Blois, in Hainault, were seized, MS. Hist. Univ., Bib. Nat., fr. 23018, f. 441.

an offensive and defensive alliance of the three dukes,[139] under which Brittany agreed to furnish 500 men-at-arms and archers, as soon as Bedford required aid.[140] Frontier conditions continued to cause complaint,[141] but the two governments remained in accord and on November 20, 1423, Bedford and Brittany, with their respective councils, met on the borders of the Cotentin to consider "many great needs touching the royal interest."[142]

In Normandy itself the English position was strengthened by the death of the intransigent archbishop of Rouen on November 19, 1422, and the election of a pro-English successor.[143] Bedford sought still further to strengthen it by appointing a commission, including the seneschal, to suppress the excesses which had attended the English occupation and the continuance of the war.[144]

In order to hold his own in the field, Bedford dispatched commissioners into England to raise recruits. This effort secured, early in March, agreements from Exeter, the earl marshal, Lord Willoughby, and Sir Walter Hungerford to provide 1500 men for six months' service.[145] Early

[139] Morice, *Preuves,* II, 1125; Fauquembergue, II, 94-7.

[140] Morice, *Preuves,* II, 1135.

[141] Sept. 5, 1423, order to the vicomte of Falaise to publish the fact that an Anglo-Breton commission had been appointed to settle complaints arising along the frontier, Bib. Nat., fr. 26046, no. 104. "Toutefois les Bretons," wrote Jean de Saint Paul (*Chronique de Bretagne,* Arthur de La Borderie, editor, Nantes, 1881), p. 53, "s'en alloinet en France servir le roy, mais le duc fesoict semblant de riens n'en sçavoir, combien que souvent leur donnoit de l'argent et des chevaulx." Is this merely a patriot's attempt to clear his country from the stigma of aiding the enemy? It is too characteristic of John V's habit of trying to carry water on both shoulders to be lightly dismissed as such.

[142] Bib. Nat., fr. 4485, pp. 348-9.

[143] Fallue, *Histoire de diocèse de Rouen,* II, 356-7.

[144] Jan. 31, 1423, Chéruel, p. j. page 85 ff.

[145] The bishop of Thérouanne served as a commissioner from Nov. 19, 1422, until March 28, 1423, *Gallia Christiania,* X, 1565. March 4, 1423, Exeter received £2901 8s 10d for 200 men-at-arms and 600 archers, Willoughby received £571 3s 9d for 40 men-at-arms and 120 archers, the

in May this army was mustered and the earl marshal's contingent shipped across to Calais for operations in Picardy.[146] The remainder, probably in July,[147] landed at Dieppe.[148]

The French, meanwhile, were very active, recovering strongholds in the north,[149] harrying the Burgundian frontier in the east,[150] attempting to prepare Le Crotoy for the anticipated attack,[151] and summoning French and Lombards from Italy.[152] Furthermore an army of 8000 men was expected from Scotland;[153] it was hoped that a fleet of galleys could be obtained from Spain, and that the Castilians could be incited to attack Bayonne and Gascony in conjunction with a French invasion of Guienne. Now that Henry was dead the dauphin hoped

earl marshal received £3378 11s 11½d for 120 men-at-arms and 360 archers; March 10, Hungerford received £294 13s 10½d for 20 men-at-arms and 60 archers; transport £98, P.R.O., Issue Roll 659, mm. 13-4. April 28, Exeter received £30, and on July 2, £2756 2s 1½d, Willoughby £584 10s 5½d, Hungerford £294 13s 10½d, *ibid.* 661, mm. 2, 14. See also *Proceedings,* III, 66.

[146] April 28, 1423, proclamation to assemble at Dover on May 4, P.R.O., Chanc. Enroll. 273 (Close Roll 1 Henry VI), m. 1d°; May 14, commission to the earl marshal to command the army, *Cal. Pat. Rolls, Henry VI,* I, 121. The bishop of London accompanied the expedition, *Proceedings,* III, 66. Exeter's illness probably delayed sailing, *ibid.,* p. 87. Twenty-five ships served from May 29-June 5, transporting men from Sandwich to Calais, P.R.O., Ex. Accts. 51/8; Issue Roll 661, m. 14. Eighty vessels were gathered at Sandwich to transport Exeter's army, Ex. Accts. 51/7.

[147] It would seem that Exeter, Willoughby, and Hungerford were still in England on July 2, when they received pay from the exchequer. See note 145.

[148] P.R.O., Issue Roll 661, m. 14.

[149] Monstrelet, IV, 105, 131, 135, 142.

[150] Caillet, pp. 325, 329, p. j. 29-32[2]. Marshal Severac with 5-6000 men was in this region.

[151] June 27, 1422, orders to send 100 queues of wine and 100 tonneaux of wheat, and to levy a forced loan of 1500 l. t. on the farmers of the export duties on wine, to be paid to Harcourt to buy supplies, Bib. Nat., fr. 25710, no. 14.

[152] Morosini, II, 220; Caillet, p. 325, p. j. 29.

[153] *Report on the Foedera,* "Archives de France," p. 327.

to expel the English from France by a vigorous effort in the spring of 1423.[154]

Fed upon wild rumors of French success, Bedford captured, Henry VI and Burgundy dead, and Paris retaken,[155] the regions of southern France had been confirming, at meetings of the provincial estates, the aide voted at Clermont.[156] At the end of 1422, however, need for more money produced another summons for the estates of Languedoil to meet on January 16, 1423, at Issoudun.[157] Actually assembled at Bourges, they voted 1,000,000 l. t. for the war.[158] The Armagnacs also undertook to collect revenue from Tournai, under the duke of Burgundy's very nose, asserting to the citizens that, with Spain, Scotland, and Lombardy as allies, they were about to reconquer the kingdom, urging the city to be loyal and to advance some thirty or fifty thousand livres, and making veiled threats of royal displeasure. The citizens, after some delay, paid over 2000 livres, intimating that they would await the king's arrival in their midst before paying more, and then turned to Burgundy for friendship and alliance.[159]

154 Nov. 28, 1422, instructions to the ambassadors to Castile, Daumet, pp. 76-7.

155 Morosini, II, 224, 226, 228.

156 A. Thomas, *Les États provinciaux de la France Centrale sous Charles VII* (2 vols., Paris, 1879), I, 184, 223, 240, 261. "l'aide de 20,000 écus octroié au Roy nostre seigneur par les gens des trois estaz de son pais de Poitou à l'assembleé par eulx faite à Poittiers au mois de juillet l'an mil cccc vingt et deux, tant pour la conduicte de la guerre comme pour faire bonne monnoie," Bib. Nat., fr. nouv. acq. 5233, no. 10.

157 Dec. 8, 1422, Thomas, "Les États generaux sous Charles VII." *Le Cabinet Historique*, XXIV[1], 213; B. Ledain, *Lettres des Rois de France, princes et grands personnages à la commune de Poitiers* (*Archives Historiques du Poitou*, I, Poitiers, 1872), p. 145, note 1.

158 Of this 100,000 l. t. was apportioned to Poitou, Bib. Nat., Porte. de Fontainieu 113-4, f. 145v°; 1600 l. t. to Lyons, Caillet, p. 334, p. j. 35.

159 Mar. 20-May 25, 1423, Vandenbroeck, *Extraits*, II, 21-3, 28-36, 39-40. Negotiations with Burgundy continued until May 2, 1424, when the town ratified a treaty concluded Feb. 8, *ibid.*, pp. 62, 70, 78, 88, 91-2. Nevertheless an Armagnac mint was opened in Tournai in October, 1423, and two envoys

In the field also the dauphin's adherents were active. On January 14, 1423, they again surprised Meulan[160] with the help of a traitor.[161] Bedford proclaimed the ban and arrière-ban[162] and laid siege. Immediately the Armagnac captains assembled at Janville to relieve the town,[163] and the Scots even got as far as Gallardon in their march northward, but shortage of funds forced the abandonment of the campaign,[164] so Meulan was left to capitulate March 1, 1423.[165] The result was to clear the Armagnacs from the region between Paris and Chartres, for Montlhéry, Marcoussis, and Étampes followed Meulan's example,[166] and Orsay, Pacy, and Saintines were reduced in the course of the year.[167] The Burgundians, on their part, who had been skirmishing in Beauce all winter, were emboldened to capture Marchénoir[168] and to make an

from Charles were entertained from November, 1423, until April, 1424, MS. Hist. Univ., Bib. Nat., fr. 23018, f. 444. In September, 1423, Philip of Burgundy wrote promising Henry VI "a remettre en son obeissance la ville de Tournay laquelle la dict Roy luy auriot cedeé," *Report on the Foedera,*" Archives de France," p. 283.

160 Monstrelet, IV, 134.

161 Within the year the bailli of Gisors arrested and executed Jean de la Haye, called le Barbe, as "coulpable de la prinse et trayson de la forteresse de Meullent et de plusiers murdres, roberies, larrechins et autres maulx innombrables," Bib. Nat., fr. 26047, no. 207.

162 Rouen was excepted from this call, *Report on the Foedera,* appendix C, p. 149, no. 236. Mantes sent laborers to this siege, Grave p. 323.

163 Feb. 1423, order to pay 10,250 l. t. to the relieving force, Morice, *Preuves,* II, 1124. A little later Tanguy du Châtel was treating with the Breton captains about service north of the Seine (before March 25, *ibid.*), but this may very well have been in connection with an attack in the east on Burgundy. In March the seigneur de la Tremoïlle paid 2000 écus d'or for Bretons to be sent over the Seine "promptement," Bib. Nat., Porte. de Fontainieu 113-4, f. 126.

164 Cousinot, p. 163.

165 Fauquembergue, II, 90-1; "Gregory's Chronicle," in Gairdner, *Historical Collection of a Citizen of London,* pp. 149-53.

166 Waurin, III, 16.

167 Monstrelet, IV, 155; Fauquembergue, II, 127.

168 *Circa* March 30, 1423, *Chron. de La Pucelle,* pp. 415-6.

attempt on Châteaudun.[169] Indeed, later in the year, allied forces even assaulted Bourges and Issoudun, and Salisbury made an incursion into Vendôme.[170]

Preparations for carrying out Henry's plans against Le Crotoy were also in progress. Early in 1423, Suffolk, as grand admiral of Normandy, had been making ready a fleet to blockade the fortress, imposing special levies on the coast regions to meet the expenses. Although the original orders were given in January, it was not until May, under the spur of renewed commands from Bedford, that the crews began to be mustered for active service.[171] In April or May Sir Ralph Bouteller, bailli of Caux, made a dash across the Somme at Abbeville and captured Noyelle-sur-Mer, an outpost of Le Crotoy, whereupon Harcourt withdrew the garrison from Rue, his other outpost, and concentrated his strength at Le Crotoy itself. Immediately the English occupied Rue, and

[169] April 8, 1423, they were driven off by the captains of Châteaudun and Senonches, Merlet, p. 16.

[170] Perceval de Cagny, p. 129; Cousinot, p. 164.

[171] Jan. 6, 1423, orders from Suffolk to the lieutenant of the bailli of Caen to equip twelve vessels of war, Brit. Mus., Add. Ch. 11489; letter patent of Suffolk's of the same date incorporating royal orders that a balinger be armed, munitioned, provisioned, and manned with 8 men-at-arms and 24 archers, at Caen and sent before Le Crotoy, Bib. Nat., fr. 26046, no. 88. This vessel was to serve for four months and to be paid for by a special levy on the vicomté of Caen, *ibid.*, fr. 26047, no. 216. April 26, 1423, "A Mons. de Suffolk, mons., mons le Regent à commande que len vous die de par lui que vous faces diligence par vous ou voz officers que les XII vesseaulx ordonner pour le Crotoy soyent ennvoyes devant ledit Crotoy dedens le XII[e] jour de May au plus tart. Sy y veuller pourvoir tellement que ny ait pas faulte car autrement la charge en demouroit sur vous. escript ce lundy XXVI[e] jour d'avril a Rouen," Bib. Nat., fr. 26046, no. 61. May 10, Suffolk's lieutenant in Caux ordered the collector of the levy laid on the vicomté of Montivilliers to support a balinger for two months before Le Crotoy and to pay 100 s. t. each to eleven archers and arbalesters, Breard, *Le Crotoy etc.*, p. 169, no. 126. May 14-15, muster and payment of the men manning a balinger to be sent from Caen, Bib. Nat., fr. 25767, no. 15. There were four great ships under the master of ordnance's command, *ibid.*, fr. 26046, no. 66.

from these two places began a preliminary blockade.[172] Sir Ralph, who was "commisionaire à tenir le siege devant Crotoy,"[173] after advising with Bedford, determined upon an immediate renewal of the attack by land, coupled with a blockade by sea. An army of perhaps 1500 men, collected from Normandy, and prepared for a three months' siege,[174] invested the fortress on June 24. Abbeville contributed men and munitions[175] and promised 2000 francs, but Bedford had to seize on the profits of the royal aides pertaining to the town in order to collect this sum.[176] Amiens also promised 3000 l. t.[177] and the surrounding country, thankful to see an end to the Armagnac

[172] Waurin, III, 35-7. On April 15, 30 men-at-arms and 150 archers from Rouen garrison indented for this expedition, Brit. Mus., Add. Ch. 6818. The garrisons of Harfleur, Honfleur, and Torcy had been called upon for 32 men-at-arms and 86 archers for one month (Apr. 9-May 9, 1423) against Rue, Noyelle, and Le Crotoy, Bib. Nat., fr. 4485, pp. 329 ff. The Honfleur men served 34 days, i.e. Apr. 10-May 14, which probably marks the duration of this preliminary raid, Arch. Nat., K 62, no. 7⁹. Rue and Noyelle surrendered in May, according to MS. Hist. Univ., Bib. Nat., fr. 23018, f. 438. On Sept. 29, 1423, Hugh Warburton indented as captain of Rue with 20 men-at-arms and 60 archers, Bib. Nat., fr. 4485, p. 252. "The muster taken at Rewe the X day of Januar by John Lynbere, the leuftenande, the captan of Scant Walery on the see IIIIc XXIII" (1424 n. s.) shows a full complement, Bib. Nat., fr. 25767, no. 52. [173] Bib. Nat., fr. 25767, no. 16.

[174] Fenin, p. 205. The bailli of Caen was ordered to send 4 men-at-arms and 12 archers to the siege and was paid for one quarter in advance, but failed to send the men, Bib. Nat., fr. 26046, no. 151. Since February, three great guns had been in process of construction at Rouen for this siege, Bib. Nat., fr. 4485, p. 335. Beginning May 12, Robert Cottes, "maistre des ordonnances de l'artillerie," with 2 archers, 2 masons, 2 cannoneers, 6 "varlets" cannoneers, 1 master carpenter, and 5 "varlets" carpenters, was in service for this siege, Bib. Nat., fr. 26046, nos. 66, 100, 117. It will be remembered that Suffolk's fleet was to be ready by May 12, see note 171.

[175] Ledieu, *Doc. inédits sur le siege du Crotoy,* pp. 406-9.

[176] Evidently this seizure came after Le Crotoy's capitulation, Dusevel, in *Mém. de la Soc. d'Em. d'Abbeville,* 2e ser., t. XI, p. 201, quoting 3e Registre aux deliberations.

[177] In November, 1423, when the siege was over, 2000 l. t. was still unpaid, Stevenson, *Letters and Papers,* II, part 2, p. 524, note 3.

depredations, kept the besiegers supplied with provisions.[178]

To bring aid directly to Le Crotoy can scarcely have been one of the primary purposes of the French offensive which was launched in July, 1423, and which centered upon Cravant on the Yonne. It may have been hoped that a diversion favorable to Jacques d'Harcourt would result from striking a blow where the enemy was weakest. The allies were only just beginning to establish themselves in this region,[179] it was the seat of war farthest removed from the English, the dauphin's most formidable enemies, while, at the same time, it was that in which Burgundy could be most effectively threatened, and finally it was through the eastern provinces that some connection could be maintained with Armagnac captains in the north.[180] The operations themselves do not bear upon the English position in Normandy. Suffice that, without withdrawing men from other "fronts," the Anglo-Burgundians on July 31, 1423, inflicted upon the dauphin's army a serious defeat before Cravant. The French lost heavily of their Scottish contingent and were forced to fall back to the defense of the Loire while the allies continued to push their way into Mâcon.[181] What-

178 Waurin, III, 37-9. "Le nuit St. Jehan Baptist fu mis et clos le siege du Crotoy par terre et par mer par les englois tant seulement que par de picars y eubt," MS. Hist. Univ., Bib. Nat., fr. 23018, f. 439.

179 Bedford retook Pons-sur-Seine on May 25, 1423, Fauquembergue, II, 98. The siege of Montaguillon was still in progress, Waurin, III, 70.

180 Waurin's statement that the English were supposed to be absorbed with the siege of Le Crotoy hardly coincides with his assertion that Salisbury, Suffolk, and Willoughby were at Montaguillon (III, 58-9, 70).

181 Fauquembergue, II, 104-5; Waurin, III, 42-57, 61-3, 66-72 (this author took part in the Anglo-Burgundian campaign), Stevenson, II, 385. For the list of Burgundian captains see Bib. Nat., Coll. Bourg. 104, f. 229v°. Salisbury returned to Montaguillon and finally captured it, Waurin, III, 31-4, 74-5; Cousinot, pp. 165-6, 168; Fenin, pp. 198-9; Rôles de Bréquigny 1359[74]. Sir Gilbert Glasdale, Salisbury's lieutenant, was still in these parts

ever may have been the strategy contemplated by the French in respect of Le Crotoy, this disaster made it clear that the dauphin's promises to bring relief[182] could not be fulfilled. In September the bishop of Amiens, Jacques d'Harcourt's brother, entered the fortress to persuade the captain to treat, and, though failing at first, finally negotiated the capitulation in the following month,[183] whereby the garrison agreed to surrender in March, if the English would be ready to hold "journée" before the town on the first three days of the month.[184]

At one with the policy of clearing the Norman frontiers on the north by reducing Le Crotoy, was the plan, simultaneously inaugurated, to complete the conquest on the southwest by capturing Mont St. Michel. In February, 1423, fortifications were erected at Tombelaine.[185] The French replied by attacking these[186] and by strengthening the Mont's defenses.[187] On July 30, Sir John de la Pole, commanding at Avranches for his brother, the earl of Suffolk, was ordered to assemble the feudal levies and garrisons from Caen and Cotentin, and to besiege the abbey by land and sea.[188] This investment was probably about to be completed when reports arrived from Cravant which would seem to indicate that the dauphin's forces were concentrated at the other end of the Loire valley, leaving Anjou and Maine supposedly stripped of defenders. Instead, therefore, of sitting down before the

with 62 men-at-arms and 149 archers in November, 1423, Bib. Nat., fr. 25767, no. 45.

[182] Waurin, III, 40.

[183] MS. Hist. Univ., Bib. Nat., fr. 23018, ff. 441v°, 442v°, 443r°. By Oct. 14, the Abbeville contingent had returned home, Ledieu, p. 388.

[184] Monstrelet, IV, 166. For the enforcement of the interim truce see Ledieu, pp. 392-3.

[185] Luce, *Chronique*, I, 24.

[186] *Ibid.*, p. 25.

[187] May 7, 1423, Aumâle, captain of the Mont, acknowledged the receipt of munitions, and on May 11, the receipt of 751 l. t. to be spent on fortifications, *Hist. d'Harcourt, Preuves*, IV, 1685; III, 496.

[188] Luce, *Chronique*, I, 125, p. j. XX.

Mont, Sir John marched southward, besieged Segré and made a demonstration before Angers.

It was the same sort of exploit, with Avranches as a base, that Clarence and Salisbury had performed from Alençon in 1421, and the same strategy was employed to meet it that had been used successfully against Clarence. Aumâle was at Tours. In the previous month French partisans had raided into the Chartrain, vainly assaulting Chartres[189] and taking Ivry by surprise,[190] and the count was assembling troops with a view to following up this success. When, however, news came from Ste. Suzanne that the English were before Segré, Aumâle marched northwestward to Laval to cut them off from Normandy. The move was completely successful. At La Brossonière near La Gravelle, a few miles west of Laval, he defeated the English, laden with booty, on September 26, 1423, and captured Sir John de la Pole. Immediately the French followed up their victory by assaulting Avranches. Knowing Sir John's force to have included the Cotentin garrisons, the count even dared to march as far north as St. Lô where he remained for several days, leaving a force before Avranches. Only news of the approach of an English force originally intended to recapture Ivry caused the French to abandon their attack on that city and withdraw into Maine.[191] Aside from the retention of Ivry and a respite for Mont St. Michel, the results of this encounter, as of Baugé, were moral rather than material.

189 Aug. 15, 1423, MS. Hist. Univ., Bib. Nat., fr. 23018, f. 445. In Bruges it was reported that Chartres had been captured by the Armagnacs and recovered by the Burgundians, Morosini, II, 272.

190 September, 1423, pardon to the squire whose negligence made the surprise possible, Le Cacheux, *Actes,* I, 76.

191 Jean Chartier, I, 33-8; Perceval de Cagny, pp. 129-32; Monstrelet, IV, 172; Waurin, III, 22-4; Cousinot, pp. 166-7; Luce, *Chronique,* I, 24; Bourdigné, pp. 153-4; Bourchart, f. 182v°. The date is assured from mention in Surreau's account, Bib. Nat., fr. 4485, p. 325; *Hist. d'Harcourt, Preuves,* III, 496, 500-1; IV, 1685; *Rev. des Quest. Hist.,* LXXXVI (1909), 568.

Southern France, which evidently heard little of Cravant, was regaled with news of a great victory in Normandy, and with new rumors about the capture of Bedford, the death of Henry VI, and the appearance in England of a rival for the throne.[192] It may be that Brittany, who had attempted unsuccessfully to assist his new allies by attacking Poitou,[193] a region which he coveted, was awed into inaction. But the French frontier still needed protection,[194] for the English were as far south as Fougières from whence they continued to raid Anjou.[195]

However much the French might be heartened by their success in the west, the prosecution of the war necessitated renewed supplies of men and money, even before the disaster of July 31st. Just a week before that event, despite the extensive grant made in January, the estates of Languedoil had been summoned to another meeting to open at Selles, August 12.[196] In a session lasting less than a week they voted an annual levy of 200,000 l. t. for three years beginning October 1.[197] Collection, however, promised to be difficult because the soldiers were pillaging the country regardless of friend or foe.[198] Since spring

[192] Morosini, II, 260-3. [193] Cousinot, p. 161.

[194] November, 1423, receipt at Château-Gontier by Aumâle of munitions for defending the frontier, *Hist. d'Harcourt, Preuves,* IV, 1685. The date given is 1422, but mention of La Brossonière shows that it must be later.

[195] A. Joubert, *Histoire de le Baronnie de Craon de 1382 à 1626* (Paris, 1888), p. 29. Affairs, however, were such that the citizens of Craon could refuse to keep watch and ward, a required war service, and be sustained by the courts, *ibid.,* pp. 29-30. For evidence of raiding in February, 1424, see Joubert, *Une Tentative etc.,* pp. 7-8.

[196] Grandmaison in *Bull. de la Soc. arch. de Touraine,* IV, 152.

[197] *Ibid.,* pp. 152-3; Thomas, *Prov. États,* I, 185, 224; Caillet, p. 334.

[198] In July, 1423, the estates of Auvergne, Bourbonnais, Forez, Beaujolais, and Combraille had to form a defensive alliance, Thomas, *ut supra,* II, 21. In May, 1423, Lyons complained to Charles of the unbearable excesses of the soldiery, Caillet, p. 332. By March, 1424, it was complained that the burden of taxation was causing an exodus into the Empire, *ibid.,* p. 334, p. j. 35.

preparations had been under way to secure another Scottish army, a commission headed by Buchan having been sent to Scotland with authority to mortgage even the royal "meubles" to provide the cost of transport.[199] That cost was exceedingly heavy[200] and had to be met by extensive borrowing.[201] The Scots adhered faithfully to the alliance,[202] and the earl of Douglas promised to embark with an army for France by December 6, 1423.[203] This was a delay of some weeks, for which the English naval strength was made the excuse. It necessitated new negotiations with the Spanish shipmasters, whom French commissioners in Castile had hired, to persuade them to wait, and increased the cost.[204] Further delays followed so that not before April, 1424, did the new Scottish army of 6500 men reach France.[205]

In the north, Luxembourg, the earl marshal, and Sir Thomas Rempston continued successfully to combat La Hire and Poton de Saintrailles in Vermandois, Tierache, and Laonnois, despite the latter's occasional coups. Castles were destroyed, garrisons hanged, and captains forced to retire beyond the Loire under agreement not to return northward to fight except in the French king's

199 *Cartulaire de St. Jean d'Orbestier* (*Archives Historiques du Poitou,* VI, Poitiers, 1877), p. 432; Fordun, IV, 1220.

200 Bib. Nat., Porte. de Fontainieu 113-4, f. 191, shows expenditure of over 26,000 écus d'or. Stevenson, II, 20-2 shows 26,933 écus for transport, of which 20,504 was still unpaid at the end of the voyage, and payment, although promised within 22 days of landing, had to be deferred until Michaelmas for lack of funds. See note 204.

201 Bib. Nat., Porte. de Font. 113-4, f. 150.

202 *Report on the Foedera,* "Tresor de Chartes," p. 128, no. 5.

203 Oct. 26, 1423, *Inventaire Chronologique des Documents Relatifs à l'Histoire d'Ecosse conserves aux archives du royaume à Paris* (Abbotsford Society, Edinbourgh, 1839), p. 37.

204 *Cart. de St. Jean d'Orbestier, Arch. Hist. du Poitou,* VI, 430-34.

205 One of the Spanish captains who had been promised his pay within 22 days of debarkation in France, was paid on April 28, 1424, *ibid.,* pp. 430, 435. April 24, the Scots were at Bourges, Stevenson, II, 15, note 2.

army.[206] At one time the Armagnacs captured Beaumont-sur-Oise, but Bedford quickly regained and demolished it.[207] More serious was the surprise, on November 30, 1423,[208] of the Burgundian garrison at Compiègne, a place from which they could dominate the great north road from Paris and be generally troublesome.[209] Immediately the English authorities warned their commandant at Pontoise lest he too be caught napping.[210] The Burgundian captains at once attempted to recover the place but with so little success that they were forced to resort to a mere blockade from the nearby towns during the winter, from which the surrounding country suffered. In February, 1424, Bedford assembled an Anglo-Burgundian force which again attacked Compiègne and forced the garrison to capitulate March 16, agreeing to surrender April 1.[211] No sooner had they evacuated Compiègne, however, than the Armagnacs, withdrawing southward, surprised Gaillon[212] on April 16.[213]

But before that day the English had held "journée" before Le Crotoy and that stronghold had passed into their hands. In order that the defense of the Norman border and the conquest of the upper Seine region need not be weakened, preparations had been on foot during the winter in England to send a new army across the

[206] Waurin, III, 72-5, 85-7, 92-5; MS. Hist. Univ., Bib. Nat., fr. 23018, ff. 439-445; A. Ledieu, *Esquisses militaires de la guerre de cent ans: La Hire et Xaintrailles-Les Flavy* (Lille, 1888), pp. 51-2; Sorel, *La Prise de Jeanne d'Arc,* pp. 72-5; "La Livre des Trahisons," pp. 172-4.

[207] Monstrelet, IV, 173.

[208] Fenin, appendix, p. 312.

[209] Cousinot, pp. 167-8.

[210] Bib. Nat., fr. 4485, p. 396.

[211] "La Livre des Trahisons," pp. 176-7; Waurin, III, 88-90; Flammermont, *Senlis,* pp. 237-8; Sorel, *Prise de Jeanne d'Arc,* pp. 81-3; La Fons Melicocq, *Une Cité Picarde,* pp. 95-6; MS. Hist. Univ., Bib. Nat., fr. 23018, ff. 445v°-446.

[212] "Et quant il sen furent partes [de Compiègne] il allerent prendre de fait le chastel de Gaillon sur Saine sans nulle deffense," MS. Hist. Univ., Bib. Nat., fr. 23018, f. 447.

[213] Cochon, p. 293.

Channel to hold the field before Le Crotoy. In December, 1423, commissioners went out to impress ships in the southern ports with orders to have them at Winchelsea by February 2.[214] The bishop of Winchester again advanced 14,000 marks, and was ready to add another 4000, to meet the expenses of the expedition.[215] By mid-February contingents, provided by Lord Talbot,[216] Lord Ponynges, and Lord Clinton, were ready for muster.[217] At the same time the council was preparing for another contingent of 1600 men to be raised for six months' service beginning May 1.[218] Evidently it became clear before embarkation that the surrender of Le Crotoy would be uncontested, consequently it was not until April or May that the whole force, numbering some 3400 men, was shipped across to Calais.[219] Bedford was content to send some 500 men to take over Le Crotoy on the appointed day.[220] Sir Ralph Bouteller occupied it with an English garrison, "and thus was the whole of Ponthieu cleared of the Armagnacs,"[221] although the people of the vicinage

214 Dec. 26, 1423, *Cal. Pat. Rolls, Henry VI*, I, 192; Devon Issues, p. 391.

215 *Proceedings*, III, 144, 146. Another £1000 was borrowed from certain Lancastrian feoffees, *ibid.*, p. 135.

216 He refused to go until paid certain arrears, *ibid.*, p. 138; Devon Issues, p. 391.

217 *Cal. Pat. Rolls, Henry VI*, I, 193.

218 Feb. 8, 1424, *Proceedings*, III; 135; May 11, commission to Willoughby and Ponynges, Cal. Fr. Rolls, 48.230.

219 It required 7 barges, 33 transports, 6 coggeships, 4 passage-boats, a balinger, a "faircoste," and a "buse," with a total capacity of 2538 tons and a crew of 534 persons, and cost £552 5s 3d, P.R.O., Issue Roll 666, m. 8. See also Devon Issues, p. 387. Sir John Kyghley indented with 120 men for the Le Crotoy expedition but was held storm-bound in England, Ex. Accts. 51/16. It seems possible that these forces were shipped in two contingents, one at the end of April, the other at the end of May. In April, payment was made for 29 vessels transporting troops from Sandwich to Calais, while in May there was another payment for 25 vessels doing the same, Ex. Accts. 51/10. The second contingent, of 1600 men, evidently mustered and was paid on or after May 29, Issue Roll 666, mm. 3-4.

220 Fauquembergue, II, 122-3.

221 MS. Hist. Univ., Bib. Nat., fr. 23018, f. 446v°.

feared lest an Anglo-Burgundian rupture might again bring war upon them.[222]

This achievement left Guise the only northern stronghold of importance in Armagnac hands, and all winter Burgundy had been planning its reduction.[223] Operations in the spring were conducted by Luxembourg, with whom served Sir Thomas Rempston and 400 English.[224] On April 6, 1424, this latter contingent mustered at Gournay.[225] Joining the Burgundians, it helped to open the campaign with an attack upon Oisy. On April 23, this place capitulated. On May 5, it surrendered,[226] and the following day the allies were before Guise itself.[227] For over four months they blockaded the town, the costs being met by levies on Artois and Hainault, and monthly contributions from the towns.[228] At the same time L'Isle-Adam was operating farther south against Nesle and La Fère-en-Tardenois.[229] When La Hire, crowded towards the eastern border by these operations, attempted to take

[222] Waurin, III, 90-2; "La Livre des Trahisons," p. 177. The capture of Le Crotoy gave the English control of the Somme mouth, consequently Bedford could economize his strength by ordering the demolition of St. Valéry-en-Caux, June 30, 1424 (Bib. Nat., fr. 4485, p. 252), where he had kept a garrison of from 120 to 160 men, *ibid.*, fr. 25767, no. 32; fr. 4485, p. 250; fr. 26047, no. 260.

[223] In October, 1423, had been established a taille for paying a besieging army, La Fons Melicocq, *Une Cité Picarde*, p. 97. The northern towns and seigneurs were ordered to be ready to participate in the siege, Beauville, *Doc. inédits*, part I, p. 95.

[224] June 6, 1424, commission of array from Bedford to Luxembourg, Stevenson, II, 28.

[225] Bib. Nat., fr. 4485, p. 280.

[226] MS. Hist. Univ., Bib. Nat., fr. 23018, f. 447.

[227] Muster of Sir Thomas Rempston of that date and place mentioned in Surreau's account, Bib. Nat., fr. 4485, p. 281. The MS. Hist. Univ. *ut supra*, f. 448 says June 29.

[228] La Fons Melicocq in *La Picardie*, III, 153, note 1; *Une Cité Picarde*, pp. 97, 99-100; "La Livre des Trahisons," p. 178, note 1.

[229] Jan. 14, 1424, this place agreed to surrender to Salisbury if, in two months, he had taken Montaguillon, Moinet, Vitry-en-Perthois (surrendered Oct. 4, 1424, *vide infra*, p. 321.), Passavant, and Vaulconde, Bib. Nat., Porte. de Fontainieu 113-4, f. 187. The earl had evidently failed, for L'Isle-

the offensive he was quickly suppressed by a detachment from Guise.[230] A threatened attack for the relief of that castle made by the dukes of Bar and Lorraine, which caused Luxembourg to call for re-enforcements, came to nought.[231]

Simultaneously to the southeast of Paris, Salisbury, commissioned as governor of Champagne, Brie, the bailliages of Melun, Sens, Auxerre, Nivernais, Dunois, and the Mâconnois and Soissoinois,[232] was pushing forward[233] until the French, fearing an attack on Lyons, hurried soldiers under Lafayette and Bourbon eastward.[234] Burgundian captains were already beginning to dispute the line of the upper Loire, and to push westward across the Allier towards Bourges.[235] With the summer of 1424, however, operations in these theatres subsided, while both sides prepared for a great trial of strength on the Norman frontiers.

Since assuming the reins of government, Bedford had merely been holding the southern frontiers of Normandy against persistent and annoying attacks. In November,

Adam was attacking the place in July, La Fons Melicocq, *Une Cité Picarde*, p. 98. In August, he was besieging Nesle, Waurin, III, 100.

230 "En moix de Juing sen allerent Jehan Rollet et La Hire avec plus gens de pais assegier—une forteresse es marches d'Ardennes et de Retheloix pour lequel siege lever partirer [de Guise] englois et piccars dont le Sgr de Saveuses et Messire Daviod de Poix estient conduceurs. Et estoient bien V^c fuste de lances et VIII^c archers lesquelle en une matinee frapperent audit siege et firent grand orrison sur les bonnes hommes de pais et tant que tous sen fuirent ceulx qui porrent escappes et laisserent leur engines," MS. Hist. Univ., Bib. Nat., fr. 23018, f. 448.

231 *Ibid.*, f. 449.

232 Bib. Nat., Porte. de Fontainieu 113-4, f. 187.

233 He besieged Sézanne, April 6, 1424, and stormed it, June 24, Jean Chartier, I, 38.

234 March-April, 1424, Caillet, pp. 341-2, p. j. 40-42.

235 The allies were already at Cosne. In January, 1424, a Burgundian captain surprised La Charité, MS. Hist. Univ., Bib. Nat., fr. 23018, f. 446v°; Waurin, IV, 87. In the summer the Armagnacs retook Cuffy and La Guerche, Jean Raoulet, pp. 183-4; *Chronique de La Pucelle*, pp. 194-5.

1423, he appointed Lord Scales captain-general of the Seine towns and Alençon, and under his supervision a regular police was maintained along the Seine from Rouen to Paris to prevent Armagnac irregulars and raiders from crossing the river.[236] This, it was doubtless hoped, would effectively strengthen this weak sector between the two capitals, a sector at which the enemy had frequently struck. With the opening of the new year this was supplemented by the appointment of Fastolf as governor over the region south of the Seine from Pont de l'Arche to Caen, and from Caen to Alençon, to receive all manner of complaints, punish crimes, execute royal orders, resist the enemy, and suppress brigandage.[237] Even north of the river, in Caux, a commission of three, including the bailli and the captain of Lillebonne, was appointed to make monthly tours of inspection as far as the Somme, to see that garrisons were kept up to full strength and properly equipped, because of the enemy's daily raids.[238] This, however, was probably the execution of the council's decision "to send prudent and powerful knights into certain bailliages of the realm, to ride in arms through those bailliages in order to expell and extirpate the enemies, brigands, and pillagers therein, and to maintain the king's subjects in peace and tranquillity."[239] These measures of police and defense were to be followed when Le Crotoy was taken, by the capture of Ivry and Mont St. Michel, and a pacification of the Norman marches, to provide funds for which operations the Norman estates met at Vernon in February, 1423.[240]

[236] Bib. Nat., fr. 4485, pp. 256, 259; fr. 26047, nos. 209, 310; Brit. Mus., Add. Ch. 11521. During the whole month of December the English allowed nothing to pass along the Seine to Mantes "pour la deffense générale faite sur les batteaulx que ilz ne allassent par la rivière," Grave, p. 324.

[237] Bib. Nat., fr. 4485, pp. 262-3; fr. 26047, no. 200.

[238] April 30, 1424, Bib. Nat., fr. nouv. acq. 1482, nos. 39, 41.

[239] Fauquembergue, II, 125-6.

[240] *Vide supra*, p. 179.

Burgundian line of march, 1417
English line of march, 1417-1418
English minor operations, 1417-1418
Normandy and the Neighboring Regions, 1416-1424.

Perhaps conditions on the southern frontier can be more vividly illustrated by recounting the adventures of Gilet de Lointreu, a man of noble lineage, whom hard times had forced to become a man-at-arms in 1414. For three and a half years, he served in various garrisons, Ivry, Milly, Vendôme, and Mortaigne, until finally, probably in 1418, "he departed [from Mortaigne] with many others—and went into the neighborhood of Rouen, living on the country and seeking adventure, and when they were returning, having found nothing, certain men of the garrison at Danville met them and took Gilet prisoner with many of his companions. They fixed his ransom at 81 gold crowns, putting him in prison for seven months because he could not pay this amount. Afterwards, he joined the garrison at Senonches in the retinue of the captain of that fortress, where he remained for half a year. And while he was in this garrison, he made a raid with others of the garrison, into the country about Chambrois, where they found a man named Robin Maine, whom they captured and carried off to Senonches, and he was ransomed for 40 gold crowns, of which Gilet had four as his share. During his stay in this garrison, the captain gave him 'pour appatiz'[241] the parishes of St. Pierre and St. Martin de Cernières, from each of which he got 12 crowns. And during this time he was in the company of others of the garrison where many English, men from the

[241] This was a common practice. April 1, 1421, Aumâle wrote his lieutenant at Mont St. Michel "que vous mettez sus, assignez et assez appatissements sur les villes, chasteaulx, forteresses et parroisses des marches du dit lieu du Mont et autres estans on dit pays de Normandie,—ainsi qu'il est acoustumé de faire selon l'estat de la guerre," rendering an account thereof, Luce, *Chronique,* I, 107, p. j. X. The English at Fresnay levied an "appatissement" of 17 livres on the parish of Nôtre Dame de Chaufour, *La Semaine du Fidele,* p. 299. It was the method of organizing the practice of living off the country without a commissariat. If possible, as on the border, the levy was made in the enemy's territory.

garrison of Verneuil, were captured, among them John de Montfort, master of the household of Lord Scales, captain of Verneuil. This was about St. John's Day (1423). And about eight days afterwards, Gilet with five others went off from Senonches to seek adventure in Normandy, as is the custom with men-at-arms. These were encountered by men from the garrison at Verneuil, and Gilet with three others captured and carried off to Verneuil. Here after eight days he was bought by [four Englishmen] of the garrison for 81 crowns, and was then thrown into prison for about six months because he could pay nothing, having lost everything before at Danville; and fearing to die in prison he agreed to join the English, took the oath and was given to [William] Campenay [one of his captors] to serve under him. And about eight days later Campenay sent Gilet and one other into the neighborhood of Laigle, and when Gilet and the varlet were returning, convoying a wagon load of cider for Campenay, they were captured by certain men from Nogent-le-Rotrou, and carried off prisoners to Nogent. Here the captain and others wished to put Gilet to death, saying that he was English and had taken the oath, and they were on the point of doing so when the captain of Senonches wrote in his behalf telling how he had taken the oath because he could not pay his ransom and feared to die. And Gilet sent word to Verneuil to his masters, or to one of them, asking them to help in paying his ransom, else he was in danger of death. To which they replied that they would contribute a silver mark and no more; and this being insufficient, in fear of death, he promised the captain of Nogent and others of the garrison, that he would hold to their party as he had done before. And almost immediately afterwards he left Nogent to go to Senonches in company of some of the garrison, and, because otherwise he could not live, [he rode with them]

into Normandy to the country around Beaumesnil where they were discovered by men of the garrison of Beaumesnil and carried off to that place, and Gilet was held at 40 gold crowns ransom, to seek which he was given a safe-conduct by the captain. And returning from Senonches, whither he had been to get his ransom, while on his way back to Beaumesnil to keep his faith, he was encountered near Rugles by certain of the garrison of Verneuil, who put him in prison and turned him over to the officers of justice'' by whom he was condemned to be hanged as a traitor.[242]

To these turbulent conditions were added in 1424 the French preparations for an offensive. Again the estates general of Languedoil had been summoned to Selles, for May 10.[243] That the country might bear the burden of taxation and feel that the authorities were attempting to preserve order, Lafayette, the master of the arbalesters, and the admiral of France, with 400 men, were sent out to drive away all captains and soldiers who were living off the people, except the Scots and Lombards who were privileged parties.[244] Another vote of 1,000,000 livres

[242] Le Cacheux, *Actes,* I, 82 ff.; cf. 79-81.

[243] Jan. 23, 1424, Ledain in *Archives Historiques du Poitou,* I, 145, note 1; Feb. 5, Thomas in *Le Cabinet Historique,* XXIV[1], 213.

[244] Jan. 30, 1424, J. Quicherat, *Rodrique de Villandrando, l'un des combattants pour l'indépendance française au quinzième siècle* (Paris, 1879), pp. 211-2. ''The cuntre ys so stroyet wit the Dolfyns men and the Scottes, that evere man that comes out of thos coostez says he yrkes right sore wit thair lyf,'' wrote Sir John Assheton in 1420; Rôles de Bréquigny 1376. ''Scoti, quos rex venire fecerat, incendio cremaverunt magnam pulchram grangiam loci de Mellayo, plenam bladis, vinis, et foragiis, videlicet in nocte vigiliae festi sanctae Crucis Septembris, anno Domini MCCCCXII,'' A. Salmon, ''Chronique des Abbés de Marmoutier'' (*Recueil de Chroniques de Touraine,* Tours, 1854), p. 336. The peasants complained that the Scots ruined them by plunder, Michel, *Les Ecossais en France,* I, 124. Charles, although especially petitioned by the estates at Bourges not to alienate Touraine, conferred it upon Douglas on April 19, 1424, ''Analyses et fragments tirés des Archives municipales de Tours'' (*Le Cabinet His-*

was secured at Selles,[245] and in May 150,000 livres more was obtained from the estates of Languedoc at Montpellier.[246] The Armagnac commissioners at Tournai requested the town to levy an aide of 14,000 écus, to which the citizens agreed, but if the money was ever collected there is no evidence that it was used to pay a force of 1900 men for the "journée du Crotoy" which was the alleged purpose of the tax.[247] In Dauphiné the estates met April 30-May 7 and voted 24,000 florins with which were maintained 200 lances for the dauphin's service.[248] With these resources in anticipation, the French on March 16, 1424, issued a general summons for "tous les nobles et autres tenans fiefz et contés, [et] autres gens d'armes et de trait estanz en notre seigneurie" to assemble on the Loire by May 15.[249] The arrival of the Scots completed the work of La Brossonière in overawing Brittany[250] who, indeed, was that spring attempting again to negotiate an Armagnac-Burgundian agreement.[251] Late in May, munitions were being distributed for the contemplated invasion. By June, Charles had at least 8000 men available, nearly a fourth of whom were already at Le Mans.[252]

As for the English the French capture of Gaillon on

torique, V², 102 ff., Paris, 1859), pp. 103-5. John Stuart of Darnley had been enfeoffed with Aubigny-sur-Niere, March 26, 1423, Andrew Stuart, *Genealogical History of the Stewarts* (London, 1798), pp. 393-5.

245 Thomas, *Les États generaux,* pp. 186, 242-3, 262.

246 Vaissette, IX, 1077-8.

247 Vandenbroeck, *Extraits,* II, 81-9.

248 R. Delachenal, "Les Gentilshommes Dauphinois à la Bataille de Verneuil" (*Bulletin de l'Academie delphinale,* XX, 347 ff., Grenoble, 1885), 349; Bib. Nat., Porte. de Fontainieu 113-4, ff. 211, 228; fr. 26047, no. 333.

249 Delachenal, p. 347, note 1.

250 Cousinot, p. 168.

251 Treaty of Nantes, May 18, 1424, de Beaucourt, II, 353 ff.

252 Aumâle had 1700 men there, *Hist. d'Harcourt, Preuves,* IV, 1683-6. For the numbers of the Scots, *vide supra,* p. 303.

April 16 had proved troublesome from the start. By the end of April the Armagnacs had taken prisoner the captain of Louviers, while he was attempting to catch some cattle thieves, and men had to be sent from Rouen to safeguard Louviers.[253] News of the loss of Gaillon had already been sent to Bedford, to the Norman captains, and to the guardians of the frontiers,[254] and the regent had ordered Lord Scales with 800 men, half of them drawn from the neighboring Norman garrisons, to recapture the place.[255] After a two months' siege, beginning about May 7, the castle was recovered, the garrison massacred, and the fortifications demolished.[256] Meanwhile news of the French preparations for a northward offensive had caused Bedford to order the mobilization of the Norman feudal forces at Rouen for the end of May.[257] In the latter half of the following month, while Scales was still before Gaillon, Suffolk was sent to renew the siege of Ivry, where the French had remained unmolested for

253 Bib. Nat., fr. 4485, pp. 221, 429-30.

254 *Ibid.*, pp. 402-3.

255 April 28, 1424, Bedford to Belknap, Brit. Mus., Add. Ch. 309.

256 Cochon, p. 293. Of that date are royal orders assembling the men of Caux for the destruction of Gaillon, Bib. Nat., fr. 26047, no. 293. On July 16, the baillis of Rouen, Caux, Vernon, Evreux, and Mantes were informed that it was not the king's intention to destroy "les salles, chambres, et habitacion," which were to be preserved for the archbishop's use, but that all defenses were to be destroyed and the moat filled up, so that the enemy could find no refuge whatever, *ibid.*, fr. nouv. acq. 6190, no. 44. The accounts of the Norman garrisons repeatedly mention a two months' siege, for the first month of which the men from Château-Gaillard mustered on May 7, Bib. Nat., fr. 4485, pp. 208, 221, 223, 225, 228, 231, 233, 235-6, 239, 246, 249, 256, 283-4, 287-8, 291; MS. Hist. Univ., *ibid.*, fr. 23018, f. 448v°.

257 May 8, 1424, Bedford to the bailli of Caen, "Il est venu à notre congnoissance que notre ennemy et adversaire a entencion de passe briefement deça la Riviere de Loire à puissans de gens estrangers et autres noz ennemis." The bailli is to assemble his men by June 2, Bib. Nat., fr. 26047, no. 257. The orders of June 24 mention Rouen and May 28 as the place and date of assembly, Stevenson, II, 25.

about ten months,[258] with a force of about 600 men.[259] The English regained the town immediately, but for three weeks the castle held out, finally agreeing to surrender if not relieved within a month.[260]

Plans were also being pushed for the reduction of Mont St. Michel. In April, the renegade abbot of the Mont had been summoned from Rouen to consider things touching the abbey.[261] The English had a spy there in June,[262] and in July paid out 1000 écus d'or to a traitor who agreed to secure them the fort's capture.[263] Meanwhile the council, sitting in Paris in May and June,[264] had mapped out a new policy embracing the conquest of Anjou and Maine and the complete occupation of the county of Dreux. The two former were assigned to Bedford[265] and the latter conferred upon Suffolk.[266] Measures were also taken, probably at this session, for taking Picardy into royal hands,[267] and for embassies to Brittany[268] and the Spanish kingdoms.[269] From this meeting may reasonably be dated

[258] Waurin, III, 98, says siege was laid about June 15. Suffolk mustered his retinue before Ivry on June 22, Bib. Nat., fr. 4485, p. 292. MS. Hist. Univ., Bib. Nat., fr. 23018, f. 448v° speaks of the siege as a renewal. *Vide supra*, p. 301.

[259] Suffolk had 69 men-at-arms and 204 archers (Bib. Nat., fr. 4485, p. 292), Salisbury sent 19 men-at-arms and 67 archers (*ibid.*, p. 177), the bailli of Evreux had 26 men-at-arms and 78 archers, the garrison of Cherbourg sent 15 men-at-arms and 45 archers (Bib. Nat., fr. 26047, no. 295), the captain of Dreux brought 17 men-at-arms and 54 archers (*ibid.*, fr. 4485, p. 207).

[260] MS. Hist. Univ., Bib. Nat., fr. 23018, f. 448v°. Ivry agreed to surrender Aug. 14, Fauquembergue, II, 140. This would make its capitulation, July 14, which is just over three weeks after Suffolk's first muster. Mantes repeatedly sent wine to this army, and laborers, to pay whom the earl demanded a "taux" of 1000 l. t., Grave, p. 323.

[261] Bib. Nat., fr. 4485, p. 335. [262] Luce, *Chronique*, I, 139, note 1.

[263] *Ibid.*, p. 138, p. j. XXVIII; pp. 149-150, p. j. XXXV.

[264] Bib. Nat., fr. 4485, pp. 355-6.

[265] June 27, 1424, Arch. Nat., JJ 172, no. 519.

[266] July 27, 1424, *ibid.*, no. 571. [267] Bib. Nat., fr. 4485, p. 359.

[268] *Ibid.*, pp. 356-7. [269] Deprez, p. 31, no. 610.

the beginning of Bedford's personal policy. Heretofore he had merely been completing the schemes of Henry V of holding fast to Normandy and cutting off the north-Paris region from communication with the Loire, until the scattered Armagnac garrisons could be individually conquered and expelled. That process was now nearly completed so the English regent could feel free to turn his efforts towards the next step in the conquest of France.

But before these new schemes could be launched, the permanency of Henry V's triumphs had to be tested on the field of battle, and for this the relief of Ivry offered an opportunity. Both sides were newly re-enforced from overseas and momentarily supplied with money. Bedford, however, was beginning to feel the financial pinch,[270] and the French finances were always a hand to mouth matter, so that each party was disposed to make the most of his strength while it lasted. Already, also, the duke-regent was having trouble with his new forces from England, because men were leaving their captains to enroll in Norman retinues, thus getting double wages,[271] or were deserting outright and returning home.[272] In addition to these, Bedford had the feudal levies of the duchy, whose assembly had been postponed until July 3 at Vernon,[273] and the "gens de commun" from Paris, Chartres, Senlis, Normandy, and Picardy.[274] From the Norman garrisons could be drawn some 2000 men,[275] a figure which repre-

[270] *Vide supra,* p. 181.

[271] Luce, *Chronique,* I, 137, p. j. XXVII. They had been paid in advance before leaving England.

[272] *Ibid.,* p. 144, p. j. XXXII.

[273] June 26, 1424, bailli of Rouen to the vicomte of Pont de l'Arche, Stevenson, II, 24.

[274] Cousinot, p. 170. This author also includes Rouen which had been specially exempted, *Report on the Foedera,* appendix C, p. 149.

[275] Bib. Nat., fr. 4485, pp. 177, 185-6, 190-1, 193-4, 196, 198, 200-1, 203-4, 207-8, 212, 214-16, 218, 221, 223, 225, 228, 231, 233, 235-6, 239-40, 244, 246, 248, 250, 265, 270, 272, 276, 292, 296, 303.

sents about half their total strength. All things considered 10,000 men does not seem to be an overestimate.[276] By July 20 Bedford had reached Rouen and at that place his army finally assembled.[277]

All this time the French were calling in their companies[278] from the Norman frontier, from Dauphiné, Auvergne, and the Limousin, and assembling them along the Loire. That river crossed, their forces concentrated about Châteaudun and Bonneval, from whence they marched northward past Chartres to Nonancourt.[279] Bedford, in his turn, leaving Rouen August 11,[280] established his headquarters at Evreux, where L'Isle-Adam and a Burgundian contingent joined him.[281] On the thirteenth he encamped before Ivry expecting battle the next day, but no French appearing the castle surrendered. Scarcely had it done so when the scouts of the two armies clashed, but the French, discovering that they had arrived too late, turned westward and occupied Verneuil, which was "stripped of men." That night both sides held councils of war. The English leaders advised Bedford to fall back on Evreux, while Salisbury and Suffolk felt out the French position by reconnaissance. In the French camp opinion was divided. Aumâle and Narbonne, who knew the English in the field, were for strongly garrisoning

[276] Waurin (III, 100), who was present, says 1800 men-at-arms and 8000 archers. Stevenson (II, 394) gives a list of captains present, notably incomplete (i.e. Suffolk and Bedford), whose total indentures would be over 4000 men. Suffolk, Bedford, and the re-enforcements from England would number some 4000.

[277] Cochon, p. 294; Waurin, III, 100.

[278] *Chronique de La Pucelle,* pp. 194-5.

[279] Jean Raoulet, p. 184; Jean Chartier, I, 41.

[280] Bib. Nat., fr. 4485, p. 358.

[281] Waurin, III, 100-108. This chronicler's chronology becomes confused at this point because he records the celebration of the Assumption (Aug. 15) by Bedford at Evreux as though it came before Ivry's surrender (Aug. 14), whereas his account of other events shows that Ivry surrendered on the fourteenth and that Bedford must have celebrated the Assumption during his second sojourn at Evreux before setting out for Verneuil.

Verneuil and invading Normandy without giving battle. From their present position they could swing through southern Normandy, where the garrisons must have been considerably weakened for Bedford's mobilization, wasting the country, probably capturing strongholds by a series of coups de main, and retiring into Maine via Alençon or Avranches without risking a battle. The Scots, on the other hand, and certain French youths, "headstrong and courageous,"[282] were all for combat. For two days, apparently they remained debating, and then prepared to follow the more cautious plan. But by that time it was too late. Suffolk had reported the French position back to Bedford on August 15. The regent set out from Evreux the next day, and by the time the French at Verneuil had decided upon a plan of action, on August 17, their scouts reported the presence of the enemy. It only remained then to form for battle.

We cannot estimate the French strength as satisfactorily as the English. The Scots, Alençon, and Aumâle together may have numbered 8100 men, the latter two representing the forces in Maine and Anjou.[283] Jean Chartier mentions some 600 Lombard cavalry.[284] Official figures, however, fail us. Bedford put the strength of his opponents at 14,000 men.[285] Chroniclers of both parties estimate the French army at 20,000, and all agree that it was larger than the English.[286]

There was nothing novel in the tactics employed on either side. Both armies dismounted. The English placed

[282] *Chronique de La Pucelle,* p. 196.

[283] *Vide supra,* pp. 303, 312.

[284] Jean Chartier, I, 42-3.

[285] *Vide infra,* p. 319.

[286] Jean Raoulet, pp. 184-6; Waurin, III, 100-4. Perceval de Cagny, p. 133, is an exception. That the French were stronger may perhaps be inferred from the desertion to their standard on the eve of battle of certain Norman lords, Waurin, III, 120-1. Yet Bedford sent L'Isle-Adam and the Burgundians back to besiege Nesle, *ibid.,* p. 107. Douglas is said to have proclaimed before the battle that no quarter was to be given, Fordun, p. 1221.

their men-at-arms in the center and the archers, provided as at Agincourt with sharp stakes, on the wings,[287] forming a laager of their wagons in the rear of their left flank, under the guard of 2000 archers, a tactical reserve. The French placed their dismounted men-at-arms, the bulk of their army, in the center in three lines, the foremost under Narbonne, the second under Aumâle, and the third, the Scots, under Douglas. On the wings they placed the Lombard cavalry, with orders to charge the English archers and break up their formation. As at Agincourt the main point of attack was to be the center.

When the battle began, the French cavalry charged according to orders and succeeded in routing the English right. Fugitives from this wing carried news of defeat northward where it stimulated a small uprising in Auge, quickly suppressed by the local authorities.[288] On the other wing, however, behind which lay the wagons, the cavalry attack was repulsed. Meanwhile the English center charged the French men-at-arms and the shock of assault pushed back the first French line upon Aumâle, where the opposing forces became involved in a mêlée. Here the French must have had the superiority of weight for their army was not only larger than the English but also contained a larger proportion of men-at-arms. The latter had partly made up for this by their initiative in charging. At the moment then when the battle hung in the balance, the archers on the English left, including the reserve with the wagons, swung shouting into the line of battle.[289] Probably the new position thus assumed overlapped and turned the French line. At once they attacked,

[287] *Chronique de La Pucelle,* p. 197.

[288] Le Cacheux, *Actes,* I, 97, 104, 113-4, 124.

[289] "se vindrent en tourpiant mettre au front devant de leur bataille," Waurin, III, 113. This must mean that they took up a position in advance of the line of their wing, probably at an angle, for the men-at-arms were now closely engaged.

says the chronicler, which must mean, not that they poured in a volley of arrows, but that they charged.[290] The new and unexpected blow forced the French to give ground. The English men-at-arms, inspirited by this success, redoubled their efforts and pushed home their advantage, so that under this double blow the French line rolled back upon the Scots and went to pieces. Rout and slaughter followed. The victory was complete. In three quarters of an hour, Bedford had assured the retention of Henry V's conquests.[291]

Two days later the regent wrote the following dispatch to Sir Thomas Rempston at Guise. "Tres chiers et bien amez, depuis que nous avons escript la journèe d'Ivry, nous avons poursuivre à Verneuil noz anemis qui la estoient jusques à XIIII^{M} combatants, qui par fraulde et malice s'estoient entres es ville et chastel dudit Verneuil a Jeudi darrain passe. XVII jour de ce moix d'Aoust nous attendismes en bataille devant ledit Verneuil, lesquelx aprochasmes et combatismes ce meisme jour environ quattre heures apres midi,[292] et par la grace de notre Seigneur nous demourasmes le camp auquel furent mors dela partie d'iceulx anemis VII^{M} II^{C} et LXII personnes, entres lesquelx furent trouves mors le conte Du glas et messire Jacques son filz, le conte de Bosquen, le conte d'Aumaille, le conte de Tonnoire, le conte de Ventadour, le conte de Mary, le seig^{r} de Graville l'aisne, les seigneurs de Montenay, Belloy et son frere, Mauny, Combrest, Fontenay, Brimeul, de Tuville, de Pressy ou Dosme, le seigneur de Marche, le seigneur de Rainville en Languedoc, Cardulach, Sr Gautier de Lindezay, Sr Gilles de Gamaches, Sire Anthoine de Beaussault et son

290 It was an archer charge which won Agincourt.

291 Waurin, III, 107-16; Jean Chartier, I, 42-3; Jean Raoulet, pp. 186-8. Verneuil opened its gates Aug. 18, Fauquembergue, II, 140-1; Le Cacheux, I, 103.

292 Waurin (III, 112) says about 2 P.M.

frere, Joffray de Malestrais, James Duglas, Sre Charles le Bron, Sre Jehan de Bretase, Sre Gilles Martel le filz, Herpedame, le filz du filz Tournebeuve, Sre Brunet d'Auvergne, Sre Raoul de la Treille, Guy de la Fautonniere, Sre Pouchart de Vienne, Messire Faingue, Sre Jehan de Murat, le sre de Bertoix, Sire Charles de Giresme, Diago de Salle, le bastard de Lenghain et autres. Et se sont pendu le visconte de Nerbonne, Messire Maudet de Nerbonne, Guitroy le Murdrier, et Sr Franchoix de Gringmaux. Et se soit prisonniers, le duc d'Alenchon, le bastard d'Alenchon, le Sre de La Fayette, le Sre de Hommet, Messre Pierre de Herisson, Rogerin Brosset, Loys de Mortemont, et Sre Robert de Leire. Et se retournet ledicte ville et chastel de Verneuil. Et y a demoure buen peu d'Eshois qui ne soient mors. Et des gentilz hommes de notre compaignie n'avons perdu que Dondelay et Charleton et bien pau d'archiers dont nous rendons graces à dieu qui vous ait en sa sauvegarde. Donne en notre oost devant Verneuil le XIX jour d'Aoust, l'an mille IIII^{C} XXIIII.''[293]

The results of the victory manifested themselves rapidly. Nesle surrendered at the end of August and La Fere was eventually taken, if indeed it had not already fallen.[294] Guise capitulated September 18, 1424.[295] La Hire on October 4 engaged to evacuate his remaining strong-

[293] MS. Hist. Univ., Bib. Nat., fr. 23018, f. 451 headed ''Sensuivent le coppie des lettres dudit Regent escripte à Messire Jehan de Luxembourc et à Messire Thomas de Rampston estant lors au siege devant Guise, sur le fait de la dicte desconfiture.'' Evidently there was an official list of the French dead for Waurin (III, 116-118) follows the order of the above and adds the ''autres.'' In Stevenson, II, 394-5, is another list, which contains other names but reports some of the dead as prisoners.

[294] MS. Hist. Univ., Bib. Nat., fr. 23018, f. 449.

[295] Monstrelet, IV, 199. On Aug. 24 Rempston received 2989 l. t. 3s 4d for his fifth month's service according to his muster of Aug. 6, Bib. Nat., fr. 26047, no. 307. He held his last muster at Guise Sept. 21, *ibid.*, fr. 4485, p. 282.

holds in the spring.[296] These, however, were only the finishing touches to Henry V's work. More important was the beginning of a vigorous offensive which aimed at bringing the English to the Loire all along the line, for immediately the regent sent his forces to follow up his success by clearing from the southern frontiers the hostile castles, which had been a constant annoyance. Suffolk and Salisbury attacked Senonches, Nogent-le-Rotrou, Rambouillet, and Rochefort, and later operated successfully against Milly-en-Gatinois, moves which may be considered as the first steps in the advance on Orleans.[297] In the western "sector" Fastolf, Lord Scales, and Sir John Montgomery with forces drawn from the garrisons and feudal levies of Lower Normandy advanced from Alençon to the conquest of Anjou and Maine.[298] And finally in the extreme west Sir Nicholas Burdet with the men from the Cotentin laid siege before Mont St. Michel.[299] With these

[296] These were Vitry, Larzicourt, Heiltz l'Evêque, and Blacy, Ledieu, *Esquisses Militaires,* pp. 57-8.

[297] There were 180 men-at-arms and 540 archers from the Norman garrisons, and the forces from England serving under Suffolk: Sept. 12 he mustered before Senonches, Bib. Nat., fr. 4485, pp. 209, 307-9. Oct. 17, 1424, receipt by Salisbury of 644 l. t. 3s 4d for 58 men-at-arms and 136 archers serving since Sept. 12 before Senonches, and Nogent-le-Rotrou, Arch. Nat., K 62, no. 11^{10}. At the end of the year, Salisbury was assembling 120 men-at-arms and 360 archers at Mantes, to go to the surrender of Milly on Jan. 1, 1425, Bib. Nat., fr. 4485, p. 380.

[298] Aug. 25, 1424, commission to the above, Brit. Mus., Arundel 26, f. 4 (copy). For the Norman garrisons in this army see Bib. Nat., fr. 4485, pp. 177, 186, 198, 200-1, 205, 266, 272, 276, 319, 320. Some of them failed to put in an appearance, *ibid.,* pp. 141-2. Oct. 20, order for the ban and arrière-ban to support Fastolf in relieving Montfort, Stevenson, II, 38-41. Nov. 28, order to pay 110 men-at-arms and 310 archers serving under Fastolf, *Report on the Foedera,* "Archives de France," p. 150.

[299] Luce, *Chronique,* I, 147, p. j. XXXIV, gives a force of 130 men-at-arms and 390 archers. He omits the 30 men-at-arms and 90 archers at Tombelaine, Bib. Nat., fr. 4485, p. 182. In addition there were 28 men-at-arms and 84 archers with 24 sailors blockading by sea, mustered on Sept. 24 (*ibid.,* pp. 317-18), and appearing before the Mont, Sept. 29. Blockade

moves the war enters upon a new phase which was to last until the appearance of Jeanne d'Arc.

by land began Sept. 17, "Continuator of Guillaume de Nangis," Bib. Nat., latin 5696, f. 60v°; Luce, *Chronique*, I, 27.


Map
to illustrate
the Conquest of Upper Normandy
and
the English Occupation in 1421.
English line of march
English minor operations
Enfeoffed castles
Castles known to have had royal captains at sometime before 1421
Royal garrisons
Ungarrisoned English town
French town
Cherbourg
Valognes
Briquebec
Nehou
Barneville
St. Sauveur-le-Vicomte
Pont d'Ouve
Carentan
la Haye du Puits
le Hommet
Pirou
Coutances
Regneville
St. Denis
Bricqueville
Chanteloup
Beaubamp
Hambye
Beaumesnil
Vire
Clinchamps
Condé-sur-Noireau
Thury-Harcourt
la Roche Tesson
le Mesnil Garnier
Grippon
la Haye Pesnel
Avranches
Mortain
Domfront
Tombelaine
Mont St. Michel
Ardevon
Pontorson
St. James de Beuvron
Maisy
Neuilly l'Evêque
Bayeux
Cerisy-le-Forêt
Lingèvres
Tilly
St. Lô
Torigny
Villers-Bocage
Tracy-le-Bocage
Courseulles
Creully
Caen
Merville
Calloué
la Motte
Falaise
Chambois
Exmes
Argentan
Sées
Essay
Mortagne
Alençon
Bellême
Sarthe R.
Longni
la Ferté-Vidame
Maillebois
Dreux
River
Châteauneuf
Courville
Chartres
Pont l'Evêque
Vaugernon
la Rivière de Thibouville
Lisieux
Beaumont-le-Roger
Bernay
Courtonne
Beaumesnil
Chambrois
Courcy
la Ferté-Fresnel
Gacé
Orbec
Touques R.
Dives
Risle
Deauville
Touques
Quillebeuf
Harfleur
Honfleur
Montvilliers
Lillebonne
Caudebec
Tancarville
Maulevrier
Bec-Crespin
Gauzeville
les Loges
Fécamp
Valmont
Vittefleur
Cany-Canyel
Lammerville
Bacqueville
Saune
Longueville
Neufchâtel
Arques R.
Bethune R.
Hautot
Arques
Tôtes
Dieppe
Pontrenquart
Eu
Guillemcourt
St. Martin-le-Gaillard
Gamaches
Monceaux
Boissay
Pierrecourt
Auvilliers
Aumale
Beausault
Bellencombre
Rouen
Seine
Elbeuf
Pont-de-Arche
Pont Audemer
Condé-en-Auge
Bec-Hellouin
Harcourt
Louviers
Neufbourg
Evreux
Croissy
Conches
Rugles
Breteuil
Laigle
Damville
Ivry
Tillières
Verneuil
Bonsmoulins
Eure
Gaillon
Vernon
les Goules
Blaru
Baudemont
Dangu
Gisors
Château Gaillard
Etrépagny
Journay
Epte
Seryfontaine
Beauvais
Chaumont
Neaufle
la Roche Guyon
Bouconvillers
Beaumont-sur-Oise
Pontoise
Meulan
Mantes
Poissy
St. Germain
St. Cloud
Paris
The Sarthe Valley south of Alencon.
Alençon
St. Remy du Plain
Bellême
Fresnay-le-Vicomte
Dangeul
Beaumont-le-Vicomte
Nouan
Asné-le-Riboul
St. Aignan
Sillé-le-Guillaume
Ballon
Tennie
Le Mans
Montfort
River
Sarthe

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

MANUSCRIPT SOURCES

In preparing this study considerable use has been made of fifteenth century manuscripts in the Public Record Office and British Museum in London, the Bibliothèque Nationale and the Archives Nationales in Paris, the Archives de la Seine Inférieure and the Bibliothèque Municipale at Rouen, the Archives Municipales at Lisieux, and the Archives du Calvados at Caen. Probably the most important documents for the purposes of this investigation were the various account books of the English occupation of Normandy. There exist the first and fourth annual accounts of William Alington, treasurer-general of Normandy under Henry V (P.R.O., Ex. Accts. 187/14, 188/7), and a summary of his third and fourth accounts which he made for the English exchequer on the death of Henry V (P.R.O., For. Accts. 61). These cover most of the period from May, 1419, to August, 1422. The hiatus comes between May 1, 1420, and April 30, 1421, a year covered by the lost second account. These accounts have never before been utilized to my knowledge. There is also an account of Pierre Surreau, receveur-general under Bedford (Bib. Nat., fr. 4485), a much more detailed and extensive document than any of the preceding, which has been studied by several French scholars, notably Beaurepaire. All of these give in considerable detail the income derived from the various parts of Normandy and its expenditure in the support of the garrisons of occupation and the maintenance of an Anglo-Norman administration. In addition, there is an account of Sir William Philip, treasurer of war, for 1421-1422, which affords a picture of part of the army administration for the forces which the king had in the field, and there is the account of Simon Fleet, treasurer of Harfleur, for the years 1416-1421 (P.R.O., For. Accts.

69; Ex. Accts. 49/7). For conditions in France, there is the Compte of Jehan Cuillier, receveur at Fécamp, from September 1420 to Easter 1422 (Archives de la Seine Inf., Fonds de Fécamp, dossier 386; summarized in Extraits et Notes Hist. IV, 4556-4593, 5460-5469). This account shows the nature of the English relations with the abbey of Fécamp to a certain extent. Then there is an account of the farming of the "aide" at Lisieux (Arch. mun. de Lisieux CC1), which shows the relation of the central administration to the Norman cities in 1423-1424. For the French government, there is only the Compte of Pierre de Gorremont (Bib. Nat., Coll. Bourgogne, tome 104), which has been extensively used by Beaucourt, and which has been partly published by Petit. It has none of the orderliness of the English accounts, and gives a view of but a limited period of Burgundian rule. The Issue and Receipt Rolls of the English exchequer are the basis of a study of the English finances. Inasmuch as they were made in triplicate, it was usually possible, where a roll was mutilated, for me to secure a complete account of the total receipts and disbursements, if not of the separate items, from the other rolls.

In addition to the above, there is a vast amount of miscellaneous, scattered, documentary material from which I have been able to glean information of military value. Most of it consists of muster rolls, orders to pay, and quittances. Occasionally I have found a whole file, showing a month's payments by the treasurer of war, preserved in the Public Record Office. Perhaps the most striking document in this classification is the long muster roll for the army of 1417 (P.R.O., Ex. Accts. 51/2), which has been studied by Benjamin Williams and Sir James Ramsay. A detailed, tabular presentation of all this material will be found in Harvard University Library, HU 90.1215, appendix VII, Table of Captains, and appendix VIII, Table of Garrisons. Most of these miscellaneous documents deal with the English army and garrisons. Such documents as exist for the French side are too few and too scattered to make possible any study of French resources in men or money. In the departmental archives at Caen and Rouen I found a not inconsiderable mass of material preserved without very definite classification, which

repaid investigation (Archives de la Seine Inf. Occupation Anglaise, 3 cartons; I. pièces mêlées. Archives du Calvados, F Fonds Danquin). The existence of this material leads me to believe that there is still work to be done in ransacking the French local archives for miscellaneous documents relating to the Hundred Years' War.

PUBLISHED SOURCES

Calenders and Recueil: English and Anglo-Norman.

Of the published collections of documents, the most important and useful for this study were those collections of official acts of the English administration in Normandy, namely, (1) Sir Thomas Duffus Hardy, *Rotuli Normanniae* (London, 1835), which contains the roll of Henry V's first year in Normandy, set forth in full with all the original abbreviations, (2) the "Rôles Normands et Français et autres pièces tirées des archives de Londres par Bréquigny en 1764, 1765, et 1766" (referred to as Rôles de Bréquigny), published in vol. XXIII of the *Mémoires de la Société des Antiquaires de Normandie* (Paris, 1858), where appear in full nearly all the rest of the Norman Rolls of Henry V, and (3) the "Calendar of the Norman Rolls—Henry V," in *Reports of the Deputy Keeper of the Public Records,* vol. 41, pp. 671-810; vol. 42, pp. 313-472 (abbreviated Cal. Norm. Rolls 41.671 or 42.313), (London, 1880-1881). This last serves as a corrective for some of Bréquigny's errors in dating, contains all the commissions of array which he omitted, and occasionally cites documents which he overlooked. Sometimes, however, when the calendar was not sufficiently full or explicit, the original roll has been consulted. A large number of these documents are enfeoffments. A still larger number are official maintenances in possession issued to Normans who took the oath of allegiance to the new government. There are many appointments to office, treaties of capitulation, royal ordonnances, monetary regulations, and letters to royal officials. Finally there are numerous commissions of array which make possible a study of the English field and garrison forces. Of a similar sort are the "Calendar of the French Rolls—Henry V," in *Reports of the Deputy*

Keeper of the Public Records, vol. 44, pp. 545 ff. (London, 1883), and "Calendar of the French Rolls—Henry VI," in *ibid.,* vol. 48, pp. 217 ff. (London, 1887), but these, for the most part, contain only licenses to trade and letters of protection and letters of attorney for men going to France. The foregoing sources can sometimes be checked and occasionally supplemented from A. Charma, "Partie des Dons Faits par Henri V, roi d'Angleterre lorsqu'il se fut rendu maître de la Normandie," in vol. XXIII of the *Mémoires de la Société des Antiquaires de Normandie* (Paris, 1858); from Charles Vautier, *Extrait du registre des dons, confiscations maintennes et autres actes faits dans le duché de Normandie, pendant les années 1418, 1419, et 1420, par Henri V, roi d'Angleterre* (Paris, 1828); and from Léchaudé d'Anisy, *Extraits des Chartes, et autres actes Normandes ou Anglo-Normands qui se trouvent dans les Archives du Calvados* (2 vols., Caen, 1834). For the period of Bedford's rule recourse must be had to P. Le Cacheux, *Actes de la Chancellerie d'Henri VI concernant La Normandie sous la domination Anglaise, 1422-1435* (2 vols., Société de l'histoire de Normandie, Paris, 1907), which contains a mass of official documents especially useful for conditions in Normandy and along the frontier, and to J. Stevenson, *Letters and Papers illustrative of the wars of the English and French during the reign of Henry VI* (2 vols. in 3 parts, Rolls Series, London, 1864) where will be found a miscellaneous assortment of official documents mostly of an administrative and military character. A very similar collection appears as the pièces diverses of Siméon Luce, *Chronique du Mont-Saint-Michel, 1343-1468* (2 vols., Société des Anciens textes françaises, Paris, 1880), a book which is rather a collection of documents than a chronicle.

For the official acts of the English government at home there are available the great collections of (1) the *Rotuli Parliamentorum* (6 vols., London, 1767-1777), (2) the *Report of the Deputy Keeper of the Public Records,* vol. 2 (London, 1839), appendix II, which is one of the standard sources for the proceedings of the English parliament, (3) Rymer, *Foedera* (20 vols., London, 1729), to be used in connection with Sir Thomas Duffus Hardy, *Syllabus (in English) of the Documents relating*

to England and other Kingdoms contained in Rymer's Foedera (3 vols., London, 1869), which is indispensable for any extensive or continuous use of Rymer, and (4) Wilkins, *Concilia Magnæ Britanniæ et Hiberniæ* (4 vols., London, 1737). Particularly useful for information about military and financial activity and preparation in England are *Calendar of the Patent Rolls, Henry V* (2 vols., London, 1910-1911), *Calendar of the Patent Rolls, Henry VI* (6 vols., London, 1901-1910), Frederick Devon, *Issues of the exchequer* (London, 1837; referred to as Devon Issues), which is a series of selected quotations from the Issue Rolls, and Sir Harris Nicolas, *Proceedings and Ordinances of the Privy Council of England* (London, 1834). All of these can be usefully supplemented by the *Calendar of the Letter Books of the City of London, Letter Book I, circa 1400-1422* (London, 1909), which contains interesting documents concerning loans, mustering, and provisioning, and by H. T. Riley, *Memorials of London and London life: a series of extracts from the archives of the city of London, 1276-1419* (London, 1868), where are several proclamations in regard to mobilization and provisions. For English foreign affairs there is a calendar of a series of documents in the Public Record Office, published by E. Deprez and L. Mirot, "Les Ambassades Anglaises pendant la guerre de cent ans: catalogue chronologique, 1327-1450," in *Bibliothèque de l'École des Chartes,* LIX, 550 ff.; LX, 177 ff.; LXI, 20 ff. (Paris, 1898-1900), which is important for showing the extent of English diplomacy and for providing exact dates useful in determining the details of chronology. There is also a collection of documents concerning commercial negotiations between England and Flanders in L. Gilliodts-van Severen, *Le Cotton Manuscript Galba B I* (Brussels, 1896), and some interesting details about naval matters in Rawdon Brown, *Calendar of State Papers and MSS. relating to English affairs existing in the archives and collections of Venice* (7 vols., London, 1864-1870). Various collections of miscellaneous documents, both official and unofficial, have proved exceedingly useful, such as Samuel Bentley, *Excerpta historica or Illustrations of English history* (London, 1833), which contains two military codes; Jules Delpit, *Collection Générale des Documents Français qui se*

trouvent en Angleterre (Paris, 1847); Henry Ellis, *Original Letters Illustrative of English History* (second series, 4 vols., London, 1846); J. Kail, *Twenty-six Political and Other Poems* (Early English Text Society, original series 124, London, 1904); Thomas Wright, *Political Poems and Songs relating to English history from the accession of Edward III to that of Richard III* (2 vols., Rolls Series, London, 1859-1861); Thomas Goodwin, *The History of the Reign of Henry the Fifth, King of England* (London, 1704), a book that has the value of an original source, because it contains information from Cottonian MS. Caligula D V, which has been burned; and the *Report on the Foedera* (London, 1869), a calendar of a large number of diverse documents existing in various French archives, which were examined with a view to incorporation in Rymer. The dating of documents in this last publication is not always reliable.

French.

For the acts of the French government, unfortunately, no such extensive or complete collections exist as for the English. There are such monumental works as the *Ordonnances des Roys de France de la Troisième Race* (17 vols., Paris, 1723-1820); J. Dumont, *Corps Universel Diplomatique du Droit des Gens* (8 vols., Amsterdam and the Hague, 1726-1731); D. et J. Isambert, *Recueil Général des Anciennes Lois Françaises depuis l'an 420 jusqu'à la Revolution de 1789* (28 vols., Paris, n. d.); and H. Stein, *Inventaire Analytique des Ordonnances Enregistrées au Parlement de Paris jusqu'à la mort de Louis XII* (Paris, 1908), but there is nothing comparable to the English calendars, for generally speaking the published documents are much more widely scattered. On the other hand, there are two unique, strictly contemporary, sources of an official character, which provide an almost day by day picture of the French administration. These are the *Journal de Nicolas de Baye, greffier du Parlement de Paris, 1400-1417* (2 vols., A. Tuetey, ed., Société de l'Histoire de France, Paris, 1885-1888), and the *Journal de Clement de Fauquembergue, greffier du Parlement de Paris, 1417-1435* (3 vols., A. Tuetey, ed., Société de l'Histoire de France, Paris, 1903-1915), which can be very usefully supple-

mented from one of the most valuable sources for the period, the *Journal d'un Bourgeois de Paris, 1405-1449* (A. Tuetey, ed., Société de l'Histoire de Paris, Paris, 1881). In some cases royal letters from local archives have been specially published, such as are to be found in B. Ledain, *Lettres des Rois de France, princes et grands personnages, à la commune de Poitiers* (*Archives Historiques du Poitou,* I. Poitiers, 1872); V. Luzarche, *Lettres Historiques des Archives Communales de la ville de Tours depuis Charles VI jusqu'à la fin de la règne de Henri IV, 1416-1594* (Tours, 1861); Guillaume Besse, *Recueil de diverses pièces servant à l'histoire du roy Charles VI* (Paris, 1660; these are from Carcassonne); Léon Mirot, "Lettres close de Charles VI conservées aux Archives de Reims et de Tournai" (*Le Moyen Age,* 2e série, XX, Paris, 1918), or have appeared in considerable numbers among the pièces justificatives of local monographs, such as Louis Caillet, *Étude sur les Relations de la commune de Lyon avec Charles VII et Louis XI, 1417-1483* (*Annales de l'Université de Lyon,* nouvelle série II, Lyon-Paris, 1909), or of standard works, such as Gaston du Fresne de Beaucourt, *Histoire de Charles VII* (6 vols., Paris, 1881-1891). Often in connection with provincial and family history have considerable numbers of miscellaneous documents been brought together and published. Works such as Dom Vaissete, *Histoire Générale de Languedoc avec notes et les pièces justificatives* (15 vols., Toulouse, 1872-1893); Dom Plancher, *Histoire Générale et Particuliere de Bourgogne avec des notes, des dissertations et les preuves justificatives* (4 vols., Dijon, 1739-1781); and Dom Morice, *Mémoires pour servir de preuves à l'Histoire Ecclesiastique et Civile de Bretagne, tirés des archives de cette province, de celles de France et d'Angleterre, des Recueils de plusiers sçavans antiquaires, et mis en ordre* (3 vols., Paris, 1742); or E. Baluze, *Histoire Généalogique de la maison d'Auvergne* (2 vols., Paris, 1708); G. A. de la Roque, *Histoire généalogique de la maison d'Harcourt and Preuves de l'Histoire généalogique de la maison d'Harcourt* (4 vols., Paris, 1662), and *Les La Trémoille pendant cinq siècles* (5 vols., Nantes, 1890 ff.), are primarily collections of sources, often of the greatest value, rather than works of historical synthesis.

Indeed, it is the interest in local history which seems to have stimulated much of the publication of documents and the making of calendars, and consequently many of the numerous local archives have been searched for information covering the Hundred Years' War. These publications, naturally, are of varying size, interest, and value, and their number makes the task of searching for documents more complicated and tedious. Often such collections as exist can be largely supplemented from the notes and appendices of local histories which would otherwise be negligible. A collection such as J. N. A. Thierry, *Recueil des monuments inédits de l'Histoire du Tiers État* (4 vols., Paris, 1850-1870) furnished me with information about military affairs and taxation from the municipales archives of Amiens, information which the notes and pièces justificatives of A. de Calonne, *Histoire de la ville d'Amiens* (2 vols., Amiens, 1899), the same author's *La Vie Municipale au XV^e siècle dans le Nord de la France* (Paris, 1880), and R. Maugis, "Essai sur le régime financier de la ville d'Amiens du 14^e à la fin du 16^e siècles" (*Mémoires de la Société des Antiquaires de Picardie,* 4^e série, III, 133-656, Amiens, 1899), very considerably augmented. Other documents for the northern region will be found in V. de Beauville, *Recueil des documents inédits concernant la Picardie* (5 parts in 4 vols., Paris, 1860-1882), in his *Histoire de la ville de Montdidier* (3 vols., Paris, 1857), in H. Vandenbroeck, *Extraits Analytiques des Anciens Registres des Consaux de la Ville de Tournai, 1385-1430* (2 vols., Tournai, 1861-1863), and in a summary of the Senlis archives by A. Bernier, entitled *Monuments inédits de l'histoire de France, 1400-1600: Mémoires originaux concernant principalement les villes d'Amiens, de Beauvais, de Clermont-sur-Oise, de Compiègne, de Crépy, de Noyon, de Senlis, et leurs environs* (Paris-Senlis, 1850). For purposes of this study also J. Flammermont, *Histoire de Senlis pendant la seconde partie de la guerre de Cent ans, 1405-1451* (*Mémoires de la Société de l'histoire de Paris* V, Paris, 1879) may be considered as a summary of the town archives inasmuch as the author has drawn extensively upon that collection, especially the minutes of town meetings, many extracts from which are printed in full, while A. Sorel, *La prise de Jeanne d'Arc devant Compiègne et*

l'histoire des sièges de la même ville sous Charles VI et Charles VII (Orleans, 1889), is similarly useful for the archives at Compiègne. Alphonse de La Fons, baron de Mélicocq, has published a selected calendar of the registre de l'hôtel de ville de Noyon under the title, *Une Cité Picarde au Moyen-âge, ou Noyon et le Noyonais aux XIV^e^ et XV^e^ siècles* (Noyon, 1841), and a résumé of documents from local archives "1421—Documents inédits," in *La Picardie,* III, 145-155 (Amiens, 1857). Alcius Ledieu has published several interesting extracts from the Abbeville archives, in the *Bulletin de la Société d'Emulation d'Abbeville,* III (Abbeville, 1890) and in the *Bulletin Mensuel de la Société d'Histoire du Vimeu,* I (St. Valéry-sur-Somme, 1905-1907), and has made an *Inventaire sommaire des archives municipales antérieures à 1790: Ville de Abbeville* (2 vols., Abbeville, 1854). It is from these same local archives that Charles Breard has drawn his facts in *Le Crotoy et les armements maritimes des XIV^e^ et XV^e^ siècles* (Amiens, 1902). Some useful items about Burgundian affairs outside of Picardy will be found in L. P. Gachard, *Rapport sur différentes séries de document concernant l'histoire de la Belgique qui sont conservées dans les Archives de l'ancienne Chambre des Comptes de Flandre à Lille,* "Archives de Dijon" (Brussels, 1841), and in J. Garnier, *Correspondance de la Mairie de Dijon extraits des archives de cette ville* (3 vols., Dijon, 1868-1870). Most important, however, for Burgundian activities is E. Petit, *Itineraires de Philippe le Hardi et de Jean sans Peur, ducs de Bourgogne, 1363-1419, d'apres les comptes des dépenses de leur hôtel, recueillis et mis en ordre* (Documents inédits sur l'histoire de France, Paris, 1888), which in addition to a highly valuable text has an appendix filled with useful documents.

For Normandy itself, the special collections, other than those already mentioned, are not numerous, and local studies become, more often than elsewhere, the means for learning the contents of the local archives. There is V. Hunger, *Quelques actes normands du 14^e^, 15^e^, et 16^e^ siècles* (3 vols., Paris, 1910-1911), but for the period under consideration its contents are of interest rather than of importance. There are T. Bonnin's two works, *Analectes historiques, recueil des documents inédits sur l'histoire*

de la ville d'Evreux (Evreux, 1839) and *Cartulaire de Louviers* (Louviers, 1870-1871), but these are rather heterogeneous collections, with only a few things of interest. More satisfactory is E. Grave, "Archives municipales de Mantes: Analyses des registres de comptes de 1381 à 1450" (*Bulletin historique et philologique* for 1896, pp. 306-331), although often the items are lacking in specific dates. A. Durand and E. Grave, *La Chronique de Mantes* (Mantes, 1883), sometimes gives useful reference to the same municipal archives. Such a book as A. Chéruel, *Histoire de Rouen sous la domination anglaise au quinzième siècle* (Rouen, 1840), has a very useful and interesting body of documents and notes, and Léon Fallue, *Histoire politique et religieuse de l'eglise métropolitane et du diocèse de Rouen* (4 vols., Rouen, 1850-1851), contains information derived from the register of the cathedral chapter and from documents in the departmental archives illustrating conditions in and about Rouen. A similar service for Caen is performed by P. Carel in his *Étude sur la Commune de Caen* (Caen, 1888) and his *Histoire de la ville de Caen* (Paris, 1886), while H. de Formeville, *Histoire de l'ancien évêché-comté de Lisieux* (Paris, 1873), is a very learned work, filled with information. E. Meyer, *Histoire de la ville de Vernon et de son ancienne Châtellenie* (Andelys, 1874), contains useful information of a military character from the local archives, one letter from Charles VI in full. Some information from local manuscripts appears in Odolant-Desnos, *Mémoires Historiques sur la ville d'Alençon et sur ses seigneurs* (2 vols., Alençon, 1787). Conditions on the Norman borders are illustrated by documents in Lucien Merlet, *Registres et Minutes des Notaires du Comté de Dunois, 1369 à 1676* (Chartres, 1886), and in André Joubert's publications, *Documents inédits sur la Guerre de Cent ans* (Angers, 1890), *Histoire de le Baronnie de Craon de 1382 à 1626 d'apres les archives inédits du chartier de Thouars (fonds Craon)* (Paris, 1888), *Les Invasions anglaises en Anjou aux XIV^e^ et XV^e^ siècles* (Angers, 1872), and *Une Tentative des Anglais contre Château-Gontier en 1421 d'apres des documents inédits* (Mamers, 1888).

In addition to the above there are certain miscellaneous collections, difficult to classify, which contain considerable informa-

tion. Such are the inventories made of private collections, *Catalogue Analytique des Archives de M. le Baron de Joursanvault* (2 vols., Paris, 1838), L. Delisle, *Les Collections de Bastard d'Estang à la Bibliothèque Nationale. Catalogue analytique* (Nogent-le-Rotrou, 1885), C. Porée, *Inventaire de la Collection de Chastellux* (Paris, 1907). There are some items of military interest in Douët d'Arcq, *Choix de Pièces Inédits relatives au règne de Charles VI* (2 vols., Société de l'Histoire de France, Paris, 1863-1864), and in H. Denifle, *Le desolation des eglises, monastères et hôpitaux en France pendant la guerre de Cent ans* (2 vols. in 3, Paris, 1897-1899). Finally, there are J. J. Champollion-Figeac, *Lettres de rois, reines et autres personnages des cours de France et d'Angleterre, depuis Louis VII jusqu'à Henri IV* (2 vols., Paris, 1839-1847) and Jules Tardif, *Monuments Historiques* (Paris, 1866).

Some of the cartulaires have been consulted and occasionally documents and references of interest have been found there, but no one of them provided anything of particular note with the exception of H. Denifle et E. Chatelain, *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis* (4 vols., Paris, 1889-1897), which contains some interesting material illustrating French taxation and preparation for defense.

Chronicles: English.

As a preliminary to any consideration of the English chroniclers, reference must be made to C. L. Kingsford, *English Historical Literature in the Fifteenth Century* (Oxford, 1913), which treats of certain important questions of authorship and provenance. For English military operations the principal source is *Henrici Quinti, Angliae Regis, Gesta* (B. Williams, ed., English Historical Society, London, 1850, referred to as the Chaplain), a narrative written by a chaplain in the army of 1415, who probably did not participate in the subsequent campaigns. Kingsford (*E.H.R.*, XXV, 58 ff.) has shown that the author is Thomas of Elmham. Almost equally valuable is *Vita Henrici Quinti, Regis Angliae*, of Titus Livius Forojuliensis (Thomas Hearne, ed., Oxford, 1716), which is supposed to have been written under the direction of Humphrey, duke of Gloucester, youngest

brother of Henry V, and a participant in the conquest of Normandy. This is occasionally supplemented by the Translator of Livius in *The first English life of King Henry the Fifth* (C. L. Kingsford, ed., Oxford, 1911), with bits of information which he had orally from the earl of Ormond. Then there is the *Vita et Gesta Henrici Quinti Anglorum Regis,* which goes under the name of Thomas of Elmham (Thomas Hearne, ed., Oxford, 1727), which Kingsford (*E.H.R.,* XXV, 58-92) has shown is a later history based on the two foregoing chronicles. The writer, however, is acquainted with the manners of the times of which he tells and is well informed on matters of detail and dates. To avoid confusion this book is referred to as Elmham, inasmuch as it is published under his name. Finally there are the works of Thomas Walsingham, the *Historia Anglicana, 1272-1422* (H. T. Riley, ed., 2 vols., Rolls Series, London, 1863-1864), and the *Ypodigma Neustria* (H. T. Riley, ed., Rolls Series, London, 1876). This historian was a contemporary, and is reliable and detailed. The *Ypodigma* is the better chronicle of the two, but it ends with 1419. Some details of the English campaign rest on the sole authority of this writer. For conditions in England, matters relating to public opinion, recruiting, mobilization, and taxation, the contemporary chronicles are *Chronicon Adae de Usk, A.D. 1377-1421* (E. M. Thompson, ed., 2nd ed., London, 1904) which is particularly interesting for its reflection of contemporary sentiment; John Capgrave, *The Chronicles of England* (F. C. Hingston, ed., Rolls Series, London, 1858); and a group of city chronicles, *Three fifteenth century chronicles* (J. Gairdner, ed., London, 1880; this includes Gregory's Chronicle); *The Historical Collection of a Citizen of London* (J. Gairdner, ed., Camden Society, London, 1876); *Chronicles of London* (C. L. Kingsford, ed., Oxford, 1905); and "An Historical Collection of the Fifteenth Century" (*E.H.R.,* XXIX, 512 ff.). These frequently have bits of information about taxation, often give definite dates which are useful, and serve to show the news which reached England. The *Brut or the chronicles of England* (F. W. D. Brie, ed., 2 vols., Early English Text Society, London, 1906-1908) gives an important reflection of popular tradition.

French.

The classic discussion of French historical literature is A. Molinier, *Les Sources de l'Histoire de France des origines aux guerres d'Italie, 1494* (6 vols., Paris, 1901-1906), the fourth volume of which deals with the early fifteenth century. Matters of military interest receive considerable attention from the French chroniclers, owing to the fact that many of them were noblemen who participated actively in the wars of the period. Among the Burgundian partisans were Monstrelet, Fenin, St. Remy, Waurin, and Chastellain. *La chronique de Enguerran de Monstrelet* (Douët d'Arcq, ed., 6 vols., Société de l'Histoire de France, Paris, 1859) is a continuation of Froissart, and the chief Burgundian chronicle of the epoch. It is usually very well informed on military matters, especially those connected with the Burgundian operations in the north. Similarly the *Mémoires de Pierre de Fenin* (Mlle. Dupont, ed., Paris, 1837) is important and reliable for the details of military events in the north. For the period under discussion the *Chronique de Jean Le Fevre, seigneur de Saint-Remy* (F. Morand, ed., 2 vols., Société de l'Histoire de France, Paris, 1876-1881), is little more than an abridgment of Monstrelet. The author participated in the Agincourt campaign and was captured by the English. The *Recueil des cronicques et anchiennes istories de la Grant Bretaigne, a present nomme Engleterre,* by Jehan de Waurin (William Hardy, ed., 5 vols., Rolls Series, London, 1864-1891) parallels Monstrelet to a considerable extent. The two chroniclers are known to have borrowed extensively from each other. Inasmuch as Waurin took part in the campaigns of 1423 and 1424 and was present at Cravant and Verneuil, he has been used as the authority for the military events of those two years, upon which he is well informed. The *Chronique de Georges Chastellain, 1419-1470,* which occupies the first five volumes of his published *Oeuvres* (Kervyn de Lettenhove, ed., Brussels, 1863-1866), follows the earlier historians, but the editor has filled the notes with documents of interest, either in full or in summary. There is also a *Chronique de Normandie* by this same writer published in the appendix to the chaplain's *Gesta Henrici Quinti,* which bears a close re-

semblance to the "Chronique d'un bourgeois de Verneuil" (q.v.). Another Burgundian chronicle, which appears to have been written by a participant in many of the operations described, is "Le Livre des Trahisons de France envers la maison de Bourgogne" in *Chroniques relatives à l'Histoire de la Belgique sour la domination des Ducs de Bourgogne* (Kervyn de Lettenhove, ed., Brussels, 1873). Events are dated with great definiteness, and, judging from the accounts related in detail, the author may have been in the service of L'Isle-Adam. There is also considerable geographical detail of value. In the appendix of his edition of Monstrelet, Douët d'Arcq has published an "Extrait d'une Chronique Anonyme pour la règne de Charles VI, 1400-1422," which he associates with the monastery of the Cordeliers. This too parallels Monstrelet to a certain extent, but also contains some local matter concerning affairs in the north. The continuation after 1422 is to be found in Bib. Nat., fr. 23018, and is referred to here as MS. Histoire Universelle. This part contains several interesting documents in full. Probably the most important chronicle of the age is the *Chronique du religieux de Saint Denys* (L. Bellaquet, ed., 6 vols., Paris, 1844). This is less useful than the foregoing for military events, but is very well informed on the activities of the French government. What it says about the English is usually of little value, except as showing the prevailing opinions among the French. This historian is usually classed as pro-Burgundian, but he is really more anti-Armagnac and anti-war.

Among the Armagnac historians the one of first importance is Jean Jouvenel des Ursins, whose "Histoire de Charles VI, roy de France, et des choses mémorables advenues durant quarante-deux années de son règne, depuis 1380 jusques à 1422" is part of the second volume of Michaud et Poujoulat, *Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de France* (1^{e} sèrie, Paris, 1836). This is particularly useful for the activities of the French government and contains many official documents in full, but on the course of events in Normandy the author is badly confused, a fact of some significance in itself. Although pro-Armagnac, he is not badly biassed. The strictly military chronicles are less numerous among the Armagnacs than among the Burgundians for the period here

considered, but the two short ones available are unusually interesting. The *Faits et Gestes de Guillaume de Meuillon* (E. Maignien, ed., Grenoble, 1897) is a brief autobiography, written about 1426 by a French captain who took part in the Norman operations of 1415-1417. From it can be obtained many interesting details of French military activities. The other is "Chronique anonyme du roi Charles VII (1403-1429)," published by Vallet de Viriville in his edition of Jean Chartier (q.v.), Fragment A. For military matters, this is particularly useful. It has the appearance of having been written by a soldier who participated in the events which he describes and is ascribed to a certain Jean Raoulet. His account of the battle of Verneuil is strikingly vivid. Most of the other Armagnac chroniclers treat mainly of the period of Charles VII, such as Cousinot, *Gestes des nobles francoys* and *Chronique de La Pucelle* (Vallet de Viriville, ed., Paris, 1859), but these two are well informed and useful for events after 1422, while Alain Chartier, *L'Histoire Mémorable des Grands Troubles de ce Royaume soubs le Roy Charles VII* (Nevers, 1594) and Jean Chartier, *Chronique de Charles VII, roi de France* (Vallet de Viriville, ed., 3 vols., Paris, 1858) serve to reflect the chauvinism of the victorious period. The latter is the more reliable and better informed of the two. Robert Blondel, "De Reductione Normanniae" (*Narratives of the Expulsion of the English from Normandy, 1449-1450,* J. Stevenson, ed., Rolls Series, London, 1863), shows the Franco-Norman tradition of the English invasion according to the generation following Henry V.

Local.

Normandy itself produced several local chronicles. These are usually brief but often useful, such as Pierre Cochon, *Chronique Normande* (Charles de Robillard de Beaurepaire, ed., Société de l'Histoire de Normandie, Rouen, 1870), and the *Chronique du Mont-Saint-Michel, 1343-1468* (Siméon Luce, ed., 2 vols., Société des Anciens textes françaises, Paris, 1880), while the *Chronique de Bec* (abbé Porée, ed., Société de l'Histoire de Normandie, Rouen, 1883) affords considerable useful information about the relations of the monastery with the military authori-

ties, the manner in which the war affected the abbey, and the fighting in June, 1421. Much less satisfactory are two narratives published by A. Hellot. One of these, *Cronicques de Normendie, 1223-1453* (Rouen, 1881), the editor claims is a contemporary work for this period, but it offers comparatively little not to be found in other chronicles. While giving dates with great frequency this chronicler usually gets the date wrong. The editor attributes these errors to copyists! The other, Hellot has arbitrarily named "Chronique d'un bourgeois de Verneuil, 1415-1422" (*Bulletin de l'Histoire de Normandie,* III, Rouen, 1884). The narrative is brief and by no means reliable. It may be that it reflects the character of the news which went about Normandy in regard to the English advance. There is unquestionably some relationship between this work and Chastellain's *Chronique de Normandie.*

The local chroniclers of the regions bordering upon Normandy quite frequently prove to be useful sources. The best of these is the *Chronique de Perceval de Cagny* (H. Moranville, ed., Société de l'Histoire de France, Paris, 1902), a reliable account of events from the point of view of Alençon and Maine. For Brittany, there is Guillaume Gruel, *Chronique d'Arthur de Richemont, connétable de France, duc de Bretagne, 1393-1458* (A. le Vavasseur, ed., Société de l'Histoire de France, Paris, 1890), which, unfortunately, treats only briefly of the period here discussed. The other Breton accounts, *Chronique de Bretagne de Jean de Saint-Paul* (A. de La Borderie, ed., Nantes, 1881), and Alain Bouchart, *Les Grandes Croniques de Bretaigne* (Société des Bibliophiles Bretons, Rennes, 1886), are chiefly useful for giving the Breton point of view and showing the nature of the local tradition. Of similar use is Jean de Bourdigné, *Chronique d'Anjou et du Maine* (Angers, 1842). André Salmon, *Recueil de Chroniques de Touraine* (Tours, 1854), contains a short "Chronique des Abbés de Marmoutier" for this period, but it has only slight value for our purposes. In the north the only notable local chronicle is "Chronique des Pays-Bas, de France, d'Angleterre, et de Tournai," in the third volume of J. J. de Smet, *Recueil des Chroniques de Flandre* (also entitled *Corpus*

chronicorum Flandriae, 4 vols., Commission Royale d'Histoire, Brussels, 1837-1865).

Foreign.

Finally, there are several contemporary accounts from other European countries which touch upon various phases of the war in France, usually in a very informative fashion. The *Chronique d'Antonio Morosini* (G. Lefèvre-Pontalis et L. Dorez, ed., 4 vols., Société de l'Histoire de France, Paris, 1898-1902) is a series of extracts from a Venetian history, strictly contemporary, and particularly valuable for showing the difference in the news which reached Venice by way of Bruges and that which travelled through Languedoc. The latter was often highly distorted and sometimes the exact opposite of the truth. It also reflects foreign opinion of the war. Next in importance is Johannis de Fordun, *Scotichronicon Genuinum* (Thomas Hearne, ed., 5 vols., Oxford, 1722), the continuation of which contains very interesting accounts of Baugé and Verneuil, which bear signs of coming, perhaps at second hand, from participants. Ralph Holinshed, *Chronicles of England, Scotland, and Ireland* (6 vols., London, 1807-1808) has some useful information about the relations between France and Scotland, not to be found elsewhere. Eberhard Windecke, *Das Leben König Sigmunds* (Leipsic, 1886) is useful for the negotiations with Sigismund, but it should be supplemented from *Frankfurts Reichscorrespondenz nebst andern verwandten aktenstücken, 1376-1519* (J. Janssen, ed., 2 vols., Freiberg, 1863-1872). Agostino Giustiniani, *Annali della Repubblica de Genova* (3rd ed., 2 vols., Genova, 1854) is useful for the Franco-Genoese alliance, while "Comienza la Cronica del serenisimo Principe Don Juan, segundo rey deste nombre en Castille y en Leon" (*Cronicas de los Reyes de Castilla*, II, 227-695, Madrid, 1877) affords some meagre details for Franco-Castilian relations. Some idea of the current opinion of Henry V and his deeds can be derived from Aeneas Silvius, *De Viris Illustribus* (Stuttgart, 1842) and his *Commentarii rerum memorabilium quae temporibus suis contigerunt, 1405-1463* (Rome, 1584).

SECONDARY WORKS

Any attempt to discuss the standard historical works, utilized in connection with the subject here considered, would degenerate into a mere enumeration of titles already familiar to students of this period. There are, however, numerous monographs treating of other phases of the same epoch upon which some brief comment should be made. Distinguished Norman scholars have published works on French and English rule in the duchy during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, which are lasting monuments of French erudition. Foremost among these was Charles de Robillard de Beaurepaire whose "De l'administration de la Normandie sous la domination anglaise aux années 1424, 1425 et 1429" (*Mémoires de la Société des Antiquaires de Normandie,* XXIV, 170 ff., Caen, 1859), a study of Surreau's account books, has been consulted, whose *État des campagnes de la Haute Normandie dans les derniers temps du moyen âge* (Evreux, 1865) is a scholarly work which is still valuable, and whose "Les États de Normandie sous la domination anglaise" (*Travaux de la Société d'Agriculture de l'Eure,* 3e sèrie, V, 345 ff., Evreux, 1859) proved very useful for the English levies upon Normandy. De Beaurepaire was also active in editing and publishing documents (see *Bibliothèque de l'École des Chartes,* XXXVI, 307 ff., Paris, 1875 and *Précis analytique des travaux de l'Academie de Rouen* pour 1897-1898. Rouen, 1899). Some of the early studies of Léopold Delisle, his *Mémoire sur les baillis de Cotentin* (Caen, 1851) and his *Histoire du Château et des Sires de Saint-Sauveur-le-Vicomte* (Valognes, 1867) should be mentioned as being typical of quite a number of local studies from which facts pertinent to the subject in hand have been gleaned. Among contemporary scholars, the works of Alfred Coville, *Les États de Normandie: leurs origines et leur développement au XIVe siècle* (Paris, 1894), *Les États de Normandie, au commencement du règne de Charles VI, 1380-1382* (Caen, 1887) are naturally pre-eminent, and are particularly valuable for giving background to any study of the early fifteenth century, while his *Recherches sur la misère en Normandie au temps de Charles VI* (Caen, 1886) is very useful. In addition such an

exhaustive study as R. N. Sauvage, *L'Abbaye de Saint-Martin de Troarn au diocèse de Bayeux, des origines au siezième siècle* (Caen, 1911), cannot fail to have an interesting discussion of events connected with the English conquest, while the same scholar's "Une Procédure devant la Senéchausée de Normandie en 1423" (*Mémoires de l'Academie des Sciences de Caen,* pour 1910, Caen, 1910) provides details in regard to the Anglo-Norman administration. Very often these local studies, particularly when they treat of the events of the war itself, show a strong patriotic bias, as in Léon Puiseux's *Siège et Prise de Caen par les Anglais en 1417* (Caen, 1858) and *Siège et Prise de Rouen par les Anglais, 1418-1419* (Caen, 1867), although in these two this bias does not mar the quality of the scholarship. The same cannot be said for R. Postel, *Siège et capitulation de Bayeux en 1417: Notes pour servir à l'histoire du Bessin pendant la domination Anglaise sous l'occupation du roi Henri V* (Caen, 1873), which is distinctly chauvinistic. Similar criticism can be made of H. du Motey, "La ville, le château, et les pays d'Exmes pendant l'occupation Anglaise, de 1417 à 1449" (*Bulletin de la Société Historique et Archéologique de l'Orne,* VIII, 101 ff., Alençon, 1889). Other special studies directly bearing on this subject are F. Liard, *Domfront pendant la guerre de Cent ans de 1337 à 1453* (Domfront, 1884), E. Lépingard, "Les effets à St. Lô de la conquête de la Normandie par les Anglais, 1418-1437" (*Notices, mémoires, et documents publiés par la Société d'Agriculture et Archéologique et d'Histoire naturelle de department de la Manche,* IX, 164 ff., St. Lô, 1890), and F. de Fontaine de Resbecq, "Les Rapports du Gouvernement Anglais et de la Noblesse Normande dans la Vicomté de Valognes pendant l'occupation, 1418-1450" (*Mémoires de la Société Archéologique, Artistique, Littéraire et Scientifique de l'arrondissement de Valognes,* IX, 16-42, Valognes, 1912). This last study is unique in its freedom from patriotic bias, and is the only known attempt to make a thorough, scholarly study of the submission of the Norman gentry to Henry V. Finally, there are the monographs of R. Triger, *Le Château et la ville de Beaumont-le-Vicomte pendant l'invasion anglaise, 1417-1450* (Mamers, 1901), "Sainte-Suzanne aux XI^{e} et XV^{e} siècles" (*Revue Historique et Archéologique du*

Maine, LXI, 45-78, Mamers, 1907), and *Une Forteresse du Maine, Fresnay-le-Vicomte* (Mamers, 1886), which include several important documents and some references of the highest interest.

The period of victorious recovery for France during the reign of Charles VII has received considerable study at the hands of French scholars, and several able monographs dealing with military, diplomatic, and administrative phases of the early years of that monarch bear upon the English position in Normandy. For relations with the Bretons, reference should be made to the scholarly work of E. Cosneau, *Le connétable de Richemont, Arthur de Bretagne, 1393-1458* (Paris, 1887) and J. Trévédy's extensive study of Breton domestic politics, "Attentats des Penthièvre contre Duc Jean V, 1420-1422" (*Revue de Bretagne,* XXXIX, 318 ff., XL, 109 ff., 221 ff., XLI, 140, Nantes, 1908-1909). Similarly for Languedoc there is L. Flourac, *Jean I^er^, Comte de Foix, Vicomte souverain de Bearn, Lieutenant du Roi en Languedoc: Étude historique sur le sud-ouest de la France pendant le premier tiers du XV^e^ siècle* (Paris, 1884), which illustrates the diplomacy of Foix with the English authorities after 1421. In conjunction with this should be consulted P. Dognon, "Les Armagnacs et les Bourguignons, le Comte de Foix et le Dauphin en Languedoc (1416-1420)" (*Annales du Midi,* I, 433-509, Toulouse, 1889). For Anjou there is A. Lecoy de La Marche, *Le Roi René, sa vie, son administration, ses travaux artistique et littéraires* (2 vols., Paris, 1875). Probably the most interesting of these monographs is that of Georges Daumet, *Étude sur l'Alliance de la France et de la Castille au XIV^e^ et XV^e^ siècles* (Bibliothèque de l'École des Hautes Etudes, no. 118, Paris, 1898), a work of the first order based upon the study of hitherto unused manuscripts. For some of the military events we have P. Champion, *Guillaume de Flavy, captaine de Compiègne: Contribution à l'histoire de Jeanne d'Arc et à l'étude de la vie militaire et privée du 15^e^ siècle* (Paris, 1906), H. de Flamare, *Le Nivernais pendant la Guerre de Cent Ans* (Paris, 1913), Delaville Le Roulx, "La domination bourguignonne à Tours et le siège de cette ville, 1417-1419" (*Le Cabinet Historique,* XXIII^1^, 161-231, Paris, 1877), and J. Quicherat, *Rodrique de Villandrando, l'un des combattants pour l'independance*

française au quinzième siècle (Paris, 1879). Sometimes the treatment in these works of this particular period is scant, but they serve to picture the general character of military life from the French point of view. For naval matters one should consult Charles de la Roncière, "L'Invasion Anglaise sous Charles VI—Dernières battailles navales" (*Revue des Questiones Historiques,* LXVII, 56 ff., Paris, 1900) and Charles Breard, *Le Crotoy et les armement maritimes des XIV*^{e} *et XV*^{e} *siècles* (Amiens, 1902). On the English side only Joseph Hunter, *Critical and Historical Tracts, No. I., Agincourt* (London, 1850), and Sir Nicholas Harris Nicolas, *The History of the Battle of Agincourt and the Expedition of Henry the Fifth into France* (London, 1827), treat solely of military matters, and although they concern an earlier campaign they are valuable for illustrating the character of a fifteenth century army. Finally for French finances there is excellent matter in A. Thomas, "Les États généraux sous Charles VII" (*Le Cabinet Historique,* XXIV, Paris, 1878), and the same author's *Les États provinciaux de France Centrale sous Charles VII* (2 vols., Paris, 1879).

INDEX

Abancourt, seigneur d', 126.
Abbeville, 120, 181, 297-298, 300.
Acquigny, 212.
Admiral of England, lord high, 195-197. See also Dorset and Exeter.
Admiral of France, see Brabant, Clugny de.
Admiral of Normandy, grand, see Suffolk, 235.
Agincourt, battle of, XIII, XV, 4, 6, 11-13, 15, 17, 20, 25, 56, 70, 76, 118, 121, 148, 151, 157, 190, 192-193, 224, 228, 230, 236, 239, 241, 273, 276, 318-319.
Aisne river, XV, 38-40, 280.
Albany, Robert Stuart, duke of, regent of Scotland, 106, 109, 136.
Albret, Charles I, sieur d', constable of France, 5-6.
Albret, Charles II, sieur d', 136.
Alençon, Jean II, duke of, 95, 272, 317, 320.
Alençon, Pierre, bastard of, 112, 320.
Alençon, XIV, 74-78, 82, 95-96, 115, 137, 159-160, 169, 182, 215, 219, 221, 254, 262, 270-271, 275, 279, 290, 301, 308, 317, 321.
Alençon, bailliage of, 154, 176, 184, 186, 215, 245, 272, 308.
Alençon, duchy of, 181.
Alington, William, treasurer-general of Normandy, 155-156, 163, 169-170, 176, 178, 202, 204, 213, 217, 219, 243, 245, 252-254.
Allegiance, French oath of, 1417, 64.
Allier river, 307.
Amiens, Jean d'Harcourt, bishop of, 300.
Amiens, 6, 10, 12, 36, 39-42, 50-51; negotiations with John the Fearless, 62-63, 64, 66, 89, 116-117, 121, 132-133, 139, 141, 181, 298.
Amiens, treaty of, 292.
Ancre, Pierre d', 29.
Ancre river, 58.
Andover, 196.
Ange, 94.
Angers, 136, 268, 274; English attack repulsed, 275, 280, 301.
Angoulême, Jean d'Orleans, duke of, 148.
Anjou, Louis, duke of, 8-9.
Anjou, duchess of, see Sicily, queen of.
Anjou, 1, 75-76, 96, 112, 122, 138, 275, 280, 300, 302, 314, 317, 321.
Anquetil, Colart, 160.
Anthoigne, 75.
Anzeré, Jean, 159, 254.
Appatisement, 227, 309.
Aquitaine, seneschal of, 24.
Aragon, 24, 54, 83, 108, 199, 284, 314.
Arde, 33.
Ardennes, abbey d', 165.
Ardennes, 307.
Ardevon, 270.
Argences, 58.
Argentan, 56; surrendered to the English, 72-74, 80, 160, 172, 213, 215, 219, 252, 265, 273.
Armagnac, Bernard VII, count d', constable of France, XVII, 9, 13; campaign against Harfleur,

18-23, 27, 30, 35-39, 43, 45, 49-50, 70, 81; campaign against Senlis, 85-88; taken prisoner by the Burgundians, 101, 106, 239, 253.
Armagnacs, XV-XVI, 17, 37-40, 45, 49-51, 54, 61-63, 68-70, 73, 77-81, 85-90, 98, 101, 104, 107-110, 117-118, 120, 123, 131-134, 138, 143, 179-180, 184, 239, 269-270, 277-280, 288-292, 295-296, 299, 301, 304-308, 313. See also Dauphinois and Orleanists.
Army, size of, 192-194, 201-222, 281, 315-317.
Arques, 9, 50; submits to the English, 125, 160-161, 215, 221, 251-252, 254.
Arques river, 221.
Arras, 87, 133.
Artillery, 33, 59, 197, 262-265, 282.
Artois, 24, 37, 65, 306.
Arundell, Sir John, 197.
Arundell, Sir Richard, 202, 208.
Assé-le-Riboul, 75, 219.
Assheton, Sir John, seneschal of Bayeux, bailli of Cotentin, captain of Coutances and Carentan, 93, 97, 159-160, 205, 216, 268, 284, 311.
Athol, William Stuart, earl of, 136.
Aube river, 275.
Aubigny-sur-Niere, 312.
Audeley, Sir James, 248.
Auge, 80; conquered by Clarence, 98-99, 160, 174, 176, 210, 218, 236, 238, 251-252, 285, 318.
Aumâle, Jean d'Harcourt, count of, 262, 271, 273, 284-285, 290-291, 300-302, 309, 312, 316-319.
Aumâle, castle, 38; submits to the English, 127, 212.
Aumâle, county, 102.
Auneaux, 68.
Austria, 38.
Auvergne, Bernard d', 239.
Auvergne, Sire Brunet d', 320.
Auvergne, 136, 277-278, 302, 316.
Auvers, 39.
Auxerre, 307.
Avranches, Jean de St. Avit, bishop of, 163.
Avranches, XV, 93; captured by the English, 94, 113; recovered by the French, 137; retaken by the English, 138, 211, 215, 218, 244-245, 252, 254-255, 266, 270, 274, 284; taken by the Scots and recovered by the English, 285, 300; attacked by the French, 301, 317.
Avranchin, 81.
Avre river, 219.
Azay-le-Rideau, 112.

Babthorpe, Sir Robert, 205.
Bacqueville, 125.
Baden, Bernard I, marquis of, 287.
Ballon, 219, 271, 285.
Bapaume, 106.
Bar, René of Anjou, duke of, 307.
Bar, Sir Guy de, 67, 91.
Barbasan, Arnaud Guilhem, sire de, 9.
Bardolf, Sir William, 200, 234, 240.
Barnaby, Thomas, treasurer of Harfleur, 52.
Barneville, 93-94.
Baron, 239.
Bar-sur-Seine, 11.
Bar-sur-Seine, battle of, 38.
Barton, John, treasurer of the duke of Bedford's household, 155-156.
Basingstoke, 196.
Baskerville, Sir John, 205.
Battles, see Agincourt, Bar-sur-Seine, Baugé, Clef de Caux, Cravant, Creçy, La Brossonière, La Rochelle, Mieuxec, Mons-en-Vimeu, Mortagne, Neufchâtel-sur-Aisne, Poitiers, Seine-mouth, Valmont, Verneuil.

Baudemont, 128, 220.
Baugé, battle of, 149, 168, 217, 219, 275-276, 301.
Bayeux, Jean de Langres, bishop of, 48, 163.
Bayeux, 9, 35; surrendered to the English, 60, 72, 80, 93-94, 103, 159-160, 170, 172, 209, 214, 217, 245, 253, 265.
Bayeux, diocese of, 164.
Bayonne, 52, 130, 137, 191, 199, 206, 294.
Beaucaire, 22.
Beauce, 85, 107, 275; recovered by the Armagnacs, 279, 296.
Beauchamp, 94.
Beauchamp, Richard, see Bergavenny, lord.
Beauchamp, Richard, see Warwick, earl of.
Beauchamp, Sir Walter, bailli of Rouen, 161, 203, 215.
Beaufort, Henry, see Winchester, bishop of.
Beaufort, Thomas, see Dorset, earl of, and Exeter, duke of.
Beaufort, 275.
Beaugency, 97, 284.
Beaujolais, 302.
Beaumesnil, captured by the English, 99, 212, 218, 311.
Beaumont-les-Autels, 279.
Beaumont-le-Roger, 160, 183, 218-219, 251.
Beaumont-le-Vicomte, evacuated by the French, 74, 75; recaptured by the French, 97, 112, 137, 182, 211, 214; retaken by the English, 271.
Beaumont-sur-Oise, 39; captured by the Burgundians, 66, 67; recovered by Armagnacs, 68, 81, 86, 121; Armagnacs admitted through treason, 135, 221-222; captured by the French, retaken and demolished by the English, 304.
Beaussault, Sire Anthoine, 319.
Beauvais, 65-66, 81, 87, 107, 117, 121, 123, 126, 133, 141, 221.
Beauvoisis, 38.
Bec-Crespin, 212.
Bec-Hellouin, besieged and taken by the English, 99, 100, 207, 214, 218, 267; captured by the French, 279; recovered by the English, 280, 285.
Bedford, John, duke of, XIII, XV, XVII, 29, 32, 35, 52, 129, 152-153, 169, 177-184, 187-188, 194, 207-208, 211, 213-214, 217, 227, 232-233, 236-237, 244, 255-256, 265, 276, 287, 290-299, 302-307, 313-319.
Bedford, 260.
Belknap, Hemon, treasurer- and governor-general of finance in France and Normandy, 178-179, 182, 255, 313.
Bellême, 74, 78, 80, 214.
Bellencombre, 125, 221.
Belloy, seigneur de, 319.
Bergavenny, Richard Beauchamp, lord, captain of Coutances, captain of Gisors, 202, 213.
Berkshire, 146.
Bernay, 57, 73, 100, 160-161, 170, 218, 251, 290-291.
Berrier, Robert le, 169.
Berry, Jean, duke of, 9.
Berry, 136.
Bertoix, sire de, 320.
Bethune river, 221, 289.
Bigot, Hamery, 160.
Billeting, 223, 225, 228.
Black Death, 185.
Black Prince, Edward, the, XIII.
Blacy, 321.
Blancbaston, Jean jr., 164.
Blanche-Taque, 38.

Blaru, 127, 212.
Bleville, 212.
Blois, house of, 272.
Blois, Oliver of, 292. See also Penthièvre.
Blois, 45, 82, 97, 275, 283.
Blois, county of, 111, 250, 269.
Bloundell, William, 9.
Bois-Ratier, Guillaume de, see Bourges, archbishop of.
Boisruffin, 279.
Bois Vincennes, 290.
Boni, 212.
Bonnefosse, 94.
Bonnetable, 212.
Bonneval, submits to Burgundy, 68; retaken by the Armagnacs, 269-270; taken by the English, 282, 316.
Bonnieres et Noyelle, seigneur de, 106.
Bonniers, seigneur de, 117.
Bonsmoulins, 74, 78, 214, 219, 254.
Booty, 227, 229, 280.
Bordeaux, 52, 55, 130, 136, 149, 206, 240.
Boteller, John, see Kilmaynam, prior of.
Botreaux, William, lord, 199.
Bouchart, Jean, 175.
Bouconvillers, 114, 141, 222.
Boulegny, Regnier de, 21.
Boulnois, 9.
Boulogne, 10, 33, 54.
Bourbon, Jean, duke of, 208, 307.
Bourbon, Louis de, see Vendôme, count of.
Bourbonnais, 302.
Bourchier, lord, 202-203, 235. See also Stafford, Sir Hugh.
Bourchier, Sir William, captain of Dieppe, captain of Eu, count of Eu, 126.
Bourges, Guillaume de Bois-Ratier, archbishop of, 277.
Bourges, 112, 136, 295; attacked by the English and Burgundians, 297, 303, 307, 311.
Bourgh, Thomas, 216.
Bourghop, John, 205.
Bourg-le-Roi, 74.
Bourneville, Lionel de, 275.
Bournouville, William de, 67.
Bouteller, Sir Guy le, Burgundian captain of Dieppe, lord of La Roche-Guyon, 90-91, 102, 110, 131, 211, 220, 271.
Bouteller, Sir Ralph, lord of Gamaches, captain of Eu, Monceaux, and Guillemcourt, captain of Arques, bailli of Caux, 208, 221, 289, 297-298, 305.
Bowes, Sir William, 208.
Bowet, Sir Thomas, 207.
Brabant, Clugny de, admiral of France, 7, 9.
Brabant, Philip de, see St. Pol, count of.
Brageloigne, Adam de, 46.
Braquemont, Robert de, 33, 84-85, 90, 101-102.
Brent, Sir Robert, lord of Assé-le-Riboul, Ballon, and Sillé-le-Guillaume, captain of Fresnay-le-Vicomte, 206, 219.
Bresle river, 86-87, 127, 140, 221.
Bretase, Sire Jehan, 320.
Breteuil, 132, 140, 160, 182-183, 251.
Brétigny, treaty of, 1, 23.
Breton, Sir William, lord of Condé-sur-Noireau, captain of Caen, captain of Bayeux, bailli of Caen, 162, 213-214.
Bricqueville, 284.
Bridgewater, 235.
Brie, 181, 307.
Brie-Conte-Robert, 49.
Brimeu, Sir Athis de, 118.
Brimeu, Sir David, 109.
Brimeul, seigneur de, 319.

Brinkely, John, 245.
Briquebec, 48; surrendered to the English, 93, 212.
Bristol, 147, 196, 207, 235.
Brittany, John V, duke of, 6-7, 9-10, 12, 14, 17, 75-76, 89, 109, 113, 122-123, 272-273, 286-287, 292-293, 302, 312.
Brittany, Jeanne of France, duchess of, 273.
Brittany, Richard of, 277, 284.
Brittany, 1, 24, 55, 76, 79, 93, 97, 112, 133, 136, 249-250, 272-274, 276, 286-287, 292, 314.
Broglie, 99.
Bron, Sire Charles le, 320.
Brosset, Rogerin, 320.
Bruges, 35, 301.
Buch, capital de, 55.
Buchan, James Stuart, earl of, 136, 269, 275, 303, 319.
Buckingham, 260.
Burdet, Sir Nicholas, 321.
Burgundians, XVI, 6, 18, 23, 38-40, 50; campaign of 1417, 62-68, 75, 78, 81-83, 85, 88, 90, 98, 104; efforts to relieve Rouen, 118-124, 131, 138, 143, 239, 269, 279, 288-290, 296, 301, 304, 307.
Burgundy, John the Fearless, duke of, 1-2, 4, 6, 8, 11, 13, 17-18, 23, 30, 34, 36-38, 40, 43, 49-54, 62-71, 75, 79, 83, 87-91, 98-100, 103-107, 110, 115-116, 120-122, 132, 134-135, 139-140, 142, 144, 269.
Burgundy, Philip the Good, duke of, see also Charolais, count of, 173, 216, 272, 276, 281-282, 287-289, 292, 295-296, 306.
Burgundy, XV, 1, 24, 62, 282, 296, 299.
Buselet, Colin, 171.

Caen, XIV, 10, 12, 14, 21, 28, 47, 56-58; stormed by the English, 59-61, 63, 66, 68, 71-73, 77-80, 93-94, 98, 100, 115, 138, 154, 159-161, 168, 172, 175, 178-179, 182, 184, 197, 204, 209-210, 213-217, 235, 240, 245-246, 249, 253-256, 258, 260-265, 287, 297, 308.
Caen, bailliage of, 154, 166, 176, 184, 186, 215, 245, 248, 251, 291, 297-298, 300, 313.
Caille, Jean, 136, 279.
Calais, 2, 5, 7, 10, 15, 24, 29, 31, 35-36, 43, 52-53, 63, 115, 130, 153, 205, 234, 240-241, 267, 281, 294, 305.
Callouè, 72.
Calvados, 160.
Cambridge, 146.
Camera regis, 152-153.
Canterbury, Henry Chicheley, archbishop of, 198.
Canterbury, 15, 145, 148-149, 260.
Canterbury, treaty of, 25.
Cantiers, Guillaume de, see Evreux, bishop of.
Cany, 125, 212.
Capranica, Paul, see Evreux, bishop of.
Carbonell, Sir Jean, 211.
Carcassonne, 117, 283.
Cardulach, 319.
Carentan, 92; surrendered to the English, 93, 160, 162, 172, 176, 215-217, 252-253, 255, 265-266.
Carewe, lord, 156.
Carrew, Sir Thomas, 59, 146, 196-200.
Castelhon, Pons de, 197-198.
Castiglione, Branda de, see Lisieux, bishop of.
Castile, 24, 54; sends a fleet to aid the French, 108-109, 128, 130, 136-137, 197, 283-284, 294-295, 303, 314.
Casualties, 60, 202, 319-320.
Cat, Henry le, 161.

Caudebec, 20, 27-28; joins the Burgundians, 90; capitulates to the English, 114, 125, 161, 180, 182, 220, 252, 257.
Caux, 10, 16, 18, 30, 84, 91, 130-131, 154, 161, 165, 176, 186, 215, 220, 222, 245, 252, 286, 297, 308, 313.
Cesny, 72.
Chambely, 66.
Chambois, 73.
Chambre des comptes (Norman), 154, 170, 245.
Chambrois, 99, 218, 309.
Champagne, XV, 81, 89, 181, 307.
Champs, 78.
Chanteloup, 94, 284.
Charenton, 86, 101.
Charles V, king of France, 1-2, 4, 27.
Charles VI, king of France, 7-8, 12, 14-15, 18, 22-23, 31, 35-36, 41-43, 46-52, 63-64, 69, 75-76, 83-84, 103, 105, 112, 116, 118-120, 131-133, 139-140, 154, 176, 180, 238-239, 276-277, 279, 281, 288, 290, 292.
Charleton, 320.
Charolais, Philip, count of, 87, 89, 104, 139. See also Burgundy, Philip the Good, duke of.
Chartraine, 123, 132.
Chartres, Renaud de, see Reims, archbishop of.
Chartres, occupied by Burgundy, 67-68, 73, 75, 77, 82, 85, 104, 134, 218, 275; besieged by the Armagnacs, 279, 280-282, 296; attacked by the French, 301, 315-316.
Chastellus, Sir Claude de, 67, 90-91, 103, 118.
Châteaudun, 69, 111, 135, 278; attacked by the Burgundians, 297, 316.
Château-Gaillard, 10, 114, 130-131, 142, 220, 253-254, 313.
Château-Gontier, 280, 302.
Château-Laudon, 68.
Châteauneuf, 73-74, 160.
Châteauregnault, 111, 135.
Châtel, Tanguy du, 107, 296. See also Paris, prévôt of.
Châtillon, 135.
Châtillon-sur-Seine, 8, 11.
Chaulnes, 37.
Chaumont, William de, 274.
Chaumont (Champagne), 38.
Chaumont in Vexin, 171, 222.
Cherbourg, 49, 71-72, 92-93; surrendered to the English, 114, 160-161, 182, 215-216, 235, 240, 251-252, 254, 260, 270, 314.
Cheshire archers, 157, 235.
Chevreuse, 85-86.
Cheyne, Sir John, lord of La Haye-des-Puits and La Roche-Tesson, captain of Regneville, 203, 205.
Chichester, 235.
Chinon, 112, 135.
Choisy, 10, 86, 101.
Christchurch, Canterbury, priory of, 146.
Cinque Ports, 195, 197.
Clarence, Thomas of Lancaster, duke of, captain of Louviers, Honfleur, Pontoise, Pont de l'Arche, and Vivier, 57-58, 61, 73, 90; conquers Auge, 98-100, 103, 124-125; campaign along the Seine, 127-128, 140-141, 193, 204, 210, 216, 221, 223, 237; killed at Baugé, 275-276, 279, 301.
Clef de Caux, battle of, 55.
Clermont in Auvergne, 277.
Clermont-en-Beauvaisis, 39, 140.
Clifford, John, lord, captain of Château-Gaillard, 26-27, 32.
Clifton, Sir John, captain of Vire, 206.
Clinchamp-en-Perche, 78, 80, 219.
Clinton, William, lord, 305.
Coinage, 45, 106, 118, 173, 286.

Cole, John, 198.
Colombiers, 94.
Combraille, 302.
Combrest, seigneur de, 319.
Compiègne, 86-87; gained by the Burgundians, 101; surprised by the Armagnacs, 107, 118, 140, 156, 252, 270, 289; surprised by the French and recovered by the English, 304.
Conches, 9, 49, 155, 160, 182-183, 215, 218, 220, 244, 251.
Condé-sur-Noireau, occupied by the English, 80, 92, 160, 183, 212, 214, 250.
Constable of England (earl of Northumberland), 222, 226, 228-229.
Constance, council of, 24.
Convocation, see Canterbury and York.
Convoy, 27, 30, 58, 196-198, 256-257.
Coq, William le, 102.
Coquet, Jean, 160.
Corbeil, repulses Burgundy, 68, 70, 81, 86; gained by Burgundy, 101.
Corbie, 50, 63.
Cornwall, Sir John, 111, 148, 271.
Cornwall, 29.
Cosne, 290, 307.
Cotentin, XIV, 48, 71-72, 81, 92-93, 138, 154, 160, 166, 176, 184, 186, 210-211, 215-218, 223, 245, 248, 251, 255, 267-268, 270, 273-274, 284-285, 293, 300-301, 321.
Cottes, Robert, master of ordnance, 264, 298.
Cottinières, see Recourt.
Coucy, 89.
Couesnon river, 270.
Courcy, 72, 159, 218.
Courseulles, 212.
Courtenay, Sir Edward, 26-27, 32.
Courtenay, Hugh, earl of Devon, 198-199.
Courtenay, Sir Humfrey, 241.
Courtonne, 48, 98; surrenders to the English, 99, 218.
Courts-martial, 223-224.
Courville, 114.
Coutances, John II and Pandulf de Malatesta, bishops of, 163.
Coutances, 48; surrenders to the English, 93, 113, 209, 214-218, 237, 245, 253, 255, 267, 284.
Crames, William de, 110.
Craon, 302.
Cravant, battle of, 222, 228-229, 299-300, 302.
Creçy, battle of, XIII, 4.
Creil, strategic position, 66, 87; gained by Burgundy, 101.
Creully, 60, 212.
Crevecouer-en-Brie, 9.
Crocy, 69.
Crohen, Sir Jean de, 67.
Croisy, 137, 220, 269; taken by the English, 282.
Cromwell, Sir Ralph, captain of Bec-Hellouin, captain of Harfleur, 207, 223.
Croseby, Robert, 272.
Cuffy, 307.
Cuillier, Jehan, 165-166.
Curteys, Reginald, victualler of Harfleur, 52.
Curwen, Sir Christopher, 125.

Dalton, John, 169.
Damfront, Olivier de, 110.
Dampmartin, bureau de, 84.
Damville, 219.
Dangeau, 285.
Dangu, surrendered to the English, 128, 167, 220.
Danguel, 74-75.
Danville, 309-310.
Dartmouth, 196, 235, 248.

Dauphin, Charles (afterwards King Charles VII), 50-51, 56, 63-64, 68, 75, 83-84, 87, 89; flight from Paris, 101, 103, 109, 112, 115, 120, 122-123, 132-139, 199-200, 216, 262, 270, 272, 274-277, 280-288, 292, 294, 296, 299-300, 302, 311-312.
Dauphin, Jean, duke of Normandy, 35, 40-42.
Dauphin, Louis, duke of Guienne, see Guienne.
Dauphiné, 7, 51-52, 89, 288, 312, 316.
Dauphinois, see also Armagnacs, 199, 269, 274, 284, 286, 290.
Davesnescourt, 37.
Deauville, 56, 218.
Defense, measures for, 46-49, 52-53, 63-65, 85, 102-105, 112-113, 132-133, 294.
Demuin, 50.
Denis, Sir John, 272.
Derby, 235.
Desertion, 234-236, 315.
Desmouville, 212.
Desquay, Henri, 212.
Devon, earl of, see Courtenay, Hugh.
Dieppe, 29, 33, 50; joins the Burgundians, 90-91, 102, 124; submits to the English, 125-126, 141, 164, 166, 175, 180, 182, 215, 221, 235, 251, 258, 294.
Dijon, 11, 37.
Diplomacy, Burgundian, 24-25, 43, 51, 101, 108-109, 133-134, 138-139, 142.
Diplomacy, English, 24-25, 43, 51, 53-54, 75-77, 100-101, 115, 122, 129-131, 139, 142, 277, 284, 286-288, 292-293, 314.
Diplomacy, French, 11, 13, 18, 22, 30-31, 40, 77, 83, 136-137, 277, 283-284, 312.
Discipline, 29, 68, 88, 222-239.
Dives river, 58, 71.
Do, 72.
Domfront, 94, 97, 111-112, 114, 161, 178, 214-215, 218, 250, 254, 291.
Dondelay, 320.
Dorset, Thomas Beaufort, earl of, 8, 10, 16-18, 20, 23, 25, 27. See further Exeter.
Dorset, 146, 150.
Douglas, Archibald, earl of, 278, 303, 311, 317-319.
Douglas, Sir James, 319.
Douglas, Sir William, 137.
Douglas of Drumlanrig, Sir William, 271.
Dourdan, 68, 85.
Douville, 113.
Dover, 200, 205, 235.
Dreux, 73-74, 78, 82, 98, 101, 132, 182, 218-219, 239, 252, 269, 279; taken by the English, 282, 314.
Dreux, county of, 314.
Dunois, 111, 307.

Edmund de la Tour, 152.
Edward III, king of England, XIII-XIV, 1, 143, 147.
Elmden, Sir William, 78.
Ely, John Fordham, bishop of, 147.
Epernon, 282.
Epte river, 220.
Eschaufou, 212.
Espee, Gilles à l', 159.
Essay, submits to the English, 74, 215, 219, 254, 272.
Essex, 260.
Estampes, Raoul d', 178.
Étampes, submits to Burgundy, 68, 69, 85, 285; surrenders to the English, 296.
Étrépagny, 103, 110; surrenders to the English, 126, 222.
Estates General, 277, 295, 302, 311.
Estates of Auvergne, 302.

Estates of Beaujolais, 302.
Estates of Bourbonnais, 302.
Estates of Brittany, 277.
Estates of Combraille, 302.
Estates of Dauphiné, 52, 312.
Estates of Forez, 302.
Estates of Languedoc, 283, 312.
Estates of Normandy, 174-176, 179-183, 216, 308.
Estates of Poitou, 295.
Estates of Provence, 41.
Estouteville, 117, 162.
Eu, 38, 126; submits to the English, 127, 142, 221, 235, 289.
Eu, county of, 102, 167, 212.
Eure river, 132, 160, 218-219, 254.
Evreux, Guillaume de Cantiers and Paul Capranica, bishops of, 163, 237.
Evreux, 10, 21, 49, 64, 76, 78; joins the Burgundians, 90, 91, 98; surrenders to the English, 100, 104, 110, 114, 130-131, 137, 160, 172, 180, 182, 204, 211, 215-220, 237, 242, 251, 265, 314, 316-317.
Evreux, bailliage of, 100, 154, 162, 176, 186, 215, 245, 252, 313.
Exeter, Thomas Beaufort, duke of, lord of Harcourt, Lillebonne, and Croisy, captain of Rouen, captain of Conches, 100, 124-125, 128, 131, 197-198, 204, 220, 237, 244, 248, 276, 293-294. See also Admiral of England and Dorset, earl of.
Exmes, evacuated by the French, 73, 80, 160, 214-215, 219, 252, 254.

Faingue, messire, 320.
Falaise, 9-10, 12, 47, 63, 65, 71-72, 77; besieged and taken by the English, 78-79, 92, 94, 160, 169, 172, 184, 209, 215, 245, 248, 250-255, 265, 293.
Fastolf, Sir John, lord of Bec-Crespin and Gauseville, captain of Fécamp, St. Antoine (Paris), Meulan, Fresnay-le-Vicomte, and Alençon, 125, 165-166, 208, 241, 248-249, 262, 308, 321.
Faugernon, 99, 218.
Fautonniere, Guy de la, 320.
Fécamp, 124-125, 165-166, 175.
Fenys, Sir Roger (alias Fieules), bailli of Caux, captain of Longueville, and Pierrecourt, 161, 222.
Feriby, John, 241.
Ferrers of Chartley, Edmund, lord, 193.
Ferrières, 270.
Feudal levies, 31, 69, 82, 85, 116, 119, 121, 130-131, 134, 136, 207-211, 238, 282, 285, 296, 300, 312-313, 315, 321.
Fieules, see Fenys.
Fitz-Hugh, Henry, lord, lord of Laigle and Chambois, captain of Falaise, 73, 77, 204.
Fitzwalter, Walter, lord, captain of Vire, 206, 219.
Flanders, 10, 24-25, 54-55, 62, 65, 109, 115, 270.
Fleet, Simon, treasurer of Harfleur, victualler in Lower Normandy, bailli of Cotentin, captain of Carentan, 16-17, 213, 254.
Foix, Jean, count of, 136, 288.
Foix, county of, 109.
Fontaines le Bourg, 125.
Fontenay l'Abbey, 58.
Food, see Subsistence.
Foraging, 19, 114, 224-227, 239-240, 250.
Forez, 302.
Fortifications, 35, 46-48, 79, 172, 265-267.
Fosseux, seigneur de, 65-66.
Fougières, 302.
Frankfurt, 11.

Freneuse, 158.
Fresnay-le-Vicomte, surrendered to the English, 74, 75; regained by the French, 97, 112, 137, 214, 219, 254, 262; retaken by the English, 271; repulses the French, 290, 291, 309.
Fresnel, Peter, see Lisieux, bishop of.
Freteval, 69.
Fronsac castle, 240.

Gacé, 73, 218.
Gaillon, submits to the English, 127, 164, 182, 220, 252; surprised by the French, 304, 312; recovered and demolished by the English, 313.
Gallardon, submits to Burgundy, 68; occupied by the Armagnacs, 279, 281; taken by the English, 282, 296.
Gamaches, Sir Gilles de, 319.
Gamaches, William de, 157.
Gamaches, 140, 180; surrendered to the English, 289.
Gardin, William, 164.
Gascony, William, 164.
Gascony, 130, 190, 294.
Gaucourt, Raoul de, 47.
Gauzeville, 125.
Genoa, 13, 22, 54-55, 136, 195, 199, 288.
Germany, 288.
Ghent, 18, 139.
Gien, 284.
Gippewich, 235.
Giresme, Sire Charles de, 320.
Gisors, 9-10, 49, 114, 126, 130, 140; surrendered to the English, 141, 156, 161, 171-172, 213, 215, 221-222, 241, 254, 265-266, 286, 296.
Gisors, bailliage of, 84, 154, 176, 186, 245.
Glasdale, Sir Gilbert, 299.
Gloucester, Humphrey, duke of, 60; invades the Cotentin, 92-93, 114, 131; advances on Paris, 141, 160, 177, 193, 251, 285.
Gloucester, 258.
Gombaut, William, 161.
Goulaffre, Jean, receveur-general of Normandy, 155, 161, 168-169, 243.
Gourdel, Michel, 160.
Gournay, 49, 66, 86, 114; captured by the English, 126, 140, 161, 183, 221, 252, 254, 306.
Grainville, 125.
Grange, Thomas, 248.
Gras, Richard le, 161.
Graville, seigneur de, 319.
Graville, 167.
Gray of Codnore, John, lord, captain of Argentan, 213, 219-220.
Gray of Codnore, Richard, lord, captain of Argentan, 74.
Gray of Ingleby, Sir John, 205.
Gray, Sir John, captain of Mortagne, captain of Pontorson, 74, 78.
Great Yarmouth, 196, 235.
Grentheville, 58.
Grey of Heton, Sir John, count of Tancarville, lord of Tilly, captain of Harfleur, 168, 209, 220.
Gringmaux, Sire, Franchoix de, 320.
Grippon, 94.
Gueldres, 109.
Guerillas, 285-286, 308.
Guernier, Michel, 171.
Guerre, Raymonet de la, 38, 50.
Guesclin, Bertrand du, 1, 4-5.
Guiche, seigneur de la, 67.
Guienne, Louis, duke of, dauphin, 7-8, 10-11, 13.
Guienne, 2, 109, 115, 122, 130, 239, 294.
Guildford, 196.

Guillemcourt, 127, 221, 289.
Guise, 270, 289; besieged by the English and Burgundians, 306-307, 319; surrenders, 320.
Guisnes, 289.

Haidon, Thomas, 157.
Hainault, 35, 287, 292, 306.
Halsale, Sir Gilbert, lord of Tillières, bailli and captain of Evreux, captain of Dreux, 137, 204, 206, 218, 242.
Ham, 289.
Hambye, 48; surrenders to the English, 93, 94, 212.
Hammes, Richard, 245.
Hampton, Walter, 272.
Hangest, 37.
Hankeford, William, 198.
Hanley, John, 199.
Harcourt, Sir Colart d', master of waters and forests in Normandy, 66.
Harcourt, Guillaume d', see Tancarville, count of.
Harcourt, Jacques d', captain of Le Crotoy, 34, 103, 110, 276, 280, 288, 294, 297, 299, 300.
Harcourt, Jean d', see Amiens, bishop of.
Harcourt, Jean d', see Aumâle, count of.
Harcourt, Jean d', captain of Rouen, 85, 90.
Harcourt, Louis d', see Rouen, archbishop of.
Harcourt castle, surrendered to the English, 99, 182-183, 218, 251.
Harcourt, county of, 167, 212.
Harewode, Nicholas, 52.
Harfleur, 5, 7-37, 39, 43, 52-53, 56-59, 61, 86, 105, 114, 124-125, 144, 153, 183-184, 194, 197, 200, 206-209, 213, 215, 220-221, 234-236, 240, 244, 249, 254-258, 264, 298.
Harling, Sir Robert, 241.
Harrison, Sir Peter, 320.
Hatfeld, Thomas, 212.
Haye, Jean la, 296.
Heiltz l'Evêque, 321.
Hende, John, 146.
Henry II, king of England, 1.
Henry IV, king of England, 2, 143, 273.
Henry V, king of England, XIII-XVII, 2, 4-5, 8, 14, 16, 23-25, 30-32, 35-36, 41, 43, 52-61, 63-66, 69-79, 81, 92-93, 98-104, 109-110, 113, 115, 120, 122, 124-125, 127-131, 134, 139-143, 147-150, 153-154, 156-160, 162, 164, 167, 169, 172-174, 176-178, 180, 184-186, 188, 190-195, 198-200, 205-207, 209-212, 216, 220-222, 226-227, 230, 232, 234-236, 239, 241-244, 247-252, 256-257, 259-263, 266-267, 271-276, 278, 280-294, 297, 315, 319, 321.
Henry VI, king of England, 150, 177, 241, 261, 295-296, 302.
Herbert, William, 164.
Herle, John, 125.
Heron, Mace, 21.
Herpedame, 320.
Hertford, 260.
Hesdin, 50.
Holgill, Thomas, victualler royal, 253-254.
Holigost, 196.
Holland, Edward, see Mortain, earl of.
Holland, John, see Huntingdon, earl of.
Holland, Sir John, 207.
Holland, 42.
Hommet, Sire de, 320.
Hommet, barony of, 212.
Hommet castle, surrendered to the English, 93, 94, 167.
Honfleur, 9, 28-29, 34-35, 46, 55-56,

72, 84, 114;. capitulates to the English, 127, 179, 183-184, 197, 215, 220, 235, 267-268, 273, 298.
Honyngham, 24.
Horses, number of, 191, 194.
Hospitallers, Knights, 147.
Household, the duke of Bedford's, 155-156. See also Barton, John.
Household, royal, 150, 152-153, 155, 248, 251, 253, 258, 261.
Huisne river, 275.
Humfreyville, Sir Gilbert, earl of Kyme, lord of Hotot, captain of Caen, captain of Neufchâtel, 77, 93, 159, 167, 203-204, 217, 248, 253.
Hungerford, Sir Walter, captain of Cherbourg and Regneville, captain of Château-Gaillard, 32, 216, 218, 220, 293-294.
Huntingdon, John Holland, earl of, lord of Bricqueville, captain of Gournay, 26-27, 30-31, 55-56, 60, 72, 93-94, 223, 241, 271.
Huntingdon, county of, 260.

Illiers, 269.
Indenture, 190-191, 242.
Inspection, 244-246, 308.
Issoudun, 295, 297.
Intebergh, Walter, 223.
Ireland, 52, 205.
Isabella of Bavaria, see Queen of France.
Italy, 276, 294.
Ivry, count of, see Richemont.
Ivry, 101, 131; surrendered to the English, 132, 179, 182, 218, 251; captured by the French, 301, 308-309; recovered by the English, 313-314, 315-316, 319.

Janville, 132, 135, 296.
Jargeau, 135.
Jesus de la Tour, 196.
John the Fearless, see Burgundy.
John the Good, king of France, 5.
John of London, 59.
Joigny, 274-275.
Jolivet, Robert, see Mont St. Michel, abbot of.
"Justification du duc de Bourgoine, le," 40.

Kemp, 24.
Kent, 260.
Kilmaynam, John Boteller, prior of, 114.
Kingston-on-Hull, 198, 248.
Kygheley, Sir John, captain of Touques, captain of Louviers, captain of Pont de l'Arche, bailli of Rouen, 207, 305.

La Brossonière, battle of, 301-302, 312.
La Charité-sur-Loire, 290, 307.
Lafayette, Gilbert Motier, seigneur de, 47, 65, 275, 307, 311, 320.
La Fère-en-Tardenois, 306, 320.
La Ferté Arnaud, 104.
La Ferté Fresnel, 78.
La Ferté-sous-Jouarre, 89.
La Ferté-Vidame, 104.
La Ferté-Villeneuil, 270.
La Flèche, 112, 276.
Lagny-sur-Marne, 11, 17, 37, 81, 107, 122, 140.
La Gravelle, 301.
La Guierche, 96, 307.
La Haye de Puits, 93-94.
La Haye-Pesnel, 212.
La Hire (Etienne de Vignolles), 112, 280, 303, 306-307, 320.
La Hogue, 59.
Laigle, surrendered to the English, 73, 74, 78, 80, 132, 214, 218, 285, 310.
Lalemont, William, 102, 162.
Lalier, Michiel de, 21.

Lamban, Jacques, 107.
La Motte, 80, 214.
Lancashire archers, 157.
Langhais, 135.
Langres, Jean de, bishop of Bayeux (q. v.), 48.
Langres, 89.
Languedoc, 12, 14, 21-22, 41, 51, 64, 69, 83-84, 89, 283, 288, 312.
Languedoil, 278, 295, 302, 311.
Laon, 38.
Laonnois, 303.
Larchier, Jean, 168.
La Rivière Thibouville, 99, 218.
La Roche Guyon, 114, 130; taken by the English, 131, 220.
La Roche-Tesson, 94, 212.
La Rochelle, battle of, 200.
La Rochelle, 136, 268, 278.
La Rogue, 212.
Larzicourt, 321.
Launde, Pierre de la, 159.
Laval, 301.
Lay, Alain le, 117.
Layres, Hameric, 160.
Leche, Sir Philip, lord of Pontranquart, captain of Arques and Monceaux, 78, 157, 221, 235.
Le Crotoy, 10, 33, 34, 120, 140-141, 181, 213, 257, 264, 270, 280-281, 287, 289; besieged, capitulates to the English, 297-300; journée, 304-305, 306, 308.
Leire, Sir Robert de, 320.
Le Mans, 76, 80, 94, 111, 219, 270-272, 275-277; French headquarters in 1421, 278, 279, 312.
Le Mesnil Garnier, 94.
Lenghain, bastard de, 320.
Lenthale, Sir Roland, bailli and captain of Alençon, 96, 160, 205.
Lescrope, Sir Richard, 198.
Les Andelys, 170.
Les Goulets, 35; besieged by the English, 128, 254.
Les Loges, 125.
Liege, 33.
Lievre, Robin le, 161.
Lihons-en-Santerre, 37.
Lillebonne, surrendered to the English, 125, 220, 308.
Limousin, 316.
Lincoln, John Mackworth, dean of, 147.
Lincoln, Philip Repington, bishop of, 147.
Lincoln, 146.
Lindsay, Sir Walter, 319.
Lingèvres, 60, 212.
Lisieux, Peter Fresnel and Branda de Castiglione, bishops of, 163.
Lisieux, 41, 48; occupied by the English, 56-58, 80, 98, 100, 169, 172, 214, 217-218, 265, 285.
L'Isle-Adam, Jean de Villiers, seigneur de, joins the Burgundians, 66, 86-87, 90, 107, 141, 274-276, 306-307, 316-317.
L'Isle-Adam, 67, 141.
Loans (English), 146-149, 191-192.
Loans (French), 42-44, 46, 68-69, 84, 89, 105-106, 278, 303.
Loches, 135.
Logempré, 113.
Lointreu, Gilet de, 309.
Loire river, 69, 75, 82, 101, 130, 134-136, 138, 275-276, 280, 282, 284, 286, 290, 299-300, 303, 307, 312-313, 315-316, 321.
Lombards, 294-295, 311, 317-318.
London, John Kempe, bishop of, 294.
London, 15-16, 26-27, 30, 33, 145-147, 192, 248, 256, 258-259, 281.
Longny, marshal de, 19.
Longny, 219.
Longueville, 35; submits to the English, 125, 161.
Longueville, priory of, 105.
Loré, Ambrose de, 97, 112; cap-

tured by the English, 137, 219; liberated by the French, 269.
Lorraine, Charles I, duke of, 307.
Lorraine, 109.
Loudon, 75, 95-96.
Louis, dauphin of France, see Guienne.
Lounde, Henry, 235.
Louviers, joins Burgundy, 90; surrenders to the English, 100, 101, 103-104, 110, 115, 118, 152, 157-158, 161, 164, 172, 214, 218, 251-252, 265, 313.
Luterell, Sir Hugh, seneschal of Normandy, 217, 234, 244-245.
Luxembourg, Sir John, 67, 87, 120, 288, 303, 306-307, 320.
Luxembourg, Louis de, see Thérouanne, bishop of.
Lynbere, John, 298.
Lyndeleye, Sir Percival, 223.
Lynn, 27, 235.
Lyons, 36, 41, 83, 84, 136, 277-279, 282, 295, 302, 307.

Mâcon, 41-42, 89, 136, 282, 299.
Mâconnois, 307.
Maillebois, 114.
Maine, Robin, 309.
Maine, 71, 74, 76, 80, 85, 107, 138, 181, 184, 268, 271, 290, 300-301, 314, 317, 321.
Maisonlemée, 75.
Malestrais, Joffray de, 320.
Mantes, 14, 19, 28, 40, 42, 48-51; admits the Burgundians, 67, 90-91, 126; submits to the English, 127-128, 132, 141-142, 171, 173, 214, 220, 222, 236-237, 251-252, 263, 265, 269, 281-282, 285, 296, 308, 314.
Mantes, bailliage of, 176, 186, 245, 313.
Mar, Alexander Stuart, earl of, 278.
March, George Dunbar, earl of, 136.
March, Edmund Mortimer, earl of, captain of Vire, captain of Mantes, 58, 59, 93, 142, 237, 253, 255, 272.
Marche, seigneur de, 319.
Marchénoir, 296.
Marcoussis, surrendered to the Burgundians, 68; recovered by the Armagnacs, 85; surrendered to the English, 296.
Marne river, XV, 10, 107.
Marshal, John Mowbray, earl, captain of Pontoise, 142, 222, 226, 228-229, 241, 293-294, 303.
Martel, Sire Gilles, 320.
Martel, Reginald, 165.
Martin V, pope, 180.
Mary, count of, 319.
Master of ordnance, 259, 261, 297-298. See Cottes, Robert.
Master of waters and forests in Normandy, 246. See Harcourt, Sir Colart d', and Woodville, Sir Richard.
Maubuisson, abbey of, 163.
Mauny, seigneur de, 319.
Maupreau, 96.
Maurepas, 279.
Mautravers, John, lord, earl of Arundell, captain of Pontorson, 96.
Mayenne, 94.
Meaux, 9, 106-107, 118, 123, 129, 135-136, 153, 250-252, 264, 269, 282-283, 285-286; taken by the English, 287, 289.
Melcombe, 235.
Meliver, Conrad, 161.
Melun, 45, 68, 86, 101, 107, 118, 123, 135-136, 153, 211, 248, 274, 307.
Merbury, Nicholas, 205.
Mereduth at Owen, 207.
Meru, 81.
Meuillon, Guillaume de, 29, 55, 79.
Meulan, receives the Burgundians,

67, 86; submits to the English, 128; occupied by the English, 142, 180, 220, 241, 281; stormed by the French and recovered by the English, 285, 296.
Meulan, Pont de, 128.
Mieuxec, battle of, 137.
Milly, Lestendard de, 87.
Milly-en-Gatinois, 309, 321.
Miraulmont, Sir Guy, seigneur de, 120.
Mobilization, 190-193.
Moinet, 306.
Molineaux, 35.
Monceaux, 127, 221, 289.
Mons, 109.
Mons-en-Vimeu, battle of, 288.
Monstreul, 161.
Montacute, Thomas de, see Salisbury, earl of.
Montaguillon, 68, 299, 306.
Montaigu, 38.
Montargis, 10.
Montberon, 284.
Montdidier, 39, 87.
Montenay, William de, 34, 319.
Montereau, 86, 142, 269.
Montferrand, 49.
Montfort, John de, 310.
Montfort, 75, 321.
Montfort-le-Rotrou, 271.
Montgomery, Sir John, captain of Domfront, bailli of Alençon, 178, 205, 218, 321.
Montgomery, 212.
Montivillers, 20, 46, 91, 105, 124; surrendered to the English, 125, 172, 200, 220, 252, 265, 297.
Montjoye, 141, 254.
Montlhéry, surrendered to Burgundy, 68; recovered by the Armagnacs, 85; repulses the Burgundians, 107-108, 118; taken by the English, 296.
Montmirail, 279.
Montpellier, 312.
Montreuil, 252.
Montrichard, 112.
Mont St. Catherine, 47.
Mont St. Michel, Robert Jolivet, abbot of, 48, 271, 274, 314.
Mont St. Michel, 112, 113, 142, 179-180, 182-184, 270-271, 273-274, 278, 291, 300-301, 308-309, 314; besieged by the English, 321.
Monville, lordship of, 168.
Moret, 68.
Moreul, sire de, 10.
Morgan, Philip, chancellor of Normandy, 161, 217.
Mortagne, battle of, 290.
Mortagne, 74, 78, 80, 214, 219.
Mortain, Edward Holland, earl of, lord of Hommet, 97, 204.
Mortain, 97; attacked by the Scots, 137, 160, 182-183, 219, 270, 309.
Mortemer, Sir John, 197.
Mortemer, 10.
Mortemont, Sir Louis, 320.
Mortimer, Edmund, see March, earl of.
Mortymer, John, 207.
Munitions, 49, 55, 69, 81-82, 97, 102, 258-262.
Murat, Sire Jehan de, 320.
Murdrier, Guitroy le, 320.

Nantes, treaty of, 312.
Narbonne, Guillaume, vicomte of, 55, 269, 274, 290, 316, 318, 320.
Narbonne, Maudet de, 320.
Navarre, Charles III, king of, 106.
Navarre, Joanna of, dowager queen of England, 273, 287.
Navarre, 109.
Navy (English), 29-32, 58-59, 128, 152, 195-201, 281, 297.
Navy (French), 14-15, 22-23, 29.
Neaufle, 126, 128.
Nehou, 93.

Nemours, 68.
Nesle, 38-39; submits to the English, 125, 306; surrendered to the English and Burgundians, 320.
Nessefield, George, captain of Vire, 208.
Nessefield, John, 208, 270.
Neufbourg, 100.
Neufchâtel, seigneur de, 108.
Neufchâtel, 35, 114, 125; capitulates to the English, 126, 141, 161, 167, 183, 221, 252, 254.
Neufchâtel-sur-Aisne, 38.
Neuilly-l'Evêque, 48; surrendered to the English, 60, 93, 162, 217.
Neville, Sir John, captain of Verneuil, 72-73, 77-78, 80, 159, 248, 271.
Newcastle, 29.
Newton, John, 272.
Nicholas de la Tour, 59, 152, 197, 200.
Nivernais, 307.
Nogent, 11, 106.
Nogent-le-Roi, 279, 282.
Nogent-le-Rotrou, 182, 285, 310, 321.
Nogent-sur-Seine, 62.
Nonancourt, 40, 316.
Noon, Sir Henry, 168, 207.
Norfolk, 206-207, 260.
Normandy, XII, 4-5, 9-10, 12, 17-18, 21-23, 28-30, 32-34, 36, 40, 45-46, 48, 50; English invasion, 55 ff., 65-67, 70-71, 74-75, 78, 81, 84, 89-90, 92, 98-99, 101, 104, 108-115, 118, 122-124, 127, 130, 132, 134, 137-140, 142-143, 150, 153-158, 161-167, 170-173, 177-181, 184-185, 187, 189, 198, 200-207, 210-220, 233-234, 239-240, 243, 247-248, 252, 254, 256-258, 261-262, 270, 274-280, 283-285, 289-290, 293, 298-302, 307, 310-311, 315, 317, 321.
Northumberland, Henry Percy, earl of, 54, 77-78, 208. See also Constable of England.
Nôtre Dame de Bernay (monastery), 164.
Nôtre Dame de Bonport (monastery), 164.
Nôtre Dame de Chaufour (parish), 309.
Nôtre Dame de Lire (abbey), 164.
Nôtre Dame de Paris, 69, 84, 88, 119.
Nôtre Dame du Val (priory), 164.
Nouan, 214.
Nouens, 74-75.
Noyelle, see Bonnieres.
Noyelle-sur-Mer, 297-298.
Noyon, 38, 81, 101, 106, 238.
Numbers, see Army, size of.

"Occoes," Sir Jehan, 109.
Offemont, sieur d', 280.
Ogart, Andrew, captain of Touques, 262.
Oise river, XV, 10, 37-39, 40, 48, 62, 66-67, 81, 86, 101, 110, 140, 222.
Oisy, 37, 306.
Oliviere, Diago d', 108.
Orange, Louis de Chalon, prince of, 89.
Orbec, 99, 160, 210, 251.
Orglandes, 212.
Oriflamme, 119.
Orkney, Henry Sinclair, earl of, 136.
Orleanais, 40, 86, 111, 250, 282.
Orleanists, see also Armagnacs and Dauphinois, 2, 4-6, 8.
Orleans, Charles, duke of, 6, 12, 69, 82, 136, 148, 275.
Orleans, Jean d', see Angoulême, count of.
Orleans, Philip d', see Vertus, count of.

Orleans, 69, 82, 86, 97, 111, 178, 275, 278, 283, 321.
Ormond, earl of, 61.
Orne, 160.
Ortenberg, Peter von, 11.
Oxfordshire, 146.

Pacy, 296.
Paillart, Sir Jacques, 119.
Pailleux, William, 161.
Palaiseau, 68.
Parc l'Evêque, 94.
Paris, Gerard de Montaigu and John de Courtecuisse, bishops of, 44, 116.
Paris, Tanguy du Châtel, prévôt of, 8, 23, 37, 47, 85, 107.
Paris, XIV-XV, 8-14, 17-18, 21, 23, 31, 36-40, 42, 48-50, 57, 62-70, 73, 75-78, 81-90, 98; Burgundian coup d'état, 101, 103-104, 106, 112, 114-120, 122, 124; preparations for defense against the English, 132-136, 138-142, 153, 177, 179-180, 183, 188, 218-221, 248, 262, 269-270, 274, 276, 279-282, 288, 304, 307-308, 314-315.
Paris, parlement of, 12, 40, 43, 117-118, 180, 234.
Paris, university of, 6, 14, 40, 104, 121.
Parliament, 15, 25, 53, 144, 148-149, 200, 241, 259.
Parthenay, 76, 136.
Patay, 270.
Pavia, 180.
Pay, 45, 52, 152-153, 155-157, 162, 166, 168, 172, 191-192, 194-195, 197-199, 204-205, 208, 213, 239-245, 252-253, 259, 262, 293-294, 315.
Pecche, Nicholas, 78, 208.
Pelham, Sir John, 53, 240.
Penthièvre, 272-274, 287.
Perche, 85, 107, 160, 183.
Percy, Henry, see Northumberland.
Peronne, 10, 50, 106.
Philip, Sir William, treasurer of war, 155, 253, 257.
Picardy, 10, 33, 36-37, 39, 62, 66, 101, 107, 109, 123, 133, 177, 267, 276, 281, 289, 294, 314-315.
Pierrecourt, 222.
Piket, 268.
Piquet, Jean, 7, 21.
Pirou, 93-94.
Plessys Grimoult, 253.
Pleville, 212.
Plymouth, 196, 235.
Poissy, 67, 171, 186.
Poitiers, battle of, XIII, 4, 6, 260.
Poitiers, 82, 295.
Poitou, 82, 274, 295, 302.
Poix, David de, 307.
Pole, Sir John de la, 235, 300-301.
Pole, William de la, see Suffolk, earl of.
Pons-sur-Seine, 299.
Pont, Michel du, 169.
Pontaudemer, 35, 99, 127, 178, 210, 251-252.
Pontauton, 35, 210.
Pont de Gennes, 275.
Pont de l'Arche, 34-35, 49, 101-102; taken by the English, 103-104, 105, 113-114, 127, 152, 158, 170-171, 214, 220, 236, 251-254, 265, 286, 308, 315.
Pont de Remy, 140.
Pont d'Ouve, 93-94, 214, 216.
Ponthieu, 102, 305.
Pont l'Evêque, 57.
Pontoise, 66; surrendered to Burgundy, 67, 81, 86-87, 90, 107, 120-121, 126; captured by the English, 139, 140-142, 186, 221-222, 232, 241, 248, 281, 304.
Pontorson, English garrison, 94; retaken by the French, 137, 138, 142, 202, 218, 266, 287.

Pontranquart, 50, 221.
Pont St. Maxence, 10, 101.
Ponynges, Robert, lord, 305.
Popham, Sir John, chancellor of Normandy, lord of Torigny, bailli of Caen, captain of Bayeux, 53, 160, 217.
Population, 184-187.
Porter, Sir William, 78.
Portsmouth, 29.
Portugal, 288.
Pougnant, Jacques, 161.
Pouilly, treaty of, 139.
Préaux, seigneur de, 47.
Préaux, 126, 167.
Pressy ou Dosme, seigneur de, 319.
Prévost, William le, 165.
Prisoners, 12-13, 157, 227-229, 285-286.
Provence, 41, 83.
Provins, 11, 68, 122, 124, 132-133.
Provisions, see Subsistence.
Purveyance, 248, 251, 258.

Queen of France, Isabella of Bavaria, 45, 75, 83, 89, 102.
Quesnes, 37.
Quesnoy, 35.
Quillebeuf, 43, 110, 114.

Radeclyf, Sir John, bailli of Evreux, 100, 157, 159-160, 232.
Rainville en Languedoc, seigneur de, 319.
Rambouillet, 321.
Ransoms, 12-13, 79, 100, 117, 147-148, 157-158, 229, 232-233, 239, 285-286.
Raoulet, Jean, 307.
Reading, 146.
Receveur-general of Normandy, 155, 161, 168, 178-179, 182, 213, 265. See also Dalton, John, Goulaffre, Jean, and Surreau, Pierre.
Reconnaissance, 57, 73-74, 92, 229, 316.
Recourt, Charles de, sieur de Cottinières, 102.
Recruiting, 206, 293-294.
Regent of France, see Dauphin, Charles the.
Regneville, 9, 49, 94, 215, 218, 235, 252.
Reims, Renaud de Chartres, archbishop of, 31, 77.
Reims, 41, 43, 50; declares for Burgundy, 63, 116, 123, 134, 180, 276.
Rempston, Sir Thomas, captain of Bellencombre, captain of Meulan, 125, 205, 303, 306, 319.
Rennes, 94, 288, 292.
Réole, 51.
Retheloix, 307.
Ribemont, 9.
Richard II, king of England, 1, 222.
Richehomme, William, 160.
Richemont, Arthur of, count of Ivry, 273, 286-287, 292.
Rieux, Jean de, marshal of France, 272.
Risle river, 90, 99-100, 160, 218.
Riviere, Jean, 29.
Robessart, Sir Lewis, master of waters and forests, lord of Thury-Harcourt, captain of Caudebec, 160-161, 205.
Rochecorbon, 135.
Rochefort, Sir Ralph, 31.
Rochefort, 321.
Rochetaillée, Jean de la, see Rouen, archbishop of.
Rokeby, Sir Thomas, 194, 200, 241.
Rokelond, Simon, 248.
Roos, Sir John, 131.
Ross, bishop of, 109.
Rothenale, John, treasurer of war, 153.
Rothenale, William, captain of Pont d'Ouve, 146, 205, 216.

Rouen, Louis d'Harcourt and Jean de la Rochetaillée, archbishops of, 164, 293, 313.
Rouen, 7-10, 12, 15, 17-19, 21-22, 29, 34-35, 41-43, 46-47, 49-51, 56-57, 63-64, 85, 87; Burgundian revolution, 90, 91, 98, 101-106; besieged and taken by the English, 110-121, 122-125, 127, 129-135, 141, 153, 155-156; ransom, 157-158, 167-168, 170, 172, 174, 197, 201, 203-204, 206, 213-215, 218, 220-222, 234-236, 248, 250-251, 253-254, 256, 258, 260, 263-265, 296-298, 308-309, 313-316.
Rouen, bailliage of, 84, 154, 161, 166, 176, 186, 220, 245, 251, 286.
Rouveray, Egidius de, 126.
Rouveray, 126.
Roye, 133, 224.
Rue, 297-298.
Rugles, surrendered to the English, 73, 78, 80, 214, 218, 311.

Sablé, 112.
Sablé, treaty of, 277.
Saillenay, seigneur de, 117.
St. Aignan, 75, 214.
St. Albans, 266.
St. Albans, abbot of, 147.
St. Antoine, 241, 248.
St. Avit, Jean de, see Avranches, bishop of.
St. Barbe, 159.
St. Botho, 235.
St. Cloud, 10, 67-68, 101.
St. Denis, 37, 44-45, 67, 86-87, 119, 122, 140.
St. Denis (abbey), 84, 88.
St. Denis (castle in Normandy), 94.
St. Denis, port, 87, 100.
St. Evroul, abbey, 164.
St. George, cross of, 225.
St. Germain de Prés, 22.
St. Germain-en-Laye, 10; occupied by the Burgundians, 67; taken by the English, 141, 254.
St. Germain-sur-Cailly, 125.
St. Ioire des Groiseliers, 253.
St. James de Beuvron, 94, 214.
St. Lô, 12, 59; surrendered to the English, 92-93, 113, 208, 215-216, 285, 301.
St. Malo, 10, 287.
St. Marie, Menauton de, 191, 202-203, 241.
St. Marie de Rouen (church), 271.
St. Martin de Cernières (parish), 309.
St. Martin-le-Gaillard, 127, 140.
St. Maur-des-Fossés, treaty of, 109, 115.
St. Ouen, 46.
St. Paul's, 15, 147.
St. Pierre, lord de, 191, 208.
St. Pierre (parish), 309.
St. Pierre de la Cour (church in Le Mans), 111.
St. Pierre-sur-Dives, 71, 159.
St. Pol, Philip de Brabant, count of, 123, 140.
St. Quentin, 123.
St. Remy-du-Plain, 74-75, 214.
St. Saturnin (church in Chartres), 104.
St. Sauveur de Dives, 58.
St. Sauveur-le-Vicomte, 48; surrendered to the English, 93, 94, 167, 212, 214, 270.
St. Sever (convent), 165.
Sainte-Suzanne, 135, 272, 301.
St. Sylvin, 160.
St. Valéry-en-Caux, 33, 158, 180, 197; capitulates to the English, 289, 298; demolished, 306.
St. Victor-en-Caux (abbey), 167.
Saintines, 296.
Saintrailles, Ponton de, 280, 303.

Salisbury, Thomas de Montacute, earl of, lord of la Rivière-Thibouville, Auvilliers, Deauville, and Longi, captain of Alençon, Exmes, Bonsmoulins, Essay, Verneuil, Falaise, Fresnay-le-Vicomte, and Argentan, 53, 56, 59, 124, 126; campaign along the Seine, 127; recovers Avranches, 138, 181, 219, 223, 235, 245, 270-280, 285, 297, 299, 301, 306-307, 314, 316, 321.
Salisbury, 146.
Salle, Diago de, 320.
Sancheville, 270.
Sandwich, 26, 235, 294, 305.
Sanitation, 226.
Santerre, 18, 37, 39.
Santonge, 136.
Sarse, 94.
Sarthe river, 221.
Savage, Sir John, 130, 204.
Saveuse, the brothers, 86.
Saveuses, seigneur de, 307.
Savoy, 38, 62, 133, 136.
Scales, Thomas, lord, captain of Dreux, captain of Verneuil, 308, 310, 313, 321.
Scotland, 54, 106; alliance with France, 108-109, 133, 135-137, 278, 294-295, 303.
Scots, 24, 108, 136-137, 199-200, 204, 269, 271-272, 275, 278, 285, 296, 299, 303, 311-312, 317-320.
Secret service, see Spies.
Sedition, 223, 228.
Séez, John III, bishop of, 163.
Séez (town), 74, 184.
Séez (diocese), 164.
Segrays, sieur de, 96.
Segré, 301.
Seine-mouth, battle of, 33.
Seine river, XV, 10-11, 29, 37-38, 40, 46, 48, 55-56, 62, 67-68, 73, 80, 85, 91, 98, 101-104, 107, 110, 113-114, 123-124, 125, 127, 130-132, 134, 141-142, 152, 164, 218, 220, 223, 232, 245, 254, 256-257, 269, 274, 281, 286, 288, 296, 304, 308.
Selles, 277, 302, 311-312.
Seneschal of Normandy, 217, 234, 241, 244-246, 293.
Senlis, 10, 41, 47; admits the Burgundians, 67; attacked by Armagnac, 86-88, 104-105, 107, 239, 315.
Senonches, 182, 285, 297, 309-311; attacked by the English, 321.
Sens, 22, 38, 86.
Sens, bailliage of, 123, 307.
Sevenok, William, 257.
Severac, Amaury de, marshal of France, 284, 294.
Sézanne, 307.
Shotisbroke, Sir Robert, 207.
Sicily, Yolande d'Aragon, duchess of Anjou, queen of, 75, 95, 111-112.
Sicily, 136.
Sickness, 282-283. See also Sanitation.
Sigismund, king of the Romans, 11, 13, 18, 21, 25, 31, 35, 51-52, 144, 288.
Sillé-le-Guillaume, 96, 214, 219.
Sluys, 7.
Smith, Walter, 169.
Soissons, 61, 238.
Soissoinois, 307.
Somerset, 146.
Somme river, XV, 37-39, 50, 127, 140, 280, 297, 306, 308.
Southampton, 26, 29-33, 52, 58, 128-129, 146-147, 192, 195-199, 204, 207-208, 235.
Spain, 108, 135, 197, 199, 284, 294-295, 303.
Spenser, John, 146.
Spies, 68, 267-268, 314.
Stafford, Sir Hugh, lord Bourchier, captain of Domfront, 234.

Stafford, Sir Richard, lord of la Haye-Paynell and Lingèvre, 207.
Staffordshire, 235.
Standard, William le, 67.
Stapleton, Sir Brian, 78, 205.
Strategy, XIII-V, 4-5, 19, 37-39, 49, 56-57, 59-60, 62-63, 66-71, 73-74, 79-82, 84-87, 94, 98-99, 106-107, 122-123, 129-130, 134-135, 138-142, 216-222, 269-271, 274-276, 278-282, 284-286, 288-290, 296-307, 312-317, 320-322.
Stuart, Alexander, see Mar, earl of.
Stuart, James, see Buchan, earl of.
Stuart, John, of Darnley, 312.
Stuart, Robert, see Albany, duke of.
Stuart, William, see Athol, earl of.
Styward, John, 202-203.
Suane, 125.
Subsistence, 26-28, 48, 52, 57, 59, 66-67, 95, 107, 113-114, 118-120, 123, 173, 197, 226-227, 231-233, 239-240, 247-258, 298. See also Appatisement, Foraging, and Purveyance.
Suffolk, William de la Pole, earl of, admiral of Normandy, lord of Bricquebec and Hambye, captain of Pontorson, Avranches, St. Lô, and Coutances, 138, 157, 191, 194, 202, 218, 241, 266, 274, 284, 286, 297-300, 313-317, 321.
Suffolk, 207, 260.
Surreau, Pierre, receveur-general of Normandy, 155-156, 176, 178-179, 182-183, 188, 213-214, 219, 255, 301.
Swinford, John, captain of Ardevon, 270.

Tactics, see Verneuil, battle of.
Talbot, Gilbert, lord, captain-general of the marches, captain of Caen, 59, 72, 77, 92, 193, 222, 230, 249, 305.
Tancarville, county of, 167.
Tancarville, Guillaume d'Harcourt (q. v.), count of, 47.
Tancarville, John Grey of Heton (q. v.), count of, 168.
Tancarville, 125, 220.
Tanis, 75, 285.
Tarte, 141.
Taxation, 11-15, 21-22, 29, 41-45, 53, 64, 69, 82-84, 88-89, 91, 116-117, 144-151, 154, 158, 173-189, 239, 277-278, 283-284, 295, 297-298, 302, 306, 311-312.
Tenchebrai, 250.
Tewkesbury, 258.
Thames river, 196, 207.
Thérouanne, Louis de Luxembourg, bishop of, 109, 293.
Thiboutot, 125.
Thomas of London, 59.
Thorigné, 96.
Thury-Harcourt, 60, 72.
Tierache, 303.
Tillières, 279, 282.
Tilly-sur-Seulles, 60.
Tiptoft, Sir John, president of the Norman exchequer, captain of Essay, 74, 97, 154, 159, 161, 168-169, 243-244.
Tombelaine, 94, 255, 270, 300, 321.
Tonnerre, Louis de Chalon, count of, 319.
Torcy, submits to the English, 125, 221, 248, 298.
Torigny, 92; surrendered to the English, 93, 94.
Toulonjon, Antoine de, 89.
Toulouse, 51.
Touques, 10, 54; surrendered to the English, 56, 57, 71, 197, 214, 218, 241.
Touques river, 56, 57, 99, 217-218.
Touraine, 112, 311.
Tournai, 62, 64, 117, 120, 295, 312.

Tournebeuve, 320.
Tours, 18, 36, 43, 75, 82, 89, 111-112; surrendered to the Armagnacs, 135-136, 239, 275, 301.
Transport, 31, 58-59, 136-137, 191, 195-197, 265, 278, 294, 303, 305.
Trappe, 239.
Treasurer of the royal household, see also Rothenale, John, and Philip, Sir William, 152-153, 261.
Treasurer of war, 152-153, 154-156, 192, 194-196, 200-201, 205, 213, 241-244, 243, 259, 266, 289. See also Treasurer of the royal household.
Treasurer-general of Normandy, 155, 161, 164, 169-170, 174-175, 178-179, 182, 203, 213, 217, 245-246, 252, 254, 259, 267, 272. See also Alington, William, Belknap, Hemon, and Woodville, Sir Richard.
Treaties, see Amiens, Brétigny, Canterbury, Nantes, Pouilly, Sablé, St. Maur-des-Fossés, and Troyes.
Treille, Sir Raoul de la, 320.
Tremoïlle, Georges, sire de la, 296.
Treverak, Thomas, 198.
Trinitie Rial, 196.
Troarn (abbey), 58, 159.
Troyes, 11, 38, 51; occupied by the Burgundians, 62, 79, 87, 89, 91, 119, 140.
Troyes, treaty of, 77, 173, 215, 262, 273, 276, 288, 292.
Truces, 36, 41, 54, 76, 95-96, 101, 103-104, 113, 122, 130, 134, 139, 239, 272, 286-287.
Trun, 72.
Trye le Chastel, 141.
Tuville, seigneur de, 319.

Uniforms, see St. George, cross of.
Usk, Adam of, 149.

Valmont, 125.
Valmont, battle of, 19-20.
Valognes, 49, 92, 94, 160, 215-216.
Van Clux, Sir Hortank, 205.
Varin, Robert, 171.
Vaucquelin, Raoul, 169, 184.
Vendôme, Louis de Bourbon, count of, 136, 148.
Vendôme, 75-76, 82, 281-283, 297, 309.
Venice, 195.
Ventadour, Jacques, count of, 319.
Vermandois, 38-41, 50, 81, 107, 117, 238, 303.
Verneuil, 73-74, 77, 80, 157, 160, 183, 215, 219, 248, 310-311, 316-317.
Verneuil, battle of, XV, 183, 211, 317-320.
Vernon, 35, 47; submits to the Burgundians, 67, 90, 102, 114, 126; submits to the English, 127, 128-129, 131, 162, 170-171, 179, 220, 252, 254, 265, 281, 308, 313, 315.
Vertus, Philip d'Orleans, count of, 82, 111-112, 136.
Vexin-François, 245, 286.
Vicomte, William le, 67.
Victori, John, of Florence, 146.
Vielzville, sire de, 10.
Vienne, Sire Pouchart de, 320.
Vierville, Jacques de, 117.
Vigault, Pierre le, 164.
Vigneron, Henry le, 161.
Vignolles, Etienne de, see La Hire.
Villebon, 279.
Villeneuf, 212.
Villeneuve-le-Roi, 86, 274, 282.
Villequer, seigneur de, 20.
Villers-Bocage, 60, 212.
Villiers, Jean de, see L'Isle-Adam.
Vimeu, 140, 289.
Vincent, Jehan, 165.
Vire, 92; surrender to the English, 93, 97, 160, 172, 176, 182, 209-

210, 215-216, 219, 244, 250, 252-255, 262, 265.
Vire river, 92.
Vitry-en-Perthois, 306, 321.
Vittefleur, 125, 165-166.
Viviers, 72.
Voves, 270.

Wales, 52,
Walkstede, Sir Richard, captain of Torcy and Neufchâtel, bailli of Caux, 205, 234.
Waltham, Roger, 170.
Warburton, Hugh, 298.
Wardrobe, 152, 168.
Ware, Henry, 31.
Warwick, Richard Beauchamp, earl of, captain of Thury-Harcourt, captain of Rouen, count of Aumâle, 72, 74, 77; leads an expedition against Domfront, 94, 111, 114, 126, 131, 158, 221, 250-251, 289.
Watch, 224-226, 233.
Waterton, 24.
Welsh, 24.
West, Sir Reginald, captain of St. Lô, captain of La Motte, 202-203.
Westminster, 53.
Whitington, Richard, 146-147.
Wight, isle of, 29, 59, 284.
Wigton, Sir Malcolm Fleming, earl of, 269.
Willoughby, Robert, lord, lord of Beaumesnil, 192, 248, 293-294, 299, 305.
Wiltshire, 146, 150.
Winchelsea, 26, 197, 305.
Winchester, Henry Beaufort, bishop of, 15, 128, 147, 149, 305.
Woodville, Sir Richard, lord of Dangu, bailli of Gisors, captain of Gisors and Chaumont, seneschal of Normandy, treasurer-general of Normandy, captain of Caen, 171, 176, 178, 205, 217, 220, 222, 241, 246, 290.

Yevre, 69, 135.
Yonne river, 85, 274, 299.
York, 16, 53, 145, 148-149, 248.
Yvetot, 212.